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Entitled: The Role of Retailers as Channel Captains
in Retail Supply Chain Change: the Example of Tesco.
The large scale retailer with a strong retail brand and sufficient critical mass
in the market place may reach a pivotal point in its development when the directors can
address the question: “Does the company want to get directly involved in the functions
of centralised buying, logistics and supply chain management?”  This thesis takes one
such company and expands in some detail about its growth towards excellence in the
techniques of retail supply chain change.  The evolution and critical decision moments
provide an in depth case study for others to use as a benchmark.
Its purpose is to examine the role of the retailer as a channel captain; a
concept from an earlier marketing era, whose origins it reveals.  It takes that learning
together with contemporary supply chain thinking and examines real retail supply chain
events in Tesco.  The results of matching the new and old academic theory with
practitioner events confirm that the channel captain is the retailer.  It demonstrates that
retailers can make the transition into that leadership position and apply supply chain
management skills to competitive advantage.  This can become a strategic tool both at
national and international levels. The principles of this thesis could be used or applied in
research in three areas: in depth with Tesco; in breadth, exporting expertise to other
retailers; globally with retailers extending the operations internationally and suppliers
seeking to trade with European retailers.
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There are times when someone is speaking or writing that they capture the
essence of a topic in a short phrase, they swiftly get to the kernel of the task, they
illuminate the subject and it then becomes obvious for all to see and understand the
point that is being expounded.  Such was the moment when my tutor, Leigh Sparks,
wrote: “Retailers are the channel captains and set the pace in logistics” (1998).  This, I
thought was it, a succinct phrase that puts across the key message of my operational
experience in retail distribution operations.
This raised the level of my awareness of the operational role that, for more
than a decade, I had been doing for a major UK multiple food retailer.  It challenged the
boundaries of my thinking about that role.  It transformed my view of it from ‘just doing
a job’ to a deeper awareness of being part of a much wider team, the supply chain team.
I saw my operational experience in a new light.  It made me ask myself whether, by
finding a way of putting it into the academic arena, my operational experience could
help other people understand the channel perspective more easily. It would be available
for researchers in the future to use as a picture of what it was really like at the time.
This thesis is the result.
This chapter is the Introduction to the thesis.  It provides information that is
relevant to the aim of the thesis, (section 1.1); the manner in which it is approached by
the author; the implications and consequences of that approach for the style and
methodology (section 1.2); and finally, an explanation of the thesis chapters and the
logic of the sequence in which they are positioned (section 1.3).  Although this thesis is
submitted in 2006, its origins and starting point go back over a good number of years to
31997.  The reasons for the extended length of time and the consequences on the contents
of the thesis are explained in section 1.2.  This make the first chapter longer than might
normally be expected, but it is intended to cover issues that might arise as unexplained
queries during the reading of the main script itself.  This Introduction, therefore, needs
to begin by explaining the nature of the thesis; its aim, objectives and intended
contribution to academic and practitioner knowledge.
1.1 Thesis Topic, Aim, Objectives, Contribution
This PhD is that attempt to bring the strength of live logistics operations
experience within a retailer into the arena of academic debate and so provide a critical
reassessment of a topic, such as logistics or supply chain, that some might consider a
mere Cinderella alongside the serious commentaries on retail and marketing.  The
process of defining the topic is an important first step in moving forward and setting the
boundaries of the research.  The initial interest in the evolution of the retailers’ role in
the supply chain followed on from some earlier academic study by the author.
1.2 Topic, Aim
The journey began while the author was doing his MBA at Stirling
University in 1990 – 1992.  One of the textbooks from the course included a reference
whose significance was not appreciated at the time.  Buried in that text in brackets is the
term ‘channel captaincy’ (Figure 1.1).  Although at the time it passed unnoticed, its
importance surfaced later, when considering the topic for this thesis in 1997.  That 6th
edition, (Davidson, Sweeny, and Stampfl 1988) encapsulated a period in time when the
balance of power in the manufacturer – retailer channel was in the process of changing.
The context is the American manufacturing and retailing scene and the data that it is
based on; the top fifty retailers by sales volume in 1984.  That context had different
4characteristics from the retailing scene in the UK approaching the millennium.  It was
that contrast, which led the author to start reflecting on a whole series of questions that
could be asked, investigated and researched about the nature of that entity, which
controlled the channel and the dynamics of change, over a longer time frame.  Later in
the thesis these issues will be taken up.  This was a first component of the thinking
about the thesis topic.
From a retail perspective, the concept of a channel is important since it recognizes the linking of
typically independent businesses (except in vertically integrated firms) into a functioning whole.
Questions of control and power (channel captaincy), cooperative methods, and conflict resolution
pepper the marketing literature concerning channels.  Although many marketing texts explicitly or
implicitly assume a manufacturer marketing perspective, the present reality is one of large retailers
(see Figure 1-3, p10) with strong local, regional, or national market dominance controlling
distributive entry to major consumer markets.
Source: Davidson et al 1988, p58 [Emphasis added]
Figure 1.1  Channel Captaincy
The second component of the thinking about the thesis topic relates to the
author’s practitioner logistics experience in retail and at what level to pitch the research
investigation.  One option is to examine the dynamics of channel change at the level of
the logistics operation.  It was this matching of the author’s experience and the
academic reflection that: “Retailers are the channel captains and set the pace in
logistics” (Sparks 1998), which had fired the author’s imagination.  A little further
reflection, however, revealed a broader and deeper level of research over a longer
timescale, that also flows out of the author’s operational track record.  It is a level that
stretches the author’s natural research horizon.  But, it can bring about a valuable and
lasting contribution to the academic literature from a retail logistics practitioner.  The
level that presents itself is that of the retail supply chain change and the retailer’s role in
making it happen and in leading it; in effect being the ‘channel captain’.
5The result is the thesis Title: ‘The role of Retailers as Channel Captains in
retail supply chain change: the example of Tesco’.  A broader, deeper and more
demanding research task, which is set firmly within the contemporary debate about the
nature of supply chain relationships and practitioner initiatives, such as Efficient
Consumer Response.  This sets the perspective on the research task and aim.
The thesis Aim. is: ‘To examine the role of Retailers as Channel Captains
in retail supply chain change using the example of Tesco’
The aim drives the formulation of the research objectives.  The objectives
shape the methodology and the approach that is needed to conduct the research; and to
ensure that, by the end, the thesis provides a good quality contribution to the academic
and practitioner knowledge base.
1.2.1 Objectives
There are three objectives for the thesis.  The first objective is to investigate
the origins of the concept of Channel Captain.  The second objective is to consider the
selection of Tesco from among modern European retailers to be an example of a
Retailer acting as a Channel Captain. The third and main objective is to examine the
role and behaviour of a retailer acting as a Channel Captain.  What then, is the thinking
behind choosing these objectives and what challenges do they pose for the researcher?
In order to expand on the explanations, it will help to go back to some of the basic
building blocks of the title of the thesis and explore their implications.
61.2.1.1 Channel Captain: Origins
At first sight, there is one building block in the title that stands out as
unusual, as unexpected, even somewhat out of place in the modern UK retail supply
chain and logistics operating environment.  It is the concept of a ‘Channel Captain’.  It
is not used in everyday conversations.  Certainly, the author did not use the term
‘Channel Captain’ during his retail logistics working life with any of the parties in the
supply chain.  In fact, it might have appeared rather eccentric and odd if he had.
Nonetheless, the concept of Channel Captain can be understood quite clearly and might
be expressed in everyday conversation as leadership or deciding the policy or having the
power and influence to make things happen in the supply channel.  It does convey the
notion of the strength of character and the quality in depth that can exist in a well
organised and strongly motivated team, which is then able to achieve more demanding
goals than would be possible from a fragmented and disorganised group of isolated
individuals or functions or companies.
But, there was that other critical factor, namely, the evidence that it had
been used in American manufacturing and even retail marketing channel literature, as
illustrated above in Davidson et al (1988).  The fact that it had been used in America,
even if not over here in the UK, posed a challenge for the UK based researcher.  The
task was to find out about the use and even the origins of the term ‘Channel Captaincy’
when it was not on our doorstep.  Without a understanding of the way the concept was
used earlier in the American literature, it would be difficult to use the concept to make
comparisons with UK retailing and supply chain developments that are taking place.
Hence, the first objective is to research the origins of the concept of Channel Captain
and its use, application and meaning.
7With this researched information about the origins and role of the channel
captain in American marketing literature, it is possible to think about ways of applying
that knowledge more broadly and even in a different geography and different time zone.
How would that original role transfer across into the modern retail way of thinking
about logistics and supply chain management?  Would the characteristics that were
found be of such a nature that they would sustain being transposed from America to
Europe and across decades of time?  Would those roles be closely related to a modern
retail supply chain operation or the reverse?  The results of the investigation can be used
as a benchmark or milestone in the evolution of ideas about the changing relationship
between businesses involved in the retail supply chain.  If the measures were
acceptable, then the next question would be to enquire if there are one or more retailers
in Europe, who could be said to represent the modern day equivalent of a channel
captain?  This is the second building block of the thesis topic.
1.2.1.2 Channel Captain: Retailers, Tesco
The second objective builds on the achievement of the first objective.  It is
to consider if there are one or more modern European retailers, who are acting in the
role of a channel captain.  From the author’s practitioner experience in UK retail
logistics, there are several retailers, who contend for this role.  They operate in a way
that strongly suggests that they are in control of their supply chain from supplier to
store.  This view is shared by other senior practitioners as evidenced by the excerpt in
Fernie and Sparks (1998), which included an observation by Christensen who, at that
time, was Logistics Director, Safeway Stores (Figure 1.2).  If there are several retailers
who fit the profile of being a channel captain, it poses the question, which to select as an
example.  Given the authors operational record with Tesco, which is now the number
one grocer retailer in the UK, it was the obvious choice.
8Christensen argues that a further step change is needed by all logistics managers if additional
costs are to be squeezed out of the supply chain.  In the 1980s most retail companies were
primarily concerned with physical distribution management and the management of stock from
RDCs [Regional Distribution Centres] to stores.  Now, retailers are focusing upon the whole
supply chain, seeking to also reduce inefficiencies in primary distribution through closer
collaboration with suppliers and logistics service providers, and to manage logistics supply better
to the final customer.  The academics and trade press have been quick to embrace the new jargon
of the 1990s – quick response, efficient consumer response, category management, continuous
replenishment, and so on.  In essence, relationships are the key; the whole supply chain has to be
visible in that an efficiency gain in one part of the chain is not negated by imposing additional costs
on other parts of the chain.  Retailers are in competition as retailers but also as supply chain
relationships and partnerships. [Emphasis added]
Source: Fernie and Sparks 1998, pxiv
Figure 1.2  Retailers And The Whole Supply Chain
1.2.1.3 Channel Captain: Role & Behaviour
The main objective of the thesis is the third objective, which is to examine
the role and behaviour of a retailer acting as a channel captain in retail supply chain
change.  It is a very important building block of the thesis topic, because it will provide
the evidence upon which to make evaluations, conclusions and recommendations.  The
objective has four parts, which will provide different points of view and levels of
investigation.  A little explanation is required in order to understand the relationship of
these four parts in this objective.  The first two parts cover two aspects of the role of
being a channel captain in retail supply chain change.  They are a result of the major
physical components of the retail supply change.  The first is the outbound deliveries
from distribution centres to retail stores, which is called retail logistics.  The second is
the inbound deliveries from suppliers into the distribution centres, which is described in
various ways, but in this thesis it is called the supply channel.  The third part of the
objective is about change in the retail supply chain; managing change, initiating change,
and the dynamics of the parties involved in retail supply chain change.  The fourth part
of the objective is to obtain an insider view from each of these three aspects.  This in
depth research is intended to reveal more clearly the quality of the behaviour of the
channel captain.
9Once this third objective is achieved it is then possible to conduct an
evaluation and draw out the conclusions and recommendations.  So far, the items
covered are the thesis topic, its title and the rationale for the selection of the four
objectives.  The overall aim is to create a higher profile for the concept of channel
captain and to provide some depth of exposition of the retailer’s role and behaviour in
leading retail supply chain change.  The value of all this has to be assessed in terms of
the contribution this research provides to both the academic and the practitioner
knowledge base.  This should be something unique, something new, something
refreshing; something that helps move the debate forward for both academics and
practitioners.
1.2.2 Contribution
The main assessment of a thesis is the quality of the contribution that the
thesis makes to the body of knowledge among academics and practitioners.  It is
essential that it contributes to the topics under debate.  It may be contemporary, it may
be historical, but it should fit in by moving that debate forward.  This leads to a series of
questions about the desired contribution that might arise as a result of this thesis.  What
is that wider debate about, where has it come from and where is it going?  What is
unique or special about the thesis research and is that a matter of originality of content;
does it help answer a question that everyone is searching for?  Which of these applies to
this thesis?  It is worth examining some of the issues surrrounding the thesis topic over
the extended length of the research period.
The types of issues that have been raised are primarily about the retail
supply chain management structure and the changing relationship with suppliers,
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manufacturers and producers.  They cover the content, i.e. what is being done; and the
behaviour, i.e. how it is being done.  The content of what is being done, can be visible
to external observers and internal practitioners.  The behaviour of how it is being done
is subject to a wider range of interpretations.  One party’s experience and expressing
that experience may be quite different from that of another party, even when they are
part of the same event.  That experience is more personal, more subjective, more hidden
from external view, even though it may have its external manifestations.  The reason for
the debate and the interest is that there has been a sea-change in the way the supply
chain is organised and who is organising it.  Making these matters more explicit, more
visible is a contribution to that debate.  Examining these matters in a new way, with
fresh ideas, from a different perspective, is also a contribution to that debate.
Sometimes it is worth testing concepts and ideas even if the end result is negative.  The
understanding of boundaries and what is appropriate or not appropriate is part of the
debate and part of the contribution.
By the end of the thesis there should be sufficient information to deal with
some specific issues.  Although the types of issues that follow are not intended as
comprehensive, they are an indication of the range of possible contributions from this
thesis.  Here are some questions.  Is the channel captain concept valuable or not? Why
or why not? What are retailers actually doing in terms of channel captaincy?  What are
the pros and cons of the concept of channel captain and of the activities the idea
represents?  What did the author learn that he did not know before?  How can this
learning be applied in business and in academia?  What does the thesis tell us about
management in the channel? Is it reliant on people, or companies, or good managers, or
what?  Was the retailer or retailers selected particularly special? Are the cases saying
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more about those retailers than they are about the concept of channel captain? Can or do
other retailers and / or suppliers do the same or learn from this?
It is intended that the contribution flows out of the aim of the thesis.  It is
taking an earlier concept, that of ‘Channel Captain’, from a different time and place and
transplanting it into a very different business environment in the modern era.  It is also a
way of emphasising the power of the modern retailer over the supply channel and the
suppliers.  That shift in power balance has an impact on the relationship behaviour
between companies and within companies.  As this is a PhD with a practitioner
orientation the contribution can also be at the level of the operational behaviour taken
from real events.  It is important to expand on the implications of this PhD, because that
can influence some of the opportunities as well as limitations on the approach,
methodology and style.
1.3 This PhD
The author is a practitioner, with twenty years operational experience in
retail logistics.  He is also interested in the academic dimension, but is not a full-time
academic.  His operational experience and academic interest influence some of the
opportunities that are open when considering research and also conditions the
boundaries and limitations in the approach, methodology and style.  It is important to
expand on the implications of this PhD with a practitioner orientation so that the reader
is fully aware of these opportunities and limitations before embarking on the contents of
the main thesis.
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1.3.1 Part time PhD
This PhD is on a part-time, distance-learning basis.  The author is running a
private business and Stirling University, being in Scotland is a long distance from the
author’s base in Bedford.  When the author did his MBA at Stirling University in 1990 -
1992, that had also been on a part-time distance-learning basis.  The author was
working fulltime and based in Bedford.  On the surface, a part-time distance-learning
PhD seemed quite feasible.  However, certain conditions were different.  First, the level
of research required for a PhD is quite different from that required for an MBA.
Second, the author started his own private business, which brought with it demands on
time and energy and a rather unpredictable workload.  For example, the author might
intend to complete certain research tasks over a designated period of time, but the
pressures of the private business thwarted that academic goal.  The other important
consideration at the time of initiating this PhD was how best to get started.  The
proposal was that as well as having a main Supervisor at Stirling University, this would
be supplemented by some help from a more local supervisor, in this case James Cooper
at Cranfield University, but sadly he died about that time and the idea did not
materialise.
These two factors combined to extend the length of time taken for the part-
time PhD.  The consequences of this extended time are explained in section 1.2.4.1
Limitations.  The PhD was formally started in 1997 and the submission is in 2006,
which is just over nine years.  These dates are significant in terms of the literature being
published and the real-time developments taking place in the retail supply chain.  The
other aspect, that can easily be overlooked, is that in 2006, everyone takes for granted
the internet, email and broadband, online wireless access, even in airports, for so many
things including academic literature.  In 1997 these facilities were not so widespread
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and the distance learning access, which is now fully developed in the academic world,
was in its early stages of development and quite limited.  Consider as well, just how
much more literature resource has been digitally converted so that it is available on line,
at the touch of a button.  This is especially valuable for the earlier years of Journals and
their informed articles that reflect the topics of earlier academic debate, which was the
nature of the author’s literary research.  Clearly a full-time academic student researcher,
based in a well-stocked university library in the late 1990’s, would have an advantage in
terms of accessing relevant articles and be able to follow up any leads suggested by
other academic colleagues.  Nonetheless, part-time, distance-learning PhD is the way
this thesis has been accomplished, with all its limitations and foibles.
1.3.2 The Practitioner
It was precisely the operational background of the author that was one of the
good reasons, which was put forward by others, for the author to make his contribution.
They invited the author to sit down and do some thinking and writing to increase his
exposure and so bring his convictions into the academic arena for further scrutiny and
debate. In this way, they said, the author can make a contribution to the academic
literature on this topic and put something back into the academic pool.  Hence, this
operational background needs a little explanation and coverage.  Then, those aspects
that pertain to retail supply chain change can be understood and related to the topic of
retailers as channel captains.
1.3.2.1 Transport and Logistics Professional
The author is a professional transport and logistics operator, with twenty
years experience in national retail companies.  During the whole of that time he has also
been a member, then a fellow, of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport.
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These two facts alone position the author firmly in the retail logistics sector, not only as
an operator but also as a contributor to the professional institution.  The fact that the
whole of this experience is with national retail companies also places the author firmly
in the retail camp in terms of his knowledge, skills, perspectives and views.  There are
two further very significant developments during this career history.  The first is the
transformation that has been going on in retail throughout that twenty-year period.  The
second is the transformation that has been going on in the transport and logistics
profession over that same twenty-year period.  Both dimensions of the operational
experience have been like walking on a travelator in an airport.  Not only has the
individual been gaining in experience and skills but, at the same time, the business
environment has also been evolving, developing and growing in stature, status and
power.  Naturally, everyone who has been involved in these industries during that
period of time has experienced a similar evolution.  They have both seen growth and
success.
Looking at this from the outside, as an external observer and commentator,
it can be very easy to make that type of observation.  However, when a person is
engrossed in the pressures of the day job, it is possible not to see the bigger picture.  In
the heat of operations, transport and logistics professionals may not see the whole
supply channel from producer to retail or even think about the dynamics of the bigger
organisational set up.  The benefit of involving a practitioner in high level research, like
a PhD, is that the person begins to see the broader picture in a completely different way.
The experience is interactive.  How?  A small example might show how this can be
interactive.  Suppose an engineer designed a vehicle that could have two temperature
regimes rather than a single temperature regime.  The technical detail would be
uppermost in that engineer’s thinking, reflection and action.  If that engineer were to see
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the whole supply chain operating with dual rather than single temperature regimes, the
perspective on that technical evolution might be transformed dramatically.  Suddenly,
all the transport utilisation efficiencies become visible.  The way that this is interactive
is that the engineer is then re-appraising that technical development in a completely new
way, in a supply chain perspective.  The point of the example is that, sometimes, it is
only in the revisiting of that experience from a different perspective that the operator
can recall, reveal, and explain that event in a new way.
The same applies to this thesis.  When an operational event is recounted
from a broader, perhaps a supply channel perspective, new insights, new emotions, new
valuations come into play.  It is as though they were there in a latent state, waiting to be
released, but that would only occur in the light of a different vision or view of that
event.  That transformation in perception of an event is important.  It helps when
revisiting an operational career from that different perspective.  Having explained this
process, it is now possible to review the author’s practitioner operational experience.
This is summarised in Figures 1.3 & 1.4 from the perspective of the role of the retailer
as the channel captain in retail supply chain change and highlight aspects that are
particularly relevant to that thesis topic.
1.3.2.2 Bamber Stores, Granada TV Rental: 1978 –1984
Author’s Practitioner Operational Experience
BAMBER STORES,  1978 – 1982
Barnet, Transport Manager
• 220 High Street shops, women’s clothing, national depot 90k sq ft,
• Vertically integrated retailer, privately owned
• Garments manufactured in London East End
• Developed the transport capability to handle business growth
GRANADA TV RENTAL,  1982 – 1984
Bedford, National Distribution Controller
• 462 High St Showrooms, £129m turnover, 5000 employees
• UK operation vertically integrated, Manufacturer imports direct to depots.
• Six depots, 86 staff, TV videos, £1.2m budget
Figure 1.3  Practitioner Experience: Bamber Stores; Granada TV Rental
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The first relevant operational experience, Bamber Stores 1978 to 1982, was
in a privately owned, national women’s clothing high street retailer, who had a
successful retail formula and grew rapidly to 220 stores.  It was a vertically integrated
company with the garments being manufacturer by the rag trade, as it was known, in the
East End of London, where there was warehouse for out of season stock.  There would
be daily collections from the various small garment suppliers into the single warehouse
and head office in Barnet, North London, where the two entrepreneur owners were
based.  These garments were allocated to the branches, a push supply chain; loaded on
the distribution vehicles and despatched around the country.  There was very close
contact with the retail staff in the stores.  As the driving team was small, the role of
transport manager was involved in the operation, managing everything from scheduling,
dealing with the drivers, as well as the mechanical maintenance of the fleet.  There was
even time to get on the road, during the holiday season and have some direct contact
with the retail high street stores.
The next company, Granada TV Rental, 1982 to 1984, was a public
company with a strong brand, and a national chain of 462 high street showrooms.  It had
originated in the TV rental business, which is an example in itself of stimulating
consumer demand and growing a business, all triggered by the Coronation in 1953.  The
organisation had an effective administration discipline, which was essential for
controlling the TV and video assets in the rental market.  The head office was in
Bedford. The company owned the six depots and the fleet of vehicles as well as the
team of technicians and their repair centres.  The supply of product from Japan was very
closely controlled and delivered direct into the depots around the country.  The control
over the assets was by individual serial numbers, which conditioned the warehousing
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and transport delivery disciplines. The company culture was very professional, with
strong administration; it was tightly controlled, even traditional; operating in a mature
market that was nearing its end phase.  There was very close contact with the retail staff
in the showrooms.  The retail logistics role, of national distribution controller, gave the
author total responsibility for the six depots and the delivery of the goods to the high
street showrooms.  The transition from that culture to the next company culture was
dramatic.
1.3.2.3 Tesco: 1984 -1998
Tesco, from 1984 to 1998, went through major development and a dramatic
evolution in retailing, logistics and supply chain.  Even in the early 1980’s the culture
was dynamic and energetic rather than traditional or conservative.  The two previous
companies had a can-do culture and were confident in their respective market places,
even though these were competitive.  But at Tesco there was a step change in the level
of that confidence and innovative energy.  From the supply channel perspective it was a
very fast moving environment, there was certainly no counting of serial numbers.
Product came in and went out fast.  There was a large team of warehouse staff and
drivers.  The distribution centre was large and the size of the transport fleet was big.
There was very close contact with the retail stores and regional directors.  This first role
as a general manager of an in-house ambient grocery distribution centre gave the author
a thorough experience of being at the heart of the supply chain, from suppliers to retail,
from stock control to backdoor staff at the store.
The move in 1986 to contract distribution was a big contrast.  If the grocery
distribution network was completing its evolution, then the contract distribution
network had just begun the journey of its transition.  This role, divisional director,
distribution, was national, required contact with commercial buyers, suppliers, retail
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store operations, the retail directors.  Throughout this time the contract distribution
operators were on the receiving end of some major reorganisation initiated by Tesco,
the retailer.  The quality of this operational experience from the viewpoint of this thesis
topic is exceptionally high.  There is absolutely no doubt that it was Tesco the retailer
that was initiating the supply channel changes that took place during my ‘watch’, to use
a nautical term.  There was no need to say “the retailer is the channel captain making
the supply chain changes”; that was self evident to every company that was involved,
from suppliers to logistics service providers, as well as the team at Tesco.  Because the
company was about to launch the Composite distribution network, all these changes and
enhancements went unnoticed, except by those closely involved at the time.  It was
‘well-hidden’.
Author’s Practitioner Operational Experience
TESCO 1984 – 1998
General Manager, Crick Distribution Centre,  1984 – 1986
• Regional depot 250k sq ft, serving 70 stores, 20m cases pa
• 2000 lines fast moving consumer goods, 300 staff, £5m budget
• Implemented new working practices in warehouse and drivers
Director, Contract Distribution,  1987 – 1990
• 24 contractor depots, 2000 staff, 150m cases pa, 7500 product lines
• Produce Groups: chilled, frozen, bond, ambient, budget £60m
• Seamless transition from these single product depots to Composite 1989
• Initiate, designed open book contracts from traditional case rates
Head of Composite Distribution  1990 – 1994
• Composite: Up to five contract operated centres, including start up in 1989
• Capability from 100m to 200m cases per annum, budget £70m
Head of Primary Distribution  1994 – 1997
• Initiated primary distribution opportunities: £20m benefit on £250m
• Plastic Tray throughput increased to 100m with suppliers
• Best Practice Case Study No 364: saved 3m miles, 4600 tons CO2
Secondment: Special Advisor, Freight Logistics, DETR (now DfT) 1998
• Best Practice material for sustainable distribution policy White Paper
Figure 1.4  Practitioner Experience: Tesco
The Composite distribution contract operators provided their best teams to
be involved in that brand new project.  It was ambitious, opening seven composites in
nine months in 1989.  It was very energetic and demonstrated the high level of
confidence that existed in the company, which believed in itself, in its retail strategy, in
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its supply chain change.  There was so much else going on at the same time.  From a
supply channel perspective, the significant aspect of composite was the temperature
controlled fresh product and the very fast pace at which it flowed through the pipeline.
Many of the practices that were later discussed as part of efficient consumer response
were already happening in the fresh environment.  That period of being in charge of
composite operations until 1994, provided the author with leading edge experience of
retail supply chain change.
The final phase is about primary distribution, starting with supplier logistics
in 1991 and developing to a separate role and team until the changes in realignment
between commercial, distribution and supply chain development in 1996.  There
followed a couple of years working with commercial division on the plastic tray rollout
with suppliers, which provided an insight into another aspect of retail supply chain
change.  Throughout the 1990’s it was Tesco the retailer that initiated and drove
forward the supply chain change.  It is this range of experience in retail transport,
distribution, logistics and total supply chain change that this practitioner brings to this
PhD thesis research.  But there was also another side, which was the academic strand
that intertwined with the operational.
1.3.3 The Academic
The author has had the benefit of a long standing contact with his academic
supervisor, Leigh Sparks.  It started in 1985 when the author was interviewed by.
Sparks, with Tesco Director, Donald Harris.  It was at the time he was the general
manager at a Tesco grocery distribution centre.  Five years later, Tesco sponsored
several senior executives, including the author, to complete an MBA at the Institute for
Retail Studies, Stirling University.  The MBA dissertation topic was ‘Integrated supply
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chain management; the case of fresh produce in Tesco’.  It coincided with a proposal
that the author made to the company about working on supplier logistics.  This was later
to become primary distribution.  Thus, participating is that academic endeavour was a
valuable contribution and also a key moment in the author’s career development.
1.3.3.1 Author Collaboration
As a result of completing the MBA, the author embarked on some academic
writing.  But there is a huge gulf between writing business reports and writing scholarly
academic articles.  In business, the emphasis is on brevity; the bottom-line; say it in a
sentence.  In academia, the emphasis is on explanation, examination, elaboration; all of
which has to be properly documented and cross-referenced to other academic articles,
journals, and books.  It is said ‘a picture paints a thousand words’; the practitioner’s
view of academic writing is that they do not want the picture; they want the thousand
words.  Quite often a practitioner does not need a book to tell him what happened; he
was probably there, making it happen.  Hence it a major step-change for a practitioner
to become fluent in academic writing. However, what can help is a collaboration
between a practitioner and an academic.  The practitioner may provide the case study
material and the academic may apply the literature cross-referencing.  The author was
fortunate to be able to engage in such a collaborative writing arrangement (Table 1.1).
As a result there followed an extended period of writing in collaboration with Leigh
Sparks on the topic of retail, logistics and related subjects.  There were: articles for
Journals (1993) and Conferences (2005), chapters in books (1998, 2004 a, b, c), and
even co-authoring a book (2006).
One of the benefits from being involved in academic writing, especially
when there is a mixture of practitioner and academic input is that it stimulates interest in
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what others have written, especially in the same book.  In particular those books that are
compilations of different authors writing different chapters; such as ‘Retail and
Logistics Management’ (1998, 2004) and Food Supply Chain Management (2004).  It is
natural to become familiar with the related topics in the different chapters.
Year Author Collaboration: Publications
1992 Smith DLG (1992) Integrated supply change management, the case of fresh produce in Tesco. MBA
dissertation, Stirling University
1993 Smith DLG and Sparks, L (1993) ‘The transformation of physical distribution in retailing: the example of
Tesco plc’.  International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, no. 3, p35-64.
1998 Smith DLG (1998) ‘Logistics in Tesco’, in J Fernie and L Sparks (eds) (1998) Logistics and Retail





Smith, DLG., and Sparks, L (2004) ‘Temperature controlled supply chains’ in M Bourlakis and P
Weightman (eds.) Food Supply Chain Handbook, chp. 12, pp. 179-2198, Oxford, Blackwells.
Smith DLG and L Sparks (2004) ‘Temperature-controlled supply chains’, in J Fernie and L Sparks (eds)
Logistics and Retail Management, 2nd edn., chp. 7, pp. 121-163, London, Kogan Page.
Smith DLG and L Sparks (2004) Logistics in Tesco: past, present and future, in J Fernie and L Sparks
(eds) Logistics and Retail Management, 2nd edn., chp. 6, pp. 101-120, London,  Kogan Page.
2006 Gustafsson K, Jonson G, Smith DLG and Sparks L (2006) .Retailing logistics and fresh food packaging;
managing change in the supply chain, London, Kogan Page.
Table 1.1  Author Collaboration: Publications
The author now feels a lot more comfortable with the process of academic
writing that is necessary to complete this thesis.  The collaborative work on the articles,
chapters and book has provided sufficient practice.  There have been other ways of
keeping in touch with the academic community, through attending conferences, giving
presentations to executive programmes at Stirling University and to practitioners in UK,
Europe, Asia and America.
1.3.3.2 Logistics Research Network Conferences, UK
The author has joined in academic conferences as much as practical.  The
Logistics Research Network Conference, which is held in September, is the major
academic logistics and supply chain conference in the UK. (Table 1.2) They have
provided him with the opportunity to meet leading academics and interview them about
22
the thesis topic.  For example in 1999, Martin Christopher (Cranfield); 2000, Dan Jones,
Peter Hines, (Cardiff), Michael Browne, (Westminster); 2001, Alan McKinnon, John
Fernie (Heriot-Watt), 2002, David Menachof, (London); 2004, David Grant, (Heriot-
Watt), 2005, Steve Burt, John Dawson.
Year PhD Workshops & Logistics Research Network Conferences
1999 Morpeth, Keith Smith,
2000 Cardiff, Peter Hines,
Future Challenge in Supply Chain Management
2001 Heriot Watt, Alan McKinnon,
2002 Aston, Birmingham, John Griffith,
Collaborating for Innovative Supply Chain Solutions
2003 Turku, Finland, Case Study Workshop Week, NOFOMA, James Stock, ß
2003 European Logistics Association: PhD workshop France, Herbert Kotzab
2004 Dublin, Edward Sweeney,
Enhancing Competitive Advantage through Supply Chain Innovation
2005 Lund, EAERCD, [European Retail Conference] joint paper: Plastic Trays in Retailing: The Challenge of
Implementing Change in Packaging Logistics, Sparks, L, Gustafsson, K, Jonson, G, Smith, D.
2006 Newcastle, Michael Bourlakis,
Sustainable Logistics in an Intermodal Setting
Table 1.2  PhD Workshops And LRN Conferences
In addition there is a short PhD workshop held before the start of the
conference, organised by Tony Whiteing, (Leeds), which the author has attended
regularly.  It has provided a touch of realism as to what can be achieved in a PhD and
brought him in contact, over the years, with the full range of student researchers.  There
is one special residential weeklong PhD workshop held just north of Paris, organised by
the European Logistics Association.  The author was accepted to join this in 2003, lead
by Herbert Kotzab (Copenhagen) and assisted by Alan Harrison (Cranfield), Marianne
Jahre (Norway), Steef van de Velde (Erasmus).  This was a week of intense work with a
small group, less than twenty, and provided the author with valuable feedback on the
thesis content and style.  Prior to this in January 2003, there was a Case Study
Workshop lasting a week at Turku, Finland, organised by NOFOMA and assisted by
James Stock from USA.  All these events provided motivation and feedback on the
limitations and strength of a practitioner setting out on a PhD thesis.
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1.3.4 Limitations & Strengths
Any author of a thesis has to be aware of the limitations and strengths of the
particular research conducted and be able to share that assessment with those reading
the thesis.
1.3.4.1 Limitations
The circumstances of this thesis have been described earlier. They account
for two limitations.  The first limitation arises from the extended period for conducting
this thesis research; the second limitation arises from the author’s practitioner
background.  As regards the first limitation; a thesis needs a base from which to start.
This is particularly important for the literature review.  This raises a difficulty: what was
contemporary at the beginning, in 1997, is now superseded by subsequent academic
writings.  Using a document from 1997 or 1998 as a base, would appear to a reader in
2006 as rather dated.  The second limitation is that the author’s practitioner operational
experience with Tesco ended in 1998.  The company has continued to develop its
logistics and supply chain strategy during the intervening years.  The dilemma facing
the author is how to address these dichotomies with credibility.  It is considered prudent
to raise these issues in this introductory chapter, so that the reader is in touch with the
real circumstances that condition the writing of this thesis.
The proposed approach is to limit the periods covered by the literature
review and the operational experience of the practitioner author.  For the literature on
modern logistics and supply chain management, the period would be between 1997 and
2004. This will be in the style of a practitioner reflecting on the literature, rather than a
more classical academic literary review.  The investigations into the origins of the
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concept of channel captaincy are in a much earlier period of time.  The operational time
span is limited from 1984 to 1998, for direct experience by the author; supplemented by
further investigations up to 2004.  The anticipated benefit is that a moderate amount of
distance in time from events can help revisit those events with a more detached and
reflective perspective.  Having been candid about these limitations, it is now important
to emphasise some strengths.
1.3.4.2 Strengths
There are two main strengths in this research.  The first is that the thesis
topic has had time to strengthen or weaken since 1997.  This will assist the process of
evaluation of the contribution that will take place in the final chapter.  The second is
that the cases selected are real events, and more importantly, are chosen from a critical
phase in the development of the retail control over the strategy and shape of the supply
chain.  The author’s practitioner’s operational experience bridges the transition from
manufacturer control to retailer control.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The writing of the thesis is intended to follow the logic of the building
blocks of the thesis objectives.  The concept of the Channel Captain is central to this
thesis.  It is not a term that has been in use during the period of the literature review of
1997 to 2004, nor was it in use immediately prior to 1997. It is the re-introduction of an
old idea from a different time and place.  The reader will be left in suspense unless the
concept is explained at the beginning, in Chapter Two.
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1.4.1 Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter One is the Introduction to the thesis.  It provides information that is
relevant to the aim of the thesis and the manner in which it is approached by the author.
It explains the implications and consequences of that approach for the style and
methodology adopted.  Finally, there is an explanation of the logic of the sequence of
the chapters.  The thesis had its origins a good number of years ago in 1997 and is being
submitted in 2006.
1.4.2 Chapter Two: Channel Captain: Origins; Retailers; Tesco.
Chapter Two has four parts.  The first part investigates the origins of the
channel captain concept. It sets out to help the reader with an understanding of the
origins of the concept of channel captain. There is little contemporary literature on this
specific topic so the author cannot presume that its meaning is self evident. The author
decided to make a visit to America in 2003, to Michigan State University.  He met and
interviewed Professor Stanley C. Hollander, who sadly has since passed away.  This
provided valuable information about the background and recommendations for literature
sources on the origins of the concept of ‘Channel Captain’.  The second part is a
consideration of the modern retailing environment.  It is a review of the major drivers
that have influenced the evolving shape of retailing, especially food retailing, into the
modern scale of international operations. This growth in market scale has brought
retailers into a position of dominance over their suppliers.  The third part is the
identification of those retailers who are acting as channel captains from which this
thesis takes the example of Tesco.  The fourth part is an introduction to UK grocery
retail logistics.  Behind the retail revolution there has been a revolution in distribution
and logistics.  This provides the background for the more detailed of study of Tesco
supply chain development in chapters three and four.
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1.4.3 Chapter Three: Tesco Retail Logistics
This extended case study of Tesco is the topic of the next two chapters,
which cover the role and behaviour of the leading grocery UK retailer, acting as channel
captain in retail supply chain change. It is an account of the phases of transformation of
the Tesco physical distribution system that provided the retailer with a competitive
advantage.  Behind the retail revolution there had been a revolution in distribution and
logistics. The principal theme of chapter three is the Tesco involvement in retail
logistics, which is the assembly of goods in regional distribution centres and their
delivery to the retail stores.  This is examined first because historically it is the segment
of the supply chain over which retailers chose to start to establish their control.
1.4.4 Chapter Four: Tesco Supply Channels
Chapter Four continues this two-chapter study of the Tesco supply chain
development.  It investigates the next segment of the supply chain that Tesco took
control over.  This is the inbound movement of goods from suppliers to the distribution
centre.  The transport activity is called primary distribution. This transport activity
cannot be reorganised in isolation from broader supply chain developments.  The
chapter includes a general introduction to the Efficient Consumer Response movement
in the UK, which promotes collaboration between retailers and suppliers on supply
chain development.  In this thesis the term supply channel is used to refer to this supply
chain activity. There are several supply channels in modern retailing. This reflects the
broad product groups that are to be found in a large retail store.  The author had
experience across a range of these supply channels. The chapter examines the processes
of one particularly complex and intricate supply channel: that of temperature controlled
fresh food.  This is selected in order to demonstrate the high degree of sophistication of
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the retail leadership and implementation of retail supply chain change.  These two
chapters about the Tesco supply chain development are the operational context in which
to assess the main ideas from the literature about supply chain change that are presented
in chapter five.
1.4.5 Chapter Five: Managing Supply Chain Change
Managing Change within Retail Supply Channels is the theme of chapter
five. In the complex and demanding new discipline that the retailers were entering,
survival and progress required a special approach in their change management style.
This did not come readily to retailers nor did suppliers find the shift in the power
balance easy to acknowledge let alone accept positively.  It is from this changing
dynamics in the supplier – retailer power base that the role of a channel organiser,
leader or captain emerged. The chapter steps through the issues from the literature
around change management in supply chains, models of leadership and negotiating and
the implications of these for the role of channel organiser, leader or captain.
1.4.6 Chapter Six: Methodology
Normally the chapters on  the literature review and methodology would be
positioned earlier in a thesis.  However, the nature of the thesis topic with Tesco as an
example necessitated a modification to the standard approach.  The earlier chapters have
provided a context, which is the retail logistics industry and the developments within
Tesco. Chapter five assembles the main ideas, concepts and constructs from the
literature. The real focus of the research is the series of twenty case studies in chapter
seven.  These are based on the author’s operational experience.  The style of the
research is involvement in influencing the change itself. This leads to the choice of the
methodology for this longitudinal study of Tesco supply chain development as
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Participant Action Research.  The chapter includes a consideration of the application
and suitability of this method of research and of the case study research process.
1.4.7 Chapter Seven: Case Studies
Chapters, three, four and five have covered major topics in the evolution of
retail supply chain change. This is the background for the cases in chapter seven. One
objective is to obtain an insider view through some in-depth research that is intended to
reveal more clearly the quality of the behaviour of the channel captain.  The external
changes were self evident to observers. The research in this thesis is an exploration of
the internal experience that occurred during the various phases of transformation taking
place in British food retailing.  It was decided that an effective method to illustrate this
would be to present a range of appropriate mini-case studies based on the direct
experience of the author, which are documented in chapter seven.
These cases are real events revisited with the benefit of a different
perspective. It is a revaluation from the perspective of retail supply chain change and
the role of the retailer as the channel captain. These real events are from a critical time
in the transition of the power balance from manufacturers to retailers. The focus was on
the control over the middle ground, which is the supply chain.  These twenty case
studies are an indicative rather than an exhaustive selection. They throw some light and
insight on a range of actual events that took place over a period of more than a decade.
They include some personal reflection on the big changes in retail supply chain change.
Some of the cases that are included would not have been visible to external observers.
This chapter is an in-depth review of real events. .
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1.4.8 Chapter Eight: Case Study Analysis
The conclusions from these case studies are assessed more fully in chapter
eight within the framework of the theories that had been expounded in the earlier
chapters.  The critical success factors for a channel captain in retail supply chain change
are similar to those in most major changes in businesses.  This highlights that good
quality businesses have the potential to be channel captains of their retail supply chains.
1.4.9 Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Nine summarises the thesis and identifies the main contributions to
academic and practitioner learning. For the academic, there has been value in taking an
earlier concept from a different country, time and setting and placing it in the midst of a
very challenging, modern retail business environment. For the practitioner, there are a
number of retailers who now act as channel captains, in a similar manner as detailed in
this thesis.  The author reviews the limitations of the thesis and the opportunities for
future work. These are applications that can be made in both developed and emerging
markets. These are grouped; first, greater depth with further study of Tesco; second,
regional breadth examining applications to other European retailers and suppliers, and
third, global and international retailers and those suppliers who are looking to supply
the UK and other European retailers. These fields of further research support both the
academic and the practitioner.
1.5 Summary
The purpose of an Introduction is to provide the reader with all the
important components that they need to know about before embarking on the main body
of the thesis.  This chapter has detailed the thesis title, its aim, objectives, and intended
contribution to body of academic and practitioner knowledge.  There was important
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information about the author’s practitioner and academic experience.  This influenced
the manner and scope of the research.  One benefit was to maximise both the
practitioner experience and the academic strengths of the Institute for Retail Studies at
the University of Stirling.  There has been an explanation for the logic of the structure,






2 Channel Captain: Origins, Tesco
This thesis will argue that retailers are the channel captains in retail supply
chain change.  It will provide some depth and breadth to the subject.  This chapter
examines the origins of the concept, which provides a foundation of the rest of the topic.
It then considers the retail trends that have brought about the increase in the power of
the retailers.  The role of retailers in the consumer economy is powerful because they
have a broad operating scale and strong financial turnover, which is derived from their
closeness to the consumer. But, behind the retail revolution there has been a logistics
revolution. This leads onto the link between retail and logistics.  The strategic issue is
whether retailers regard the supply chain as a competitive advantage or merely a method
of getting product from the supplier to the store.  Those that regard the supply chain as a
strategic issue possess one of the necessary qualifications for being a channel captain.
This is the broad industry and European setting for the more detailed study of Tesco as
an example of a retailer that is a channel captain in retail supply chain change.  A theme
that is covered in depth in chapters three and four.
2.1 Origins
As a result of the author’s research in America in 2003, meeting
experienced retail and supply chain academics, an interesting view emerged about the
origins of the concept of channel captain. The visit had become necessary because there
was scant contemporary European literature on the concept of Channel Captain.  In
Efficient Consumer Response there is use of the title captain in current retail and
supplier relationships.  However, it is used on the manufacturing or supply side as
Category Captain.  The category captain is the lead supplier to a major grocery retailer,
who organises the second tier suppliers to provide a comprehensive set of products
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within a category range.  But the author’s search was for some reliable academic
account of retailers as channel captains in America.  The term is no longer used
although it had been in the past.  Stock recalled its use with an emphasis on the strength
of control that the retailers as channel captain exercised.  This he expressed as
‘benevolent dictator’ (Figure 2.1).
Source & Quotations: Channel captains: results of American research 2003
Most people define the channel captain as ‘that entity of the distribution channel that exercised
control over the other member’.
That notion predates vertical marketing systems.  The early literature on channel power control,
where the channel captain concept comes from, pre-dates the systems perspective that was
developed later.
Most of the significant literature is in the 1960’s and 1970’s or even earlier in 1950’s.  Some of the
literature looked upon the channel captain as a benevolent dictator.  In the 1930’s the
manufacturers dominated most channels.
The literature died out in 1980’s, it became one of those issues the we know enough about and
we don’t need to know any more.  [Emphasis added]
Source: Stock, James. Author interview, January 2003
Figure 2.1  Channel Captains: Stock J. Interview 2003
It was during that conversation with Stock that he put the idea into the
author’s mind to visit Stanley C Hollander, who sadly has since passed away.  He had
spent some time working during the mid 1930s in the stock room of a wholesaler
providing sweaters to Sears Roebuck.  He explained how the business was so dominated
by Sears that when the buyer visited the wholesaler he went behinds the boss’ desk and
the boss took the visitors chair.  “It was clear who was the channel captain in that
situation.  Yet this man lived a happy middle class life under that situation”.  This is the
background he related when the author asked about the origins of the concept of
channel captain.  His academic contribution to the author on the topic was invaluable.
He pointed to an article on ‘Specification Buying’ by his contemporary, William T
Kelley (1953) written after he had spent a summer at a Sears Roebuck private label
supplier.  It was the first academic discussion on the topic.
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It goes back much farther than normally believed.  The very big retailers, Sears Roebuck, K.C.
Penny & Company, people of that sort very frequently dominated their suppliers, it was pretty
clear who was the channel captain.
You see in the retailing field we looked up to and admired the retailer, whatever they did was
considered right and good; there was a certain amount of hero worship, rather than critical
judgement. I think that some of the economic literature might have taken up that issue but they
would not have expressed it as channel captaincy but as control and domination.
One of the earliest places it showed up was E.J. McCarthy’s Marketing Textbook.  That was quite
a revolutionary book, it was the first textbook that took a managerial point of view with a different
orientation from other books.   It had the four Ps, McCarthy coined the term channel captain,
but he saw the manufacturers as the channel captains and I think the literature went that way.
The growing importance of Walmart, as a really national chain, drew attention to the dominant role
of the retailer over their suppliers.  Both Walmart and KMart turned over the role of channel captain
to a category captain, to an outsider. Walmart appointed a team of their brightest people for that, K
Mart turned over their most marginal people – the results showed up. [Emphases added]
Source: Hollander, S. Author interview, May 2003
Figure 2.2  Channel Captains: Hollander S C. interview 2003
Hollander explained that one of the earliest places the concept of the
channel captain appeared was in Edward Jerome McCarthy’s Marketing Text book
(Figure 2.2).  He described it as a quite revolutionary book.  It was the first textbook
that took a managerial view.  He coined the term channel captain, but he saw the
manufacturers as the channel captains and the literature went that way.
D5 Transporting, storing and financing
Transporting, storing, and financing are basic marketing functions, which must be provided
throughout most distribution channels.  They are of common concern to nearly all channel
members.
When a channel captain is developing Place policies, he must consider how these functions are
to be divided within the channel.  Assuming that the team captain is a manufacturer, he may have
already decided to use some type of wholesaler and retailer, but this does not automatically decide
how the functions of transporting, storing, and financing are to be shared.
These functions are vitally important to Place, since they are required in the production of time,
place, and possession utility.  Their interaction with the other three P’s – especially Price for the
cost of the service and Product for the service itself – must be born in mind. [Emphasis added]
Source: McCarthy 1960 p429
Figure 2.3  Channel Captains: McCarthy E J. 1960
McCarthy described the role as primarily about developing Place policies
and considering how these functions were to be divided within the channel. (Figure
2.3).   He assumes that the channel captain is a manufacturer.
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How to manage channels:
Managing conflict in channels.
There are many good reasons for cooperation with a channel system.  But there are also reasons
why conflicts can arise – and these are and should be anticipated and managed, if possible…
conflicts can easily happen unless channel systems are planned very carefully.  This leads us to
the channel captain concept.
Channel captain can guide channel planning
We can now see that it is logical that each channel system should act as a unit – perhaps
directed by a channel captain - a manager who would help direct the activities of a whole
channel and try to avoid or solve channel conflicts.  But given that there are several firms and
marketing managers in a single distribution channel, a big question is: Which marketing manager
should be the captain.  Also: Is it necessary to have a recognised channel captain?
The concept of a single channel captain is useful – but we must recognise that some channels,
including most traditional channels, do not have a recognised captain – since the various firms are
not acting as a system.  The reason may be lack of leadership.  Or members of the system may
not understand their interrelationship.  Many managers – more concerned with those firms
immediately above and below them - seem almost unaware they are part of a channel.
But, like it or not, firms are interrelated – even if poorly – by their policies.  And there is potential for
conflict in the buyer – supplier relationship.  So, it makes sense to try to avoid channel conflicts by
planning for channel relations. [Emphasis added]
Source: McCarthy and Brogowicz 1981 p351-6
Figure 2.4 Channel Captains: McCarthy 1981
The concept gradually evolved and in the 1981 7th Edition (Figure 2.4) he
argues that it is logical that each channel system should act as a unit, perhaps directed
by a channel captain.  This illustrates the power of the channel captain concept.  It
directed the minds of the marketing students and practitioners of that era to view
competition from a channel perspective not just as a company rivalry.  This introduces a
higher strategic vision to the marketing channel.  The concept had an evolving life span
in marketing textbooks in 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s and 1990s with Kotler P., who
wrote about the channel captain concept from his 1967, 1st edition through to the 1994,
8th edition.
In his 1988, 6th edition (Figure 2.5) Kotler emphasises that the channel
captain is the dominant member of a particular channel, the one who organizes it and
leads it.  But he is firmly of the view that it is the manufacturer taking that role. There
was recognition that players other than the manufacturer could become channel
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captains, the middlemen and such retailers as Sears Roebuck.  There was also the
observation that some channels do not have a leader because the various firms were not
acting as a system.  These developments are given further clarification in chapter five
on managing supply chain change.
Another important role is that of channel captain.  The channel captain is the dominant member
of a particular channel, the one who organizes it and leads it.  For example, General Motors is
the channel captain of a system consisting of a huge number of suppliers, dealers, and facilitators.
The channel captain is not always a manufacturer, as the examples of McDonald’s and Sears
indicate.  Some channels do not have a channel captain in that each firm proceeds on its own.
Some amount of vertical channel conflict is inevitable, and the problem is not one of eliminating it
but of managing it better.  There are several mechanisms for conflict resolution:
Channel captain leadership.
If one channel member acquires leadership and earns the trust of other members, it can set the
tone that will reduce the potential for conflict and resolve conflicts more quickly. [Emphasis added]
Source: Kotler 1988, p550-1
Figure 2.5  Channel Captains: Kotler 1988
The benefit of investigating the historical roots of the concept of the channel
captain was to gain an insight into that era of American business life when team play
and leadership were clearly values instilled into the young graduates coming through
college and into business.  It had a special ethos about it and the language is
straightforward and direct, although the actual business turmoil going on was probably
quite pressurised.  One of the strengths of the channel captain concept was to create an
awareness amongst independent parties in the marketing channel that by uniting
together they could compete as a channel with the large integrated corporate companies
that controlled these functions in - house.  Physical distribution was part of the
marketing function.
The role of the channel captain involved several tasks.  The most important
task was to plan the allocation of responsibilities in the marketing channel.  A correlated
task was the coordination of the marketing, distribution and channel functions.  One
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task that required the right approach was to resolve conflict between members of the
channel by harnessing the energy from their different points of view.  An outward
looking task was to provide leadership in marketing awareness.  The channel captain
needed to gain the trust of the other channel members.  It was necessary to provide the
support to help members see the benefits of acting together as a united marketing
channel.  In this way their action was for the good of the whole, through sales growth to
satisfied consumers.  The role and motivations of a channel captain exist in modern
retailing.  The terminology may be different but the intention is to promote the whole
business channel.  This provides one base for this research.  The other base is the role of
the retailers in their primary task of retailing and the various retail trends.
2.2 Retail Trends
Sales in €bn
Rank Company Origin Sector Yr
End
2003 2004
1 Carrefour France groc Dec 61.23 62.85
2 Tesco UK groc Feb 40.65 45.62
4 Aldi Germany groc Dec 31.60 na
6 Edeka Group Germany groc Dec 29.58 29.78
8 Schwarrz Group Germany groc Feb 27.95 na
9 E Lecrerc France groc Dec 23.30 na
10 Auchan France groc Dec 22.56 na
12 J Sainsbury UK groc Mar 20.54 21.97
14 Wm Morrison Group UK groc Jan 19.5 17.85
19 Ahold Group Netherlands groc Dec 12.98 13.05
20 Systême U France groc Dec 12.53 13.35
24 Cora/Louis Delhaize Group France groc Dec 10.00 na
25 Coop Italia Italy groc Dec 9.74 10.89
34 Somerfield UK groc Apr 7.30 7.68
35 ICA Sweden groc Dec 7.28 7.52
37 Mercadona Spain groc Dec 6.56 6.77
42 Spar Österreich Austria groc Dec 5.86 6.21
44 Conad Group ITALY groc Dec 5.66 6.27
49 Grupo Erosk Spain groc Jan 5.20 6.20
50 Delhaize Group Belgium groc Dec 4.87 5.10
52 Co-operative Group UK groc Jan 4.70 3.19
55 Norges Gruppen Norway groc Dec 4.21 4.18
57 Laurus Netherlands groc Dec 4.07 3.50
63 Axfood Sweden groc Dec 3.68 3.71
Source: Mintel 2005 permission granted
Table 2.1  European Top Grocery Retailers
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Retailing is a major component of many economies.  Within the retail
sector, food retailing is the largest and most important component.  Perhaps 25% of all
enterprises in the European Union (EU) are involved in retailing.  About 12% of the
total working population are engaged in retailing.  There are well over 3.5 million shops
in the EU.  Food retailing makes up perhaps 40% of the total in many countries.
The retail sector is enormous and influential (Table 2.1).  These twenty four
grocery retailers are within the top 60+ retailing companies in Europe by sales volume.
Carrefour, Tesco, Aldi, Edeka, Schwarrz, Leclerc, Auchan are in the top ten retailers in
Europe.  The scale and concentration of the modern retailing business in Europe is in
contrast to the American retailing scale in the 1960’s, at the origins the concept of
channel captain.  That contrast is heightened in the context of the retailers in the top 60+
who are not classified as grocery including Walmart, Rewe, Intermarche, Metro (Table
2.2).
Within the sector however are massive dichotomies.  There are many single
shop businesses, but there are also some of the largest companies in Europe.  Retailing
is a local affair with local demands: but Euro-brands are increasing and indeed global
brands are important.  Retail sales are increasing but the number of shops is falling and
their format is changing.  Retailing is a business sector of contrasts, under-going
considerable change.  One element in this change is the supply of products to retailers,
in particular the large food retailers.  The operation and structure of supply channels
have been re-engineered to achieve efficiency and the flexibility to meet the demands of
modern retailing and the needs of consumers.
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Table 2.2  European Top Non-Grocery Retailers
2.2.1 Culture and Retail Consumers
Retailing is the market place where people purchase goods.  Their choice is
dependent on their own culture, experience and financial circumstances.  The success of
the retailer is dependent on understanding these factors and the drivers of changing
consumer demand.  The retailer must bring the right product in the right quantity to the
right market place format.  The culture within which the retailers operate is dynamic.
Sales in €bn
Rank Company Origin Sector Yr
End
2003 2004
3 Intermarché ITM Enterprises France multi Dec 33.30 33.33
5 Rewe Germany multi Dec 30.73 32.67
7 Metro Germany multi Dec 28.17 29.66
11 Wal-Mart Stores USA moss Jan 21.64 na
13 Rallye France multi Dec 19.67 20.03
15 KarstadlQuelle Germany multi Dec 15.27 13.44
16 Tengelmann Germany multi Apr 14.64 na
17 PPR France multi Dec 13.88 14.54
18 El Corte Ingles Spain multi Feb 13.64 na
21 Marks & Spencer UK multi Mar 10.63 10.36
22 Migros Switzerland multi Dec 10.33 10.25
23 Kingfisher Group UK diy Jan 10.15 11.27
26 Coop Nodden Sweden multi Dec 9.43 9.48
27 DSG Internation UK elec Apr 9.34 9.89
28 IKEA Sweden furn Aug 9.27 10.37
29 Otto Group Germany asp Feb 8.93 na
30 Coop Scheweiz Switzerland multi Dec 8.56 na
31 Euronics International France elec Dec 8.38 8.56
32 GUS UK multi Mar 8.21 9.01
33 Experl Switzerland elec Dec 7.59 na
36 Boots Group UK multi Mar 6.76 7.12
38 John Lewis Partnership UK multi Jan 6.50 na
39 Kesko Finland multi Dec 6.03 6.35
40 Intersport Switzerland sport Apr 6.00 na
41 La Rinascente (Group) Italy multi Dec 5.66 na
43 Dansk Supermarked Denmark multi Jul 5.82 na
45 Schlocker Germany h&b Dec 5.61 5.69
46 Galeries Lafayette France dept Dec 5.53 5.64
47 Kesa Electricals UK elec Jan 5.45 5.83
48 H&M Hennez & Mauritz Sweden clo Nov 5.28 5.88
51 Leroy Merlin (Group) France diy Dec 4.80 5.58
53 Vendex KBB Netherlands multi Jan 4.50 na
54 C&A Belgium clo Dec 4.28 4.95
56 Globus Group Germany multi Jun 4.19 na
58 Woolworths Group UK multi Jan 4.01 4.21
59 SOK Finland multi Dec 4.00 4.73
60 Colnyt Group Belgium multi mar 3.86 na
61 Hutchinson Wharmpca (retail) Hong Kong h&c Dec 3.75 na
62 Grupo Inditex Spain clo Jan 3.75 4.70
Source: Mintel 2005 premisson granted
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They need to be responsive to a range of influences: population demographics; changes
in disposable income; the different social groups and trends in demand.  Examples of
such issues are the fall in birth rate and an ageing population due to better health care.
This population has greater wealth and has experienced travel, demanding a wider range
of products.  There is the need for the segmentation of product groups: organic foods;
ready meals; baby products, etc.  Consumers choose how they want to shop.
Purpose Reason Product Example Retailer and Format
Example
Essential Replenishment of stock items;
primary food shopping trip
Food and household items Food superstore
Purposive Clear purpose to trip, big
items
Food and household items,
Christmas purchases
Retail park, shopping centre
with department stores
Leisure (or fun) Social activity, occasionally
ancillary to visit
Specialised food products,
factory or farm visits
Town centre, shopping
centre or mall, leisure
activity focus
Convenience Time constrained, top-up trip,
everyday purchases




Experimental Unusual product or innovative
method
Home delivery of standard




Source : Burt and Sparks 2003b p11
Table 2.3  Types of Food Shopping Trips
Consumers satisfy their needs in different ways at different times (Table
2.3).  The design and availability of the market place has had to adapt to the desires and
choices of the consumer.  An understanding of the consumer culture leads the retailer to
reflect on the location and type of outlet.   Food retailing requires a wide range of
outlets and locations.  The number and type change with time.  There are large and
small fixed shops, mobile shops, car boot markets, other town centre markets and now
even virtual shops.  The trend for superstores to remain open 24hrs together with greater
car ownership has coincided with the reduction of small corner shops.
Traditionally retailing has low entry and exit barriers.  The number of
independent traders is numerically the dominant force.  However, the large
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organisations have used their economies of scale to gain dominance.  The complexity pf
the large hypermarkets and supermarkets require professional managers with a range of
skills.  A large UK food hypermarket or supermarket is likely to be open for 24 hours a
day, will have a staff of 750 working at many different levels and take £2 million per
week in sales.  This is a different environment from the local retailer. The small and
medium sized retailers have responded to the competitive market and now have
developed the skills to manage the complex environment.
The increasing affluence and mobility of the population, combined with the
development of the strong corporate retailers, has led to the large out of town retail
outlet, with large sales and car parking areas. The superstores are a dominant retail
format.  This development is controversial and has led to some concern from planners
and local retailers.  However, the presentation, choice and availability of the product in
the food superstores remain successful with the consumer.  Their success has stimulated
demand.  The range of goods has increased. The challenge for the supply chain is to
manage the range and volume of products to be distributed.  They have had to ensure
they are designed to deal effectively with distribution and the replenishment of stock.
Retailing involves the selection and sourcing of products for sale.
Retailers, in particular food retailers, have a wide variety of goods.   These may be
sourced from the producer by the retailer or through an intermediary wholesaler. The
increasing power and capability of large retailers have enabled them to exploit
international sourcing and buying openings.   It makes retailing sense to source the
product in countries where the cost of production is lower.    Many of the perishable
products will have been sourced from around the world.   British food retailers’ logistics
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systems, using computer technology and control of the supply chain, have made them
amongst the most efficient in the world (Fernie and Sparks 2004b p23).
In obtaining products, retailers have a choice about the range to sell.
Retailers have now become strong brands.  The approach to retailer branding varies
across the globe, but large retailers are becoming much more concerned in managing
their own retail names or brand (Burt and Sparks 2002).  In food retailing in the UK,
retailer brands (what others term own-label or private label) have become dominant.
Therefore the product supply and quality needs to be even more within the retailers’
control. Promotion is constantly reinforcing the corporate brand. Most UK food retailers
now have a structured branding approach targeting specific consumer segments.
Consistency, reliability and quality of supply are thus critical (Table 2.4).
Exclusive Standard Value
Tesco Finest Tesco Value
Safeway The Best Safeway Saver
Sainsbury Taste the  Difference Sainsbury’s Economy
Asda Extra Special Asda Smart Price
Note:  This table is constructed on the basis of product price points.  It excludes alternative branding concepts based
on other product attributes such as health (e.g. Sainsbury’s Be Good to Yourself and Tesco Healthy Eating), organic
origin (e.g. all company retailer Organic brands) or other segments (e.g. Sainsbury’s Blue Parrot Café brand of
healthy eating products for children).
Source: Burt and Sparks 2003b p19
Table 2.4  UK Grocery Retail Branding 2004
2.2.2 Changes in Food Retailing
The changes in food retailing influence the major functions in the retail
business and are a response to the dynamics of the sector. Any analysis of major recent
trends in retailing produces quite an extensive list of transformations and issues.  The
listing in Table 2.5 is readily recognisable from developed economies. Burt and Sparks
(2003b) summarised the listing into three key areas.
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A decrease in the total number of shops.
An increase in the number of large food and non-food superstores.
New shopping centres.
Growth of retail sales and floor space
Low levels of inflation.
Increase in small store formats.
Concentration in retail sales.
Extensions of product ranges in superstores
Strengthening of primary locations and weakening of tertiary ones.
Large retailers taking control of the supply chain.
Changes in accessibility to retail provision.
Increased use of sophisticated technologies by retailers.
More variety of potential locations.
Wider use of town centre management.
More awareness of retailer activity.
[Emphasis added]
After Dawson 2000
Source: Burt and Sparks 2003b p23
Table 2.5 Major Retail Trends of the 1990s/2000s
First, it is clear that in recent decades there have been enormous change in
the location of retailing.  Food retailing takes place now in very different locations than
previously.  There have been broad trends of decentralisation of retail location and the
rise of superstores. Retailing has been locationally transformed.  From a channel
perspective this may have had advantages for the distribution of products.
Secondly, there has been an alteration in the format through which food
retailing takes place.  Shops today are not like shops of previous times and retailer
strategies have become more segmented.  They differ in scale, design, technique and
approach.  This is obvious in terms of the larger store formats, but is equally true for
smaller formats.  A common component however is the improvement in the quality of
provision.
Thirdly, it has been emphasised that food retailers have increased in scale
and power (Table 2.6).  They are now major businesses, often being larger than the
manufacturers who supply them.  They can thus reorganise various relationships to suit
themselves.  This scale of operation brings practical and financial benefits to the
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business.  The world’s leading retailers are now amongst some of the biggest
organisations around and have an increasingly international approach. Their
professionalised management approach has changed the sector and its supply systems.








Tesco 21.1 15.6 23.0
Sainsbury 17.6 11.8 18.7 11.8 18.7
Asda 12.7 9.1 12.2 9.1 12.2
Safeway 9.3 7.4 11.5 7.4 11.5
Somerfield 4.1 6.2 9.8 6.2 9.8
Marks & Spencer - 2.9 4.9
Morrison 4.1 3.0 3.9
Waitrose - 1.9 3.0
Iceland - 1.9 3.0
Others - 40.2 1.0
Total 100 100 100
Concentration ratios -
CR1 21.1 15.6 23.0
CR2 38.7 27.4 41.7
CR3 51.4 36.5 53.9
CR4 60.7 49.9 65.4
CR5 64.8 50.1 75.2/69.3*
Notes: Market definition: Taylor Nelson Sofres – retailer share track (179 markets: packaged grocery, fresh foods & toiletries/
healthcare); IGD – Total market size includes M&S food sales, retailers where food sales exceed 50%, CTNs where food-
related items exceed 35%, chemists and VAT; Competition Commission – groceries defined as food, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic drinks, cleaning products, toiletries, household goods. ‘All grocery stores’ category. *75.2% taking largest five
company shares; 69.3% presented by Competition Commission (Morrison replacing Somerfield as C5 company). Power and
Competition in the UK Retail Grocery Market 239
Source: Burt and Sparks 2003a p239
Table 2.6 National Market Share
One of the key themes that emerges, is that if there has been a
transformation at the retail shop end of the channel then there has also to be a
transformation in supply systems as well (Sparks 1998). To meet consumers’ demands
for new products in new formats and in new ways, the supply system has had to be
reorganised and refocused.  This reorganisation is needed because the nature of retailing
and supply has changed.  Retailers through their knowledge of consumers have gained
power and used it in a variety of ways.  One of their applications has been through the
reorganisation of supply channels and the adoption of supply chain management
principles to gain efficiency and effectiveness.
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2.3 Retail and Logistics
EXTENT OF RETAIL CONROL IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN ACROSS EUROPE
Firms in countries with greater retail concentration and a higher level of retail branding will
assume greater responsibility for distribution support to their stores.  In the UK it was shown
that the construction of large RDCs, often composites, was the end product of an expensive
distribution system to support store brand loyalty.  By contrast in Southern and Eastern Europe,
control of the supply chain is in the hands of the suppliers. While larger chains in Germany,
France and The Netherlands have centralised distribution in the grocery sector a large number of
platforms have been built to serve limited product groups and temperature ranges p43.
The distribution ‘culture’ in the UK is different from that in the rest of Europe.  UK retailers
have opted for a high cost, high efficiency distribution model with a small number of large RDCs –
often composites – supplying their stores.  On the continent of Europe, a low cost, non-composite
model is the norm for those retailers who have reached the stage of centralising their distribution
p45. [Emphasis added]
Source: Fernie 1992, p35-47
Figure 2.6 Difference in European Distribution 1992
Across Europe, different retailers in different countries and at different
times approach the matter of supply chain management and retail distribution with
contrasting strategies (Figure 2.6).
Concentration in retailing by kind of business, GB 1992




£ Million Amount £m % Amount £m %
Food 43,479 18,391 23.1 25,261 58.1
Drink, confectionery &
tobacco
20,956 4,836 23.1 7,681 36.7
Clothing, footwear and
leather goods
21,742 7,872 36.2 10,671 49.1
Household goods 29,389 5,862 19.9 18,780 29.9
Other non-food goods 26,035 6,336 24.3 9,000 34.6
Hire & repair 1,509 951 63.0 1,012 67.1
Sales by non-store
activity
10,035 3,683 36.7 4,560 45.4
Total Retail Trade 143,645 31,539 22.0 46,286 32.2
Source: Fernie 1997 p386
Table 2.7 Concentration in Retailing GB 1992
These supply chain configurations evolve at different paces.  Some retailers
in some countries are more advanced than others (Fernie 1992).  One strong link
between retailing and retail distribution is the degree of concentration in the market
(Table 2.7).  In UK Food has a concentration factor of 58.1 for the largest ten
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enterprises, with five stores at 23.1 percent.  It is a similar level for other product sectors
like clothing and footwear.
Distribution Strategies of European Retailers
This article will attempt to address an area of investigation which has been largely neglected by
retail marketers, namely the physical distribution and logistics strategies of European
retailers.  More specifically, it will be argued that the strategies which have evolved in the UK are
unique and differ markedly from those of their continental European counterparts.  These
differences have a particular significance to retailers with pan-European aspirations, especially for
UK retailers entering Western European markets and for continental retailers wishing to reap the
relatively high profit margins which can be obtained in the UK p35.
Many of these changes in the retail market place have heralded advances in distribution support to
stores with a shift from a supplier-controlled to a retailer-controlled distribution network.
The net result of this centralisation of stock by retailers has been the construction of a relatively
small number of large, strategically located regional distribution centres [RDCs] with the
subsequent closure of smaller depots operated by manufacturers or contractors providing
‘groupage’ services.  Retailers have also rationalised their networks p36.
If centralization of stock into large RDCs and contracting out the operation to third party
contractors were the trends of the 1970s and 1980s, what are the likely trends to the year 2000
and beyond?  The main challenge facing distribution managers is the more efficient management
of the whole supply chain.  Innovation in retail secondary distribution is renowned and has been
applied in other business sectors P37. [Emphasis added]
Source: Fernie 1992, p35-47
Figure 2.7 European Distribution Strategies
Fernie goes on to argue that the UK strategy is unique and distinct from
mainland Europe (Figure 2.7).  The difference is not only driven by the degree of retail
concentration, but also by the extent of retailer control in the supply chain. The result
has been a small number of large distribution centres placed in strategic geographical
locations.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
To ensure a quick response to customer needs in a competitive market, better relationships with
suppliers will be required to enable further reductions in lead times throughout the supply
chain.  The facilitating technology is in place; indeed, most retailers are committed to the full
implementation of EPOS and EDI in the near future.
For example Tesco was able to quantify the benefits of IT to its business from 1986-1991:
Net margin from 3.7 to 6.6 percent
Stockholding from 3.0 to 1.9 weeks of stock
Service level from 96 to 98 percent.
[Quote from Joe Galloway, Director IT, Tesco]
A commitment to stronger retailer-supplier links    “partnership demands a relationship based on
tough collaboration not tough adversity”  This collaboration will be needed to reduce the level of
working capital in the supply chain.
The key to success is the sharing of information….Success of this, and ventures proposed by
retailers, will depend on the trust and goodwill between business partners p38. [Emphasis added]
Source: Fernie 1992, p35-47
Figure 2.8  Information Technology 1992
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The physical distribution of retail goods may be well advanced.  However,
the management of the whole supply chain through information and data flow was still
a challenge at the time of that study (Figure 2.8).  The timing, 1992, coincides
conveniently with the author’s practitioner experience with Tesco.  Control over the
whole supply chain depends on the rapid and efficient flow of information and data
between suppliers and retailers.
Since that report, the arrival of the internet has enabled companies to share
easily.  Thus retailers have engaged in logistics across Europe.  However, in order to
understand the status and development of the Tesco supply chain, it is necessary to take
a broader view of the logistics trends in the UK, which is the subject of the next section.
Acknowledgement:  The author wishes to acknowledge that sections 2.3.1
and 2.3.2 reflect earlier work completed on a collaborative basis (Gustafson et al 2006;
Smith 1998; Smith and Sparks 1993, 2004 a, b, c).
2.3.1 The Logistics task
Retailing and logistics are concerned with product availability. Many have
described this as ‘getting the right products to the right place at the right time’ (e.g.
Fisher, Raman and McClelland 2000).  Unfortunately however that description does not
do justice to the amount of effort that has to go into a logistics supply system and the
multitude of ways that the supply systems can go wrong.  The very simplicity of the
statement suggests logistics is an easy process.  The real trick however is making
logistics look easy, day in and day out, whilst reacting to a volatile and changing
consumer demand. For example, if the temperature rises and the sun comes out in an
untypical Scottish summer, then demand for ice cream, soft drinks and even salad items
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rises dramatically.  How does a retailer make sure they remain in-stock to capture this
fluctuating demand?
The example above demonstrates that retailers must be concerned with the
flows of product and information within the business and the supply chain.  In order to
make products available retailers have to manage their logistics in terms of product
movement and demand management.  They need to know what is selling in the stores
and both anticipate and react quickly to changes in this demand.  At the same time they
need to be able to move less demand-volatile products in an efficient and cost-effective
manner.
Component Description
Storage Facilities •  These might be warehouses or distribution centres or simply the stock rooms of
retail stores.
• Retailers manage these facilities to enable them to keep stock in anticipation of or
to react to, demand for products.  Increasingly some centres are run ‘stock-less’
and act as consolidation hubs.
Inventory • All retailers hold stock to some extent.
•  The question for retailers is the amount of stock or inventory (finished products
and/or component parts) that has to be held for each product and the location of
this stock to meet demand changes.
Transportation • Most products have to be transported in some way at some stage of their journey
from production to consumption.
• Retailers have to manage a transport operation that might involve different forms of
transport, different sizes of vehicles and different scheduling availability of drivers,
vehicles and even store access.
Unitisation and
Packaging
•  Consumers generally buy products in small quantities.  They sometimes make
purchase decisions based on product looks and packaging.
• Retailers are deeply concerned to get products that are easy to handle in logistics
terms, don’t cost too much to package or handle, yet retain their selling ability on
shelves.
•  Secondary and tertiary packaging can be a cost to the supply chain and is
increasingly replace by returnable handling systems where possible.
•  Unitisation is combined with standardisation to provide order to the handling of
products.
Communication • To get products to where we want them, it is necessary to have information, both
about demand and supply, but also about volumes, stock, prices and movements.
• Retailers have thus become increasingly concerned with being able to capture data
at appropriate points in the supply and demand system, and most importantly, to
use that information to have a more efficient and effective logistics operation.
Source: Gustafsson et al, 2006 p42
Table 2.8 Implications of the Components of the ’Logistics Mix’
The logistics management task is therefore concerned with managing the
components of the ‘logistics mix’.  Table 2.8 identifies five components. It should be
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clear that all of these elements are inter-linked.  If a retailer gets good data on demand
from their checkout system, then the scheduling of transport and the level of stock
holding become more straightforward.  If the level of inventory can be reduced, then
perhaps fewer warehouses are needed.  If communications and transport can be highly
effectively linked, then perhaps a retailer can move from putting stock away in a
warehouse to running a distribution centre which sorts products for immediate store
delivery i.e. approaching a 'just-in-time' system.
It should also be clear that retailers might not do all of this on their own.
Retailers are involved in the selling of goods and services to the consumer.  For this
they take product from manufacturers and suppliers.  Retailers thus have a direct
interest in the logistics systems of their suppliers.  If a retailer is effective, but its
suppliers are not, then errors and delays in supply from the manufacturer will impact the
retailer and the retailer’s consumers, either in terms of higher prices or stock-outs (no
products available on the store shelves).  If a retailer can integrate its logistics system
with that of its suppliers, then such problems can be minimised.  Much more
importantly however the entire supply chain can then be optimised and managed as a
single entity.  This brings potential advantages of costs reduction and service
enhancement, not only for the retailer, but also for the supplier. It should also mean that
products reach the stores more rapidly, thus better meeting fluctuating customer
demand.
For example, Tesco, by working with producers of fresh foods e.g. lettuce
can ensure that products are picked in reaction to demand levels and distributed through
the distribution centres rapidly i.e. not stored.  By being in the shop more quickly, the
freshness is maximised and shelf live is extended.  The consumer gets a better quality
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product but at the same time wastage costs are reduced.  The system is cheaper but also
provides a better service.
This description of the logistics task is immediately recognisable.  However
it does tend to gloss over the importance of one aspect that is less obvious, namely, that
of unitisation and packaging.  Products appear to move seamlessly from production to
the retail store and shop floor.  This is of course far from the truth.  In reality products
have to be organised and handled in order to make this journey.  If organised efficiently
then there are costs and service benefits.  If there is a lack of supply chain agreement on
appropriate sizing and handling then time and cost will be lost.  This search for
efficiency and effectiveness through packaging and standardisation in handling is at the
heart of packaging logistics (Gustafson et al 2006).
Products when produced have to be packaged and/or handled in some way.
Decisions about the size and shape of packaging and the information it carries are
important to handling throughout the supply chain.  How many products make up
various packaging sizes is a fundamental question.  Similarly, if standard handling
systems can be adopted then systems can be built around the sizes and processes.  In
environmental terms returnable or reusable handling systems may reduce the amount of
transport packaging and be more environmentally sustainable.
Summarising, the logistics task can be described (Christopher 1998, p4) as:
‘The process of strategically managing the procurement, movement
and storage of materials, parts and finished inventory (and the related
information flows) through the organisation and its marketing channels in
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such a way that current and future profitability are maximised through the
cost effective fulfilment of orders’.
As retailers have begun to embrace this logistics approach and examine their
supply chains, many have realised that to carry out logistics properly, there has to be a
transformation of approach and operations.  It is to this we now turn.
2.3.2 Retail Logistics Transformation
When Tesco opened their new 16,000 sq ft store in Leicester in 1961, they
claimed it was the largest grocery store in Europe.  Today, the Tesco average store size
in the UK is almost twice this and internationally, Tesco have opened hypermarkets ten
times as large as this pioneering store.  It should be obvious that the scale, location and
product range of the 1961 Leicester store and these hypermarkets reflect major shifts in
the retail form.  The average Wal-Mart Supercenter is approaching 200,000 sq ft in size.
It should be clear that the supply systems for such stores also represent a fundamental
shift in operations and approach.  New store formats demand new logistics. The
logistics required for a new hypermarket is vastly different to the logistics required for
the stores it replaces.  Such differences are one component of the logistics
transformation. It is as essential as well that existing stores and new smaller formats
also have effective supply systems to meet their new requirements and demands.
Such new stores, which we see across Europe, and increasingly elsewhere in
the world, also represent visible reminders of the change in power.  Retailers have
grown substantially in scale as businesses.  This growth has been greater than the
growth that has taken place in manufacturers.  This scale imbalance has been combined
with the better understanding of consumers that retailers can gain through closeness to
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customers and through technology.  Manufacturers are a step removed from this
customer demand.  With better data and greater scale, combined in the UK in some
sectors with a massive development of retailer branding, retailers have been able to
wrest and then maintain control over distribution channels and logistics activities,
though the relationships are uneven (Burt and Sparks 2003; Ogbonna and Wilkinson
1996).
Table 2.9 Major Logistics Innovations by Multiple Grocery Retailers
Retailers were once effectively the passive recipients of manufacturers’
products, allocated to stores by the manufacturers in anticipation of demand.  Today,
retailers are the active controllers of product supply in reaction to known customer
demand.  They control, organise and manage the supply chain from production to
consumption.  This is the essence of the retail logistics transformation that has taken
place.   Retailers are the channel captains and set the pace in logistics. Having extended
their channel control and focused on efficiency and effectiveness, retailers are now





s u p p l i e r s  t o
supermarkets; queues
of vehicles led to both
ine f f i c iency  and
disruption.
Introduction of Regional
Distribution Centres (RDCs) to
channel goods from suppliers to
supermarkets operated by
retailers.
Strict timing of supplier delivery to RDC
imposed by retailers.
Retailers build and operate RDC.
Retailer operates own delivery fleet





services in support of
retail activity.
Operations of retailer-owned
RDCs and vehicle fleets out
sourced to specialist freight
companies.
Retailers can concentrate on the ‘core
business’ of retailing.
Retailer achieves better financial return
from capital investment in supermarkets









Convers ion  o f  s to rage
floorspace at supermarkets to
sales floorspace; Corporate
s t r a t e g y  a n d  b r a n d
development.
Better sales revenue potential at retail
outlets.
RDCs absorb products formerly kept in
store at supermarkets.
Just-in-Time (JIT) delivery used from RDC




Requi rement  fo r
be t te r  cus tomer
service and cost
control over a range
of retail formats and
channels; range of
products expands.
Reorganisation of RDCs; some
development of stock-less
centres; store based Internet
delivery systems; development
of ECR; concentration on flow
through processes and store
specific distribution.
Better in-store quality and stock position.
Technological  expansion through
operations.
Rapid rollout of Internet operations
Source: after Cooper, Browne, and Peters 1991
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attempting to engender a more co-operative and collaborative stance in many aspects of
logistics. They are recognising that there are still gains to be made on standards and
efficiency, but that these are probably only obtained as channel gains (i.e. in association
with manufacturers and logistics services providers) rather than at the single firm level.
Table 2.9 charts this history of innovation in logistics by major grocery
retailers.  The stages are characterised by a movement from a manufacturer-controlled,
transport oriented system to a retail led, and replenishment focused technology-rich
supply chain.  This transformation began in the food retail sector.  Figure 2.9 shows the
effect this assertion of leadership and maintenance of control has had on the
stockholding levels of Tesco (see also Smith 1998; Smith and Sparks 1993, 2004a, b, c).
The figure visibly illustrates the shift from disorderly systems through the enhancement
of efficiency phase to the current low-stock position (with recent increases accounted
for by the developments in non-food and global retailing expansion).































McKinnon (1996) reviewed and summarised the key components of this
logistics transformation, primarily in the context of the United Kingdom.  He identified
six trends, all of which are closely related and mutually reinforcing (see also Table 2.9):
Retailers increased their control over secondary distribution (i.e. warehouse
to shop) by channelling an increasing proportion of their supplies through distribution
centres (DCs).  In the grocery sector this process is now virtually complete.  British
retailers exert much tighter control over the supply chain than their counterparts in most
other countries.  Their logistical operations are heavily dependent on information
technology (IT), particularly the large integrated stock replenishment systems that
control the movement and storage of an enormous number of separate products.
(a) Restructured retailers’ logistical systems have reduced inventory and
generally improved efficiency through the development of ‘composite
distribution’ (the distribution of mixed temperature items through the same
distribution centre and on the same vehicle) and centralisation in specialist
warehouses of slower moving stock.  In the case of mixed retail businesses
the establishment of ‘common stock rooms’ (where stock is shared across a
number of stores, with demand deciding to which store stock is allocated) is
developed.
(b) Adoption of ‘Quick Response’ (QR) type approaches with the aim of cutting
inventory levels and improving speed of product flow.  This has involved
reducing order lead-time and moving to a more frequent delivery of smaller
consignments both internally (between DC and shop) and on external links
with suppliers.  This has greatly increased the rate of stock-turn and
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increased the production of supplies being ‘cross-docked’, rather than
stored, at DCs.  QR was made possible by the development of EDI
(Electronic Data Interchange) and EPOS (Electronic Point of Sale), the
latter driving the ‘Sales Based Ordering’ (SBO) systems that most of the
larger retailers have installed.  In other words as an item is sold and scanned
in a shop, these data are used to inform replenishment and re-ordering
systems and thus to react quickly to demand.  Sharing such data with key
suppliers further integrates production with the supply function.  Major
British retailers have been faster to adopt these technologies than many
counterparts in other European countries, though they still have to diffuse to
many medium-sized and small retail businesses.
(c) Rationalisation of primary distribution (i.e. factory to warehouse).  Partly as
a result of QR pressures and partly as a result of intensifying competition,
retailers have extended their control upstream of the DC (i.e. from the DC to
the manufacturer).  In an effort to improve the utilisation of their logistical
assets, many have integrated their secondary and primary distribution
operations and run them as a single ‘network system’.  This reduces waste
and improves efficiency.  This rationalisation of primary distribution has
now been taken a stage further within the UK as retailers implement Factory
Gate Pricing (Primary Distribution) with their suppliers.  This strategy (ex-
works costing) extends the retailers’ control over the flow and transportation
of goods from the supplier.  The retailer decides which companies should be
doing the transport and also the shape of the consolidation of suppliers and
their products.
(d) Introduction of Supply Chain Management (SCM) and ECR (ECR).  Having
improved the efficiency of their logistics operations, many retailers have
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closely collaborated with suppliers to maximise the efficiency of the retail
supply chain as a whole.  SCM and ECR provide a management framework
within which retailer and suppliers can more effectively co-ordinate their
activities.  The underpinning technologies for ECR have been well
established in the United Kingdom, so conditions have been ripe for the
application of this principle.
(e) Increased return flow of packaged material and handling equipment for
recycling/re-use.  Retailers have become much more heavily involved in
this ‘reverse logistics’ operation.  This trend has been reinforced by the
introduction of the EU packaging directive.  Although the United Kingdom
has lagged behind other European countries, particularly Germany, in this
field, there remain opportunities to develop re-usable containers and reverse
logistics systems to manage their circulation.
Whilst McKinnon’s analysis was developed in the context of the United
Kingdom, such trends are being found in many other countries.  This diffusion of
logistics approaches has occurred for two main reasons.  First, the benefits from
reconfiguring the supply chain are recognisable from the results achieved.  As with
much in retailing therefore, there has been a spate of ‘copying’ or replication.
Secondly, the process of retail internationalisation has itself gone beyond simply
opening shops in another country.  As retailers have internationalised, so they have used
their power and position to redevelop and export supply chain practices.  Thus, the
Tesco systems in Poland and Thailand are based on practices in the United Kingdom.
For Wal-Mart, the ability to export its ‘model’ of business, including its supply chain, is
fundamental to its chances of success in international markets.
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It should be clear from the discussion above that the modern retail logistics
system is heavily dependent on the use of information technology.  Logistics now is as
much about information movement as it is about product movement.  Of course it
remains true that products have to be distributed.  Vehicles, packages, boxes and crates
are still involved.  But, increasingly data and its use drive logistics and organise what
gets moved, when it moves and the form in which it is moved and stored.
Modern retail logistics no longer operate as a separate or functionally based
activity.  Within a company, warehousing and transport cannot exist as private separate
operations.  Instead logistics is all about integration, not only within a company, but
also increasingly outside the business with suppliers, logistics services providers and
customers.  Partnership is a strong component of modern retail logistics and an ability to
work with other individuals and other companies is fundamental to success.  This of
necessity will include discussions about packaging and handling systems.
It should also have become apparent that the ‘reach’ of retail logistics has
expanded enormously.  Originally companies had to manage their supplies and product
from local warehouses.  Nowadays, retailers are much more international and global in
their outlook.  Product is sourced from around the world, and so the interactions and
movements involved in logistics are now equally international and global.  Yet, at the
same time, there is concern to enable local suppliers to participate in such systems and
thus to add a point of differentiation.
However it must not be forgotten that logistics is eventually about the
movement of product.  Much work is undertaken on improving the mechanics and
details of product movement and handling, including packaging.  For example, a
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modern supermarket contains good examples of packaging and handling
standardisation, the best of which makes handling easier and allows customers to buy
direct from the product packaging.  Vehicle fleets may be equipped with GPS (Global
Positioning Satellite) systems and advanced tachograph and communications
equipment, allowing real-time driver and vehicle performance monitoring and linking
vehicles to stores and other distribution points.  The timing of deliveries into ‘windows’
is critical for product flow and labour scheduling.  In distribution centres, voice
activated or controlled picking has added a degree of accuracy and speed to the process.
Shelf-Ready merchandising or other ‘flow’ based handling systems have also speeded
up the processes involved.  Such detailed analyses remain key elements of supply chain
integration.
This section has highlighted many of the issues and topics involved with
retail logistics and the supply chain in Europe and UK.  It is the industry environment
for the Tesco developments, which follow in chapters three and four.
2.4 The Example of Tesco
The example of Tesco is the platform for the detail of this thesis.  Tesco is
the number one grocery retailer in UK and now has an international presence.  The
supply chain and logistics in Tesco have evolved over recent decades.  Some of the
development has been ground breaking and demonstrated leadership in the industry.
The author’s operational experience was with Tesco during an extended period during
which the supply chain grew in its complexity, scale and interaction with the suppliers
and their transport providers.  Tesco has, in reality, been a channel captain in retail






3 Tesco Retail Logistics
Chapter Three introduces Tesco retail logistics and chapter four continues
the process, examining primary distribution and then the fresh food supply chain.  This
chapter describes the evolution of retail logistics in the UK including interviews with
senior Tesco distribution directors, who experienced the company’s development at
different stages.  The chapter concludes with Tesco International growth, which has
placed Tesco firmly as one of the three global grocery retailers in the world, alongside
Carrefour and Wal-Mart.
The company is known internationally as a retailer.  What is not so well
known is its role in retail logistics and supply chain management. It has a long expertise
in, and understanding of this critical success factor for its business strategy.  That
strategy is to ‘serve customers to earn their lifetime loyalty’.  This combination of retail
success and supply chain expertise makes it a good candidate for further study in this
thesis.  It is selected for examination as an example of the role of retailers as channel
captains in retail supply chain change.
It is logical to start with a short introduction, Tesco as it is today based on
annual reports.  This presents financial highlights from its 2006 results.  It lists the detail
of recent investments in retail logistics and supply chain management, both UK and
International.  It provides an insight into its continuing supply chain strategy.  That does
not explain how it reached this advanced state of expertise and practice.  To understand
that more fully it is necessary to examine the historical roots of its supply chain
development.  Those origins help to explain the conviction that Tesco has, as a retailer,
that retail logistics and supply chain management are critical to its business success.
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They lay the foundation for its transformation into the sophisticated modern supply
chain structure and network that exists today.  The journey through history includes an
interview with a Board Director during the 1970s.  This supports the base from which to
take up the story under the theme; ‘behind the retail revolution there has been a
distribution revolution’.  This is based on a series of articles that the author wrote
collaboratively with a colleague from Stirling University.
3.1 Tesco Today
Tesco today is a large successful international company reaping the rewards
of its ten year strategy of International; core UK; non-food; and retailing services.  The
evidence is in the results for year ending 25 February 2006.  This success explicitly
recognises the alignment of the supply chain with the needs of the final consumer, for
their lifetime loyalty (Table 3.1).
Yr Ended  25 Feb
2006
Year on year change
Sales (inc VAT) £m UK 32,657 10.7%
International 10,480 40.7%
Sales Total Group 43,137 16.7%
Operating Profit Total Group 2,280 16.8%
No of Stores UK 1,897
International (Asia 450, Europe
364)
414
No of Stores Total Group 2,711




Sales Space Total Group 58,720 100%
Source: Tesco plc 2006, Preliminary Results 2005/6
Table 3.1  Tesco 2006
The scale of the modern Tesco supply chain operation is conveyed through
some excerpts from the 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports (Tesco plc 2005, 2006).
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UK: distribution: “(05 p12):  The company delivered 1.6 billion cases in the
year through 26 distribution centres. There are  new trunking stations in Cheshire and
Hertfordshire.  These receive stock from distribution centres and suppliers and organise
deliveries to stores.  A new centre at Daventry to coordinate non food imports.  A new
fresh food depot for meat and produce opens in Peterborough (October 2005) handling
700,000 cases per week for Christmas.  (06 p10)”.
UK Stores: “1.5 million customers per week use self checking in 200 stores.
There is more shelf ready packaging to speed replenishment of products and customers
benefit form clearer aisles.  Step Change £330 efficiency savings: introduced mobile
display units for prepacked bread; new ways of managing stock in stores to increase the
availability of products for customers, involving scanning gaps using hand held
computers on a regular cycle, has significantly reduced out of stocks and also reduced
costs.”
International: “Sharing skills (05 p 14) to help us server customers better
wherever we operate, we share knowledge and best practice across the business.  By
transferring what we know in the UK about running our stores, buying and marketing
our products, we are able to develop better ways of working, invest in price and
improve the shopping trip for customers”.
Hungary (05 p16): “we extended our 430,00 sq ft Herceghalom distribution
centre.  To improve our fresh food offer we opened a new 225,000 sq ft fresh food
distribution centre in Gyal.  It uses radio frequency technology instead of paper to keep
track of products and sort orders.  It accounts for over 95% of the volume of our fresh
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food.  Poland (05 p 17): our new grocery, fresh and non food distribution centres in
Teresin are now operational, handling around 95% of the volume.  Slovakia(05 p 18): a
new fresh food distribution centre under construction in Beckov will be operational by
May 2005 and is another example of Tesco transferring world class knowledge to local
teams for the benefit of our customers”.
Turkey (05 p18): “Kipa, we plan to introduce a new suite of IT systems
called ‘Tesco in a Box’.  These systems will run many key areas of our business
including our supply chain and replenishment operation to help customers get what
they want, when they want it.  This implementation has been the model for subsequent
rollout to Japan and China (06 p10).  This ‘Tesco in a Box’ system was developed in
India to standardise out IT systems to improve efficiency and reduce cost”.
Suppliers(06 p12): “We take a partnership approach to working with
suppliers, sharing our knowledge and listening to suppliers feedback.  This includes
providing technical expertise, advice and insight into customer trends and making
regular payments on time.  Supplier viewpoint(06 p7): We aim to monitor supplier
relationships through Supplier Viewpoint Surveys.  The target is for over 90% of
suppliers to view Tesco as trustworthy, reliable, consistent, clear, helpful, and fair;
[achieved 94% in 2006 and 90% in 2005)”.
Tesco is a company that is integrated in its corporate culture and alert to the
importance of its long term relationships with customers, suppliers and the supply
chain.  It is an international company with a clear strategy of being  Flexible, act Local,
keep Focus, operate Multi-formats and Capability (Terry Leahy CEO 05 p5).  It is the
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subject for this thesis:  The Role of Retailers as Channel Captains in retail supply chain
change.
3.2 Retail Logistics
Retail logistics, in this thesis, is the term used for: the movement of goods
from retailer controlled regional distribution centres to the retail stores.  It might appear
illogical to begin with end of the supply chain, when considering the flow of product
from producer to consumer.  The reason retail logistics is placed first is that it was the
first segment of the physical supply chain that the retailers chose to control directly for
themselves.  Retail logistics is a well-established sector of retail control over the supply
chain.  The next section provides some data covering a twenty-year period establishing
that this is a major trend.
3.2.1 Tesco 1984 – 2005
The Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) has provided annually valuable
data on retail logistics.  This provides a factual basis for statements about the
development in retailers control over their distribution in the UK.  For this reason it is a
solid base on which to build the proposition that retailers are the channel captains in
retail supply chain change.  Let the facts speak for themselves.  The 1984 results are
reported in McKinnon (1989, p65).  In 1984 Sainsbury had centralised 85% of its
grocery volume; by 2005 (IGD 2006) that had increased steadily to 95%.  During the
same period, Tesco who had started from a lower centralised base of 50% of its grocery
volume in 1984 volume; accelerated up to the same 95% by 2005 (Table 3.2).  But that
does not reveal the full scale of this transformation.  The annual volume of cases
throughput that Tesco now distribute through its centralised distribution network is 1.6
billion cases a year.  That is almost twice the case throughput volume, of 810 million,
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for Sainsbury.  On initial examination of the percentage figures on their own, it would
not be possible to identify Tesco as a leader, it appears more to be a late adopter than an
initiator.




















Tesco 34.70% 1,631,181,842 8,077,000 23% 28 95.00% 50%  
Asda 19.80% 931,615,000 7,168,000 21% 23 96.50%  
Sainsbury’s 17.20% 810,000,000 5,772,000 17% 20 95.00% 85%  
Somerfield 7.40% 348,298,764 3,257,000 9% 14 90.00%  
Co-operative
Group
5.99% 279,503,380 2,783,000 8% 22 85.70%  
Pa lmer  &
Harvey
3.80% 180,971,000 917,000 3% 15 100.00%  
Waitrose 3.70% 175,922,000 1,632,000 5% 8 97.90%  
Nisa-Todays 1.90% 91,100,000 700,000 2% 3 100.00%  
Budgens 1.00% 47,296,599 297,000 1% 1 94.00%  
United Co-
operatives
0.40% 19,000,000 165,000 0% 1 65.00%  
M & S
(Food)





Boots 2,624,000 8% 24 95.00%  
Londis 382,000 1% 3 85.00%  
Safeway 93%  
Kwiksave 80%  
Waitrose 80%  
Fine Fare 45%  
Dee 40%  
Totals   34,613,000 100% 169 24.15%   
Source: IGD 2006; McKinnon 1989 p65
Table 3.2  Warehousing Key Statistics 2005
The rate of centralisation for Tesco is rapid.  They had started from a lower
base at the time of Operation Checkout in 1977.  By 1984 they had put their
centralisation plans onto an accelerated implementation programme.  They were
expanding their current depots, building on new sites, and contracting out in order to
provide the capability to meet the company’s ambitions centralisation targets.  The first
phase was the capital investment to expand the warehouse and distribution capacity.
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The second phase was an intense stock reduction programme, called Corporate
Replenishment.  In order to free up sales floor space in the retail stores, the back up
stock rooms needed to be cleared.  That could only be achieved by introducing ever
improving stock replenishment systems throughout the company, in retail, in
distribution, in head office.  The third phase was the ability to continue to increase the
case throughput achievement with the same warehouse space.  All this understates the
technological transformations that took place in the early years of this period.
The strategy was a successful formula.  These large centralised operations
had the scale to handle ever-increasing throughput.  The dry grocery model of
centralised distribution was to be replicated in other product sectors; Beers, Wines &
Spirits; Slow moving lines; Frozen foods.  The speed of implementing centralisation in
Tesco is demonstrated in the twenty-year trend from 1984 to 2005.  This trend will now
take place in the countries around the world that Tesco is establishing its stores.  It is
exporting its expertise in supply chain and logistics.  Other major retailers are also
implementing this.  One example is Carrefour and others in Greece (Bourlakis and
Bourlakis 2001).
The main point that is relevant to this thesis is that all the major UK grocer
retailers have committed themselves fully to the principle of controlling directly the
physical movement of goods from their regional distribution centres to the retail stores.
In different ways, there is a similar story to tell.  The centralisation process is a great
advantage to suppliers.  They did not have to invest in the capital or technological
infrastructure.  Delivering full loads into regional distribution centres reduced their
transport costs.  The direct delivery to retail stores was costly and inefficient.  The
suppliers had to contribute a discount on the product price for full vehicle loads into the
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RDCs.  McKinnon (1990, p76) reports on a recent survey of 50 major multiples who
were operating 187 distribution centres cover three million square feet of warehousing.
This is part of the evidence that centralised distribution is controlled by UK retailers.
Acknowledgement:  the remainder of this chapter is based on previously
published material that has been co-authored on a collaborative basis. (Smith 1998;
Smith and Sparks 1993, 2004a, b, c)
3.3 Behind the Retail Revolution is a Distribution Revolution
Food retailing in the 1980s and 1990s went through a massive
transformation.  The most visible effects of this were the food superstores in the 1980s
on which many food shopping trips are based and the return to a range of smaller
formats in 1990s. Since the mid 1990s we have seen the impact of the international
expansion of the big food retailers. The performance of the operations that underpin the
retail outlets is vital.  This chapter takes one such operation, the distribution process in
one such company, Tesco plc, to illustrate how the retail 'revolution' has also been a
distribution revolution.
Retailing has been relatively neglected as a subject of academic study,
despite its importance in the economy as a provider of both goods and jobs.  It is
apparent that components of the 'retail revolution' (Gardner and Sheppard 1989) are
worthy of detailed study, and one such component is physical distribution.  While
changes in retail location, outlet size, design and product range are obvious in a visual
sense to consumers and academics alike, the development in distribution underpinning
these retail changes are less apparent and less well understood.
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This chapter aims to explain and account for the changes in physical
distribution in food retailing.  It develops earlier work both broadly (e.g. Fernie 1989,
1997; McKinnon 1989) and specifically (e.g. Sparks 1986) and gives a focus in
particular on how one company, Tesco plc, has transformed its distribution operations
in order to satisfy modern consumer and retail demands.  The chapter argues that
change has, and will continue to have, an effect on corporate operations as well as on
consumers and manufacturers. The Tesco plc Annual Report for 1991 states:
‘The transformation of Tesco from a price-driven retailer into an integrated
group of the highest quality has been measured, discussed and commented on all along
the way. We could probably say that there has never been a more public repositioning
of a company's image than ours.’ (p20)
However, for many consumers, commentators and academics, the crucial
distribution transformation that underpins change is unrecognized.
3.3.1 The Challenges for Distribution
The retail responses (Dawson and Sparks 1985) to the consumer and
societal trends above require changes to the physical distribution strategy and operations
of retailers. Table 3.3 links the earlier discussion of consumer effects on these
responses.  Each of these can be considered in turn.
The increase in store size that has occurred has seen the majority of food
retailing concentrated on large superstores and supermarkets. The increase in scale of
units has brought increased vehicle requirements at such stores and the need to handle
larger volumes of a wider range of products. As the stores increased in size, so the
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complexity of the back door increased and the potential for congestion and disturbance
has been enhanced. The effect on distribution has been to force consideration of vehicle
scheduling and how best to manage the large volumes needed by a modern superstore.
Consumer, Societal Change Retail Change Distribution Effects
Consumption store size vehicle scheduling and volumes
consumer behaviour Location ease of distribution
shopping behaviour own brands control of distribution
Individuals Product extension distribution complexity, specialist handling
Groups Finance cost of distribution
Society service / value need for consistent high-quality distribution
technology control by information
Source: Smith and Sparks 1993 p44
Table 3.3  The Distribution Effects of Consumer, Societal and Retail Change
Concomitant with the rise of the unit size has been the movement of such
stores to off-centre locations. The movement away from the high streets has improved
the distribution position in many cases. The new stores are located in off-centre
locations, generally with good road access.  Their newness means that in many cases
they have been built with modern distribution requirements in mind.  This has eased the
problems of distribution.  However, the increase in unit sizes and ranges means that
congestion and volume handling remain problems, even at off-centre sites.  A modern
food superstore in an off-centre location has a very different physical distribution
requirements from the stores it replaces, even where the replaced store is a first or
second generation superstore rather than a number of small stores.
The retailer development of own brands has clear distribution effects.  Since
own brands are within the control of retailers for longer than manufacturer brands,
closer control can be exercised throughout the distribution channel. Food retailers have
invested heavily in food technology and product development (Senker 1989) and
encouraged technological change in suppliers (e.g. Walsh 1991).  This is well
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demonstrated by the detailed involvement for example that Marks and Spencer and
Tesco, for example, have with their suppliers and represents the movement from a
physical distribution to a logistics orientation. Such involvement, particularly in
own-brand development, provides distribution savings by better knowledge,
information and co-ordination in the distribution channel.  If a retailer has an own brand
strategy, then manufacturer brands often have a greater battle to obtain shelf space.
Individual manufacturers can gain by accurate adherence to delivery schedules and
standards set by the retailers.  Accurate and effective physical distribution thus becomes
a competitive weapon for the manufacturers.
Own brands have been developed in existing and new product sectors.
Product extension has been generated by consumer and technological changes.  The
development of frozen and chilled products exemplifies these interrelationships, as does
the introduction of microwave cooked products.  The development of new product types
has increased the complexity of retail distribution.  In many cases, the initial response
was to allow specialist distribution companies to set up distribution channels for these
products.  During 1980s and 1990s, however, there has been an integration of such
channels with the core grocery products, although the need for specialist handling has
increased rather than decreased.  The food industry as a whole has been heavily
involved in legislation such as the Food Hygiene Act and throughout the distribution
channel there are requirements on product handling.  This is most apparent where
products require special temperature environments and specific control procedures, e.g.
Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) (Smith and Sparks 2004a p133).
Finance is a key part of retailing, and with stores becoming more and more
expensive, attention has turned to the costs of distribution.  This has taken a number of
71
dimensions.  The actual costs of the distribution activity have come under close scrutiny
as their true nature is revealed by better accounting and finance information systems.
At a simple level therefore distribution has to justify its expense.  Obtaining the most
effective system possible is a reasonable goal.  However, distribution is also affected by
the need to maximize selling space and avoid large distribution areas within stores.  The
stock therefore has to be held away from the retail location which places a premium on
effective and consistent distribution.  At the same time, stock holding can be expensive
and wasteful and can hide proper consumer demand.  The aim is to eliminate as much as
is consistent with maintaining an appropriate service level.  Purpose-built distribution
centres themselves are expensive and retailers are concerned to make the best use of
these costly facilities.
As has been indicated earlier, service and quality expectations held by the
majority of consumers have increased. The need for distribution is therefore to perform
the distribution activities at a 'consistently high quality level'.  The move to centralized
management and control is associated with the emergence of strategic planning and the
adoption of a systems approach to retail operations, by the new management style
among the leading retailers. As these strategies create a better focus on the consumer, so
the distribution strategy and operations that underpin these corporate strategies have had
to adapt to service this focus.  Distribution strategy has become an important element of
corporate strategy (Christopher 1997; Gattorna and Walters 1996; Walters 1988).  Most
strategies in food retailing focus on service and quality and thus the distribution quality
must match the retail offering. The whole ethos of better service and customer care,
however, means little if physical distribution is unable to get the foods to the shop in the
right conditions, sizes, etc, and at the right time and at the right freshness (Smith and
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Sparks 1993). Managing the retail environment and pleasing the consumer also implies
better management of the distribution process and channels.
Finally, distribution is an aspect of retailing whose performance is enhanced
by good information flow. This is the result of the substantial amount of technology that
retailers have introduced into their operations at both store and head office levels which
has delivered a major benefit for distribution. Technology enables control by
management to remain effective in large stores and in chains of small stores.  Laser
scanning, with radio transmission to the computer control centres, is standard in
warehouses and distribution centres, with the replenishment orders from the stores
being transmitted electronically to suppliers and distribution.  Communications and
payment between retailers and suppliers were put onto a new level through
electronic-data interchange systems, such as Tradanet (e.g. Hendry 1995; McKinnon
1990).  The important point to note is that there is an increase in the level of control of
all aspects of the operation, which is the result of technological data collection,
transmission and interpretation.  Technology has been applied throughout the
distribution channel to facilitate rapid and accurate information flows to help with the
timely product distribution.  As illustrations, Walters (1988) and Belussi (1987),
provide detail on the importance of technology for Benetteon in linking retail sales,
distribution and production.  Distribution is now a part of retailing that is controlled by
information rather than by just doing.
Following on from technology introduction at the point of sale is the better
matching of products and product availability to consumer desires and needs.  Examples
abound, particularly but not solely in the fashion trade, of how technology is being used
to ensure that the retailer is stocking in the store what is selling rather than what the
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retailer hopes will sell.  Retail buying and merchandising retain elements of retail
knowledge and risk taking but increasingly consumer behaviour patterns are used to
channel the knowledge and help decision-making.  Merchandising and buying are
becoming increasingly dependant on information technology assistance and this also
then impacts on distribution practices, taking account of local variations.
The discussion above has demonstrated the range of effects and pressures
that have faced retail distribution due to the changes in consumers, society in general
and retailing.  In addition to the effects noted above, it is also apparent that, as
companies have grown bigger and become more successful, so the requirements on the
distribution function have increased and the pressures, in terms of consistency and
quality of performance, on running a multi-locational system have expanded.  Stock has
to be controlled not only in a horizontal dimension but also in a vertical dimension
within the distribution channel.  The managerial task in achieving this has become
harder and more complicated as a result of the changes discussed above.
The main distribution responses to the managerial complexities have
involved centralization and subcontracting. Centralization has involved the replacement
of multiple stock-holding points by one larger stock-holding point.  For example, the
back-rooms of many retail outlets can be replaced by a centralized distribution centre.
This centralization saves valuable retail land from being used as storage facilities but
also allows the flow of products to be regulated to the stores.  There are thus operational
and control reasons why centralization has been an attractive option.  At the same time
this move to centralize facilities has allowed the subcontracting of distribution to be
considered.  Distribution specialists often merchandise for food retailers but they have
now taken over many core operations.  There are arguments for and against contract
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distribution, but one benefit is that it has released food retailers from the direct issues of
human resource problems and the financial issues associated with distribution. There
has been a major expansion of the role of specialist distribution contractors in food
retailing's centralized distribution.
In the same way as retailing has become more centralized, so too has the
specialist distribution market.  The effect has been to have distribution activity
organized by a small number of large companies at the various stages in the distribution
channel.  This exchange among large companies has increasingly become computerized
and electronic in nature.  Electronic links promote closeness in the distribution channel
and also help with delivery flexibility and the sharing of forward planning information.
In this way the service and cost trade-offs can be better organized and a more effective
and efficient distribution system is developed. The changes in distribution operations as
a consequence of the changes outlined above can be illustrated through the extended
discussion of physical distribution in Tesco.
3.4 Tesco Past:  Establishing Control Over UK Retail
Distribution
The development of Tesco is well documented through journalistic accounts
of the company's history (Corina 1971; Powell 1991).  Tesco is Britain's number one
food retailer and Europe's number one with annual sales of almost £43bn in 2005/06
from 58 million sq ft of sales area in 2,711 stores worldwide, (Tesco plc 2006).  Much
of this sales area in the UK is in the form of 'conforming' superstores, i.e. off-centre,
large, single-storey buildings with associated free ground-level car parking.  Over 75
per cent of profits come from such stores.  A conforming store stocks more than 16 000
products across all major product groups in food and grocery.  While mostly self-
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service, counter service is provided for departments such as delicatessen and fresh fish
and other in store departments e.g. Bakery.  Over 50 per cent of products are own brand
with a particular own-brand emphasis in fresh food. Tesco recognise that customers
want a range of retail formats for their various shopping needs.  So there is a range of
sizes and locations in addition to the edge of town superstore; the large Extra, with its
full range of non-food; the  city Metro store for the needs of the office worker, e.g.
Covent Garden, London; and the fuel-linked Express, which appeals to the motorist on
the move.
This view of Tesco is, however, far removed from the origins of the
company.  Tesco made its name by the operation of a 'pile it high, sell it cheap'
approach to food retailing.  Price competitiveness was critical to this and fitted well
with the consumer requirements of the time.  The growth of the company saw expansion
throughout the post-war period until the early 1970s.  The approach to retailing
epitomised by Sir Jack Cohen was put under pressure at this time as competition and
consumer values altered.
3.4.1 1970s Operation Checkout and Ambient Centralisation
Since the heyday of the era of 'pile it high, sell it cheap' the number of stores
has decreased, while the average size of store has risen.  This has involved a
transformation of the store portfolio into several formats: extra, superstore, metro and
express.  Tesco emphasizes high quality, freshness and responsiveness to the customer.
By keeping in close touch with its consumers, Tesco argue that they can provide better
for their changing needs and wants.  Their strategy has been to invest in about 20 major
new stores each year.  There has been enormous increase in the scale of the business
between the 1960s and the 2000s.  The boost to turnover began in 1977 when the
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company, through Operations Checkout (Akehurst 1984), stopped giving trading
stamps, cut prices by 4 per cent but also started to move up-market.  From 1985 the net
margin and thus profitability has been driven higher as the new Tesco took over and
business efficiency gains have occurred.
The changes the customer sees are obviously focused at the store, but
behind the store revolution and the changing store portfolio (location, scale, type, age)
lies a distribution transformation without which the success of the 1980s and 1990s
could not have been achieved and the base for the current millennium would have been
insufficient.
The distribution policies and strategies of Tesco have been the subject of
previous study.  This chapter extends this earlier work (Smith and Sparks 1993, 2004c;
Sparks 1986, 1988).  There have been five main phases in distribution strategy and
operation.  First, there was a period primarily of direct delivery by the supplier to the
retail store.  Second, there was the move, starting in 1970s, to centralized regional
distribution centres for ambient goods and the refinement of that process of centralised
distribution; it is this phase that has received most attention.  Third, there has been the
development of composite distribution starting in 1989.  Fourth, the advent of retail
vertical control up the distribution chain into primary distribution in 1990s.  Fifth, the
application of retail horizontal collaboration with other companies to achieve better
operating efficiency.
The Tesco distribution system in the 1970s in the wake of Operation
Checkout (Akehurst 1984) almost came to a halt.  The volume of goods being moved by
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Tesco proved too large to handle in the timescales required. As Powell comments,
quoting Sir Ian Maclarin:
‘Ultimately our business is about getting our goods to our stores in
sufficient quantities to meet our customers' demands.  Without being able to do that
efficiently, we aren't in business, and Checkout stretched our resources to the limit.
Eighty per cent of all our supplies were coming direct from manufacturers, and unless
we'd sorted out our distribution problems there was a very real danger that we would
have become a laughing stock for promoting cuts on lines that we couldn't even deliver.
It was a close-run thing.’ (Powell 1991, p184)
Powell continues:
‘How close is now a matter of legend: outside suppliers having to wait for up to
twenty-four hours to deliver at Tesco's centres; of stock checks being conducted in the
open air; of Tesco's four obsolescent warehouses, and the company's transport fleet
working to around-the-clock, seven-day schedule.  And as the problems lived off one
another, and as customers waited for the emptied shelves to be refilled, so the tailback
lengthened around the stores, delays of five to six hours becoming commonplace.
Possibly for the first time in its history, the company recognised that it was as much in
the business of distribution as of retailing.’ (1991, p184, emphasis added)
Operation Checkout provided a short-term shock to the distribution system.
There were major problems in handling the peak weeks and the increased volumes, but
generally the company coped, albeit through running multi-shifts in the distribution
centres.  Having weathered the distribution effects of Operation Checkout, it became
clear that other changes to distribution would be needed as the new business strategy
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took hold.  In effect, by Operation Checkout and the move up-market that followed,
Tesco were changing the mission, vision, strategy and culture of the company.  This
included distribution operations.
The decision was taken to move away from direct delivery to stores to
centralization.  The basis of this decision (in 1980) was the realization of the critical
nature of range control on the operations.  Tesco always had delivered some products
centrally but the majority had come direct from manufacturers to stores.  At its peak this
reached a direct to store : warehouse ratio of 83:17.  In addition to being inefficient for
the store operations and being unable to cope flexibly with increased volumes and
quality, the system allowed almost no control or standardization of the retail outlets and
of store managers.  Powell uses the euphemism of ‘private enterprise’ (1991, p185) to
describe the pricing and stocking behaviour of individual store mangers.  With direct to
store delivery, managers were 'encouraged' to 'buy-in' extra products on secondary lines
to cover stock losses.  The realization of the effects this was having on the business
forced the decision to end buying in and managers' deal books and allow the
introduction of true stock results and range control.  Centralization of control was
established for the modern business.  Tesco head office had to have this control if the
company was to be transformed: centralized distribution was one plank in the control
strategy.
Tesco adopted a centrally controlled distribution service (Kirkwood 1984a,
b) delivering the vast majority of stores' needs, utilizing common handling systems,
with deliveries within a lead time of a maximum of 48 hours (Sparks 1986). Six key
areas of this strategy can be identified. First, there was an extension and change to the
existing fixed distribution facilities, including the building of new distribution centres.
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The location of these facilities was aimed at more closely matching distribution needs to
the store location profile and to changes in this profile.  Second, lead times improved.
Improvements in technology allowed faster stock turn, allied to which was the
scheduling of vehicles at all points in the channel.  Third, common handling systems
were used at the distribution centres and stores to handle stock replenishment more
easily.  Fourth, the demands of modern retailing required multi-shift working.  Fifth,
computer software modelled company decisions, allowing the best use of all facilities.
Sixth, dedicated i.e. contract,  distribution was used to meet high levels of performance.
The standards are set by Tesco and monitored by them.  The contractors have to meet
these specifications.
The effect of this strategy for Tesco has been to produce a more rationalized
network of distribution centres, which are linked by computer to stores via head office.
The proliferation of back-up stock-holding points has been reduced.  These centres were
the hubs of the network, being larger, handling more stock, more vehicles and requiring
more efficient organization.  Control of the system ensures the stores obtain the goods
they require.  The technology enabled this control, which in turn shaped the business
strategy.  The implications of these changes were to alter the spatial locations of the
physical distribution structure and alter the transport patterns.
Tesco have handled dry grocery and non-food products via centralized
distribution for a number of years.  Many developments were made during the 1980s.
For example, in 1983-84 Tesco moved from wooden pallets to roll cages and from a
basic to a modern computer warehouse system (Dallas) which provides
computer-controlled allocation of warehouse space and computer-calculated real time
bonus for productivity.
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Since 1984 the percentage of sales via central warehouses has increased
from under 30 per cent to over 95 per cent.  By 2003, the annual distribution volume
had increased to more than one billion cases delivered, out of 25 distribution centres,
covering seven million square feet of warehouse area, holding 9.9 days stock for
stocked products, i.e. excluding the pick by line volumes. The size of the ambient
distribution centre has increased to 500,000 sq ft, e.g. Thurrock, which opened in 2002,
with a weekly assembly capacity greater than one million cases, with over 4,000 live
lines. There is also a very large non-food national distribution centre in Milton Keynes
with automation for selected product lines. The model is implemented as the business
growth requires, not only in the UK but also in the other countries in Europe and Asia
where Tesco now operates, (see later).
3.4.2 Donald Harris Interview
This section summarises an interview by the author, in 2003, with Tesco
Board Director, Donald Harris, who was in charge of Distribution during the late 1970s
and early 1980s.  He also had other responsibilities.  It is an opportunity to see from
inside the business rationale for the Tesco centralised distribution strategy that is so
evident in the twenty-year data presented in the previous section.  There are only a few
direct quotations; the rest is the author’s summary.
A sound way to start this summary is with a quote from Harris.  “I offer
Harris’s Law, which is that no company ever anticipates, wild, outrageous success”.
He is referring to Operation Checkout in June 1977, Tesco had made the decision to
stop giving Green Shield stamps because with the high rates of inflation they lost their
value and customers were not able to exchange them for the goods they wanted.
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McLaurin knew that customers now wanted quality and Tesco needed to move
upmarket.  Operation Checkout was a resounding retail success.  Market share went up
from 7.8% to 11.3% in three weeks.  “The story of stamps is well known, what isn’t well
told is the disaster area that became of distribution”.  The suppliers at that time were
delivering direct to the retail stores.  The centralised volume was low, less than thirty
percent for grocery. Most of the other product groups were delivered direct.  The gap
between the success of the retail strategy and the failure of the supply strategy was
evident to the senior directors.  A great deal needed to change from the retail store to the
suppliers.  “Centralisation was an imperative, it was not optional”.  Centralised product
delivery in full loads allowed Tesco to negotiate a discount with the suppliers.
The strategy gradually took shape.  Corporate Replenishment was the
programme for transforming the stock ordering systems in store, in head office, in
distribution.  Taking unneeded stock out of the retail store freed up sales floor space for
retail sales.  Capital investment was agreed to increase the capacity of existing and
building new distribution centres.  Agreements were made with logistics service
providers for warehousing and distribution to cover areas of the county.  Modern
warehouse systems (Dallas) were specified and introduced.  A plan was agreed for an
aggressive increase in the volume of grocery centralised.  (interview end)
The strategy for the future was made. There was internal cohesion within
Tesco.  The supply chain was aligned through the corporate replenishment programme
to retail store development.  The motivation was sustainable business development to
gain market share and the lifetime loyalty of customers.
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That summary of those years concluded the interview, but a reflective note
from the author is appropriate.  He was appointed general manager at Crick dry grocery
distribution centre, M1 Junction 18, in 1984 to 1986.  This was a modern 250,000 sq ft.
warehouse completed with the Dallas system.  There were double day shifts and the
weekly volume was 300,000 cases.  Within those two years a night shift was started,
new productivity systems were introduced, new picking methods with labels rather than
lists.  Distribution professionals were recruited to continue the implementation of the
strategy.  It was the start of the mature phase within Tesco of centralised retail logistics
for dry grocery and the other stocked products groups.  Harris had set up the contract
distribution network, which the author then controlled from 1986 to 1990 until
composite was established, which is the subject of the chapter five.
3.4.3 1980s Composite and Contract Distribution
In 1989 Tesco had 42 depots in total, of which 26 were temperature
controlled.  That in itself was a massive reduction from the plethora of small locations
(including back-ups) found in the 1960s and 1970s, but was still capable of
improvement.  Fresh foods were basically handled through single temperature,
single-product depots.  These were small, inefficient and only used for part of the day.
Tesco had reviewed the service the network gave the stores and implemented
improvements in all product areas in 1986 and 1987.  This meant, for example, in the
short-life provisions network, that the stores received more frequent deliveries from a
rationalized number of depots (from eleven to six).  Investment was made in the Dallas
computer system in the frozen depots and accounting and budget changes allowed a
more accurate idea of the cost of distribution.
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The tactics in the late 1980s were to make as many improvements as
possible in order to give the stores a better service.  But, there were still some
disadvantages of the network.  First, each product group had different ordering systems.
Some were designed by the distribution contractor for their general use and not
sympathetic to Tesco needs.  This complicated distribution.  Second, with so many sites
it was prohibitively expensive to have on-site Tesco quality control inspection at each
location. This meant that the standards of quality desired could not be rigorously
controlled at the point of distribution.  Third, because only single product groups were
handled, each store's delivery volume was low.  Hence, it was not economic to deliver
some products to all stores to maintain the best quality, as some goods require a
temperature-controlled environment during delivery.  As single products in warehouses
they had to be carried on separate vehicles, which meant that five vehicles were needed
do deliver the full range of products to each Tesco store.  This added complication and
congestion, and was costly. Fifth, it was realized that the network would neither cope
with the growth Tesco forecast in the 1990s nor, as importantly, would it be ready to
meet expected high legal standards on temperature control in the chill chain.  These
factors combined to revise the changes necessary to meet emerging operational
requirements
The produce depot at Aztec West in Bristol was opened in 1986 and
represented the best of the old network.  Tesco could have made further investment in
the traditional single-product distribution systems, upgraded the depot and transport
temperature control and put in new computer systems, but would still have achieved
overall a poor use of resources and therefore less than optimal cost efficiency.  Tesco
decided that they needed a new dimension in their distribution strategy to provide an
upgraded service to stores for all their temperature controlled products.  The business
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strategy had moved on from the watershed of Operation Checkout to take advantage of
the new quality-driven demands.  The strategy of composite distribution was planned in
the 1980s to take effect in the 1990s.  A subsidiary requirement of this development was
the importance of ensuring continuity of service during the changeover period from old
to new so that the transition was seamless.
The major change to the centralization strategy as presented above was that
the company now concentrated its distribution further by focusing on the development
of the composite distribution network.  Table 3.4 identifies the position before and after
the introduction of the composite system.
Distribution Trends Pre-composite Post-composite
regional depots single temperature & small large & complex
Centralization about 70 per cent increased to 85 per cent
stock holding high in store low in store & depot
delivery frequency less than daily daily
identify costs some case rate all costs known
chill chain control single temperature rigorous control for freshness
computerisation half telesales total integration
Source: Smith and Sparks 1993 p58
Table 3.4  The Impacts of Composite
Table 3.4 suggests that there is a more effective and transparent system of
distribution in place and that the total efficiency of the chain has improved. Composite
distribution enables temperature controlled product, chilled, fresh and frozen to be
distributed through one system of multi-temperature warehouses and vehicles.
Composite distribution used specially designed vehicles with temperature controlled
compartments to deliver any combination of these products.  It provides daily deliveries
of these products at the appropriate temperature so that the products reached the
customers at the stores in the peak of freshness.  The insulated composite trailer can be
sectioned into one, two or three chambers by means of movable bulkheads.  There is
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independent control for up to three temperature regimes.  For example, frozen products
at -20 degrees Celsius can be carried with fresh meat at +1 degree and bread and
bananas at +12 degrees without affecting product quality.  The size of each chamber can
be varied to match the volume to be transported at each temperature.  The composite
distribution network in the UK, including Northern Ireland, now has ten centres, one of
which, Southampton has a sortation system.  Centralizing distribution of these products
in this way reduced costs and improved sales and productivity through improved quality
of product and service.  These ten centres replaced the 26 single temperature centres in
the previous network.
Each of the ten distribution centres services a region of the country and
approximately 60 stores.  The sites are all close to key motorway intersections or
junctions, which allow rapid access.  Of the ten composite centres, Tesco manage five.
The remainder are operated by specialist distribution companies, three by Wincanton,
two by Exel Logistics.  This mix enabled a comparison of performance of the Tesco
centres and the subcontractors as a league table of performance.
Composite distribution provides a number of benefits.  Some derive from
the process of centralization of which composite is an extension.  Others are more
directly attributable to the nature of composite.  First, the move to daily deliveries of
composite product groups to all stores in waves provides an opportunity to reduce the
levels of stock held at the stores and indeed to reduce or obviate the need for storage
facilities at store level.  All short-life products are received by each composite
distribution centre during the afternoon and evening and delivered to the stores before
trading commences the next day. Tesco call this the first wave.  Longer-life and ambient
products, which are stocked lines, are delivered to stores on second wave, which is
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between 8 am and 10 pm.  All deliveries are made at prearranged times. Tesco
composite distribution centres have achieved on-time delivery in excess of 95 per cent
of occasions.  They have done this despite adverse weather and traffic conditions.
Given this operating procedure and performance level, the potential for stock reduction
is clear.  In aggregate terms, the changes in distribution stock position in the company
have improved continuously.  Over the 1980s, the changes have succeeded in halving
the stock days in the system.
The second benefit of composite is the improvement of quality with a
consequent reduction in wastage.  Products reach the store in a more desirable
condition. Better forecasting systems minimize lost sales due to out-of -stocks.  The
introduction of sales-based ordering produces more accurate store orders and more
rigorous application of code control results in longer shelf life on delivery, which in turn
enables a reduction in wastage.  This is of crucial importance to shoppers who demand
better quality and fresher products.  In addition, however, the tight control over the
chain enables Tesco to satisfy and exceed the new legislation requirements on food
safety, (Smith and Sparks 2004c).
Third, the introduction of composite provided an added benefit in
productivity terms.  The economies of scale and enhanced use of equipment provide
greater efficiency and an improved distribution service.  Composite distribution means
that one vehicle can be used instead of the five needed in the old network.  The result is
reduced capital costs and less congestion at the store.  Within composite, changes such
as inbound scanning and radio-linked computers on fork-lift trucks further enhanced
productivity.  In essence, throughout the system there is an emphasis on maximizing
productivity and efficiency of the operations.
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The introduction of composite was not a simple procedure. Considerable
problems were encountered and solved. This has involved close examination of costs,
which has enhanced the need to work closely with suppliers and distribution specialists.
There are detailed performance measures, which focus on the improvement of service
and cost against which specialists are measured.  Fundamentally, the move to
composites has led to the centralization of more product groups, the reduction of stock
holding and its faster movement along the channel, information sharing via Tradanet,
the reduction of order lead times and better code control for critical products.
There were certain issues that existed even post-composite. First, the
development of computerized systems takes a long time and is costly. Second, there is a
need to maintain continuity of service to retail, which means that the implementation of
improvements must be invisible to distribution's customer, the retail stores. Third, the
cost of primary distribution remained within the buyer's gross margin and was not
identified clearly and separately.  This cost had to be substantiated indirectly by talking
to suppliers and hauliers. Finally and most importantly, certain sectors of the supplier
base were fragmented and not fully organized to the needs of retail distribution.  It was
that fragmentation which made the task of securing further permanent improvements
difficult.
The most significant operational issue concerning suppliers was the gap
between the ideal and the actual supplier delivery profiles during the day and the impact
this was having on the punctuality of first-wave deliveries to the stores. The operators
had to forecast the hourly patterns of their staff in order to organize them into correct
shift patterns throughout the day. Other important but related issues were the motivation
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of the work-force during these changes, accurate planning for the peak week demand by
hour through the busiest days and maximizing the use of capital investment in the
warehouse and transport.
To address the problem of better scheduling deliveries to depots from
suppliers, particularly fresh foods, detailed rotas were established to ensure that the
composite centres did not receive all their products in a short time window at the end of
the day. Close liaison and new methods of ranking products helped to overcome the
problems of delivery compression (Smith 1992). Thus, the productivity of the
composites and the effective capacity of composite depots is increased.
By 2003 not only were there ten large composite distribution centres in the
UK, including Northern Ireland, each capable of assembling more than a million cases
per week, but in order to increase the volume capability of those composites, Tesco had
implemented a change to its frozen strategy by commissioning a new automated frozen
distribution centre at Daventry in 2001 with 2,500 live lines. This national frozen centre
serviced Tesco stores by delivering through the composite distribution centres. This
strategy enabled the frozen chambers to be converted to chill chambers at the
composites, thus releasing extra volume capability to service Tesco business growth.
This national frozen distribution centre also provided Tesco with an opportunity to
reorganise its frozen primary distribution network, (see later).
3.4.4 Computer Data Flows
The composite centres are linked by computer to head office to pass product
demand and the data to monitor and control the operation.  For all products handled by
the composite centres, forecasts of demand are produced and transmitted to suppliers.
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Composite distribution operates with no stockholding of the fresh products. The aim of
the system is to allow suppliers to have a basis for preparing products.  This is
particularly important for short-life products where the aim is to operate a demand pull,
just in time system from factory  through the composite centre to the store.  To meet
such targets on delivery each supplier needs information on predicted replenishment
schedules.
This sharing of information is part of a wider introduction of electronic
trading to Tesco.  In particular, Tesco  built a Tradanet community with suppliers
(Edwards and Gray 1990; INS 1991) for both direct to store and distribution centre
deliveries.  This provided a number of benefits.   Improvements to scanning in stores
and the introduction of sales-based ordering have enabled Tesco better to understand
and manage ordering and replenishment.  Sales-based ordering automatically calculates
store replenishment requirements based on item sales and generates orders for delivery
to stores within 24 to 48 hours.  This information is used via Tradanet to help suppliers
plan ahead both in product and distribution.  Delivery notes, invoices and other
documentation including e-mail can also be sent by Tradanet.  An INS report, quoting
Tesco, states:
'This represents a further reduction in stockholding without any drop in
service levels. Indeed the service often improves because suppliers are no longer
dependant purely on their own forecasting - there are fewer surprises and we are
developing a better understanding of each other's business.' (INS 1991, p4)
In 1997 Tesco gave a commitment to share information with its suppliers.
They could have the information they wanted; in return, Tesco wanted them to dedicate
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resource to focus on Tesco customer wishes and then provide appropriate product
offerings.  This commitment complemented the change in commercial structure to focus
on category management.  Tesco wanted to move on from the traditional single point of
contact with suppliers between the buyer and the national account manager to a more
complex interaction with suppliers in which different functions worked together.  This
commitment to share information required system support to give the visibility of the
same information to both Tesco commercial teams and their supplier teams.  Tesco set
up a strategic development with GE Information to create a commercially secure data
exchange system based on Internet principles; it was called Tesco Information
Exchange [TIE].  A limited number of key suppliers then joined the pilot phase before a
phased roll-out was implemented.  Promotion was a key area identified through
Efficient Consumer Response [ECR] as an opportunity to provide a better offer to the
consumer, a simpler operation to manage at all stages and a cheaper supply chain cost
by avoiding the waste of overstocking or large fluctuations in demands
3.5 Present: Tesco Retail Goes International .
3.5.1 The International Retail Operation
“Tesco is now recognised as an International Group.” John Gardiner,
Chairman, (Tesco plc 2003, p2)
This process of becoming an international retail operation started in the mid
1990s, when Tesco embarked on a long term strategy of building a profitable
international business of scale in Europe and Asia. Within ten years, by 2006, Tesco had
successfully established that retail presence; in Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland; in Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia; and in Asia:
Thailand, South Korea; Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan, and now China and USA. It has
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already become the market leader in five of those international countries, in addition to
being number one in the UK.  By 2006 that overseas operation accounted just over half
the Tesco Group retail space, 56%, (Tesco plc 2006). There is a big opportunity to
leverage the scale of those markets and Tesco is applying itself to gain the dual benefits,
of local market awareness, and the transfer of best practice from the UK.
One of the lessons that Tesco does not have to re-learn, is the importance of
expertise in supply chain logistics in gaining competitive advantage. It has gained a
great deal of ability through its strategy of learning the value of taking control over the
whole length of the supply chain, from producer to consumer; as detailed in the earlier
part of this chapter.  This has provided Tesco with expertise, which it has transferred as
best practice to support its international operations outside the United Kingdom.
3.5.2 Tesco.com
In 1995 Tesco conducted a pilot in home shopping at Osterley Store near
Heathrow.  Customers could use a variety of methods: telephoning a customer service
centre, fax, personal computer with CD ROM or the Internet.  A menu-style screen gave
the customer the choice of selection process for shopping, for example, by accessing a
product category or new products etc.  These orders were then picked at the store by
Tesco staff and could be collected or delivered to the customer’s home or drop off
point.  This pilot was extended to ten stores in the London postcode area in 1997.  By
2003 the annual turnover of Tesco.com had increased dramatically to £447 million,
reaching 96% of the UK population, serviced from local Tesco retail stores using a fleet
of 1,000 temperature controlled vans delivering 110,000 orders per week, which is a
65% share of the UK internet grocery market. It is now established in the Republic of
Ireland, where it reaches 70% of the population; and in South Korea, with
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www.homeplus.co.kr, where over 70% of the population have internet access. In the
USA, Grocery Works, which is a partnership between Tesco.com and Safeway Inc, has
established coverage in Portland, Oregon, San Francisco and the Bay.
In the UK, Tesco.com has 20,000 grocery lines, 1.2 million books, 25,000
videos, 7,500 DVDs and 1,800 electrical goods, as well as special sections for flowers
and wine.  The Tesco.com home shopping model uses personal shoppers to hand-pick
all their customers’ shopping in the Tesco Store, which is then delivered to customers
homes, at their convenience.
This is clearly a successful model, which has thrived in contrast to
competing home shopping models, such as Webvan in USA, which was in vogue in
1999 but quickly went out of business.  The benefit of the Tesco.com model is that the
local retail store provides a wider selection of products for consumer selection than any
single distribution centre, since each distribution centre is specialised for specific ranges
of product, e.g. fresh, frozen, grocery, wines, health & beauty.  The retail store is the
place where all these product channels come together in one place.  The home delivery
van is designed to load products at different temperatures, and the van drivers are part
of the retail store team, so they know about the latest promotion information.
The contrasting model that was implemented by Webvan and their followers
was a dedicated warehouse look-a-like shop set up solely for picking customers’ orders.
Such a facility has the advantage of being built at lower cost, in a warehouse-type
location, where a higher productivity picking rate can be achieved. This model could
work in a population of high home shopping density, such as London. Ocado, the
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Waitrose version have opened a dedicated home shopping warehouse in Hatfield, north
of London, UK in 2002. Only time will tell if that remains profitable.
3.5.3 Future Issue: The Environment
The environment is a topic that increased in importance in the 1990s.  There
are two aspects to this topic: air quality and global warming. The first concerns the
impact on air quality and health from vehicle emissions.  For freight, which uses diesel,
it is about low sulphur fuel with a trap to catch the particulates.  The measurements are
taken at a series of kerbside locations and it will be high priority to achieve the agreed
targets.  The second has its origins in the Rio summit when governments agreed to take
action to reduce the causes of global warming.  This was later confirmed at Kyoto 1998
with the agreements on targets for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  The target for
Britain was a reduction of 15 percent by 2015.  Both sets of targets will create external
pressure on freight transport to implement appropriate solutions.
A part of the solution will come from research commissioned by DETR,
DoT, through Heriot Watt University to identify a small family of key performance
indicators [KPIs] that link freight operational performance with environmental impact.
Traditionally, government has used tonnes kilometres as a measure of freight activity.
This particular ratio, however, is not key driver of operational efficiency.  The work
conducted with industry has identified five KPIs that influence the transport business
and the trends in freight performance and its impact on the environment.  The five ratios
are:  time utilisation, space utilisation, empty running, predictability, and miles per
gallon.  The work started in the temperature-controlled sector and has now extended to
other sectors (DETR 1999; DoT 2003a, b).  The end result is an industry-based
measurement that both drives efficiency and demonstrates environmental benefit.
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Another part of the solution will be a review of city logistics to reduce
traffic congestion, improve air quality and, where practical, consolidate part loads into
fuller loads for inner urban deliveries. One option is to deliver during the night but that
requires a solution to the major issue of noise and residents. Whatever is done in this
area needs to be realistic and practical.  There is some experience from the continent
where cities protect their inner core.
3.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to understand and account for the changes in
physical distribution in food retailing by examining changes both in general and in one
company, Tesco, in particular. The basic premise is that the transformation of retailing
that the food consumer sees, has been supported by a transformation of distribution
methods and practices. In particular, there has been an increase in the status and
professionalism of distribution as the time, costs and implications of the function have
been recognised. Professionalism has been enhanced by the transformation of
distribution through the application of modern methods and technology. Whether the
retailer now focuses on quality or on price, the importance of distribution is undeniable.
As retailers have responded to consumer change and moved up-market, so the need to
improve the quality of distribution has become paramount. At the price-conscious end
of the spectrum, the need for low-cost distribution is fundamental to reducing the
operating cost of the business. This is not to say that quality retailers are not worried
about costs or that discount retailers do not care about quality, but in each case there is a
guiding strategy from the business that conditions the strategy of distribution.
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The Tesco study demonstrates many aspects of this transformation. In
response to the clear business strategy that emerged in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s. The distribution strategy has been realigned. From a state of almost
decentralization and poor control, the company has moved to centralization and then
composites which has enabled control to be exercised stringently and led to new
methods and relationships for distribution. This is summarised in Table 3.5, which is
based on the changes in Tesco distribution from the 1980s into its modern international
structure. These may be summarised as new benchmarks for stocking policy and
locations; new distribution centre operations and systems; widespread use of
technology; new material handling systems; different management structures involving
specialist distribution contractors; and the export of supply chain and distribution
expertise to Europe and Asia.
Centralised control
Storage facilities Specialized depots (bonds/fast moving) composite
In house and contractor management
Site location and scale
Owned premises
Two picking methods
Inventory management Increased product range
Bar coding, date coding
Fewer investment buys
Reduced stock holding




Unitization Pallets, roll cages
Plastic trays, dollies
Pack sizes for merchandising
Pre-packs
Communications Computerised systems
Electronic mail, electronic data interchange
Sales-based order, checkout plus
Depot on-line real-time systems
Forecasting
International
Hand-held scanners with radio frequency
Export of UK skill sets to Europe and Asia
Supply chain ‘Tesco in a Box’
Distribution on UK model
(after Smith 1998 p182 updated)
Table 3.5  Distribution Changes in Tesco in 1980s 1990s 2000s
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The development outlined above and the transformation described are not
the ultimate solution. As consumers change their needs, so retailing must and will
respond. As retailing responds, companies will modify their operations, not least their
distribution, or be placed at a competitive disadvantage. The pursuit of increased control
described in this chapter has been enabled by technology, control by information has
replaced control by 'doing'. Another factor has been co-operation with suppliers rather
than confrontation, as in the past. In other areas of distribution, change can be
contemplated or considered. This situation in distribution is a changing one.  Focusing
solely on the retail outlet conceals many of the fundamental business changes that have
occurred and will continue to occur as shopping behaviour changes.  Focusing on the
consumer, on the other hand, creates alignment between retail strategy and supply chain
strategy.  Tesco is a model that other retailers can follow.  It has expertise in the Role of
Retailer as Channel Captain in retail supply chain change.  The next chapter examines
the other segment of retail control over the supply chain: primary distribution and the






4 Tesco Supply channels
4.1 Introduction
The background for this thesis has so far covered the topics of retailing and
retail distribution.  These have not only set the scene but also allowed the reader to go
behind the scenes.  They have explained the nature of some of the changes that have
taken place in the structure of retail distribution.  These developments have provided the
retailer with a competitive advantage.  Retail logistics was the first segment of the
supply chain that the retailers controlled directly.  The second phase of control
concentrated on the movement of goods from the suppliers to the retailers’ distribution
centres, namely, primary distribution.  This chapter will begin primary distribution.
Then it will explore supply channel collaboration with Efficient Consumer Response
(ECR) and go into the detail of the fresh food supply channel, as this is the immediate
setting for some of the case studies in chapter seven.
This extension of supply chain control gained support from the wider
collaboration that was taking place between retailers and suppliers.  This is the
establishment of ECR projects across Europe.  The chapter includes a brief account of
the benefits of this collaboration.  It continues with a basic account of the ‘push’ and
‘pull’ supply chain.  This sets the framework for examining the specialist supply
channel that provides the retailer with fresh products.  It is an example of a demanding
supply channel.  It illustrates how one retailer took control over the fresh food channel.
The next chapter five will examine the issues of managing supply chain change.
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4.2 Primary Distribution
Primary distribution is the control of the movement of goods from the
supplier to the retailer’s regional distribution centres.  As will be shown later, Tesco and
other retailers only started to get interested in controlling this segment of the supply
chain once they were firmly in control of retail logistics and the delivery of goods to
their stores.  Primary distribution is part of  the strategy to find cost efficiencies within
Retail.
4.2.1 Enhancements in UK Distribution
There are significant enhancements currently taking place within Tesco
logistics and supply chain in the UK in the early 2000’s.  They build on the
opportunities that arise out of the success of the centralisation and vertical supply chain
control that were implemented over the previous 25 years, as detailed in chapter three.
Here we shall detail two specific enhancements that are at the forefront of Tesco
logistics and supply chain strategy at the start of the millennium: Continuous
Replenishment and Factory Gate Pricing.
‘Our Step Change programme has delivered over £230m of efficiency
savings which we pass on to our customers. These programmes have focused on
primary distribution, labour schedulers and Continuous Replenishment, which has been
fully implemented in our stores. This makes the shopping experience better for
customers and simpler for stores.’ Sir Terry Leahy, Chief Executive (Tesco 2003, p5)
‘Our step change programme has delivered £230m of new efficiency savings
this year and over £600m in the past three years. This year saw great progress with
Primary Distribution, allowing us to take control of product from the factory gates to
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our distribution centres, improving efficiency and delivering cost benefits that we
reinvest in customer initiatives. All products have now been transferred to our
Continuous Replenishment system. This has delivered substantial benefits to the
business and reduced the time it takes for a product to get from supplier to shelf. We are
now able to order seven days a week, twice a day to ensure our customers get the right
product at the right time.’ (Tesco 2003, p11)
4.2.2 1990s: Primary Distribution
Suppliers and manufacturers, logistics service providers and retailers work
together in the supply chain and focus on the needs of the customer who purchases the
product. In secondary distribution the industry had been successful with its focus on
specific objectives. By applying established skills, the operators handled higher volume
throughput and achieved improved unit cost of moving goods to retail stores.  The trend
is particularly significant because as well as absorbing inflation Tesco have made
improvements in the service to retail. The business has shorter lead times, with more
frequent and more punctual deliveries with orders transmitted by Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI). This is the heritage and background to primary distribution, which
can be defined as: the physical movement of the goods from the despatch bay of the
factory to goods in at the depot.  It is the transport and any associated consolidation of
goods from groups of suppliers.
The initial idea started in 1990.  The purpose was to identify and implement
changes that were profitable to the whole supply-chain, supplier, logistic service
provider and retailer; to identify solutions in partnership with logistic service providers
and suppliers that provided lowest cost for the supply chain as a whole and not just for
one section at the expense of the others. Frequently this was a shared user solution,
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which is different from the dedicated solution found in secondary distribution where
there is total visibility of costs. Primary distribution required a change in approach and
style; Tesco had to let go of that direct control and allow the appointed hauliers and
consolidators greater freedom with more empowerment over the shape of the solutions.
Traditionally Tesco have bought goods from suppliers at a delivered price.
There was no visibility of the distribution element of the total cost of the product. Once
the scale of the cost of primary distribution had been calculated, then there was a
business motivation to apply logistics resources to identify opportunities to make
improvements in the organisation and structure of the inbound flow of goods. The
purpose was to organise domestic UK, European and world-wide distribution networks
based on analysis of those regions from which there was a high level of purchasing and
the best centres of distribution excellence in those regions. Once this analysis was
complete, it was then possible to appoint and set up primary networks in the United
Kingdom, Europe and around the world. This was a second revolution in retail
distribution but one that does not require much capital outlay; capital that was better
directed to retail store development.  Tesco were then able to be proactive in negotiating
more competitive distribution rates as a result of the negotiation scale, the command of
the sourcing of products and their expertise in distribution operations. These factors all
contributed to enhanced operational efficiency and supply-chain profitability. There was
a valuable cost contribution that could be made by involving the operators in identifying
more efficient ways of organising primary distribution and then to helping bring those
insights to the surface and create solutions that worked for all the segments of the
supply chain. It was important to work in a cross-functional style within the different
functions of Tesco: the buyers, supply chain, distribution. The primary distribution
managers sat in the commercial areas with which they were working, for example, the
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primary manager for produce sat among the produce buyers. This created a united focus
on achieving good results for the business. This created the foundation for Factory Gate
Pricing.
4.2.3 Factory Gate Pricing
Primary distribution had its origins and its special demand on the
relationships between retailers, suppliers and logistic service providers.  It emphasises
the need for cooperation, with all parties working together to identify and implement
good quality solutions for the whole of the supply chain.  This aspect of the supply
chain is being lifted to a new level of vertical control by the retailer through the strategy
of Factory Gate Pricing.  Factory Gate Pricing is a term that summarises the method of
controlling the primary distribution segment of the supply chain, from the supplier
despatch bay to the goods in bay of the retail distribution centre, by separating out the
cost of that transportation from the purchase price of the product itself, and putting it
into a separate primary distribution budget, which can then be controlled directly.
Prior to this, the commercial buyer used to purchase products at a price,
which included the delivery by the supplier into the retail distribution centre. The gross
margin, on which buyers are measured for performance, is the difference between this
purchase price and the price charged to the consumer at the retail store. Hence, as can be
imagined, removing the transport cost element from that purchase price, impacts on the
way the gross margin is calculated and the commercial buyers have to adjust their
targets accordingly. It is a major financial development within a retail organisation to
implement such a change and still retain strict control over the disciplines of making
individual buyers accountable for achieving the new level of gross margins during the
period of transition. Factory gate pricing is a strategy that requires the cooperation of
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the whole of the supply chain including the retail commercial buyers. This Tesco
achieved by bringing together cross-functional teams and by the full endorsement of the
policy from senior directors including the chief executive.
Naturally, the suppliers, and their transport service providers, went through
quite major changes to their arrangements for the delivery of their goods to the retail
distribution centres, as they implemented this policy. A policy where the detailed plans
were put together by the primary distribution team at Tesco. It became a topic at
industry seminars, at which not only Tesco but also Sainsbury’s communicated a similar
policy. This is a good example of retail moving into an area of control that had
traditionally belonged to the manufacturer and the supplier. It is not surprising,
therefore, that there was some adverse reaction in the industry, especially from those
transport operators that had lost work as a result. The case they put forward focused on
the consequences of the fact that they had lost not only the Tesco but maybe also the
Sainsbury’s business from a supplier or manufacturer. As a result the remaining volume
from those suppliers and manufacturers, which they still had to deliver to other retailers,
was no longer at a volume and delivery pattern that it was economical to do without
raising the cost to the suppliers and manufacturers. This, they said, was the direct result
of the primary distribution decisions made by the retailer to reorganise the consolidation
of product delivery. It was now the retailer, not the supplier, who appointed which
transport and distribution companies would do this work; at a price negotiated directly
between the retailer and the logistic service provider.
The case put forward by the retailer, was that to maximize competitive
advantage, the whole supply chain needed to be aligned with the demand patterns of
consumers, and that this must now include primary distribution. They further argued
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that they saw no justification that other retailers should benefit from the economies of
scale derived from the major retailers  who ordered the majority of the volume.
Factory gate pricing is a sign of a very mature retail supply chain. It
provides both full visibility of the costs and also, the accountability to organise how the
primary network is structured. It required a high level of cooperation between suppliers
and retailers to leverage the benefits of a fully controlled supply chain, where the
transport and logistics are organised by the retailer rather than the supplier.
4.2.4 Total Supply Chain, Partnership Logistics,
The relationship between the supplier, logistic service provider and retailer
was focused to achieve a total supply-chain perspective from the supplier through to the
consumer.  This was called 3D logistics (CILT keynote address, June 1996). Tesco
appointed a Supply Chain Development Director with this broad objective of looking
ahead three to five years reporting to the Chief Executive.  One of the objectives was to
structure the hourly flow of goods both into and out of the distribution centres to create
as big a capacity as possible without building more depots and balancing the capacity of
primary and secondary distribution,  this was called pipeline distribution.
An important part of this retailer and supplier relationship is the supplier
collection programme within a depot's geographical delivery area. A supplier collection
is where a Tesco vehicle collects product from a supplier on its way back to the depot
following a store delivery. In a full year, 1996-7, this saved 3 million miles of empty
running which saved 4 600 tonnes of carbon dioxide emission (DETR 1997) [Best
Practice Award]. In addition there was the supplier onward delivery programme to the
retail stores. This involved suppliers' vehicles which had delivered to depots or were
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conveniently in the area taking goods to Tesco retail stores on their way back to their
base.  In 1997 Tesco initiated the programme with a three-year target of achieving the
same level of benefit as supplier collection.
The drive towards partnership required a change in skills.  One aspect that
required some review covered decisions about when to cooperate.  There are three
levels of collaboration that are possible between companies : operational, middle
management and strategic.  The most powerful is the strategic, where there is joint
agreement on areas of mutual importance. Within Tesco, the Supply-Chain
Development Director was involved with major suppliers about the future shape of the
supply chain together with the Commercial Directors who were increasingly focused on
the importance of the long term partnership with major suppliers for product
development and the scale of sourcing to support the growth of the business. This
created a new framework for the strategic discussions with the logistic service
providers.
This was new because traditionally the focus had been on the two-way
relationship: either the retailer with the supplier; or the supplier with the logistic service
provider. Tesco as a retailer viewed the hauliers as the total responsibility of their
suppliers.  If there was a problem with the delivery being short or late, then the retailer
would phone the supplier and expect them to address the remedy with the haulier, rather
than get involved in the detail of the issue that was their problem.  The change was
influenced by the realisation that without the involvement of the retailer, many of the
solutions could not be put in place; it required three-way collaboration. Adopting such a
partnership style with suppliers and the distribution industry became a conviction that
was held deeply by the primary distribution team in Tesco.
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Once the principles of the strategic business relationship have been agreed,
then middle management can collaborate within specific functions. The most valuable
were promotion planning, new product development, forecasting peak trading volumes,
electronic data interchange, inventory management and exchanging information on the
unit cost of distribution.  The third level of collaboration is the operational focus on the
efficiency of the day to day operation and listening to the issues raised by the operators.
For example, one of the biggest opportunities that can be unlocked is by exchanging
information on the peak and slack periods of vehicle use. Businesses are interested in
improving their return on the capital invested and in having the smallest size of core
fleet to meet their needs. There are peaks and troughs in the volume of demand, with the
result that there are periods in the week and even in the day or night when vehicles
stand idle. Each company can only go so far in terms of its own efficiency. The next
step change was by mutual collaboration because by working together there was more
that companies can achieve. Anything that helped to identify opportunities to take cost
out of the primary distribution segment of the supply chain was a topic for the sharing
of information and objectives.
The joint objective for the industry was to create the conditions in which the
unit cost of primary distribution reduced year on year and, at the same time, the return
on the capital invested in vehicles increased by better co-ordination and stronger
confidence in the planning information. The purpose was to identify and implement
profitable change: profitable to the whole supply chain - supplier, distribution operator
and Tesco. The result was an important strategic alliance between primary and
secondary distribution, which examined the peaks and troughs in vehicle utilisation to
find those there were complementary. By using the advantage of the right sort of
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information, companies could act to their mutual benefit. One way of creating an
opportunity was to examine the movement of equipment such as cages and trays which
could release these other opportunities.
There was one particular aspect of this collaboration, which had great
potential. It was the onward delivery of assembled orders from the RDC's to the retail
stores.  It required some changes in trailer design. The dry freight trailer delivered
goods on wooden pallets into the depots. If the distribution operator retro-fitted
strapping equipment in the trailer to secure the cages of assembled stock, then it created
the possibility of delivering to retail stores at peak times. This was not a new concept
but it was proving to be one that was difficult to get the industry to implement. The
industry needed to generate a critical mass of 1500 such trailers.  The application in the
temperature-controlled environment required a bulkhead and a second evaporator. A
critical mass of 500 was needed to generate confidence among the transport operators
that the right equipment was available when it is needed. They had to depend on this in
their transport operations.
These developments, in the decades preceding the millennium, took Tesco
as a retail distribution operator from a position of being in far less control than its rivals
into the very forefront of logistics expertise. Tesco distribution and supply chain
became world-class leading edge in the design and implementation of such complex and
large scale organisations delivering tangible competitive advantage to the retail
operation in their focus on consumers for their lifetime loyalty.  This expertise proved to
be one of the major strengths for Tesco as it embarked on its international expansion
into Eastern Europe and Asia. The UK company was able to transfer best practice skills
to the local management, from store design and operation; the adaptation of the product
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offering; right through to supply chain and logistics.  At the same time the UK operation
continued to implement major step change enhances.
4.2.5 Continuous Replenishment
The process of centralisation reached a mature stage in the UK by the early
1990s, and this, together with the huge developments in information technology and
data network flow capacities had, by the mid 1990s, positioned Tesco supply chain
operations capability at an excellent level of competence and expertise. The synergy
created by these two major strategic drives made it possible to start to think about a
further step change in supply chain logistics: Continuous Replenishment.
Continuous Replenishment is the synergy of scale that arises out of the  high
level of consumer demand combined with a centralised supply chain and a nationwide
data flow capability.  The recipient of the benefits of this synergy is the better
availability of products for the consumer, matched to the anticipated daily demand,
which itself varies according to the day of the week, e.g. Monday has low demand and
Friday has high demand.  The issue facing the retail ordering system is the need to
match product supply with consumer demand, and achieve the twin requirements of
providing continuous availability whilst at the same time eliminating overstocks and
product waste which occur when too much stock is delivered on a particular day.
In addition to this daily and seasonal variation in demand there are other
drivers of high and low demand for products; for example, promotions of a particular
product line or pack size. Promotions not only create surges in demand for the promoted
product line but also suppression of demand for the rival product lines or alternative
pack sizes. When consumer demand surges, as in promotions, product needs to flow
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through the supply chain faster and in higher volumes. In contrast, when consumer
demand dries up or withers, as the demand switches away from the non promoted rival
product line or pack size, then the product flow needs to be reduced to prevent product
wastage or money being tied up in overstocks.  This conundrum has been around for a
long time and retailers keep looking for new solutions by examining the structure of
their current ordering methods and any limitations that has on allowing good flexibility
to match supply with demand.
Tesco examined its supply chain and the legacy of the information systems
used in retail ordering. The major change in retail operations has been the move to 24
hour, seven day a week opening of the retail stores and the need to place daily orders on
suppliers. The legacy system had originally been designed for a five day, 8 am to 6pm
retail store opening, which allowed computer maintenance shut down overnight and at
weekends. Various enhancements had been implemented to upgrade the systems for 24
hour, seven day a week live operations, not only for the stores, but also for the suppliers
ordering processes.  The time had come to take a radical review.
This review covered the full range of product types that the company was
selling; both fresh and stocked items. In order to convey the limitations of the legacy
system, Tesco used the imagery of city traffic lights, in which queues are formed while
the lights are on red, waiting for the system to allow movement when the lights turn to
green. This represents the batch system of order processing which is based upon a
structure of placing products into product groups, and then taking the group as a whole
and releasing the orders at the designated time. This legacy system treated each product
in a product group in an identical way. Although this still allowed products to flow
through according to the different levels of demand, there were limitations on its
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flexibility.  This sometimes resulted in either product not being available for consumers,
or too much product being delivered, so there was stock left over which was in excess
of the requirements of consumer demand. This stop – go structure existed at several
places along the supply chain; waiting for all the orders from all the stores to be
received at Head Office, waiting for all the product to be produced by the suppliers,
waiting for all the product to be delivered into the distribution centres, etc. When added
together, all this waiting time became a significant opportunity for improvement, but it
meant that there would have to be expensive systems rewrites to achieve this step
change in the supply chain.
The new model, Continuous Replenishment, uses the imagery of a
motorway flowing freely without any queuing caused by traffic lights.  The key
difference in perspective was to identify products by their consumer demand
characteristics, rather than view them as items just belonging to products groups, e.g.
yogurt as dairy, and baked beans as tinned grocery. Then the company could restructure
the organisation of the supply chain, in a way which allowed products to flow through
freely, at the rate appropriate to their consumer demand characteristics. For example, a
product on promotion needs a rapid, high volume, responsive supply. In contrast, a
product that is adversely affected by another product being on promotion, needs their
supply cut back quickly to a minimal level. While a product that is on its average or
normal demand, needs an average or normal level of re-supply.
It is all a matter of setting the right pace; that is appropriate to each product,
which matches supply with actual demand. Tesco and their suppliers have worked
together to remove stock from the supply chain so that it is at a bare minimum and then
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rely on customer demand forecast information coming down daily to drive product
supply through distribution to retail store.
There was already a great deal of progress that had been made with the
introduction of Composite Distribution, when new ordering systems were developed for
the fresh food products. These products were not held in the distribution centre as
stocked items, but ordered daily from suppliers in the exact quantities required to meet
retail demand. The system developed is called Pick by Line or Pick to Zero, (see the
earlier section on composite distribution). The order cycle on those products was 48
hours, which was the minimum time the suppliers needed to process the fresh foods,
especially fresh meat and poultry. The basis for the order given to the suppliers is the
anticipated retail demand, which is calculated using actual customer demand and then
making some adjustments through applying a range of factors, e.g. day of the week,
weather, etc. Tesco, later, went to a higher level of mathematical sophistication: it took
a further order from the stores 24 hours before delivery, which was used for the specific
store allocation, when the product arrived from the suppliers. Like all excellent recipes,
the precise formula remains confidential to Tesco.
This represented a major step change in the structure of the ordering process
between the consumer and the producer. For the first time the producer received
anticipated consumer demand rather than a pipeline order, triggered by stock levels
from a stockholding distribution centres, which is the normal basis for the orders for
stocked items, e.g. canned baked beans, wine, washing powder.
All this, in a system where the scale is huge and the product variety is
enormous.  In many ways, this represented an ideal pipeline flow process; but it did put
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great pressure on the suppliers not only on their production processes but also on their
logistics. It is an important example of the supply chain and logistics being an essential
part of marketing, by delivering the retail promise: product variety, freshness,
availability, all at a good price.
A new category of supply chain characteristic has emerged as a result of the
move towards continuous replenishment; it is a category titled Flow. This is the most
interesting development to arise from continuous replenishment. It applies to fast
moving long life product lines, e.g. 2 litre lemonade, UHT milk cartons. These Flow
products only remains in the distribution centre for less than a day. The level of stock in
the distribution centre is no longer one of the triggers for the order quantity, which the
supplier receives. As a result the supplier is directly in tune with consumer demand.
This is one of the ultimate goals of any supply chain.
This is a dramatic example of the changing pace in the supply chain; but a
pace that is geared to what is appropriate for the consumer demand. Not every product
line has to be rushed at the highest speed to the consumer; that urgency is reserved for
those product lines where it is truly important because it delivers the maximum benefit
to the consumer, the retailer and the supplier.
It is evident that this level of development has been driven by the retailer.
The retailer is the leader in organising the supply chain, in cooperation with the
suppliers and the logistics service providers, who run the transport and distribution
centres. The focus is the consumer.  If the consumer wins, everyone wins.
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“It is all a matter of the aligning the whole of the supply chain with the
consumer”.  (Stuart Ross, Supply Chain and Distribution Director, Tesco; Interview,
2003).
Another aspect of this development is the cost of labour within the retail
store itself.  This analysis of the allocation of costs along the length of the supply chain
from supplier to retailer reveals that the development of secondary and primary
distribution in UK food retailing has reached a stage of excellence and maturity. This
has positioned the retailer to examine more closely the next important component of the
total supply chain: the labour cost of the last 50 metres, which gets the product from the
delivery vehicle to the customer at the shelf at the retail store. This 46 percent (Tesco
2030) of the total cost is not a sign of failure, but rather of success. The world class
excellence of the supply chain up to the retail store, on the one hand reveals the
opportunity of seeing the cost of labour in the store replenishment function, and on the
other hand, provides the means and flexibility to provide solutions earlier in the supply
chain, that will assist in reducing the labour cost in the retail store. An excellent
example of this is the use of the dolly with fast moving products, e.g. Irnbru in
Scotland.  The unit is the orderable quantity from the store, it is wheeled through the
whole supply chain: supply dispatch bay, the distribution centre and to the retail selling
point in the store a minimal labour effort.  These are good examples of collaboration
between retailer and suppliers.  A collaboration promoted by the industry through
Efficient Consumer Response.
4.3 Efficient Consumer Response
The Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) programme has delivered benefits
over its first decade since 1996 through as series of projects.  It consciously approaches
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its task on a collaborative basis.  Their motto is “Working Together to fulfil consumer
wishes, Better, Faster and at Least Cost”.  The programme is co-chaired by a retailer
and a supplier.  During its early years the supply chain director from Tesco co-chaired
with the director from Bird’s Eye Walls.  In 2006 the ECR UK Executive Board Co-
chairs are: The Group Supply Chain Director, Nestle UK and the Group Logistics &
Business Systems Director, Somerfield Stores plc.  The programme is supported by the
Institute of Grocery Distribution, http://www.igd.com/ecr.  The intention here is to
provide a brief account.  This will be followed with a contribution from a retail buyer.
Both will place the supply chain change in the broader context of retailer – supplier
collaboration.
4.3.1 ECR Summary and Benefits
ECR UK was established in 1996 and is managed by Institute for Grocery
Distribution (IGD).  It had begun in USA in 1993.  It arrived in the UK in a market that
was characterised by confrontational working relationships where businesses focused on
creating value and efficiency within their own four walls.  As well as a focus on
customers, ECR attempts to break down barriers between trading partners and internal
business functions; barriers that stop an organisation working effectively. The initiative
is supported by leading UK retailers, suppliers and wholesalers, who participate in
industry working groups.  It also has conferences, such as the Supply Chain Summit in
2006.  It offers free blue books on areas including Retail Ready Packaging and On-Shelf
Availability to help businesses understand best practice within the industry.  It has
played a leading role in the collaboration movement with the grocery supply chain over
the last ten years.  Twenty-three countries throughout Europe and including South
Africa have their own ECR Initiative.
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Collaborative Learning is a new initiative designed to help trading partners
apply ECR collaborative practices to encourage change in behaviour, and accelerate
improvement of business results in key areas.  The free ECR UK blue books cover
important issues.  ‘Availability – Closer to the Shelf’, describes the further efforts of the
UK Food and Grocery Industry to ensure products are available on the shelf.  ‘Retail
Ready Packaging’, deals with Branded and Own Label suppliers working jointly with
retailers.  ‘Synch and Swim’, Provides a straightforward introduction to data
synchronisation that is a seamless sharing of information, enabled by technology.
‘Transport Optimisation’, helps understanding of key cost drivers, analysis of supply
chain costs and how to develop an appropriate distribution strategy.  All these examples
demonstrate that the work of ECR UK with IGD is practical and available for the whole
industry to access.  In 2005 the projects taking place were: Value creating beyond price;
Optimal Shelf Availability (OSA); Shrinkage; and Consumer Relationship Management
(CRM). Further information is available are www.ecrnet.org; and this information was
gathered from http://www.igd.com/secondlevel.asp?menuID=87. Accessed 27-08-2006.
An illustration of this collaboration is given in the Fresh Food Sector, which
will be examined for fully later in the chapter.  This interview with the retail buyer for
produce from the mid 1990’s demonstrates how attitudes were changing.
4.3.2 Retail Buyer View
In this section the author summarises an interview with a Tesco Produce
Manager with a trade magazine (Retail Week) in 1995.  The summary will include
direct quotes from the buyer, Andrew Grant.  The purpose of this inclusion is twofold.
The first is that it is a snapshot in time during the evolution of the Tesco trading
structure.  The second is that it represents the buyer’s changing attitude towards
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suppliers that is contemporary with the work the author was doing with primary
distribution.  It informs the background to the cases in chapter seven.  The company
financial turnover in 1995 was ten billion pounds.  Ten years later in 2005 it is thirty
seven billion.  In 1995 the Tesco fruit and vegetable sector was worth £3.9 million,
vegetables, £2.3 million and fruit £1.6 million.  The biggest selling line was bananas.
The company sourced from 188 suppliers based in 60 countries worldwide.  The
average product spend per person was £3.80 per visit on an average of 36 visits per
year.  Produce accounted for 8.5% of Tesco shopping sales space.
At the time the national fresh fruit and vegetable sector was valued at £4.5
billion.  In 1995 it was predicted that by 2000 the supermarkets’ share would reach
80%.  The commercial reality was that over two thirds of the fresh product sold in the
UK was controlled by less than a dozen retail groups.  The buyers travel the world to
arrange their programmes and often negotiate directly with the suppliers.  At the time it
was noted that: “Improved ordering systems are working their way along the
distribution chain as retailers become more responsive to consumer demand through
information gleaned directly from the checkout.”  At the same time larger logistics
companies were buying up family haulage businesses delivering produce.  The
Sheerness Product Terminal was inaugurated late in 1995.  It is a deep-water port that
received ships from around the world and handled 350,000 tonnes in 1994.  Trade
sources estimate it is the largest investment ever seen in fruit and vegetable handling
and distribution systems.  The producers were finding themselves working more closely
with the big retail chains as they bid to reduce costs, but also seek faster distribution and
retail flexibility.
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The Trading Manager for Tesco vegetables, Andrew Grant describes his
dual role. “Half developing the long term produce business strategy; half checking the
produce needed is in depots”.  He describes his goal, “for Tesco to be and to be seen as
the very best and biggest fresh produce retailer in the country”.  He explains the
competitive situation: “We are just ahead in volume terms, tough AGB puts Sainsbury’s
ahead in value”.  There have been major changes; “Produce at Tesco has gone through
a revolution over the past two years.  We were very much second players, but the days
of ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ are well and truly gone.  Tesco is now the market leader in
bananas, apples, pears, new potatoes, salad vegetables, root vegetables, tropical fruit
and soft citrus.  The key is having the best quality produce and having it consistently.
It’s one thing to get good quality at the peak of the season, but not so easy to get it on
the shoulders of the season.  Now that we can do that and our customers recognise it.”
The trading management structure had been reorganised on the principles of category
management and multi disciplinary teams including technical advisers and marketing.
There had been an overhaul of the supplier base using the trading supplier
scorecard.  This created a more objective assessment of suppliers.  It provided
continuity of strategy because the assessments were formalised and handed on from one
buyer to the next as they changed.  “Three years ago you could have looked at any
major line we carried and seen we were getting it from 12 to 15 suppliers.  Now we
source from maybe just three or four suppliers, even for the big lines.  Those suppliers
benefit from massive volume increases and we can focus on the best ones”.  That raised
the topic of partnerships, which in 1995 were very topical.  This interview marks the
end stage of the transition from ‘transaction based’ negotiations to ‘collaborative, non-
adversarial’ negotiations.  Tesco had been operating a partnership policy for the two
previous years.  Sourcing from fewer suppliers allows Tesco to get closer to each one.
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Grant explains: “Plenty of people see this partnership concept as cosy, friendly, let’s all
hug each other sort of thing.  It’s not like that at all.  The relationship is hard-headed,
clear cut and not necessarily pally.  The purpose is to make sure the two companies are
going in the same direction and have the same aims.  We identify who are the best in
their area.  We are interested in forward-looking companies.  We look at their
management teams.  If their philosophy fits with ours then the two businesses can fit.”
And what about that difficult issue of price, that is probably still adversarial.
“Discussions with suppliers on price always used to be vicious, but now there is much
more talk about investment plans.” (Retail 1995; Shapley 1995)
This links with the forward strategic planning task, which is a major part of
his job.  “We have to look four or five years hence and make sure there will be enough
class one produce in the world to meet demand and that’s why it is important we source
from companies who are forward thinking, working out how much more land,
machinery and pack house facilities they are going to need in the future and not just
standing still.”  There had been strong growth in the first part of the 1990’s following
the introduction of Composite Distribution with its temperature controlled supply
channel strictly controlled from producer to consumer.  Although Grant does not refer
to distribution explicitly, the author knows from his operational experience that the
support assisted sales growth.  “The produce business has grown between 25 and 45 per
cent a year for the past three years.  By the year 2000 we’ll be shipping Christmas week
volumes every single day”.  Finally on the topic of plastic trays:  “We have built a
whole series of recycling depots to deal with this move.  Tesco has been using plastic
trays for the past three to four years, but now it is the group’s policy to use them as
much as possible.  Most suppliers have been enthusiastic on the basis on the cost
savings: a single carton can cost 60p while the plastic tray is less than 20p.”  There
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was 15 percent of produce in trays at that time and the target was to raise that to 40
percent.  The author was involved in assisting the achievement of that target in 1997.
This section on ECR and a buyer’s viewpoint informs the broader context
for several important changes taking place at that time.  The first and most significant is
the transformation of the trading structure and attitude.  This comes across clearly in the
interview, which is based on his direct experience.  The second is that this change in
behaviour and attitude by the buyers assisted the work of produce supplier logistics and
primary distribution.  This was a more collaborative approach with a greater willingness
to get involved and help find the best solution for the whole supply chain and the end
consumer.  This comes across in the cases in chapter seven.  The third point is that it
portrays a retailer with an integrated approach to its strategy from source to consumer,
including the supply chain.  In that interview, Tesco as the retailer was clearly the
channel captain in retail supply chain change.  It conveys the conviction and confidence
that existed at that time, which was shared by the author; but to feel it through the words
of a buyer is an independent confirmation.
4.4 Preliminary Concepts
There are two sets of preliminary concepts.  The first relates to the types of
supply channel, which are termed, push supply and pull demand.  The second explores
the change of pace within the supply channel.
4.4.1 Push Supply or Pull Demand
The push and pull models of channel organisation represent two contrasting
methods with dramatically differing consequences.  In the push model the manufacturer
that decides the quantity and timing of the movement of the various products.  The
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manufacturers, through the channels of distribution they have set up or chosen, push out
the product.  The consumer is quite passive and is presented with a range of products,
decided by the manufacturer, from which to make their choice of purchase.  Quite often
it is the vested interests of the manufacturer that dictate the detail of this movement.
The factors considered might be production capacity and efficiency or the desire to
move the stockholding away from the manufacturer’s site.  The volume produced is
decided by the manufacturer based on their assessment of the choice that should be
placed before the consumer.  There can be some adverse consequences of the push
model, of which the most critical is the mismatch between product supply and consumer
demand.  This can lead to either a shortage or a surplus of stock of particular product
lines.  The product is produced before knowing the actual consumer demand.
Unwanted lines remain in stock at the retail store and the manufacturer might have to
bear the cost of price reductions to clear out these unwanted items.  The manufacturer
might list as advantages, the economies of production scale and that the stock is off
their premises.
The pull model takes a very different starting point, namely the actual
consumer demand as recorded by product line at the checkout, which is usually referred
to as Electronic Point of Sale [EPoS] data.  It is this actual demand that is used by
retailers to calculate the precise quantity by product line for the orders that are then
placed on the manufacturers and suppliers.  In this way the demand for the product is
pulled through by consumer sales from the production source.  The manufacturers and
suppliers produce to order on an agreed lead-time, which is determined by the type of
product and the geographical distance.  One consequence is that there is less stock held
in the pipeline and less bullwhip effects, less stock outs and improved availability
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(Kotzab 2001).  In this pull model, it is the retailer who holds the key information that
of the consumer demand.
There is much debate in the literature about using the terms supply or
demand chain to describe the type of channel that is being used in particular cases.  The
push model creates a supply chain or channel; the pull model creates a demand chain or
channel.  In this thesis the term supply chain or supply channel is used in an inclusive
way to refer to both models of product distribution.
4.4.2 Just in Time
Just in Time and Just in Case: the expression Just in Time is used in
connection with a pull supply model led by consumer demand.  It refers to the
coordination of the logistics and retail activities.  The objective is to deliver the proper
level of the product to the retail stores so it can be put on the shelf just before it is
required by the consumer purchasing activity.  Just in Time is founded on the
confidence that the quantity delivered anticipates accurately the quantity to be
purchased by consumers.  This model is sometimes also referred to as Quick Response.
In contrast the expression Just in Case is used in connection with a push supply model,
determined by a manufacturer’s forecast of consumer demand.  Stock is ordered in so
that it acts as a safety factor to bolster the rather unsure and faltering confidence about
consumer demand.
There are advantages and disadvantages in both approaches.  Just in time
provides the right quantity of stock on a timely basis, so there is less stock in the
system.  However the delivery frequency has to increase and the drop size, i.e. the
quantity per delivery, for the same level of demand is smaller.  For example a twice
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weekly delivery to a store of 100 units is 50 units per drop; but five deliveries per week
is 20 units per drop.  However just in time reduces the total stockholding in the supply
chain and makes consumer demand more visible.  Where there are high volume
operations, as in food retailing, there can be economies of scale. For example, one way
to compensate for the smaller drop size per product line is to combine the delivery of
many product lines to create an economical daily delivery volume.  Retail distribution
operations thrive on high volumes.  The just in time model operates more efficiently if
the retailers hold their stock in their regional distribution centres, rather than at their
retail stores.  Alternatively, it could also be held at the suppliers themselves, but the
suppliers may experience this as an additional cost. The evidence, however, is that the
fewer the number of stockholding points, the lower the financial investment in stock for
a given service level.  The stock can be moved effectively to those retail stores where it
is in demand by consumers; this is an efficient use of stock holding.  Just in Case
creates a higher level of inventory in the supply chain, usually at the retailers’ premises.
This can also result in a high level of surplus or redundant stock that has to be sold off
at a reduced price or moved to another retail outlet.
4.4.3 Pace and Stockholding
There are additional consequences that follow on from the type of supply
model adopted.  In the push supply model, with its just in case approach to inventory
and less frequent deliveries in larger drop quantities, the physical storage requirements
are high.  High levels of storage have an impact on the design criteria for the
warehouses in the supply chain.  Stock will remain in one location for a longer time and
the warehouse will require high density racking for the stock holding positions, for
some products even narrow aisle, automated, random access, high bay storage and
retrieval systems.
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In contrast, there is a different emphasis in a pull supply chain model with
just in time delivery of the precise quantity of products that consumers are about to
purchase.  The emphasis is on rapid handling and fast movement along the supply
channel from supplier to consumer with minimum inventory standing still in the supply
chain.  The speed of product movement is faster and the warehouse design criteria are
different to give a greater area of floor space for handling the rapid flow through of
product rather than high level racking for the storage of reserve product.  The delivery
transport from the supplier to the retailer is organised for frequent deliveries
coordinated to an agreed time schedule.
The fresh food sector contains a diverse and varied range of temperature
controlled products.  The vulnerable nature of many fresh products makes stringent
demands on the manner in which they are stored, handled and cared for.  Their journey
from source to consumer can be complex, lengthy and open to risks.  The retailer has a
duty of care towards the consumer and hence the responsibility to ensure that these
fresh products are delivered in a proper condition for consumption.  It is this added
intensity of caring for temperature controlled products that make this particular supply
channel of great interest in this thesis.  It is a deepening and development of the thesis
topic.
The supply chain requirements for chilled temperature-controlled
distribution are so intense that it is one of the most demanding disciplines in logistics.  It
is recognised as a leading edge sector within the logistics industry itself and is a critical
sector for those retailers who are in an emerging economy or who are in the process of
developing their retailing skills.  It demonstrates the imperative of taking a whole
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channel approach rather than an attitude of “I’ve done my bit, let others do theirs”. The
fresh food sector is an important product sector for the retailer to get right in order to
build consumer trust and confidence that the product quality will be tasty and fresh.
The importance of the fresh food supply chain means that this chapter will reiterate
some of the messages from earlier to re-emphasis their importance.  This is heightened
when dealing with fresh foods.  It is like going up a gear in performance that can
provide the retailer with a greater competitive advantage.
There can be service benefits at the same time as making logistics more
effective and efficient.  The integration of demand and supply, through information
technology and appropriate handling systems, allows retailers to provide a better service
to consumers.  For example, it enables having fresher, higher quality produce arriving to
meet consumer demand.  The role of logistics and the way in which logistics are
changing in fresh food retailing are central components of this chapter.  This includes a
detailed examination of a key element of fresh food supply, namely the requirements of
Temperature Controlled Supply Chains.  It is intended as an illustration of a very
intense and demanding supply channel, which is also the environment for some of the
case studies in chapter seven.
Acknowledgement:  The author wishes to acknowledge that section 4.5
reflect earlier work completed on a collaborative basis (Gustafson et al 2006; Smith
1998; Smith and Sparks 1993, 2004 a, b, c).
4.5 Temperature Controlled Supply Chains
A quick examination of any full-range food superstore immediately brings
home the importance of fresh food to the consumer. The modern consumer expects the
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fresh food in the store to be of good quality, to have a decent shelf life and to be fit for
purpose. Similarly, if the retailer can present products attractively and extend their shelf
life then there is more chance of the products being purchased and satisfying consumer
needs. Managing the supply chain to maintain quality and ‘fitness’ therefore has direct
cost and service implications. This process of logistics management however is not
simply a question of moving box A from field B to store C. Many dimensions have to
be managed.  One of these dimensions is the need for a proper temperature regime. A
food superstore contains products supplied and retailed at a number of different
temperatures. Failing to maintain an appropriate temperature control can adversely
affect the product’s appearance or shelf life, at one end of the spectrum, or could
potentially make consumers ill or even kill them at the other end. Temperature
controlled supply chains could be said to be a matter of life or death (Kuznesof and
Brennan 2004).
CH Robinson Worldwide Inc/Iowa State University (2001) argue that
Temperature Controlled Supply Chains are more important than ‘ordinary’ retail supply
chains as they have inherently more complexity and complications:
“The (Logistics) challenge is more formidable when the materials and
products require temperature control.  The shelf life is often short for such
products, placing even greater importance on the speed and dependability
of the transportation and handling systems.  Temperature controlled
products also require specialised transportation equipment and storage
facilities and closer monitoring of product integrity while in the logistics
system.
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Adding to the logistics complexity is the seasonal demand for many
temperature controlled products…arising from natural production
conditions and consumer demand…In addition, carriers of temperature
controlled products confront unique requirements and incur greater costs
than carriers of dry products” (p1-2)
Some of the uniqueness and increased costs derive from this need to ensure
temperature control.  There is extra cost incurred in the requirements for handling
temperature-controlled products, and also in the need to monitor temperature regimes in
the supply chain.
4.5.1 What is a Temperature Controlled Supply Chain?
At its simplest, a Temperature Controlled Supply Chain is a food supply
chain, which requires that food products are maintained in a temperature controlled
environment rather than exposing them to whatever ambient temperatures prevail at the
various stages of the supply chain.  This basic description hides however an essentially
complex and potentially complicated and expensive process. The length and complexity
of such a supply chain is determined by the natures and sources of the products, the
legal and quality assurance requirements on food safety, and the distribution facilities
available from production to consumption.
There are several temperature levels for food to suit different types of
product groups: for example they might be classified as frozen, cold chill, medium chill
and exotic chill.  Frozen is minus twenty five degrees Celsius for ice-cream; minus
eighteen degrees for other foods and food ingredients.  Cold Chill is zero degrees to
plus one degree for fresh meat and poultry, most dairy and meat based provisions, most
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vegetables and some fruit.  Medium chill is plus five degrees for some pastry based
products, butters, fats and cheeses.  Exotic chill is plus ten to plus fifteen degrees for
potatoes, eggs, exotic fruit and bananas.  If a food supply chain is dedicated to a narrow
range of products then the temperature will be set at the level for that product set.  If a
food supply chain is handling a broad range of products then an optimum temperature
or a limited number of different temperature settings is used. Failure to maintain
appropriate temperature regimes throughout a product’s life can shorten the life of that
product (it goes “off”) or adversely affect its quality or fitness for consumption.
From the description of the types of temperature needed and knowledge of
the supply chains in food retailing, it should be immediately obvious that the
management process in Temperature Controlled Supply Chains is a complicated one.
Chilling and freezing products is in itself hard, but maintaining this throughout a
product’s life and in both storage and transit is complicated. How, for example, can a
retailer ensure that products are always under the appropriate temperature regime when
they travel from a field in New Zealand to a refrigerator in a house in Auchtermuchty?
How do bananas ripen so as to be available for sale?  In addition to complexity
however, we can argue that the Temperature Controlled Supply Chain is also an
increasingly important channel, both in absolute volume terms and due to the risk
assessment of the consequences should the integrity of the whole fresh food supply
chain fail.
4.5.2 The Importance of Temperature Controlled Supply Chains
The Temperature Controlled Supply Chain in food is a significant
proportion of the retail food market and one that has been increasing steadily
(McKinnon and Campbell 1998). Frozen food in the UK has been increasing in volume
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by 3-4% on average per annum for the last 40 years. Developments in products such as
ready meals and prepared salads have further expanded the market.  Per capita
consumption of fruit has risen over the last twenty years in the UK.  Analysts see the
meal solution sector continuing to increase very rapidly (Gorniak 2002). ‘Fast food’
chains have captured a huge market share and are reliant on frozen product. The
importance of products requiring temperature control, both to the consumer and to
retailers has thus been increasing and seems set to develop further.
Even products that we take for granted require some form of temperature
control. Sandwiches for example require chilled storage for their ingredients. These are
then combined to make the finished product, which in turn requires temperature control
storage, distribution and display (Smith, Davies and Bent 2001). Failure to maintain
adequate control (for example placing prawn sandwiches in the sun) generates obvious
risks. More subtly, an inability to maintain temperature control will reduce shelf life for
the product, which is any case often very limited.  This increases wastage and
complicates the supply dynamics, adding costs.
This growth in temperature controlled products derives both from changes
in consumer preferences and behaviour, and in the supply systems’ ability to respond to
these changes. For example consumer lifestyles and shopping patterns have altered
dramatically, raising demand for convenience products.  The creation, production and
supply of an ever increasing range of ready to eat meals has been stimulated to match
the desire of the consumer simply to heat up the food rather than spend time and effort
in preparing that food. The ability to take a frozen meal from the freezer and microwave
it to eat immediately is a response to the need to save time and for convenience. Ready
washed and prepared salads fit the same requirement.  Rising fruit consumption reflects
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successive healthy eating campaigns, though in the UK the national diet is low on fruit
and vegetables. At the same time greater concern over freshness of products such as
fruit, meat and fish has focused attention on their handling in the supply chain.
On the supply side, there have been changes in the location from which
product is sourced and the deliberate leapfrogging of wholesalers and importers by the
retailers to deal directly with the growers themselves.  During the 1990’s in the UK
there was the liberalisation of the Produce Boards, such as those representing producers
in New Zealand or South Africa.  This created more flexibility for retailers to deal direct
with the larger producers.  The consequence was the gradual removal of the produce
wholesalers from the supply channel, apart from the non-supermarket outlets.  This has
had a major effect on the shape of the supply channel for fresh produce.  In recent years,
some retailers have reorganised the supply channel by appointing a lead category
supplier with the responsibility of coordinating the procurement of fresh produce from
suppliers worldwide.
Technological changes in production and distribution have also allowed a
transformation of the supply network. As production and distribution technological
capabilities have developed, so the ability for national and international, rather than
local, sourcing and distribution has emerged. Products can be brought from across the
world to satisfy demands for products ‘out-of-season’ or of an exotic nature, as well as
for reasons of lower purchase or cost price. Internationalisation of supply of even
indigenous products is common. The system developments needed to meet the demands
for quality and consistency, including temperature control aspects, do impact on the
channel composition. The handling systems to manage the air freighting of for example
tomatoes from the Canary Islands, baby sweetcorn from Egypt or flowers from
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Malaysia required considerable technological development. They also however
represent a fundamental organisational and relationship shift.
As the number and range of temperature controlled products has increased,
and a number of market failures have occurred, so the issue of food safety has become
more central (Henson and Caswell 1999; Kuznesof and Brennan 2004). Failures of food
safety in the UK (not all of course associated with failures of temperature control) are
common on a localised and individual level.  For example there is a high level of
personal food poisoning in the UK, although the extent to which this is a result of
product or channel failure rather than an individual consumer’s lack of knowledge or
care is unclear. More publicly notable however have been national events (‘food
scares’) such as Listeria in cheese, Salmonella in eggs and chickens, BSE in cattle and E
coli 157 in meat. These national events raise concern and comment about food safety.
There is thus a perception over the safety of supply of food and food chains, which in
turn has focused attention on risk assessment and risk management. Temperature
Controlled Supply Chains gain importance therefore from the risks associated with
failure and from the steps necessary to minimise these risks. Some of the steps are
voluntary and company specific; others are required by legal developments over the last
decade.
As a consequence of risk assessments and the major problems in food
safety, Temperature Controlled Supply Chains have become a focal point for the
development of Food Safety Legislation across Europe.  Although such legislation
introduces requirements that cover a broad range of issues, one key aspect is the
temperature conditions under which products are maintained.  Such legislation
combined with increasing retailer liability for prosecution has put great pressure on the
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standards of control throughout the food supply chain, particularly in the case of
temperature control.  For these reasons, Temperature Controlled Supply Chains are
often seen as a specialist discipline within logistics. To some extent this is
understandable given the need for specialist facilities e.g. warehouses, vehicles,
refrigerators etc to operate chilled or frozen distribution channels. This specialist market
however is itself increasing in scale and scope, both as the market expands and as
operational and managerial complexity increases.
The discussion above and comments in the introduction leads onto the
identification of a number of key issues in Temperature Controlled Supply Chains.
Here, three are identified for further discussion: the issues of costs; food safety and
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP); and partnerships. As noted earlier,
the integrity of temperature controlled supply chains is important for food safety.  This
places an obligation of care and duty of implementation on the suppliers, the retailers
and the logistics service providers.  In the UK, for example, the Food Safety Act of
1990 defined the storage, handling and transportation requirements for food products
including temperature control for certain categories.  One of the requirements of the
Food Safety Act 1990 makes it an absolute offence to sell food that is unfit for human
consumption.  Clearly, food that has ‘gone off’ due to inadequate temperature control
can fall into this category.  The Act however allows for a defence of ‘due diligence’
against any charges.  Thus a business may be able to mount a defence based on
evidence that all reasonable precautions had been exercised to avoid the commission of
the offence.  If we think about temperature control, then this implies that there needs to
be a system of control maintenance, monitoring and recording (for evidence) of the
temperature regimes in the supply chain.
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It is important in the application of the disciplines of an integrated temperature controlled supply
chain to understand the principles of the obligations of suppliers, retailers and logistics service
providers.
All have a duty of care for the product.  In order to meet this duty of care they must
demonstrate that they have applied Due Diligence in the structure and execution of their operation
i.e. that they have taken all reasonable methods to ensure the care of the product.
One of these reasonable methods is Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) and is
central to the discipline of chill chain integrity in logistics.  The Quality Assurance department
conducts a survey of the supply chain under their control with the objective of identifying those
circumstances where the product might be exposed to unsuitable conditions, i.e. hazards.   They
rank these hazards according to the importance of their risk, e.g. high, medium, and low.
Procedures are then put in place at an appropriate level to prevent that risk.
So to express this differently: identify the hazards, analyse their importance, identify which are
critical and set up control procedures at these points.
Once HACCP is put in place it becomes a strong argument that Due Diligence is being practiced.
For temperature controlled supply chains, there are big benefits from putting the physical and
operational procedures in place along the whole length of the supply chain.  This investment
reduces a high risk to a low risk.  By stabilising the temperature throughout the life of the product
suppliers and retailers can concentrate on other aspects, which can add value to the product, e.g.
growing varieties.
Here is an example: The movement of chill goods from DC to Retail Stores on multi-temperature
vehicle.
Risk to food safety – High; Risk of occurrence – High
Critical Control
Temperature setting stated on load sheet and run sheet
Loader checks load sheet and sets temperatures for compartment
Loader secures bulk head
Loader switches refrigeration on and ticks relevant temperature on load sheet
Once loading complete a supervisor checks settings and switches against load sheet and signs off
if correct
Load sheet handed into goods out office
Driver checks digital readings (usually at the front of the unit, visible in rear view mirror) against
load sheet.  If correct, signs off and hands in to goods out office
Goods out clerks checks if temperatures on load sheet and run sheet match and if correct allows
vehicle to leave
Goods out supervisor does daily checks to assure compliance
Source: Author interviews, 2003
Figure 4.1  Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP)
The Food Standards (Temperature Control) Regulations of 1995 made it an
offence to allow food to be kept at temperatures that could cause risk to health.  This
again implied a tightening of systems in the chain.  This was effectively codified by the
General Hygiene Act of 1995, which required all food businesses to adopt a risk
management tool such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) (Figure 4.2).
Loader and Hobbs (1999) see this as a change in philosophy, representing a move away
from an end product food safety inspection approach to a preventative, scientific focus
with the responsibility for risk management placed on the food business proprietor.  As
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a result, HACCP and other systems (Sterns, Cordon and Reardon 2000) have been vital
to establish process controls through the identification of critical points in the process
that need to be monitored and controlled.
These Acts in the UK were in essence national responses to approaches
being recommended in Europe and codified in the EU legislation.  The food scares in
the UK of the late 1990s also brought forward a response.  The Food Safety Act 1999
created the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in April 2000.  The Act was intended to
induce all those involved in the food supply chain to improve their food handling
practices, including temperature control.  There is no doubt that the FSA will continue
to play a strong role in Temperature Controlled Supply Chains
(http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk).
This onus on due diligence and the responsibility of businesses had a major
effect on systems of control and monitoring of performance.  It also however had an
effect on the business relationships and governance in place.  If a retailer for example
wishes to be protected from claims, then they have to ensure that their suppliers are
undertaking good practices, in addition to their own practice.  This is not only true for
retailer brand products, but for all sourced products.  As such, traceability and tracking
become more fundamental and good partnerships become crucial.  As costs rise in
introducing new systems, increasing the depth and quality of partnerships is both a
safeguard and offers possible cost benefits.  As a result, partnerships expanded
considerably post 1991 in the UK (Hughes 1994; Fearne and Hughes 2000; Loader and
Hobbs 1999; Wilson 1996a, b).  Food retailers today are keen to have such partnerships
and to use them in their marketing, as seen in the numerous ‘farm assured’ type
schemes.  Such partnerships and changes in organisation of the supply chain are not
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restricted to UK suppliers.  Dolan and Humphrey (2000) show how in Africa, the
requirements of the leading UK retailers have transformed the horticultural sector in
scale and operational terms, leaving smaller producers in a precarious position.  This
scale dimension is linked closely to the legal requirements and the costs of compliance
and potential chain failure.
However, it is not all cost and regulation, as there are operational and
commercial benefits to be gained from proper Temperature Controlled Supply Chain
management. These benefits might include an increase in shelf life and freshness, better
in-store presentation to the customer and thus better customer perception of products
and the retailer.  This increase in product quality and perception is the direct result of
maintaining the correct temperature for that product group steadily and constantly
throughout its supply chain journey. One major effect of an increase in shelf life and
freshness has been that consumers can notice the difference between product supplied
through a fully temperature controlled supply chain and that supplied through a partially
temperature controlled supply chain, and so, make product and retailer choice decisions
accordingly. Whilst it is generally the case today that the major food retailers maintain
chill and cold chain integrity and thus have totally controlled Temperature Controlled
Supply Chains, this has not always been the case. Temperature Controlled Supply
Chains have thus changed considerably over the last two decades.
The issues in Temperature Controlled Supply Chains outlined mainly in
terms of the UK above are also found in other developed countries.  The legislative
position might be different but the net effect is the same.  Such concerns are also
spreading internationally for reasons considered in other contexts earlier.  As points of
production become more international so the need to ensure consistency and safety is
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increased, particularly when production is occurring in developing and low-cost
economies where the infrastructure may be less than anticipated.  Similarly as retailers
internationalise their stores, so they need to ensure compliance in stores and supply
chains in these other countries.  In some cases they will use their investments in these
areas to emphasise the quality and safety of their operations, including their food for
sale.  As consumers react to this, so the ‘bar’ for local retailers is raised.  These issues
are thus becoming more important in many countries.
4.5.3 Changes in Temperature Controlled Supply Chains
The temperature controlled supply chain has developed and changed since
the 1980s.  In the past in the UK, the supply chain consisted of single temperature
warehouses dedicated to narrow product ranges of food, e.g. butters, fats and cheeses at
plus five degrees Celsius, dairy based provisions, meat based provisions, fresh meat and
poultry, fruit and vegetables and frozen products.  The design, equipment and
disciplines were only partially implemented so that there was incomplete integrity of the
temperature control. Products were exposed to periods of high ambient temperature,
which affected the shelf life and the quality of the product. Single temperature systems
also meant that many more deliveries were needed. Such systems were essentially
inefficient and ineffective.
Such a situation existed in the 1980s in Tesco (see Smith 1998; Smith and
Sparks 1993, 2004a, b, c; Sparks 1986).  In the mid 1980s the Tesco temperature
controlled supply chain consisted of a large number (twenty-seven) of small single
temperature warehouses, each specialising in the storage, handling and delivery of a
narrow product range.  Examples of these sets of product ranges were: Fresh Produce;
Fresh Meat and Poultry; Butters, Fats and Cheeses; Chilled Diary Provisions; Chilled
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Meat Provisions; Frozen Foods.  Each set was managed by a different specialist
logistics service provider organised on behalf of the manufacturer and supplier.  The
deliveries to the retail stores took place two or three times a week with the temperature
controlled vehicle going from one store to another delivering the appropriate number of
pallets of products.  The delivery notes and product checking were conducted at the
back door of the store and the cost of delivery was included in the price of the product.
Fresh Meat and Poultry was controlled on an individual case basis and charged by
weight as each case had a different weight (variable weight charging).
There are several limitations of this model of a Temperature Controlled
Supply Chains.  It was expensive to expand to meet large increases in overall growth in
volume, as it requires the building of more and more single temperature warehouses.
The retail delivery frequency was limited.  The delivery volume drop size per store was
small and vehicles used were ‘under-sized’ because of problems over retail access.  At
that time there also was not full awareness of the importance of maintaining total
integrity of the chill chain.
The strategy that Tesco decided upon was to build a small number (seven)
of new large multi-temperature ‘composite’ warehouses that would store, handle and
deliver the full range of product sets, all from the same location.  The composite
temperature regimes are Frozen at minus twenty five; Cold Chill at plus one degree; and
Exotic Chill at plus twelve degrees.  The manufacturers and suppliers of all the product
sets make daily deliveries into the Composite Distribution Centre.  The Composite
delivery frequency to the retail stores increased to daily.  The delivery vehicles had
movable bulkheads and three temperature controlled evaporators so that up to three
different temperature regimes could be set on the one vehicle.  The benefit was
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improved vehicle utilisation and improved service to retail.  Chill chain integrity
disciplines were implemented rigorously from supplier to retail shelf.
There are other aspects to this change.  Distribution and retail agreed a
policy of not checking the goods at the retail backdoor which improved the speed with
which the goods could be transferred into the temperature controlled chambers at the
store.  This improved chill chain integrity. The goods were delivered in reusable plastic
trays, on ‘dollies’, or on roll cages, which improved handling at store, both in terms of
speed and quality.  New store designs permitted the use of full length vehicles, so
improving efficiency.
Another major change in supply chains between the 1980s and 2000s has
been the increasing pace of the order and replenishment cycle (McKinnon and
Campbell 1998).  Today with many fresh products there is no stock held in the retail
distribution centre overnight. Leadtimes have continued to be reduced. One of the key
drivers of this increase in pace has been the development of information technology
which has enabled a large volume of data to be collected, processed and transmitted at
faster speeds.  Today data are collected from the point of sale and used in calculating
future customer demand, which in turn forms the basis of the orders placed on suppliers.
The scale, control and skill of the retail logistics operation has improved so that even
distance sourced products can be rapidly transported to their destinations at the
Regional Distribution Centres.   An example of this is the sourcing of produce from
Spain direct from the growers into the Composite Distribution Centres. These changes,
encouraged by information technology amongst other factors, required changes in
supply chain facilities and operations to ensure chill chain integrity.
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Following the implementation of centralised distribution, the attention
turned to the condition of Temperature Controlled Supply Chains for the inbound
product sets from the supplier and manufacturer into the regional distribution centres.
The examination of the logistics of the inbound supply chain revealed that there were
huge opportunities to improve transport efficiency.  The increasing pace of the retail
supply chain had resulted in most suppliers of temperature controlled product sets
sending their vehicles long distances, but only partly filled, to the various retailers’
regional distribution centres.  So for example, suppliers’ vehicles carrying fruit and
vegetables from a supplying region like Kent, were following each other to distant
regional distribution centres in Northern England and Wales, each with a partially full
vehicle to the same destination.  Clearly there was an opportunity for the consolidation
of supply.
Year Retailers Data related to consolidation
1995 14 No reference to consolidation centres
1997 16 First mention of Primary Distribution, ref Tesco
1999 16 64 consolidation centres listed
Source: IGD Annual Retail Distribution Surveys 1995, 1997, 1999
Table 4.1  Retail Consolidation Centres 1990s
This process of consolidation saw the appointment of designated logistics
service providers in the appropriate regions to manage and operate temperature
controlled consolidation centres (Table 4.1), accumulating full vehicle loads of
temperature controlled products to despatch to the composite distribution centres.
These consolidation centres also conducted quality assurance testing of the
product.  There were two benefits of placing the quality assurance function in the
consolidation centres.  The first was that they were close to the suppliers so that any










Single Temperature Produce Centres [Three].  Ambient and plus five
degrees Celsius.  Code dates not a legal requirement.  Shelf life managed




Two further produce centres.  Operating procedures remained the same.
Suppliers normally loaded in yard or from ambient bays.  Many vehicles
have curtain sides.
1986 Notice that code dates to become a legal requirement for produce.
Produce Technical Team established shelf life and introduced QC checks
















Code dates (CD) introduced for loose and pre-packed produce.  In
addition to the selling code dates there were additional days where
product would be at its best.  This time was called “Customer Life” (CL).
QC in produce depots to enforce specification.
Two further produce centres. Code of practice introduced for suppliers

















Six Composite Distribution Centres opened.
Separate temperature chambers of +3, +10, +15 for produce.  Composite
multi-temperature trailers deliver at +3 & +10 degrees Celsius loading
from sealed temperature controlled loading bays.  Customer life extended
by 2 days for soft fruit, by 4 days for top fruit and 3 days for vegetables.
No increase in code dates.
Consumer demand for Fruit and Vegetable doubled as a consequence of
the introduction of strict temperature control disciplines throughout the
supply chain.
1990 Food Safety Act: To meet due diligence HACCP [Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Points] analysis introduced throughout the supply chain.  The
result was more consistent shelf life but no increase in days.  Retail stores

















Produce temperature controlled consolidation hubs introduced.  Six
further hubs added over next three years.  QA control introduced at hubs
so quality checked before produce despatched to the composites.  Hubs
located close to supplier regions so prompt resolution of problems with
supplier management.
Shelf life review shows increase of one day across all vegetables, soft fruit
and stone fruit.  Salads become inconsistent because of harvesting during
the night before dew point.  But there was a greater benefit of starting
despatch earlier, especially from Spain.  Retail order lead time 48 / 24
hours
1997 Composite Distribution Centres change produce chamber temperatures to
+1 and +12 degrees Celsius with tighter variation of +/-1 degree from +/-2
degree before.  There was no change to shelf life because the supply

















Technical Departments given targets to increase produce shelf life.  One
potential improvement was to introduce USA type variety control.  The
benefit is only possible because of the very strict total supply chain
temperature control.  One extra day of Code life for stores.
2000 Continuous Replenishment introduced.  The benefit is split deliveries into


















Further supply chain improvements in shelf life to extend code dates by
one day, no change to customer life to improve availability on selected
lines, i.e. core vegetables, top fruit, stone fruit but not salads or soft fruit.
Three potential methods are: a) atmospheric control especially during the
three day delivery from Spain; b) humidity control; c) ethylene control.
Source: Author Interviews 2002
Table 4.2  Enhancements in Shelf Life – Tesco
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The second benefit was that these vehicles did not then need to undergo
quality assurance checking when they arrived at the composite distribution centre.  This
improved the turnaround time of the inbound vehicle, increasing its productivity and
profitability and also enabled the handling operation to commence earlier and so keep
the goods in bay clear for the next set of deliveries.  This was especially important in
the early evening when a very high volume of produce harvested that same day is
delivered.
Some of the effects of these changes to the Tesco supply chain are
considered in Table 4.2. This summarises the last 15-20 years of temperature control
supply and the ways in which this has changed. Over that time period the shelf life for
these products has increased considerably, and in the case of vegetables and top fruit, it
has doubled (Figure 4.2).

























This provides better product for longer for the consumer and is more
efficient for the retailer. It does, as the table indicates, require a major reorientation of
the supply chain and a dedication to achieving high standards in the whole operation.
The overall effect however has been to provide fresher product more quickly and at
lower delivery cost to the retail store and to lengthen the shelf life and quality of the
product for the consumer.  Packaging logistics systems, by implementing alterations to
the handling and packaging methods, has had an important role to play in this.
The discussion above has been centred on developments in Tesco. Similar
operations and developments have been introduced in other major food retailers. These
have been needed to handle the massive expansion of demand in the temperature-
controlled sector in recent years and to compete with the market leader. Not all the
changes and developments can be outlined above and in the tables. Changes to
packaging, e.g. the handling systems and transport environments, such as vacuum or
other atmosphere controlled packaging, have also extended the shelf-life of products
and improved in-store quality.
The application of this study of Temperature Controlled Supply Chains to
illustrate some of the aspects of concern in retail logistics shows the level of detail at
which businesses need to operate if they are to deliver fresh food at the right freshness,
Smith (1992). Information systems have become widespread, integrated and complex.
Technology is a logical response to aspects of control, whether this is data capture or
process monitoring. However, all aspects of the supply system have come under such
scrutiny as retailers have used their increased power and expertise to work with
manufacturers, suppliers and logistics services providers to improve the quality and
consistency as well as capabilities of all food supply chains.  Such alterations and
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approaches are going on across the world as the search for supply efficiency and
effectiveness continues.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has examined Primary Distribution and change in one
particular supply channel, the temperature controlled supply of fresh food.  The scale of
change in retail control over the supply channel reflects the growing influence of
retailers.  There has been a general rise in power and use of that power by retailers.  In
many countries and most retail sectors, retailers have increased their scale and power in
relation to their suppliers and manufacturers.  The retailers have used this increased
power to demand, structure, implement and control changes in operational practices.
They have taken over as the channel organisers.  They have speeded up the pace of
movement along the supply channel.  There has been a restructuring of many aspects of
retail supply networks.
Some of these changes have effectively been ‘ordered’ by retailers.
Manufacturers and suppliers have simply had to comply in order to maintain the
business.  The timing and presentation of suppliers into retailers’ distribution centres is
one example of this.  However, the extent and ability of retailers to order total change is
constrained by their inter-dependence with their supply partners. Absolute power only
works in some circumstances and for a certain period.  Retailers have to continue
working with suppliers and manufacturers.  Adversarial relationships have only a
limited ability to achieve supply chain objectives.  Many changes have therefore been
collaborative and channel transformative.  This is demonstrated by the success of the
ECR programme.  The inter-dependence of food retailers and their suppliers leads to a
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search for potential benefits for all parties.  Efficiencies in the supply chain are the
result of collaborative effort rather than unilateral demands.
Supply chain management is a critical success factor needed by companies
to deliver products to the consumer and so fulfil their marketing or brand promise.  In
today’s complex supply chains and supply networks, supply chain management
involves a global reach.  Companies may view themselves as being in direct
competition with other companies in the same market sector.  Even retailers and their
suppliers can regard each other as competitors and rivals.  However, the full nature of
competition is evident from a different perspective; that of the supply chain.  Supply
chains competing with each other.  The more effective supply chain team delivers to the
consumer rapidly and reliably. That supply chain is effective, efficient, and productive.
It operates at low unit cost, a fast pace, that adapts to market demand.  The vitality of
the supply chain has a strong influence on the health of those companies who together
are reaching out and meeting the needs of the consumer by good anticipation and
coordination.
Supply chains, supply networks, supply channels do not just happen by
accident.  They are created and put together consciously by those who have a stake in
their success.  This chapter has looked at some of the broader trends that have taken
place in the development or evolution of the retail supply chain.  It has described the
temperature controlled supply channel designed to suit modern consumer requirements.
This has been a descriptive chapter.  The next chapter picks up the theme of ‘channels
compete’.  It examines the changing skill sets needed to manage the modern supply
chain change.  Retail business strategy should drive the supply chain decisions.
Relationships in the supply chain depend on the broader relationships between the
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retailers and the suppliers.  Those relationships are changing.  Companies are taking an
integrated approach to their strategy.  They are appointing Supply Chain and Logistics
Directors to the Board.  Chapter Five: ‘managing supply chain change’ provides a
selection of related theories.  One of the outputs will be a short list of ten success
characteristics as a key word shortlist.  This list is the benchmark for the cases that






5 Managing supply chain change
The previous chapters have considered retailing and its demands on retail
logistics and the re-structuring of supply channels.  The supply chain is organised with a
purpose; a strategic business purpose that relies on an ability to manage change.  This
ability to manage change successfully requires further reflection.  This chapter will refer
to a selection of theories about the nature of supply chain change.  The selection
examines related disciplines; change management, supplier partnerships, supply channel
characteristics, leadership and negotiation models.  The intended outcome is to produce
a shortlist of ideal characteristics for supply chain relationships.  The key characteristics
can then be used as a benchmark for the cases in chapter seven.  A fuller analysis of
these cases will be conducted in chapter eight, using the theoretical bases presented
here.  The intention is to add to academic knowledge by reviewing the role and
behaviour of a channel captain from the learning gained from these principles.
There are a variety of ways of handling and implementing change.  This can
be influenced by the scale and size of the parties involved.  They might range from the
small to the very large.  They will probably have differing company cultures and
contrasting management styles.  The individual members of the supply channel may
have specialist skill sets and different contributions to make to each other.  The retailer
can supply customer data.  The manufacturer brings an in-depth knowledge of customer
tastes and preferences for their product range.  The logistics service provider is skilled
at moving products in the appropriate manner.  Organising this cooperation requires
leadership and direction.  However, navigating through the supply channel leadership
role is quite complex.  Doing this and implementing organisational and channel change,
is a challenging task.  Furthermore, it is not enough to make a decision, it must be
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carefully planned, accepted and successfully implemented in order to achieve the
desired organisational and channel results.
How then is this supply channel collaboration acquired, achieved and
sustained?  How are supply channels created, initiated, evolved, and developed?  What
sorts of barriers exist and how are they over come?  Who are the enablers of success in
managing supply channel change?  What might be the qualities and role of a channel
leader?  These questions face those companies working on re-engineering their retail
logistics and their supply channel solutions.  Obviously adding to the complexity and
difficulty, is that within a food supply channel it is not enough to have a successful
change process going on within just one or a few of the companies involved in the
supply chain.  The change process, to be effective, must involve all actors along the
supply channel in order to achieve the full consumer benefits and business profitability.
Those companies that work in unison and pull together can create competitive
advantage in their service to their customer.   The challenge is to lift the debate from the
level of the individual company level to that of the supply chain as a whole.  The
inference is that supply channels compete with each other as whole channels.
5.1 Channels Compete
A competitive advantage is generated when all the companies in a supply
chain choose to align their strategies to satisfy the demand from the end consumer.  One
way to visualise this is to present the three main components; retailing, retail logistics,
and supply channels, as interlinked circles.  The segment in the centre where the three
circles overlap with each other represents this strategic alignment between the business







The Role of Retailers as Channel Captains in retail
supply chain change
Figure 5.1  Retailing Supply Channels and Managing Change
This strategic alignment is a core premise on which this thesis is based.  The
issues for change management arise at two levels.  The first level is this strategic
alignment.  The second level is the more practical implementation to achieve that
alignment in the supply chain operation.  These practical implementation issues are the
primary the focus for chapters six, seven and eight.  However, their validity is
dependent upon the presence of the first level, that of strategic alignment.  If there is no
strategic alignment, it will frustrate the hard work taking place at the second level of
practical implementation.  The practical work will only produce excellent results within
this broader framework of strategic alignment, which seeks to integrate the components
of the supply chain with enhanced customer service (Gattorna 1998, Figure 5.2).
The principle of strategic alignment is present in the practitioner
development of ECR.  This cohesion motivates retailers and suppliers to work
collaboratively in these detailed and practical projects.  The projects not only take
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unnecessary cost out of the supply chain but also provide a better service to the end
consumer.  In this way, they benefit the different members of the supply chain.
Companies are now competing globally and traditional barriers between industries are breaking
down.  To cope with these changes and achieve superior performance, business leaders are
moving towards new business paradigms that allow their companies to work more closely with
their traditional and new business partners to adapt to the rapidly changing marketplace.  This
improved integration is the very essence of supply chain management.  Supply chain leaders
are reconsidering the linkages, not only between functions within their own company, but with
other organizations up and down the supply chain.
The traditional view of logistics was very narrowly defined.  It focused on the physical movement of
goods and (more recently) information, from suppliers to customers and their consumers.  This led
to a preoccupation with internal functions and processes within the firm in the name of increased
efficiency…..This narrow definition of logistics takes no account of different customer types and
the different demands they place on the business.
It is our contention that a new framework is required that integrates the formulation of logistics
strategy with the human factors that both create demand outside the firm and form the core
capability inside the firm to deliver the prescribed strategy to the marketplace.  We argue the need
for a Strategic Alignment Model that brings together the external market’s dynamics, the firm’s
strategic response(s) and the firm’s internal capability to execute this desired alignment, through
the appropriate subcultures and leadership style(s) built into the organization.
Source: Gattorna1998, p 1-2 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.2  Strategic Alignment Model (Gattorna 1998)
5.1.1 The Whole Channel Competes: McCarthy 1981
Figure 5.3  The Whole Channel Competes (McCarthy 1981)
The conviction that whole channels compete with other systems was present
earlier in the American marketing literature (McCarthy 1981, 1984, Figure 5.3).  The
difference in the headings between the seventh edition (1981) and eighth edition (1984)
is a sign of the deepening awareness of the need to emphasis the whole-channel way of
The whole channel competes with other channels (1984)
Our captain, the producer – for convenience only (1981)
We cannot overemphasize the importance of a whole channel system viewing itself in competition
with other systems.  Without this view, one firm might adopt policies clearly unfavourable to
another member of the same system.  In the short run, the stronger firm might succeed in forcing
policies by sheer weight of market power.  Yet – In the long run – this might lead to the failure, not
only of a weaker channel member but of the whole team.
A good example of how not to act as a channel captain is the manufacturer who loads retailers
with excessive inventory.  The manufacturer may make money in the short run – but will not be
welcomed back by the overloaded firms.
The person or firm that helps direct an integrated system of action is the leader.  We will consider
that person our channel captain.  Identity may change from time to time – depending on the
success of product development or promotion efforts, financial reserves, or management
personalities – but this does not change the concept or its impact on marketing.
For convenience, we will assume that the channel captain is the producer.  Remember, though,
that the middleman may play this role too.
Source:  McCarthy and  Brogowicz 1981 p351-6 [Emphasis added]
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thinking.  The words of the text itself in both editions remain the same.  This is the
framework for the concept and role of the channel captain.  In 1981, it is the person or
firm that helps direct an integrated system of action who is the leader or channel
captain.
The channel captain role was identified earlier (McCarthy 1960, Figure 5.4).
The motivation for that channel captain role had remained the same, although then it is
expressed in the marketing framework of the 4 Ps: Product, Pricing, Promotion, and
Place.  One of the roles the channel captain needed to perform was to develop place
policies and consider how the functions should be divided within the marketing channel.
D5 Transporting, storing and financing
Transporting, storing, and financing are basic marketing functions, which must be provided
throughout most distribution channels.  The are of common concern to nearly all channel
members.
When a channel captain is developing place policies, he must consider how these
functions are to be divided within the channel.  Assuming that the team captain is a
manufacturer, he may have already decided to use some type of wholesaler and retailer, but this
does not automatically decide how the functions of transporting, storing, and financing are to be
shared…
These functions are vitally important to Place, since they are required in the production of time,
place, and possession utility.  Their interaction with the other three P’s – especially Price for the
cost of the service and Product for the service itself – must be born in mind.
Source: McCarthy 1960, p429. [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.4  Channel Captain (McCarthy 1960)
There has been a consistent development of the importance of planning and
organising the channel, which brings benefits to all the members of the channel
(McCarthy and Brogowicz 1981, Figure 5.5).  In earlier times that was conveyed in the
marketing style of thinking.  In recent times, the concept is extended to the supply chain
and put into a supply chain management expression of behaviour.  There is this strong
link between the two sets of academic thinking on the importance of whole channels
competing.
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A coordinated channel system can help everyone
A channel system in which members have accepted a common product – market commitment can
work very well – even though not everyone in the channel system is strongly market – oriented.
As long a someone, say, the channel captain, is market – oriented, it may be possible to win the
confidence and support of production – oriented firms – and make the whole channel work
effectively…
Ultimately, a successful channel system must deliver the goods and services desired by target
customers – at reasonable prices.
Conclusion
The chapter has discussed the role of Place – and noted that Place decisions are especially
important because they may be difficult to change.
The importance of planning channel systems was discussed – along with the role a channel
captain.  It was stressed that channel systems compete with each other – and that vertical
marketing systems seem to be winning out in the marketplace.
Question No. 7
Explain how a “channel captain” could help traditional independent firms compete with a corporate
(integrated) channel system
Source: McCarthy and Brogowicz 1981, p351-6 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.5  Coordinated Channel System (McCarthy 1981)
The role of the channel leader or captain has been expressed in a variety of
ways.  This will become apparent as the chapter progresses.  The views about the
channel leader are linked to a wider consideration.  The relationship between the
members working in the channel is central to its success.
5.1.2 Democracy, Mallen 1963
This contribution provides various insights into the marketing thinking of
the time.  The first is the description of the structure of the relationship options as
autocracy, democracy, anarchy (Mallen 1963, Figure 5.6).  Anarchy exists when there is
so much conflict that no one member is able to establish a strategy. The autocrat
commands without consulting.  The cooperation from the members that results is
subdued conflict that could erupt at any time into open conflict.  The democrat leads by
helping the channel members to cooperate willingly and voluntarily because they are in
agreement with the direction of the strategy and the detail of the implementation.  They
have been consulted and involved in the decision making process.  They have had the
opportunity to make their contribution.
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Autocracy, democracy, anarchy
This paper will show that between channel members a dynamic filed of conflicting and cooperating objectives exist also
that if the conflicting objectives outweigh the cooperating ones, the effectiveness of the channel will be reduced.  Thus,
the efficient distribution of consumer goods will be impeded.
The channel members can meet this problem in three distinct ways.  First, they can have a leader (one of the channel
members) who “forces” members to cooperated; this is an autocratic relationship.  Second, they can have a leader who
“helps” members to cooperate, creating a democratic relationship.  Finally, they can do nothing, and so have an
anarchistic relationship.
If anarchy exists, there is a great chance of the conflicting dynamics destroying the channel.  If autocracy exists, there is
less chance of such happening.  However, the latter method creates a state of cooperation based on power and control.
This controlled cooperation is really subdued conflict and makes for a more unstable equilibrium than does
voluntary democratic cooperation.
But how does a supplier project itself into the channel?  How does it make organization and channel into one?  It
accomplishes this be doing many things for its retailers that it does for its own organization.  It sells, advertises, trains,
plans and promotes for these firms… The big supplier can act as a management consultant to the members, dispensing
advice in all areas of their business.
Source:  Mallen 1963, p24-33 & 54 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.6  Autocracy, Democracy, Anarchy (Mallen 1963)
The word democracy has a normal political meaning of ‘the representation
of people through a democratically elected government’.  Clearly that is not the
meaning used here.  Democracy can also mean ‘the control of an organization by its
members who have a right to participate in the decision making process’.  The use of
the word democracy or democratic in this latter sense can cause misunderstanding in
this marketing channel context.
Summary
An autocratic relationship exists when one channel member controls conflict and forces the
others to cooperate.
A democratic relationship exists when all members agree to cooperate without power play.
An anarchistic relationship exists when there is open conflict, with no member able to impose his
will on the others.
For maximization of channel profits and consumer satisfaction, the channel must act as a unit.
This has led to the concept of the channel as an extension of the firm’s organization.
It is argued that this concept is actually the marketing concept adapted to a channel situation
The mass retailer appears to be best adapted for leadership under the marketing concept
Source:  Mallen 1963, p24-33 & 54 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.7  Democracy Summary (Mallen 1963)
The definition used here is quite specific.  There is a leader of the channel
but the style of that leadership is consultative rather than democratic.  The leader
consults with the members of the channel for their input and commitment (Figure 5.7).
This is quite distinct from the members having the right to participate in the decision
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making process, or taking a vote on policy.  The leader organises and plans through
consultation and participation.  It is with this particular meaning that the word
democracy is included in the list of key word expressing important supply chain
characteristics in this thesis.
Retailer as channel leader
The usual pattern in the establishment of channel relationships is that there is a leader, an initiator
who puts structure into this relationship and who holds it together.  This leader controls, whether
through command or cooperation, i.e., through an autocratic or a democratic system.
Too often it is automatically assumed that the manufacturer or producer will be the channel leader
and that the middlemen will be the channel followers.  This has not always been so nor will it
necessarily be so in the future.  The growth of mass retailers is increasingly challenging the
manufacturer for channel leadership, as the manufacturer challenged the wholesaler in the
early part of this century.  The mass retailer is next is line.
Pro-Retailer.  This writer sees the mass retailer as the natural leader of the channel under the
marketing concept.  The retailer stands closest to the consumer; he feels the pulse of the
consumer wants and needs day in and day out.  The retailer can best undertake consumer
research right on his own premises and can best interpret what is wanted, how much is wanted,
and when it is wanted.
Source: Mallen 1963, p24-33 & 54 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.8  Retailer as Channel Leader (Mallen 1963)
There is a further insight from this contribution.  It is that it identifies the
changing power base in the marketing channel.  Early in the twentieth century the
middlemen were the powerful brokers while the manufacturers were small businesses
and unable on their own to access the market place.  Then manufacturers grew in scale
and power and the middlemen became the less power member of the marketing channel.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the mass retailers were growing in scale and
power.  They were identified as the ‘natural leader of the channel under the marketing
concept’ (Figure 5.8).  Yet most of the other literature was still heavily engaged in
promoting the concept of the channel captain and directing that at the large
manufacturers.  What is revealing in this excerpt is the use of the term ‘natural leader’
in connection with the retailer rather than the explicit channel captain that is used with
the manufacturers.  It is as though the term is being fine-tuned: channel captain for
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manufacturers; natural leader for the mass retailers.  This could be a contributory factor
for the gradual reduction in the use of the word channel captain.
Democracy is the first of the supply chain characteristics chosen for the
short list.  This shortlist of key words will be used as a benchmark for the cases in
chapter seven and will be derived from the literature as the chapter progresses.
5.1.3 Retailers as Product Innovators: Moyer 1975
The proposition that ‘channels compete’ combines with the increasingly
powerful position of the ‘mass retailers’ to shift the balance of power away from the
manufacturers towards the retailers (Figure 5.9).  One technological influence on this
power balance was the introduction of automated front ends in retail.
Retailers as product innovators
Captained channels have “high vertical programming potential”.  In retailer-led marketing
channels, an attractive use of that potential is to absorb some of the manufacturer’s product
planning function through specification buying.  But here the merchant’s paucity of market
information becomes increasingly a penalty.  In unambitious forms of private branding, retailers
can get by on simple “knockoffs” of supplier’s makes.  Most do.  To date then, private branding has
required the ability to imitate rather than innovate.  But if retailers are to grasp their full
potential as channel captains, they will need to develop forms of specification buying that
can generate something more than “me too” products.  Then there will be a new need to
discover unique, wanted, product features.  As has been shown, the price of progress is that they
lack that capability.  However, if through market research and automated front ends retailers could
steep themselves more deeply in consumer’s unmet wants and needs the retailer-managed
marketing systems could more fully exploit that vertical marketing potential.
Conclusion
In an era of advancing vertical marketing systems, it is increasingly realistic to see the channel
of distribution as a unit of competition.  If these units are to be truly responsive to public needs
and expectations, they must be led by channel captains who are well tuned to their constituencies.
In the marketplace, mass retailers are important channel captains, and in academia they are
usually favored ones.  Yet they are often less understanding of their environments than has been
commonly thought.  Their unresponsiveness stems less from lack of will than from fundamental
changes in the retailing industry.  However, the retailer’s capacity and credentials for channel
captaincy are correspondingly diminished.
Source: Moyer 1975, p 8-15 & 112 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.9  Retailer as Product Innovators (Moyer 1975)
Ideally, this technological breakthrough should give the mass retailers all
the data they needed to enhance their power position relative to the manufacturers.
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They could have used that customer purchasing information to improve their ‘private
brand’ product range.  ‘Specification Buying’ is the term given to this process of a
retailer telling a manufacturer exactly what to make and even how much it should cost
to produce.  As will be explained later ‘Specification Buying’ is a powerful tool in
establishing retailers as channel captains.  However many retailers were not aware of
the potential advantage of this technological innovation.  Their lack of awareness
limited their ability to establish control over the marketing channel.
There is now a clear link between mass retailers as channel captains and the
technology power to see the ‘channel of distribution as a unit of competition’ in an ‘era
of advancing vertical marketing systems’.  This demonstrates the enabling power of
information technology to alter the member in the channel that is the natural leader.
This use of information and technology is an influence on supply chain change that is
external to the relationship dynamics between the members.  Yet it does affect directly
the balance of power between the manufacturers and the mass retailers.  There was the
potential for a big switch in the point of control over the ‘channel of distribution as the
unit of competition’.  The insight provided by this contribution reveals a pivotal change
that was then taking place in supply chain change.
5.1.4 Associative Relationships: Dawson 1990
Relationships within the supply chain are closely linked with the style of
relationship between retailers and suppliers.  A centralised buying function can operate
in an aggressive competitive style, playing one supplier off against another as though
they were interchangeable and transient.  This is a ‘transactional’ style.  There is a
different form of relationship that is ‘associative’.  In an ‘associative’ relationship,
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participants jointly undertake the necessary activities in a value adding partnership
(Figure 5.10).
Associative Relationships
A fifth type of channel relationship may be observed which again is intermediate between the
transactional and corporate integrated extremes, but which is associative.  In this type of
relationship participants jointly undertake the necessary activities in a value adding partnerships
(Johnston and Lawrence, 1988)…The form of the relationship has been present in horizontal
markets for some time, whether at the consumer level through consumer cooperatives or at retail
level with buying consortia and joint ventures.
A radically different management culture is required for these associative relationships
than is commonplace in the highly aggressively competitive transactional relationships or
power exploitative administered and contractual systems…..members of co-operative groups
with shared objectives should not be the first to play ‘competitive’ games, nor should they seek to
gain an upper hand on other members of the association.  Such almost altruistic behaviour can be
culturally painful for managers who have been encouraged, throughout their career and
development, to compete.  It requires a different approach to insiders of the associative
relationship than to outside competitors.
Associative systems are enabled by networks which allow simultaneous sharing of information
among network members but exclude non-members (Miles and Snow, 1987).  These allow co-
ordinated responses to the environment outside the channel and to the activities of non-members
of the network.  These networks of shared information also work positively to increase
interdependency and efficiencies of member of the network such that new cost economies
of network membership arise which become exclusive to the particular vertical
relationship.
The vast majority of retailer-supplier relationships is of one of the four more widely recognised
types.  There appears to be an increase in the proportion of administered systems of channel
relationships at the expense of the two extreme positions.  Such a move to channel relationships
which have explicit power and dependency component is quite distinct from the creation of
associative relationships.
Source: Dawson and Shaw 1990 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.10  Associative Relationships (Dawson 1990)
The relationship style in an ‘associative’ relationship is radically different
from the aggressive, competitive style found in ‘transactional’ buying.  It is a more open
sharing of information and the avoidance of ‘competitive games’.  This ‘associative’
relationship style is found in some supply chains.  The ECR Movement seeks this style
of relationship between retailers and suppliers in managing supply chain change.  For
this reason ‘associative’ is the second characteristic chosen for the shortlist of keywords
that will be used as the benchmark for the cases in chapter seven.  As this will be an
extension of the use of the term, it will be applied to specific circumstances.  These
circumstances will be situations where information and assistance is provided to supply
chain members on an open and voluntary basis for the good of the whole supply chain.
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This often is alongside a more structured relationship that may exist between two or
more members of that supply chain.  This will be the manner in which this characteristic
is applied in the cases.
This concludes the section on ‘channels compete’.  It has provided two
supply chain characteristics, ‘democracy’ and ‘associative’.  These two key words will
be part of the benchmark for the cases in chapter seven.  This journey about channels
competing as whole channels bridges America and Europe over a period of several
decades.  Within this ‘channels compete’ framework for the supply chain, it is logical to
examine the dynamics within the channel to establish further key characteristics for the
benchmark exercise.
5.2 Channel Dynamics
Channel dynamics is a complex topic.  Recent business developments have
radically changed the way organisations operate.  This section begins with a short
account of the transition from ‘function’ to ‘process’.  This type of transformation in
company behaviour opens up new opportunities for the management of supply chain
change.  This will set the scene for a closer examination of four key supply chain
characteristics.  The task is to take concepts evolved in one business environment or
discipline and place them in the supply chain change framework.  This extends the
knowledge base for academics and practitioners.  It applies learning from one arena to
that of the supply chain.  This is one of the purposes of this thesis.  It is intended as a
bridge.  This section is a contribution to that purpose.
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5.2.1 Function to Process: Christopher 2003
Supply chains evolve so that they become faster and more responsive to
customers actual demand patterns.  This is a major component of supply chain change.
In order to achieve this responsiveness there has been transition away from
conventional functional structures, which create silos within and between organisations.
The emphasis is on controlling the processes related to the flows of information and
material from source to consumer.  This process control requires all the relevant
disciplines to work together in a multi-functional team (Figure 5.11).  This change in
relationship behaviour is a challenge for a traditional organisation to break down the
barriers to integration.  Making that transition from function to process is important in
modern supply chains.  It is essential to have the involvement of the different members
in the decisions about changing the process so that a benefit to one member does not
result in a counterproductive effect on another member.  Such impacts can negate the
benefit of the change proposed for the supply chain.
Function to Process
These cross-functional linkages should follow the materials and information flows that connect
the customer with the business and its suppliers.  They are in fact the core processes of the
business.  In the responsive organisation the emphasis is upon the management of processes.
One of the thought leaders on process re-engineering, Thomas Davenport, has defined a
process in an organisational context as:
• Any activity or group of activities that takes an input, adds value to it, and provides an output
to an internal or external customer.
• The characteristics of business processes include the following:
• They have customers for whom they create value
• They typically cross functional boundaries
• They are team based
• They have strategic goals
• The challenge to the organisation is to break down the functional barriers to integration and
instead become a market-facing business.
Source:  Christopher and Peck 2003, p107 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.11  Function to Process (Christopher 2003)
The transition from function to process is built on the partnership
relationships that need to exist in the modern business environment.  It is a change from
transactional to collaborative mode (Figure 5.12).  Supply chain management is a
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critical capability to which a firm must have access.  If that is outsourced, there is the
task of retaining control over the activity, while a third party is conducting its executive.
That ability to control external activities is one of the elements in supply chain change.
Partnerships (a)
In the past, business organisations tended to perform most activities in house.  In the era of
vertical integration, companies would seek to control through ownership of their entire value
chain….Today, the thinking has undergone a 180-degree change, with corporations seeking
to focus on core competences and outsource everything else.  By definition, the more
companies focus on those activities they believe they have a differential advantage in, the more
they need to rely on others.  As these external dependencies increase, it becomes vital that the
nature of the relationship switches from the arm’s length transactional mode to a collaborative
partnership mode.
We would argue that there are three critical capabilities to which any firm must have access: 1)
Customer relationship management; 2) Innovation; 3) Supply chain management.
The business itself may lack the competencies and skills to master all of these, and will almost
certainly need to rely upon others to provide some (or all) of the key elements of these processes.
The danger in outsourcing anything is the loss of control.  In fact, outsourced activities must be
even more closely managed than if they were performed in house.  The maxim must be,
outsource the execution of a process but never the control of that process.
Source:  Christopher and Peck 2003, p 28-29 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.12 Partnerships (Christopher 2003)
The new style partnership approach to channel management challenges
much of the conventional thinking about buyer-supplier relationship.  The extent and
nature of this challenge is a component of assessing the degree of difficulty in
implementing supply chain change.
5.2.2 Collaboration: Spekeman, Kamuff and Myhr 1998
Collaboration is one end of a long journey from transactional relationships.
It is identified as a goal to be achieved in the supply chain (Figure 5.13).  Collaboration
supports a sustainable long-term supply chain strategy.  There is a clear distinction
between the levels of co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration.  Their description is
provided in (Figure 5.14).  The foundation of collaboration is ‘trust and commitment’.
It leverages the ‘skills, expertise and capabilities’ of the firms in the network.
‘Collaboration’ is one of the key supply chain characteristics that are part of the
benchmark for the cases in chapter seven.
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Figure 5.13  Collaboration Diagram (Spekeman 1998)
Collaboration
Collaborative behaviour engages partners in joint planning and processes beyond levels reached
in less intense trading relationships.
The essence of supply chain management is as a strategic weapon to develop a
sustainable competitive advantage by reducing investment without sacrificing customer
satisfaction.  While reduced cost is typically a result, supply chain management should
emphasize leveraging the skills, expertise and capabilities of the firms who comprise this
competitive network referred to.
Managers have long acknowledged the importance of getting close to their key customers.
Now that this logic has extended upstream as well, it is also important to forge close ties to one’s
key suppliers.  A sustainable supply chain strategy extends these linkages upstream and
down.
Effective supply chain management in the new competition suggests seeking close, long term
working relationships with one or two partners (both suppliers and customers) who depend on one
another for much of their business; developing interactive relationships with partners who share
information freely, work together when trying to solve common problems when designing new
products, who jointly plan for the future, and who make their success interdependent.
Co-operation, whereby firms exchange bits of essential information and engage some
suppliers/customers in longer-term contracts, has become the threshold level of interaction. That
is, co-operation is the starting point for supply chain management and has become a
necessary but not sufficient condition.
The next level of intensity is co-ordination whereby both specified workflow and information is
exchanged in a manner that permits JIT systems, EDI, and other mechanisms that attempt to
make seamless many of the traditional linkages between and among trading parties. Trading
parties can co-operate and co-ordinate certain activities but still not behave as true partners.
Again, this evolution is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for total supply chain
management.
Success is no longer measured by a single transaction; competition is, in many instances,
evaluated as a network of co-operating companies competing with other firms along the
entire supply chain. Supply chain management is built on a foundation of trust and
commitment
Source: Spekeman et al 1998, p 53-67 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.14  Collaboration and Networking (Spekeman 1998)
Open market
negotiations















The key transition from open market negotiations to collaboration (Source: Spekeman et al. (1998) 
An empirical investigation into supply chain management, Supply chain management, 3 (2), pp57
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There are considerable benefits to be gained through partnership style
relationship (Figure 5.15).  This is the motivation to achieve that style of relationship in
supply chain management
Benefits gained from working closely with suppliers
The supplier is given long term motivating to invest and improve
A close relationship is a pre-requisite for just in time [JIT] implementation
Waste between companies can be eliminated; paperwork, transportation problems, quality
expectations
The opportunity to eliminate inbound goods inspection as the supplier is developed to be 100%
quality capable and zero inspection is required
The opportunity for vendor managed inventory
joint research and development opportunities for new products and processes in both companies
The opportunity for common electronic data information [EDI] standards development
True final consumer demand sharing to eliminate artificial demand distortions
Preferential pricing over market based supply
Preferential supply in times of short supply to the marketplace
Summary: These combine to allow the serving of customers with better products, faster and at a
lower price than through maintaining transactional supply relationships
Quote from the article:  “The literature on supply chain, operational, strategic and logistical
management over the past two decades has repeatedly emphasised the benefits that can be
gained from companies working closely with suppliers and forming long term relationship:
Womack et al 1990; Womack & Jones 1996; Saunders, 1997; Bailey et al, 1998; Bicheno 1998;
Christopher 1998; Hines et al 2000; Reeves, 2001; Kotzab, 2001; Jones, 2001”.
Source: Hines, Holweg, Piercy and Richl 2002
Figure 5.15  Supplier Relationships – Benefits (Hines 2002)
These benefits from good supplier collaboration partnerships provide
evidence of the success of this type of relationship.
5.2.3 Interdependence: Porter 1980
‘Interdependence’ is used to express a balanced relationship between buyer
and supplier in which the rewards are equal (Figure 5.16) (Also Kumar 18996 cited in
Fernie 2004a).  “The buyer and supplier are said to be interdependent if the relative
utility and scarcity of resources held by each party is high”.  This is an ideal position for
partnerships but occurs in limited circumstances.  Where there is Dominance by either
the buyer or the supplier, they will take a large portion of the reward. The assumption
could be that ‘interdependence’ would not apply between large and small businesses.
There are circumstances when the two form a complementary relationship despite their
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differences in size.  Even in these circumstances, it is appropriate to use the term
‘interdependence’.  This key characteristic ‘interdependence’ is therefore included in
the shortlist for the benchmark because it represents an ideal outcome for the two
parties.
Figure 5.16 Power and Competition Analysis (Porter 1980)
5.2.4 Non-Adversarial: Lonsdale 2002
There is a view that even adversarial relationships can be collaborative.
(Lonsdale 2002, Figure 5.17).  However, an ideal relationship is that which is
collaborative and non-adversarial.  For this reason ‘non-adversarial’ is included in the
shortlist of key characteristics for the supply chain benchmark.
The supply chain application will be linked to the buyer – supplier
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adversarial.  Conversely, if the buyer already has a non-adversarial relationship with the
supplier, there is a high probability that the supply chain relationship will also be non-
adversarial.  A different combination might also apply.  Parts of the relationship may be
adversarial, perhaps relating to a price on a specific product.  Other aspects of the
relationship may be non-adversarial.  Both parties are able to work well on supply chain
issues.  These are the judgements that will be made when considering how to apply the
key word ‘non-adversarial’ in the cases in chapter seven.
Figure 5.17  Adversarial – Collaborative. (Lonsdale et al 2002)
5.2.5 Goodwill Trust: Hines 2004
Goodwill Trust is a key characteristic of supply chain relationships.  It is
included in the shortlist of key words for the benchmark exercise.  It is selected because
it is a desired relationship.  That goodwill trust represents a bridge between a small and
a large member in the supply chain.  It is founded on ‘withheld power’.  This is an































opportunism that presents itself from another member.  That type of exploitation is a
great risk between members of unequal power.  Clearly, the model (Figure 5.18) is
complex.  It is a recent contribution to academic debate about change in the supply
chain.  It explores the two-stage transition from the frequent starting point to the desired
relationship, from contractual, through competence to goodwill trust.
Figure 5.18 Model of Integrated Supply Chain Management (Hines 2004)
In the cases, there are situations where there is a small niche supplier
working with a large national supermarket operator.  This term ‘Goodwill Trust’ will be
applied to those circumstances where the large retailer has withheld ‘opportunistic’
power.  This is withheld in order to nurture a relationship.  In some instances, the niche
supplier may be providing a quality product that adds high value to the category in
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This concludes the section on channel dynamics.  It has identified further
key characteristics for the benchmark: collaboration, interdependence, non-adversarial,
and goodwill trust.  The next section considers channel champions.
5.3 Channel Champions
The earlier sections demonstrated that there is a role for a leader in the
supply chain.  In the American marketing literature, the leader is called the ‘channel
captain’.  Mostly that refers to the manufacturers but there was recognition of the rise in
power of the mass retailers.  In the era of advanced vertical marketing systems, the
retailer was a strong contender to take over the leadership of the marketing channel.
This was founded on not only their size and scale but also their access to consumer
information.  This access was the result of technology at the front end of the retail store.
This was linked to the value of ‘specification buying’ for retailer branded products.  In
ECR, there are calls for champions in the supply chain.
This section explores a limited set of topics.  The first is Situational
Leadership.  As this is a broader reflection that applies to all the cases in chapter seven,
it is not included in the benchmark shortlist.  The next three topics are included in that
shortlist.  The win-win of the negotiation styles, the presence of a dominant designer
and finally ‘specification buying’.
It is recognised by the author that there are many other models of behaviour
that could be brought into debate, but two frameworks concerning situational leadership
and negotiation are sufficient to help to inform an assessment about the range of skill
sets required for a channel organiser, leader and captain.  They can be used to evaluate,
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review, critique and develop leadership success, which is a demanding task given the
complexity of the retail channel.
5.3.1 Situational Leadership: Hersey & Blanchard 1997
The role of leadership is complex.  How individuals, companies or other
bodies relate to each other in leadership is a relevant topic for consideration at this stage
in the chapter. Research reveals that no particular style of leadership is best.  On the
contrary, effective leadership behaviour is that which is appropriate for the specific
situation that exists in the environment in which the leader is functioning (Figure 5.19).
Figure 5.19  Situational Leadership Style (Hersey and Blanchard 1977)
S1 Structuring.  Here the leader takes a major role in deciding how the task
can best be accomplished and then giving those instructions, including demonstrating































S2 Coaching.  This focuses on interaction, since the leader–subordinate
relationship revolves around two goals, accomplishing the task and developing
task–relevant ability and commitment, so the leader explains the why and how with
realistic targets, helping the person and recognising and rewarding performance.
S3 Encouraging.  This seeks to ensure that subordinates are increasing in
their confidence and ability in an outstanding and independent fashion, by facilitation,
listening and two-way communication.
S4 Delegating.  This assigns tasks to appropriately skilled subordinates and
allowing them to proceed on their own with minimal involvement.
The styles S1, structuring and S4, delegating are less demanding in terms of
the manager’s time and emotional involvement.  In contrast, style, S2, coaching and S3,
encouraging, demand a higher level of time and emotional involvement.
The arrows show the various routes of progress or regression that people
can take place over time and which determine how the leader could deal with those
situations.  In the context of this thesis such a model, which is applied in people
leadership, can also be extended to exploring how leadership styles might need to adapt
in managing change in a supply channel between companies; the same principles apply.
Table 5.1 provides information about the people and tasks for which the particular
styles are most relevant or least appropriate.
This topic of situational leadership style applies to all the cases in chapter
seven.  It will be used as part of the analysis in chapter eight, as a general point.  It is
not a specific key characteristic for the benchmark shortlist.
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MOST appropriate when managing LEAST appropriate when managing:
S1 Structuring management style with persons who:
• are new or have little experience in doing a task
•  are not self-motivated or willing to do a particular
assignment
• feel insecure and lack self-confidence
• are performing well below standard
• are skilled and experienced in doing a task
•  are self-motivated and confident in their ability to
meet or excel performance standards
•  Where it is difficult to measure production in the
short run
• Where time pressures are not critical
S2 Coaching management style with persons who:
•  bring to the task some skills and experience but
are performing below standard
• respect you and your knowledge and position
•  want to share responsibility and work with you in
an interdependent way
• Where time is not a critical factor
• are very skilled and experienced in doing the task
• are highly motivated to do their best
•  do not need your hands-on involvement to do a
good job
• have little or no skill, experience, or confidence in a
particular work assignment area
S3 Encouraging management style with persons who:
•  are quite skilled and experienced in doing an
assignment
•  are self-motivated and takes responsibility for the
task
• are performing at or above standard
• Where there are a number of different ways to go
about getting the task done
• are not performing up to standard
•  lack sufficient knowledge or experience to perform
satisfactorily without direction
• do not show initiative in this area
•  do not take responsibility for outcomes in this
performance area
S4 Delegating management style with persons who:
•  have all the required knowledge, skill, or
experience needed to do an outstanding job
• are self-confident and highly motivated
• take pride in excelling and is performing well above
standard in this particular area
•  A person who initiates action and accepts
responsibility for a task
•  are new, inexperienced, or unskilled in a particular
task
•  are unwilling to take responsibility for their own
planning and productivity in a work area
•  do not feel comfortable or confident in doing the
task
• are not performing the assignment above standard
Table 5.1  Situational Leadership Styles (Hersey & Blanchard 1977)
5.3.2 Negotiation Styles: Glaser & Glaser 1991
Similarly, there is a model for the various styles that can be used in
negotiation.  Every participant in a negotiation has two important concerns during the
negotiation process.  The first concern is with the substance or outcome of the
agreement.  The second is a concern with the relationship with the other parties in the
negotiation.  People have varying degrees of interest in these two behavioural
dimensions.
One person through his or her determination to drive the best bargain at any
cost, for example, might express the concern for substance.  Only the substance or
getting the best deal matters.  Others have somewhat less concern for substance.  There
are people who are willing to accept whatever can be gained and make little or no effort
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to influence directly the outcome of the process.  The second concern every participant
to a negotiation has, is for the relationship with the other party.  Does the other person
want to have certain needs fulfilled?  Does this person like me?  Is my behaviour
offensive?  Will this person negotiate with me in the future? What kind of relationship
should we build before and during our discussion?  How will it affect this person’s
willingness to carry out our agreement, if one should be reached?  An individual’s
concern for the substance and concern for relationship with the other negotiating partner
may both be graphically represented on a continuum ranging from low to moderate to
high (Figure 5.20).  This model of negotiating styles shows how the two concerns
interact to produce the five characteristic negotiating styles.
Figure 5.20  Model of Negotiating Styles (Glaser and Glaser 1991)
There are five negotiating styles.  First, N1; defeat the other party; a pattern
that is characterised by win-lose competition, pressure, intimidation, adversarial
relationships, and the negotiator is attempting to get a much as possible for themselves
















































Second, N2; win–win outcome; here a high degree of concern for both the
substance of the negotiation and the relationship with the other party is expressed;
characterised by searching for common interests with the other party, problem solving
behaviour, and recognising that both parties must get their needs satisfied for the
outcome to be entirely successful.
Third, N3; accommodate the other party’s needs, where the focus is on
building compatible relationships in the hope that the negotiation will be successful,
characterised by avoidance of substantive differences, yielding to relationship pressure
above the fairness of the outcome.
Fourth, N4; withdraw, where there is a low concern with both the substance
of the negotiation and the relationship with the other party, characterised by feelings of
powerlessness, indifference to the outcome, resignation, surrender, taking whatever the
other party is willing to concede.
Finally, N5; compromise, where there is only a moderate interest in the
substance or the relationship, characterised by compromise, meeting the other party
half-way, looking for trade – offs; conflict reduction is valued over synergistic problem
solving.
A negotiator may choose variations of each style because it may be
appropriate in certain conditions.  However a consistent application of the N2,
collaborate style, offers the greatest probability of producing negotiation results of the
highest quality and most enduring satisfaction to the parties involved.  This win – win
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collaborative style will be highly successful in the right context if it approached with the
right skills and the manner (Figure 5.21).
The ‘N2 win-win’ negotiation style is a key characteristic of good supply
chain management.  It is on the shortlist for the benchmark of criteria for the cases in
chapter seven.
Interpersonal skills identified for win – win N2 negotiation style
Assertive behaviour
Supportive climate – building
Active listening, empathetic responding
Non verbal behaviour sensitivity
Using probes to raise receptivity
Confronting and working through differences
Method of approach to help achieve win – win N2 negotiation style
Comprehensive preparation
An appropriate opening to set the tone of the negotiation
Exploring each party’s needs
Creating development of alternatives
Use of objective criteria to evaluate agreements
Appropriate closing to define the agreement
Critique of negotiated outcomes
Figure 5.21  Negotiating Styles: Interpersonal Skills (Glaser and Glaser 1991)
5.3.3 Dominant Designer: Koehorst et al 1999
The concept of a designer is readily understood.  The application of the term
‘dominant’ refers to the party that is able to insist on the application of their design
concept.  Normally this is the producer of the product (Figure 5.22).  Occasionally it is
the purchaser of the product.
Dominant Designer
When the initiator of a new standard has a considerable market share, one may call him the
dominant agent: an agent that is in a position to enforce his initiative on others (Braunstein and
White, 1985). Typically, however, the dominant agent concept is reserved to describe the role of
a producer as against user-initiated standardization as is here the case (and in Dankbaar and
VanTulder, 1992).
Source:  Koehorst,  de Vries and Wubben 1999, p95–101 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.22  Dominant Designer (Koehorst 1999)
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Some of the cases in chapter seven have been selected because the represent
a dominant designer situation.  It is the retailer who is the dominant designer in these
cases, which are not related to consumer products.  They relate to aspects of the supply
chain, for example, plastic tray design and temperature controlled trailer design.
Dominant Designer is one of the key words in the benchmark of characteristics.
5.3.4 Specification Buying: Kelley 1954
The concept of specification buying goes back to the 1930s for the
American great department stores.  It illustrates both vertical integration and process
control over suppliers (Figure 5.23).
Specification Buying
The definition of ‘specification buying’ however, contains the idea that the purchasing firm
exercises a rigid control over the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of a given item.  Since
this control aspect is such an important attribute of the arrangement, it well reflects the complex of
ideas presented below.
There are many examples in which the great department stores of the latter part of the 19th
Century integrated vertically into the manufacturing field.
Source: Kelley 1954, p 255–265 [Emphasis added]
Figure 5.23  Specification Buying (Kelley 1954)
There are two reasons for including this in the list of key characteristics on
the benchmark short list.  The closeness of the relationship between those original
retailers and their suppliers provided the great department stores with competitive
advantage.  The first is that it is a link to the past.  It is not a term that is used in Europe.
The second is that there are instances in the cases that can be described as ‘specification
buying’.
5.4 Channel Types
Acknowledgement:  The author worked on the content of this section 6.4
with his co-authors, particularly at Lund University Packaging Logistics Department
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(Gustafsson et al 2006, Ch. 5).  At that time of writing, there were two purposes.  One
was for the book; the other was for this PhD.  The way of working was to nominate one
writer as the lead author for a chapter with all the others contributing to the input and
output.
The term ‘Integrative’ is included in the shortlist of benchmark
characteristics.  It is an issue that assists the alignment of the supply chain with the
business strategy.  It facilitates and reflects collaborative style of relationships both
internally and externally.  The topic is explored first at a company level and based on
this learning is then extended to the supply chain.  This combination provides a useful
tool to map the circumstances of supply chain change.
5.4.1 Integrative, Segmentalist: Kanter 1984
Decision-making and change within businesses and companies is a complex
process where there often are several options to consider and many issues to negotiate.
There are two types of organisational attitudes or company cultures.  Their cultures and
attitudes shape their disposition towards the change process.  They are the integrative
attitude and its opposite the segmentalist attitude (Kanter 1984, 1994).  This applies at
the company level.  Later this context is extended to the supply channel level (Sections
5.4.3 & 5.4.4).
The integrative company is a company where employees have access to
many types of useful information, collected from both internal and external sources.
There is open communication and collaboration between departments, where
decentralised decision-making results in team-building, entrepreneurial spirit, less
control and more focus on visions for the future. Problems are treated with a holistic
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perspective, where attention is given to the consequences in the analysis of different
problem-solving actions. Top management encourages innovation and gives support to
many change processes. Integrative companies are more proactive than segmentalist
companies are. An integrative organisation shows an openness to the surrounding
environment and so able to notice the early signals of change in the market. Employees
are expected to report to the management on such early signs of change.
The segmentalist company is more hierarchical, conservative and traditional.
Only the few managers at the highest level make decisions. A fear of change is
prevalent and problems are dealt with in a manner that focuses on details rather than
trying to get the fuller picture. “Walls” between departments restrict communication
and there is little cross-functional team working, the classic silo management culture.
Innovation is as Kanter describes it “something given to the R&D department to take
care of so no one else has to worry about it.” Control systems allow management to
keep a detailed check of the company’s past and present operations but this information
is not shared with the workforce. Segmentalist companies with a stable market share,
well-running operations and a high profitability are the least likely to support new ideas.
Employees who try to point out the emerging threats are considered disloyal. This type
of segmentalist company is most vulnerable because of their inability to react to a major
change that is emerging rapidly in their market place.
5.4.2 Enablers, Barriers.
There are three requirements for successful change management. First, the
availability of information; second, having sufficient resources allocated to the change
project; and third, support from senior management, not only in terms of economic
resources but also in the form of a strong commitment to the vision and objectives of
175
the change project.  In addition, there is a fourth requirement. Senior management effort
to gain acceptance from personnel and all the companies in the supply channel.
There are skilled people who have the insight, experience, knowledge and
understanding of the need for change.  Sometimes these enablers have already initiated
the change process.  These drivers of change are entrepreneurs who have the ability to
see through the obstacles.  They understand the full picture without losing the detail.
They are good communicators, as well as good listeners.  They have the capability of
sharing their early vision with others.  They can handle tension, and they know how to
deal with the barriers of change.
There are a range of barriers and obstacles.  Opposition and resistance can
be active or passive. There are two time frames for opposition.  Early opposition can be
seen as scepticism, as well as reluctance to commit time and resources.  Later
opposition can emerge unexpectedly, to challenge details in the plan.  Active opposition
may be easier to handle.  It is often possible to discuss with people say they are against
proposed action. The verbal argument can be better than silent opposition.
5.4.3 Supply Chain Application: Gustafsson et al 2006
The discussion above has contrasted integrative and segmentalist companies
and how their characteristics affect their ability to change.  This concept is extended to
the supply chain (Gustafsson et al 2006).  It can operate at both the company and the
supply chain level.  It is argued that change processes are more successful in integrative
than in segmentalist organisations.  The supply channel perspective is complicated by
the diversity of member companies.  For example, how do segmentalist companies
survive in an integrative supply chain?  This theory of segmentalist and integrative
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styles can be placed in two dimensions, namely at the company and at the supply chain
levels. In this way, it is possible to consider the change management process with the
companies in the supply channel as a matrix.
5.4.4 Quadrant Characteristics
In this matrix (Figure 5.24 a, b; Gustafsson et al 2006), the company style is
on the Y-axis and the supply channel style on the X axis This creates four quadrants,
identified as A, B; C, and D representing the various combinations of company, supply
channel and their styles.  Quadrant A represents a segmentalist company in a
segmentalist supply channel. Quadrant B represents an integrative company in a
segmentalist supply channel.  Quadrant C represents a segmentalist company in an
integrative supply channel. Quadrant D represents an integrative company in an
integrative supply channel. Members in each quadrant will have different
characteristics, different behaviour and face different barriers and find different
opportunities. Members can clearly choose how they wish to change or indeed, they
may wish to stay as they are.  These situations can now be examined in more detail.
The two company types, A and B, are within the segmentalist supply
channel, and their information, also from Figure 5.24, provides a short description of the
abilities and attributes of the companies and their organisational style. Later there will
be a discussion of the options available for them to follow. Quadrant A is a segmentalist
company in a segmentalist supply channel. This type of company will be focused on the
silo benefits, e.g. marketing are divorced from distribution etc, and will have a single
point of contact with suppliers. It will fairly ineffective, confused about the broader
implications and slow to respond. It would experience trauma when faced with supply
channel change because it would be overwhelmed and out of its depth.
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Quadrant B is an integrative company in a segmentalist supply channel.
This type of company will already have multifunctional teams working together and
understanding each other’s goals and objectives.  It will have experienced the benefits
of this multifunctional collaboration in other areas of its business.  However being
located in a segmentalist supply channel it will experience frustration with other
members of the supply channel because although individual companies can do their bit
the other members cannot.
The other two company types, C and D, are within the integrative supply
channel, and their information provides a short description of the abilities and attributes
of the companies and their organisational style. Later there will be a discussion of the
options available for them to follow.  Quadrant C is a segmentalist company in an
integrative supply channel. This type of company will be focused on the silo benefits,
e.g. marketing are divorced from distribution etc, and will have a single point of contact
with suppliers.  It might be powerless on its own because it is not open to the
collaborative approaches of the other companies in the supply channel.  It could become
a reluctant or willing follower, which this may depend on the nature of the contact.  For
example, a top-level contact with a powerful function would have a more positive effect
than a middle level contact with a marginalised function.  As this company still operates
in a segmentalist style the different functions do not work collaboratively or adopt a
mutual understanding of each other’s goals, the company is more likely to have an
entrenched hierarchical attitude with a clear view about which functions control the
organisation and which are there simply to do as they are told.  Even worse, there may
exist strong conflicts between different company functions that can be destructive as
well as wasteful in time and effort. Even if the integrative supply channel has good
quality leadership, there is a probability that a segmentalist company could reject that
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channel leadership, even though it might take some time for it to realise that the
company itself has lost out as a result.  In contrast, this company might suddenly break
out of its segmentalist attitudes and make a surprise breakthrough into the benefits of
participating in the integrative supply channel.
Quadrant D is an integrative company in an integrative supply channel.
This type of company will already have multifunctional teams working together and
understanding each other’s goals and objectives.  It will have experienced the benefits
of this multifunctional collaboration in other areas of its business.  It will be very active
with its integrative supply channel with multiple contact points with suppliers.  The
decision-making will focus on the benefits for the competitive position of the channel
members in the marketplace. It will be able to make fast and effective implementation
of the agreed supply channel policies.  It will possess self-confidence, take the initiative
and be creative. It could be in a position to take the channel leadership shaping the
supply channel. It could be a channel captain.
5.4.5 Routes for Change
We can now consider the various routes to implementing change in the
different combinations of companies and supply channels (Figures 5.25 & 5.26;
Gustafsson et al 2006).  It can be assumed that integrative companies in integrative
supply channels are more likely to succeed with their change processes than those in
other combinations. This ideal situation is not always present in a retail supply chain, or
generally in supply chains formed by the combination of separate companies.  This
could possibly be the result of an uncoordinated approach to supply chain development.
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Figure 5.25  Route A: Change Position in Supply Chains
What then is the position of an integrative company in a segmentalist-
influenced supply channel?  How can an integrative company solve the problem of
managing change with segmentalist companies in such a segmentalist supply channel?
What is the role for that integrative company, which has the vision of improving
customer value, product value or system value? If it is a large retailer, the chances of
achieving success are better than if it is a small supplier. The large retailer can use their
power of influence as being the supplier of customer demand data and information for
the other actors in the supply channel.  The situation however is not hopeless for the
small supplier that is integrative and innovative and has visions for change.  Being
innovative, this company may identify other companies within the supply channel, who
are defined as integrative and innovative. By forming an alliance with such companies,
they can gain power and so increase their ability to gain acceptance for such ideas from
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Take another scenario; what about the company with a segmentalist
company style that decides to switch to the integrative attitude (Figure 5.25, in the case
of Route A). The company has first to overcome its silo conflicts and then generate
multi-functional teams to address its supply channel issues. This should result in an
improvement of the company’s position, enabling it to leverage any collaboration that is
developing between other elements of the supply channel.  This type of leadership is a
model that can be applied when such a company acts as the nodal point or stimulus with
colleague companies by encouraging cooperation within the supply channel. In some
instances, that company could develop into an emerging channel captain role if it were
to hold the balance of power within the channel and so influence the other players to
adopt an integrative style in their business relationships.
A fuller channel captain role would be that taken by a company, which not
only progresses through this process (Figure 5.25, Route A) but also acts as a catalyst
for the supply channel to be transformed from segmentalist to an integrative cooperative
whole. Such a company would be creative and identify the channel benefits early in the
development process. It would become sufficiently influential to reposition both itself
and the other players in the supply channel to realise and gain the benefits from channel
cooperation. The whole supply channel would then gain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace.  Rather than companies competing with companies, it is more a matter of
supply channels competing with supply channels; the better team wins. Thus companies
think more strategically about their channel choices, e.g. to which channel do they want
to belong?  This is the context for the role of the Channel Captain.
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Figure 5.26  Route B: Changes Position in Supply Chains
In addition, what might happen to a company with a segmentalist company
style?  It has a choice: either it can stagnate or it can develop (Figure 5.26).  If it
continues in its own silo conflict, power imbalance and power struggle, while the other
elements in the supply channel are collaborating to gain channel benefits then the
company could stagnate and isolate itself from the other players in that supply channel.
Such a company could take on a blocker role. If so, it can be identified as a blocker by
the others in the supply channel.  They may choose to deselect it so that it is excluded
from their supply channel and from access to their market place.
On the other hand, if a company is willing or even reluctant, it could evolve
into a follower role, develop, and so benefit from the strategic reposition that is taking
place in the supply channel to gain competitive advantage in the market place. To do
this it has to overcome its internal silo conflicts so that it can gain these long-term
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that route B has two legs so there are two options or two phases of change the company
could choose.  Similarly, a segmentalist company could elect to change from its current
segmentalist supply channel and join an integrative supply channel, and by so doing
learn how to become more integrative in its style.
5.4.6 Benchmarks
There are ten key words in the Benchmark shortlist.  They are derived from
the literature.  In some instances, their application in this thesis is an extension of their
use based on the learning gained by the author.
No Characteristics Author Description and connections
1 Democracy Mallen 1963 Autocracy, democracy, anarchy
2 Associative Dawson and Shaw
1990
Voluntary joint action
3 Collaboration Spekeman et al 1998 Trust, withheld power, cost reduction,
customer benefit
4 Interdependence Porter 1980 Mutual dependence
5 Non adversarial Lonsdale et al 2002 Equal sharing of reward
6 Goodwill Trust Hines and Samuel
2004
Withheld power, large – small
7 Win – win Glaser and Glaser
1991
N2 negotiating style
8 Dominant Designer Koehurst et al 1999 Usually producer led sometimes user led;
Lee and Billington 1992
9 Specification Buying Kelley 1954 Retailer specifies product
10 Integrative Kanter 1984 Companies & supply chains
Categories 1 -3 Democracy; Associative; Collaboration;
Categories 4-7 Interdependence; Non-Adversarial; Goodwill Trust; Win-Win;
Categories 8-10 Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
Table 5.2  Ten Supply Chain Characteristics
All ten keywords are placed at the end of each case study and those that
apply are underlined.  The results are analysed in chapter eight (Table 8.1).
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5.5 Summary
Managing change in supply channels is a challenging task and a demanding
role of leadership.  This chapter has presented a range of theories and explorations on
the nature of supply chains.  Chapter six explains the methodology used for this thesis
and so prepares the setting for chapter seven, which contains twenty cases.  Each case is
based on a real event known to the author.  These provide information about the
location of channel decisions; what these decisions are about.  It identifies the tension
that results from channel changes.  It shows the range of choices that are available to the
channel players.  The key characteristics that apply are identified for each case.  The
cases will be analysed in chapter eight in the context of the theories presented in this
chapter five.  The result should be a clearer understanding of the role of the retailers as






This thesis applies the methodology of Participant Action Research in a
Case Study setting to this longitudinal supply chain development study of Tesco. Earlier
chapters provided detail of its operational history and the ideas surrounding supply
chain and channel captain. This chapter explains the reasons for choosing this
methodology and prepares the groundwork to understand the criteria for selecting the
twenty case studies.  It provides an explanation of the structure for case study research
and the process used to reassess theory from those results.  Extended consideration is
given to participant action research and to the case study research process.  There is a
shortage within the supply chain literature on these topics. Filling this gap in the
literature could, however, create an opportunity to apply these methods with the current
generation of professionals in the sector in order to contribute more to supply chain
insight and theory from their operational experience.
6.1 Action Research
The phrase Participant Action Research is used in this thesis to emphasise
which style of Action Research is being used in the methodology.  As will become clear
from the text, there are different forms of Action Research.  Participant Action Research
is a methodology for a researcher who is not only present in a case study but is also
active in the work of the case study itself.   This is quite different from the role in the
established social science tradition of researchers acting as external observers, who
study what is happening and then interpret the reasons behind the events that occur.
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That tradition follows a principle of independence for the researcher, who is
not there to change the behaviour of those being observed; in fact any interference by
the researcher is regarded as inappropriate.  For example, in a workplace environment, a
time and motion study would be conducted by an external researcher, who assesses the
current processes and productivity.  The data from that study would then be analysed
and recommendations made about changes to the processes to achieve better
performance.  This is one example among the many different types of study by external
researchers that can add value in understanding and improving organisations.
Participant Action Research is different.  It sets out to approach a specified
environment using a different style.  The researcher is not only present in that
environment but is expected to take an active part in influencing the outcome of those
circumstances.  This is not a passive background role of observation.  It is instead an
interactive engagement with those persons involved with that environment.  The
researcher is active in changing the situation and influencing the behaviour of those
participating in the event.  The active nature of this type of research raises issues about
the appropriate role for the researcher to adopt.  It is these issues that are addressed in
the methodology of participant action research.
A key issue that arises for participant action research is the value set that the
researcher brings to the situation. In general, social science research is conducted with a
clear awareness of such value sets, even when the researcher is acting as an external
observer.  It is the value set that provides the basis for the interpretation of the
behaviour and the circumstances. Some of these values are known publicly to those
involved and other values may be less obvious either to the participants or even the
researcher. It is part of the methodology to make these value sets explicit, or to put it
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another way, to provide an answer to the question, what are the ideas and objectives that
are driving a particular piece of research?
In participant action research methodology, the researcher strives to develop
awareness not only of these broader values, ideas and objectives but also the actual
values that are revealed by the researcher’s style of behaviour during the research.  An
example might be: a researcher is working with a self-help group in a community to
explore their ability to work in a participative manner.  If the researcher conducts this
research by issuing detailed instructions to those taking part, without any opportunity
for them to share their own ideas, then the behaviour of the researcher is not in harmony
with the broader intentions of the research project.  The researcher is therefore required
to practise some self-reflection about the integrity of the practice of their personal value
set and those of the intended project.
Participant Action Research methodology is first, about observing what is
happening externally, ‘out there’, and second, what is happening internally through the
style of the researcher’s behaviour, or what is ‘within here’.  If the two are in harmony,
then there is integrity.  If the two are in conflict, then the researcher has a duty to reflect
and amend their style of behaviour accordingly.  This is not just a matter of behaviour,
self-awareness and reflection, the methodology has guidelines for the evidence to
support what has taken place in both the external and internal aspects.
The methodology for the evidence is that it must be provided for both the
external and the internal dimensions.  The external evidence of what happens would be
documented publicly, as it is by a researcher acting as an external observer.  The
participant action researcher has also to provide evidence of their internal self-
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awareness about their behaviour and its impact on the other participants.  In addition,
those who are participating can contribute evidence to the researcher about the impact
of the researcher’s own behaviour on the other participants in the project.
This has been a summary of the main differences of Participant Action
Research Methodology from other social science research.  Participant Action Research
has been used extensively in Education (McNiff, & Whitehead 2000) and the
underlying principles summarised (McNiff & Whitehead 2006).  The term self study is
used in the education methodology.  A summary of the educational application follows,
which will provide a base from which to transfer the main components to the supply
chain study.
The background to some of this literature relates to the Irish Education
System, which needed to make a transition during the 1990s from its established
tradition to a modern approach.  One route through this transformation was the
application of a new role for the teacher.  The teacher would experiment on different
educational styles with the students and then review the outcomes.  The teacher became
a teacher – researcher.  The results of these experiments were incorporated into
education policy.  The teacher as a practitioner had evolved into a teacher – researcher,
whose conclusions were accepted as a critical contribution to policy development.  The
teacher was deliberately changing the situation with the students in order to find a way
forward to a modern educational approach.  The model is best explained in its original
context, then it will be possible to adapt the model and apply it to the supply chain case
studies.
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6.2 Action Research in Education
The main literature and thinking that is relevant to this thesis is in the
writings of McNiff and Whitehead.   These were both involved in the promotion of
Action Research for Education.  Although the origins of Action Research go back
further, these writings from 1990s and 2000s are contemporary with this thesis.  The
ideas they contain can be modified to apply to the supply chain.  This section
summarises their approach to and their application of Action Research, in a direction,
which was developed for practitioners, such as teachers and principals, in Education.
This summary draws heavily from their writings with references at key points. [Note:
McNiff & Whitehead 2006 All you need to know about Action Research, Sage, London
provides a complete guide as indicated by the title. ]
6.2.1 Action Research
Action Research is a form of enquiry that enables practitioners, such as
teachers, to investigate and evaluate their work.  They ask, ‘What am I doing? What do
I need to improve? How do I improve?’  Their accounts of their practice show how they
are trying to improve their own learning and influence the learning of others. (McNiff &
Whitehead 2002).  Action research aims to be a disciplined, systematic process.  A
model action plan would be:
• Take stock of what is going on
• Identify a concern
• Think of a possible way forward
• Try it out
• Monitor the action by gathering data to show what is happening
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• Evaluate progress by establishing procedures for making judgements about
what is happening.
• Test the validity of accounts of learning
• Modify practice in the light of the evaluation.
This can also be represented as a cycle of the following activities; observe,
reflect, act, evaluate, modify and then move in a new direction. This is generally known
as the action – reflection cycle.
However, within the action research family, different approaches have
emerged.   While all action researchers ask questions about influencing the processes of
change, different perspectives ask different kinds of questions.  Compare this
contrasting question posed first by a social scientist: ‘Does management style influence
worker productivity?’ and then by an action researcher: ‘How do I improve my
management style to encourage productivity?’ To appreciate these differences we need
to explore the idea of outsider and insider research.
Traditionally, social scientists tend to stand outside a situation and ask,
‘What are those people over there doing?  How do we understand and explain what they
are doing?’  This kind of research is often called spectator research or outsider research.
Action researchers, however, are insider researchers.   They see themselves as part of
the situation they are investigating, and ask individually and collectively, ‘Is my/our
work going as we would wish?  How do we improve it where necessary?’  This
difference in approach has its roots in the way social science research evolved.
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6.2.2 Emergence of Action Research
This section traces the emergence of action research from its beginnings in
the 1930s and 1940s to its current position of world importance.  It discusses the
historical journey of action research through social science and educational research and
places it within the emergence of different paradigms.
New forms of enquiry became established throughout the twentieth century.
A shift took place in some quarters, away from a positivist view towards an interpretive
view.  Positivism held that the world was a ‘thing’, separate from an observer.  It was
possible to observe and comment on the world in an objective, value – free way.  In the
same way, knowledge was a ‘thing’, separate from a knower, so it was possible also to
comment on knowledge in an objective, value – free way.  This view led to a tradition
in which the world and its phenomenon could be studied, experimented with and
analysed and outcomes could be predicted and controlled by manipulating variables in
the form of objects, people and practices.
The emergent interpretive tradition, however, held that people were part of
and created their own reality, so it did not make sense to see the world as separate from
the people who inhabited it, or practices as separate from the people who were doing
them.  Rather than study the world and practices as separate phenomena, the focus
shifted to understanding how people interacted with one another and their environment.
The purpose of such research therefore has shifted from a wish to control the
environment and human practices by imposing change from without to a commitment to
understanding and improving the environment and human practices by changing them
from within.
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Action Research, as modified for its application in Education, developed
from these origins in social science during the 1930s and 1940s, through its application
in the work of Lawrence Stenhouse (1975:165) with the idea of ‘teacher as researcher’.
This then continued to develop in the work of Jack Whitehead with the idea of ‘living
educational theories’ and in the work of Jean McNiff, with the idea of ‘practitioner as
theorist’.  There were different paradigms of Technical Rational, Interpretive and
Critical Theoretic research (Ernest 1994 cited in McNiff & Whitehead 2006). Action
Research developed out of Critical Theory.
“Action research developed out of critical theory, and went beyond.
Critical theory asked, ‘How can this situation be understood in order to change it?’ but
aimed only for understanding, not for action.  Action research went into action and
asked, ‘How can it be changed?’ Some researchers, however, still like to locate action
research within a broad framework of critical theory, emphasizing its participatory
nature to combat relations of power.” She goes on to explain.  “What distinguishes a
living theory form of action research is that is grounded in the ontological ‘I’ of the
researcher, and uses a living logic, that is, researchers organize their thinking in terms
of what they are experiencing at the moment” (McNiff 2006 p41-42).
A living theory is a set of ideas about what we claim to know and how we
have come to know.  If we can show that what we know (our theory) stands up to public
scrutiny, we can claim that our theory has validity (has truth value and is trustworthy).
By doing our research, we can claim to have generated our theory of practice, that is, we
can say with confidence that we know what we are doing and why we are doing it.  We
are showing that we are acting in a systematic way and that we are developing a praxis,
which is morally committed practice.
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The best accounts show the transformations of practice into living theories.
The individual practitioner asks, ‘What am I doing?  How do I understand it in order to
improve it?  How can I draw on ideas in the literature and incorporate them into my
own understanding?  How do I transform these ideas into action?’  Asking these
questions can help practitioners to find practical ways of living in the direction of their
values.
New ‘movements’ such as postmodernism explain how researchers need to
regard themselves as influenced by, and influencing, the situation they are investigating.
Researchers such as John Law (2004, cited in McNiff & Whitehead 2006:19) explain
that the stories people tell about research actually come to inform how they do research
in the future. Action research has this self – transforming capacity. This has developed
further to focus on self-study.
Self-study places individual researchers at the centre of their own enquiries.
Researchers ask, ‘What am I doing?  How do I describe and explain my actions to you?’
The individual ‘I’ is always seen to exist in company with other individual ‘I’s’. and
each asks, ‘How do I hold myself accountable to myself and to you?’  The boundaries
begin to dissolve, as researchers come to see themselves as sharing meanings, that is,
developing a common understanding about what they are doing and why.  Boundaries
become permeable membranes (Capra 2003, cited in McNiff & Whitehead 2006:11)),
where meanings and commitments flow between lives and people perceive themselves
not as separate entities, though still unique individuals, but as sharing the same life
space as others (Whitehead 2005).  The idea of self-study has potential for generating
personal, organizational and social change.  Such practitioners show the reality of their
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self-study by explaining what their values are and showing whether or not they are
realizing them.
Personal theories are powerful for sustainable change.  Sustainable change
happens when people create and implement their own ideas rather than only accept and
implement the ideas of others.  Existing power relationships between ‘experts’ and
‘trainees’ are demolished and more democratic forms of working developed.  While an
external researcher may make suggestions about what a practitioner may do, it is for the
practitioner to make decisions and stay committed to them.
Although the purpose of all research is to generate new knowledge, action
research generates a special kind of knowledge.  Action research has always been
understood as people taking action to improve their personal and social situations.  The
potential of action research becomes real when ideas are linked with action.  People can
give meaning to their lives, because they stop talking about action research and start
talking about themselves as action researchers.  They communicate their ideas as
theories of real-world practice, by explaining what they are doing, why they are doing it
and what they hope to achieve.  These personal theories are also living theories because
they change and develop as people change and develop themselves.  The purpose of
action research is to generate living theories about how learning has improved practice
and is informing new practices.
This section has set out some core issues in action research.  It has explained
that, unlike social science, action research places the individual ‘I’ at the centre of an
enquiry.  Different forms of action research have emerged over the years, which
prioritize different aspects. Action research can be used to evaluate whether what the
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researcher is doing is influencing their own or other people’s learning or whether the
researcher needs to do something different to ensure that it is.  Action research is
inappropriate for investigations that aim to draw comparisons or establish cause and
effect relationships.
6.2.3 Assumptions of Action Research
Action research is one form of research among many.  Different forms of
research are used to achieve different goals.  Action research is used to find ways of
taking action to improve learning with social intent.  In order to understand how action
research is different from other kinds of research, it is necessary to look at how the
underpinning assumptions transform into different kinds of practice.  Doing this reveals
the main features of action research.  All kinds of research, including action research,
share common features, which distinguish them as research and not just activity
(McNiff et al 2003).
• They identify a research issue
• They identify research aims
• They set out a research design (plan)
• They gather data
• They establish criteria and standards of judgement
• They generate evidence from the data
• They make a claim to knowledge
• They submit the claim to critique
• They explain the significance of the work
• They disseminate the findings
• They link new knowledge with existing knowledge
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Where research traditions differ is how they perceive the positioning of the
researcher (ontological commitments), the relationship between the knower and what is
known (epistemological commitments), the process of generating knowledge
(methodological commitments), and the goals of research in terms of how the
knowledge will be used (social commitments).  It is not only action research that is
different from other kinds of research.  All research methodologies are different from
one another according to these underpinning assumptions.  However, self – study action
research has made a significant step change from other research methodologies, in that
the researcher is placed at the centre of the enquiry, and accepts the responsibility of
showing how they account for themselves.
This section has set out some of the main features of action research and its
underpinning assumptions.  The assumptions are ontological, epistemological,
methodological and to do with social purpose.
The main ontological assumptions are that action researchers see themselves
as trying to live in a way that is consistent with their values.  These values are to do
with the need to see oneself as in relation with others and how inclusional and relational
practice can strengthen those relationships.
The main epistemological assumptions are that knowledge is always in
process, so it is impossible to create final answers.  Processes of knowledge creation
involve social processes, so while knowing may be a property of the individual knower,
all answers should be regarded as provisional and subject to social critique.
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The main methodological assumptions are that action research is done by
practitioners, who perceive themselves as agents, regardless of their social and
institutional contexts.  Their methodologies are open – ended and developmental as they
ask how they can learn to improve social practices.
The main assumptions underpinning the social purposes of action research
are that learning can be improved in relation to all social practices and that the way
societies operate can be improved if their members reflect on what they are doing and
hold themselves responsible for their own thinking and actions.
Action researchers undertake their enquiries for two main purposes, which
are intertwined and interdependent: first, to contribute to new practices, which is the
action focus of action research; second, to contribute to new theory, which is the
research focus of action research.
The public acknowledgement of practitioners as practice innovators and
theory creators is a key factor if practitioners are to be seen as legitimate participants in
public debates about what is worth striving for in life and which lives are important.
The researcher also has to take on a dual role; as a capable practitioner and as a capable
theorist.  So, what does it take to turn the practice into a form of theorizing?  It takes
two things: showing how the researcher learns to improve their practice and showing
how the researcher’s learning can stand as a contribution to new theory.
While we remain practitioners, our main concern is to improve practice.  As
soon as we become researchers, our main concern is to generate new ideas, knowledge,
and theory.  As a practitioner – researcher, our concern is to show how we are
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connecting both our educational theorizing and our practice in a process of working to
improve our practice.  So there is a need to contribute to new theory and to learn how to
make that contribution.
6.2.4 Generating Evidence
The self-study aspect of Participant Action Research requires the researcher
to make explicit the researcher’s own internal thinking, ideas and values throughout the
research project from its inception, during its development and at its conclusion.  This
section explains how both aspects of generating evidence are progressed in an
educational setting.  Much of what is described can be applied in the supply chain study
that is the core of this thesis.  The section includes the feasibility study, the action plan,
the types of questions appropriate at the different stages, the selection of that data,
which constitutes evidence and finally, the demonstration of its validity and legitimacy.
The project begins with a feasibility study, which identifies some
opportunities and any constraints plus an audit of what resources are needed. This
should reveal any hidden pitfalls, which need to be known before the researcher
commits to the project. Part of this process is learning how to negotiate difficulties and
transform them into opportunities.  These are questions what help to link the feasibility
study to the proposed action plan.
• What is my concern?
• Why am I concerned?
• What experiences can I describe to show I am concerned?
• What can I do about it?
• What will I do about it?
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• What kind of data will I gather to show the situation as it unfolds?
• How will I explain my educational influences in learning?
• How will I ensure that any conclusions I come to are reasonably fair and
accurate?
• How will I evaluate the validity of the evidence – based account of my
learning?
• How will I modify my concerns, ideas and practice in the light of my
evaluations?
We now assess realistically whether we can address the questions and any
ethical issues about involving others in our research. Before launching into our research
we draw up an action plan.  It will guide us through the process of asking and answering
the question, ‘How do I improve what I am doing?’ This question often arises from a
situation where we experience ourselves as a living contradiction when our values are
denied in our practice.  Whitehead (1989) expresses these ideas as follows:
• I experience a concern when some of my educational values are denied in
my practice
• I imagine a solution to the concern
• I act in the direction of the imagined solution
• I evaluate the outcome of the solution
• I modify my practice, plans and ideas in the light of the evaluation
Whatever may be the starting point, this set of ideas can transform into an
understanding of what action research involves: (McNiff  et al 2003)
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• We review our current practice
• Identify an aspect we want to investigate
• Imagine a way forward
• Try it out and
• Take stock of what happens
• We modify what we are doing in the light of what we have found
• We continue working in this new way
• Or we try another option if the new way is not right
• Monitor what we do
• Review and evaluate the modified action
• Evaluate the validity of the account of learning
• Develop new practices in the light of the evaluation
It is important to note again that Action Research involves two interrelated
processes.  First, we take action in the social world, by doing things differently in
relation to the people we are working with.  We carry out certain actions and monitor
what happens.  This can be seen as action in the social world ‘out there’.  At the same
time, we think about what we are doing as we carry out the actions and reflect on what
we are learning.  We are learning not only about the action, but also through the action.
This can be seen as action in the mental world ‘in here’.  The two sets of ‘out there’ and
‘in here’ actions go on during Action Research and are both intertwined and of equal
importance.   Most of the action research literature focuses on social action ‘out there’
and not too much on the learning ‘in here’, especially in terms of how learning arises
from the action and feeds back into the action.  The best action enquiries show the
interrelated nature of learning and social action and how one interpenetrates the other.
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Claims to knowledge need to be supported by validated evidence, so that the
claim does not appear as opinion or supposition. Evidence is generated from data, so
this means gathering quality data from which to select those pieces that can stand as
evidence.  The researcher has to monitor their practice and gather data without wasting
time gathering data that is irrelevant.  What is required is solely that data, which is
relevant to the research question.  As already stated, asking action research questions is
complex.  First, action research questions involve the generic question: ‘How do I
improve my work?’ Second, any improvement happens over time, so the data will be
based on those episodes of practice that are selected to show the development of the
researcher’s practice over that time.  Third, practice does not happen.  Actions ‘just
happen’.  Practices are always informed and intentional.  They are informed by learning
and their intent is improvement.  So the researcher examines their practice to examine
the influence of their learning.  What the researcher looks for, therefore, when looking
for data, are episodes that show initial contexts, when the researcher did not know
something so well, and later episodes when they knew it better, and can show the
influence of the researcher’s own learning.
Data are merely pieces of information.  Out of the data, some is selected as
evidence to establish the validity of a claim to knowledge.  Evidence is more than
illustration, which is used solely to show a point in action without making a value
judgement about whether it shows an improvement or an explanation for why it is
better.  Selecting the data is based on the established criteria and standards of
judgement. They are different but related, criteria is a list of items while standards are
the level of performance for those items.
203
Having generated the evidence, it is necessary to show its validity and then
seek legitimacy for the account.  Validity and legitimacy are different things.  Validity
refers to establishing the truth value of a claim, its authenticity or trust – worthiness.
This is a matter of rigorous methodological procedure. Validating the claim to
knowledge means it has to be put into the public arena with an explicit articulation of
the procedures to demonstrate its methodological rigour, so that its validity can be
tested against other people’s critical assessment.
Legitimacy refers to getting the account accepted in the public domain, by
getting people to listen to the account and to take the work seriously, in the hope that
they may be open to learning from it or trying out something similar for themselves.
Legitimacy means being recognized by the two communities; the practitioners and the
researchers.  The researcher needs to learn how to tell their story.  Habermas (1987,
cited in McNiff & Whitehead, 2006) states that ideally the researcher should: speak
comprehensibly; speak truthfully; speak authentically; speak appropriately. This means
the researcher needs to: get passionate; get personal; get clarity; and get on and do it.
6.2.5 Summary
Action Research in Education provides a detailed and proven application of
Participant Research, which has been well documented.  There is nothing in this style of
research that has been documented for supply chain research.  It is therefore appropriate
and valuable to use this education research methodology as a model to follow for the
research of this thesis about developments in the Tesco supply chain.
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6.3 Supply Chain Application
The Participant Action Research methodology that has been used in these
educational research endeavours has a structure that could be applied by researchers in
different settings, who are engaged in the direct action of changing an environment with
other participants.  Supply Chain Change is driven by people and for its success it needs
to engage with those persons participating in the chain.  The development of the Tesco
supply chain created new solutions that were actioned by practitioners, who were
immersed in the situation and were continually exploring and discovering new ways
forward.  There are strong parallels, therefore, between the application in Education and
an application in Supply Chain Change.  The author was one of those practitioners, as
detailed in the Introduction (Chapter One).  That direct operational experience is the
subject of this thesis, which seeks to reflect on the significance of those developments
(Chapters Three & Four) and review them in the light of the literature (Chapters Two &
Five).  Participant Action Research is therefore an appropriate methodology to adopt for
this thesis research.
6.3.1 Action Research Principles
The details of the Action Research principles have been explained in
sections 6.1 Action Research and 6.2 Action Research in Education.  The key elements,
only, need to be summarised here to provide a platform and structure for their
application to Supply Chain Change.  One of those main elements is an involved action-
researcher, who is or has been placed and active in improving a situation over a period
of time with other participants.  A second main element is a Value Set, which expresses
the desired direction of that development and against which the researcher can assess
the style of their own performance.  A third main element is the opportunity to reflect
on both the external and internal changes in behaviour that take place during the
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evolution of the research project in the action-reflect cycle to try out, review and modify
the detail of the project to keep it successfully in the desired direction.  A fourth main
element is process of Validity of the evidence and Legitimacy of being recognised by
the two communities of practitioners and researchers.  This may a seem a high level
summary of the main elements, but the detail is explored fully in the earlier section 6.2
on its application in Education.
6.3.2 Application to Supply Chain Change
The application to Supply Chain Change is constructed through the presence
of each of these four main elements in this research.  The first main element is an
involved action-researcher.  This role of action-researcher is performed by the author,
who was directly involved in improving the supply chain situation with other
participants within Tesco, its suppliers and logistics service providers.  The second main
element is a Value Set, which expresses the desired direction and style of
implementation.  This Value Set is detailed fully in Chapter Five, Managing supply
Chain Change, culminating in the list, Table 5.2 Benchmarks, of particular qualities
desired in supply chain change to achieve Strategic Alignment (Figure 5.2) of the whole
chain with the needs of the final consumer.  The third main element, the opportunity to
reflect on the changes in the evolution, is one of the objectives of this thesis itself.  The
fourth main element, establishing Validity and Legitimacy, is also an objective of
writing this thesis to complement the presentations the author has already conducted
with seasoned practitioners in the industry.
6.4 Case Study Selection
In the introduction to this chapter one of the objectives stated was to explain
the rationale for the case study selection that follows in Chapter Seven, which is a core
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contribution of this thesis.  This section elaborates the criteria used for choosing those
twenty case studies.  It then explores the case study methodology as a qualitative
research approach.  It concludes with a transition preparing the way for the detailed
exposition in Chapter Seven of the twenty topics chosen to provide evidence of the role
of the retailer in supply chain change.
The criteria for selecting the case studies develops out of both the practical
experience, Chapters Three and Four, and the thinking in the associated literature,
Chapters Two and Five.  The dominant theme is the Strategic Alignment of the
components of the supply chain and the business to the needs of the consumer (Figure
5.2).  This is the desired vision, towards which the practitioners aimed in their
exploration and evolution of supply chain change. The cases selected are evidence from
different situations, of the processes that took place to transform the supply chain from a
position where there was an absence of alignment into a result of greater alignment.
Each case demonstrates an improvement in the practice through supply chain change.
Each case is also performed within the action-reflection cycle.  They were not
repetitions or reiterations of previous practice, they were genuine innovations, no matter
how small that innovation might appear to be.  Cumulatively, the series of minor
innovations amounted to continuous and significant improvement towards the desired
goal of alignment. There are ten characteristics or constructs, Figure 5.2, which are set
as standards for assessing each of the case studies.  These characteristics all relate to
styles of behaviour, which are judged in the literature to assist beneficial supply chain
change. These form the Value Set for the research.
The research is a longitudinal study covering events over the years 1977 to
2005.  This is a mature timescale during which to evaluate the benefits and effectiveness
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of the changes.  The author or a member of his team performed the participant aspect of
the methodology.  The factual accounts of the case studies were documented through
contemporary business minutes and notes.  The reflective component of the research is
documented in this thesis.  The ideas, constructs and value set from Figure 5.2 have
been brought together in the thesis and used as the basis for establishing the criteria for
selecting the case studies as well as their application in the evaluation process itself. The
presence of the values is indicated by an underline in each case study, those not
underlined are not present.  The research methodology was not fully in place when the
case studies took place hence some of the reflection is after the event itself, which does
not necessarily diminish its validity as the results can be seen to have stood the test of
time.  A great deal of operational, inspirational, self-reflection and review had been
conducted at the time by the author and the participants in the various projects.  Some
boundaries were placed on the scope of the research and there are limitations on the
case studies selected.  They do not include examples of failure. They do not include
case studies from the point of view of the supplier or logistic service provider.  This
may be a matter for further research.
Case study methodology may include a qualitative research approach. Cases
provide rich data about the research topic.  Semi-structured open interviews with key
persons provide an interpretation of the reasons for the nature of the events.  The
research in this thesis retains all the benefits of case study methodology. In addition it
introduces the dimension of the action-researcher with its personal account from the
experience of taking part in these real events.
208
6.4.1 Building Theories from Case Study Research
There is good literature on case study methodology, its various forms and
bridging the link between theory and the results of the data.  This thesis has a dual
purpose.  The first task is to find examples of the type of behaviour of the role of a
retailer as channel captain implementing supply chain change.  The second task is to
examine the opportunity of building or extending theory from these case studies.
Rather than document a wide range of sources, an in depth summary is given from a
well recognised case study researcher (Eisenhardt, 1989), which contributes a roadmap
of building theories from case studies and positions this into the larger context of social
science research.  The roadmap synthesises qualitative methods, design of case study
research (Yin 1984) and grounded theory building (Glaser & Strauss 1967).  It extends
work in areas such as a priori specification of constructs, triangulation of multiple
investigators, within–case and cross-case analysis and the role of existing literature.
This complements and contrasts with the Participant Action Research application in
Education given in section 6.2.  It clarifies the confusion that can surround the
distinctions among qualitative data, inductive logic, and case study research.
The case study is a research strategy, which focuses on understanding the
dynamics present within a single setting.  They can involve single or multiple cases and
can employ an embedded design of multiple levels of analysis within a single study.
Case studies combine data collection methods, such as archives, interviews,
questionnaires and observations.  The evidence may be qualitative, eg words,
quantitative, eg numbers or both.  They can be used to accomplish various aims: to
provide description, test theory, or generate theory.  The road map (Eisenstadt,
1989:535) sets out eight phases: getting started, selecting cases, crafting instruments and
protocols, entering the field, analyzing data, shaping hypotheses, enfolding literature,
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and reaching closure.  There are three outputs from following this road map.  First, it
focuses on theory building from cases.  Second, the process includes new ideas, such as
a priori specification, flexible instrumentation, multiple investigators, cross-case
analysis tactics, and several uses of literature.  Third, it adopts a positivist view of
research, to develop testable hypotheses and theory, which are generalizable across
settings.
The process of building theory from case study research is strikingly
iterative, backwards and forwards between steps.  It is alive with tension between
divergence into new ways of understanding the data and convergence onto a single
theoretical framework. The process also involves converging on construct definitions,
measures, and a framework for structuring its findings.  Finally, the process is
intimately tied with empirical evidence.  Its three strengths are first, the likelihood of
generating novel theory because creative insight often arises from the juxtaposition of
contradictory or paradoxical evidence.  Second, the emergent theory may be testable
with constructs that can be measured and hypotheses that can be proven false. Finally,
the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid because it is consistent with
empirical observation.  The weakness is that it could become over complex and lack the
simplicity of overall perspective.  It could result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory
because case study theory is a bottom up approach.  However, a strong theory-building
study yields good theory, which is parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent, and
result in new insights.
6.5 Summary
This research examines the role of the retailer as channel captain in retail
supply chain change. The intention is to identify some insights into the nature of
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channel leadership, its style, its characteristics, its presence, its critical success factors
and find a way of highlighting key elements that should be visible to the external
observer.  These key elements could become key indicators of the full presence or
absence of channel leadership and help with assessing the various degrees of partial or
growing presence of that channel leadership which could be used in emerging
economies.
What are the intended outcomes from this research?  The author has chosen
this multiple micro case study approach in order to illuminate parts of the retail supply
channel that would not normally be visible to retail commentators.  These case studies
are based on the practitioner experience of the author.  They reveal the power of the
change management dynamics.  The important question is how can academics reflect on
the insights provided by this series of multiple micro case studies?  It is intended that
each case study is judged on its own merits, by whatever method of critique others
choose to apply.  The case studies are presented as documentary accounts of real events
that took place.  They are neither models nor hypothetical scenarios.  They reflect the
feedback and dynamics involved.  There is an interplay between the broader theoretical
and practitioner context and the selected case studies.  It is intended that the inside story






7 Research Tesco Case Studies
The previous chapters have provided an account of the major trends in
retailing (chapter two), retail logistics (chapter three), supply channels (chapter four),
managing supply chain change (chapter five), and the research methodology (chapter
six),.  This chapter presents selected case studies.  They will help the process of
investigating the role of retailers as channel captains in retail supply chain change.
The diagrammatic representation (Figure 5.1) demonstrated that the area
where the three circles overlap is the retail supply chain, integrated into the retail
strategy so that it is aligned with the consumer.  For this reason, ‘alignment’ is the
general condition applying to all the cases.  It does not need to be included in the
individual lists.  The conditions that exist where only two circles overlap are only partial
alignments.  They are limited by not being linked to the third element in the mix.   Some
cases start from a position of partial alignment.  The dynamics in those cases is to bring
the three into an aligned strategy.  They were selected to illustrate these boundaries of
alignment.  It is intended that the evidence of the cases will contribution to academic
knowledge by extended application of earlier concepts into the core of retail supply
chain change.
The objective of research, in general, is to investigate questions that are not
immediately obvious and thus reveal some hidden depths of analysis and explanation of
a topic.  Here, the purpose is to gain insights from the perspective taken from the middle
of the value chain, which was the context of the author’s operational experience.  This
set of case studies builds on the author’s earlier work; the MBA dissertation on
‘Integrated supply chain management, the case of fresh produce in Tesco’ (Smith 1992)
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and the article ‘The transformation of physical distribution in retailing: the example of
Tesco plc’ (Smith and Sparks 1993) and further extension (Gustafsson et al 2006; Smith
1998; Smith and Sparks 2004a, b, c).  The focus moves from retail distribution to
supplier logistics and the style of channel decisions so that the topic becomes broader to
include channel leadership.
These practitioner case contributions will be assessed against concepts
derived from the academic analysis of supply chain and buyer – supplier relationships.
These have evolved from earlier marketing origins to modern supply chain analysis.
Ten characteristics emerged, each represented as a keyword (Table 5.2), whose context,
derivation and meaning were examined in chapter six, managing supply chain change.
These characteristics represent an idealised good practice benchmark.  The list of ten
keywords is placed at the end of each case study.  Those characteristics that are
reflected in the case are underlined.  This will permit a more thorough analysis in
chapter eight between the practical cases and the academic concepts.  The use of these
cases will contribute to extending the application of these key characteristics to the
concept of retailers as channel captains in retail supply chain change.  This analysis will
inform the conclusion in chapter nine on the contribution to academic and practitioner
knowledge.
The cases have been selected in a variety of ways.  Some involve situations
with which the author was intimately involved.  These in particular build on retail
logistics, (chapter three) and supply channels, (chapter four).  Others are drawn from the
experience of colleagues to whom the author had access at the time or later through
personal interviews.  These case studies are intended to illustrate different aspects of
managing change and finding solutions in the broad area of shaping the retail supply
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channel.  There is no intention of suggesting that any of these cases are ‘right’ or
‘wrong’; rather the aim is to explore aspects of change implementation and business
practice.  They are not intended to be exhaustive case studies but rather are indicative of
the issues and the solutions that may be found in the real world.
Table 7.1  Case Studies: Categories, Research Contact.
Table 7.1 lists the five categories into which the case studies are grouped in
order to provide a way of linking the sets.  The first category provides detail on supply
channel change relating to specific products.  The second then looks at broader
developments or trends in retail supply channel change. The third deals with issues of
managing capacity and control.  The fourth relates to some technical aspects such as the
design of vehicle trailers and plastic trays.  The fifth and final category presents two
international examples from outside the UK.  This final set illustrates the different
levels of development that can exist with their related challenges that have to be
understood and dealt with.  There have been varying degrees of author involvement in
these case studies, identified by the letters L1, L2, L3, L4. The first level, (L1) is from
direct personal experience; the second (L2) is from close personal contact; the third (L3)
is from the experiences of other contacts which whom the author had access at the time
and finally, the fourth (L4) is from access to key persons through interviews.
No Page start Cases Categories
A 204 7.1 - 7.6 Specific Products
B 232 7.7 - 7.10 Broader Developments
C 248 7.11 - 7.14 Capacity & Control
D 267 7.15 - 7.18 Technical & Design
E 283 7.19 - 7.20 International
Codes for the level of research contact by author:
L1: Direct personal experience;
L2: Close personal contact;
L3: Other contacts author had access to at the time;
L4: Access to key persons through interviews
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Case Studies: Structure of the account and review of the event
The account of the event
Summary
The background and context
The description of the event
The result or outcome of the event
The review of the event from a channel perspective
The author’s experience of the event
A critique of the event on the scale of leader to follower
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
Identifying where the decisions were located
Clarifying what the decisions were about
Identifying the tensions that existed
Showing the range of choices
Supply Chain Characteristics: Ten key words; those that apply are underlined
Table 7.2  Case Studies: Structure, Description, Analysis.
The case studies, whose purpose is to demonstrate channel leadership, are
structured in two sections (Table 7.2).  The first section is an account of the event:
starting with a summary, the background and context, then providing a description of
the event itself and finally the result or outcome.  The second stage is a review from a
channel perspective: the author’s experience of the event, a critique of the event on a
scale of leader or follower, then revealing any hidden evidence more explicitly, in order
to identify where the decisions were located, clarify what the decisions were about,
identify the tensions that existed and show the range of choices available.  The broader
conclusions from the case studies will then be made in chapter eight. Now it is time to
turn to the detail of the case studies themselves.
The full list of these twenty Tesco case studies (Table 7.3) provides a
complete picture of the range of categories and the specific topics studies.  The series
begins with specific products to provide detail, which supports the broader
developments and other category case studies.
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Ref Category A: SPECIFIC PRODUCTS
7.1 L1 Potato supply channel reorganisation: 1990
Benefits of shaping the supply profile collaboratively
7.2 L2 Banana centralisation: 1992
Controlled implementation and coordinated development
7.3 L1 St Peter’s Fish: 1994
Small niche supplier integrated into large supermarket supply chain
7.4 L1 Implementing centrally prepared meat & poultry strategy: 1994
Long term partnership approach to adding value by creating a step change for retail, logistics and
the supply channel
7.5 L1 Strawberry supply & peak demand for Wimbledon Tennis: 1996
Retailer shapes the solution by collaborating with the other partners
7.6 L3 Iceberg lettuce supply channel from Spain to UK retailers: 2002
The Iceberg lettuce journey from Spain to UK. Retail control their producers to demanding
standards of production and delivery
Category B: BROADER DEVELOPMENTS
7.7 L1 Chilled product supply ‘At the right freshness’: 1985 to 2005
Retail leadership in food safety, longer shelf life for consumer, dramatic growth in sales, still a
benchmark for others to follow
7.8 L1 Produce supplier logistics and primary distribution: 1990 – 2005
Shaping supply networks for service, efficiency and competitive advantage. Multifunctional
collaboration with suppliers and logistics service providers.
7.9 L1 Frozen from bulk storage to national network: 1986 – 2003
Transforming the structure and pace of the frozen supply channel from intervention to rapid retail
distribution
7.10 L1 Sustainable distribution: an integrated transport approach: 1997
The Tesco supplier collection and Department for Transport best practice programme, an example
of sustainable distribution.
Category C: CAPACITY & CONTROL
7.11 L2 Warehouse Productivity, Just in Time capability:1980’s – 2000’s
The innovative techniques to increase productivity in distribution to service retail as they improved
their stock systems in store.
7.12 L1 Shaping supply networks pre-composite: 1980’s
Logical evolution, preparing way for composite
7.13 L1 Composite Capacity: 1989 – 2004
Ground breaking initiative, zero stock, pull demand and since then continuous growth that is hidden
from external view
7.14 L1 Role of Logistic Service Providers: 1980’s to 2005
The partnership with logistics service providers enabled retailers to, harness their logistics initiative
and achieve scale quickly. The retailer provided the thought leadership but with a style that was
transformational rather than transactional
Category D TECHNICAL & DESIGN
7.15 L1 Open book accounting pre and post composite: 1986-90
Implementing visibility of costs for greater flexibility in service. This is a basic building block of
professional logistics, which is now the norm
7.16 L2 Composite three temperature compartment trailer: 1989
Industry innovation with external specialist Thermoking, led by retail.
7.17 L1 Second generation plastic tray: 1990s
Industry leadership from Tesco Board pushing design boundaries
7.18 L2 Bonded Distribution and Customs & Excise: 1988
Retail leadership in initiating assembly direct for Bond.
Category E: INTERNATIONAL
7.19 L4 Thailand suppliers of fresh product: 2002
One example of the transfer of supply and logistics skills from UK retail to Eastern Europe and Asia,
shaping local temperature controlled supply chains to higher standards
7.20 L1 South Africa fresh product and air freight: 2003
An example of retails’ global reach and sourcing using air freight with good chill chain disciplines to
create value for the consumer
Table 7.3  Twenty Tesco Case Studies
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Case Studies Category A: Specific Products.
The first group is a series of descriptions of the transformation of the retail
supply channel for six different individual products (Table 7.4).  It provides an
opportunity to look in detail at some specific examples, which makes it easier to
understand the dynamics involved.  This is a short list of examples.  It is intended to be
indicative rather than exhaustive.  Although the author had a direct involvement in some
of the examples, there were many other instances with other products that were
implemented by other colleagues across several functions.
These products relate to composite distribution.  There was a full range of
supply channels for the many product lines sold in the retail stores, which were grouped
together and supplied to the stores through different sets of distribution centres.  The
examples here were selected to provide a flavour of the style in which the retailer
implemented many of its channel reorganisations during that period.
Ref Category A: SPECIFIC PRODUCTS
7.1 L1 Potato supply channel reorganisation: 1990
Benefits of shaping the supply profile collaboratively
7.2 L2 Banana centralisation: 1992
Controlled implementation and coordinated development
7.3 L1 St Peter’s Fish: 1994
Small niche supplier integrated into large supermarket supply chain
7.4 L1 Implementing centrally prepared meat & poultry strategy: 1994
Long term partnership approach to adding value by creating a step change for retail, logistics and
the supply channel
7.5 L1 Strawberry supply & peak demand for Wimbledon Tennis: 1996
Retailer shapes the solution by collaborating with the other partners
7.6 L3 Iceberg lettuce supply channel from Spain to UK retailers: 2002
The Iceberg lettuce journey from Spain to UK. Retail control their producers to demanding
standards of production and delivery
Table 7.4  Case Studies Category A: Specific Products
218
7.1 Potato Supply: 1990
Potato supply channel reorganisation
An account of the event
Summary
The supply channel for potatoes was reorganised for composite distribution
and is an early example of the benefits of shaping the supply profile collaboratively.
The background and context
Tesco implemented composite distribution during 1989.  The original
supply delivery timetables from the suppliers into the composite distribution centres
needed to be reorganised.  The main purpose was to smooth out the hourly arrival of
product to reduce the severe peak volumes that were occurring after six pm.
The description of the event
Potatoes as a product group were identified as a suitable product to be
rescheduled to arrive from the suppliers earlier in the day into the composite distribution
centres.  The decision was made jointly by Quality Assurance, the Commercial Buyers,
Stock Control and Distribution Operations.  This decision was reached after certain
investigations had been conducted.  There were several factors that were uncovered in
the process of the author’s investigations at the time.  A key issue was that the
confirmed order from Tesco Head Office was arriving at the supplier at 17:00, just as
the suppliers’ day shift workers, who had started at 07:00, were finishing.  As the
suppliers were not set up with an evening or a night shift, no packing was done until the
next day shift came back in the next morning at 07:00.  The product was lying idle
through the night, twelve hours of elapsed time.  The author approached the top six
potato suppliers with the buyer to discuss a variety of options with Stock Management,
Technical Service and Logistics.  After these discussions the potato suppliers agreed to
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introduce revised shift patterns for the September main crop.  The result of the author’s
initiative was an agreement from the suppliers to adhere to an earlier delivery window
of 06:00 to 15:00, which was a major improvement over the previous delivery window
of 16:00 to 20:00.  Potatoes were delivered either in heavy bags or in specially designed
roll containers.  If they were in bags the labour of making up the orders for the stores
was strenuous.  If they were in the special roll containers, then they took up a great deal
of floor space.  This rescheduling applied to main season English potatoes.  New
potatoes were treated differently because of their harvesting times, and it was agreed
that they would be delivered after six pm.
The implementation process involved several parties. Commercial buying
had to agree with the suppliers, which companies were going to supply which
composite distribution centres and agree the apportioning of the volume splits between
suppliers.  Stock Control organised the actual delivery times and distribution operations
rescheduled the warehouse labour resource to meet the earlier timings.  Discussions
were held with the potato suppliers and their transport operations about more efficient
use of their vehicles.  Distribution Operations spoke to retail to agree earlier delivery
times from the composite distribution centre into the retail stores.  Retail had to ensure
that their staff were available to receive the potato delivery and that there was enough
space for the special roll cages.
The result or outcome of the event
The reorganisation of the potato supply channel added value to all parties.
The suppliers and their transport operators rescheduled the use of their vehicles more
efficiently.  Composite distribution received the potatoes earlier in the day, when they
had enough space to handle the special potato roll cages without causing congestion in
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the distribution centre.  Retail received potatoes on an earlier delivery, which they were
then able to put out on the shop floor.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was fully involved in the potato supplier debate and
reorganisation, as described.  He was a senior executive in charge of composite
distribution operations as well as working on the produce supplier delivery profile.  The
author can recall that the experience at the time was a sense of achievement in securing
an improvement for all the functions involved.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is an example of the retailer acting as channel captain and leading this
change in a manner, which harnessed the commitment of the suppliers and their
transport operations.  It was achieved in a multi-functional team working style.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The joint meeting by the commercial buyer, the author and the six major
suppliers was a step change in thinking about the issues that affected this particular
supply channel.  The retailer wanted shorter lead times on orders, but in the period
immediate after composite implementation, which had been in 1989; it took a while
before the implications came to light.  The commercial buyer was proactive and knew
his suppliers well.  He had previously organised them into clusters to serve their local
composites. He understood the issues and willingly set up the meetings with the six
major potato suppliers to discuss the reorganisation of their work shift patterns and the
changes to their deliver times into composite.
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Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located with the various buying, quality assurance, stock
control and distribution operations functions within Tesco, in consultation with the
potato suppliers and their transport operations.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were first about the timing of the deliveries in the composite
operations; the rescheduling of staff resources at the supplier and at composite
distribution; the utilisation of transport and the financial impact.
Identify the tensions
The tensions were between the various internal functions within Tesco,
commercial, stock management, technical services, and distribution operations.  There
were also tensions with the suppliers, their work shift patterns and their transport
operations.  However, these tensions were handled in a constructive manner.  The end
result was a willing commitment by all parties to the earlier delivery window.
Show the range of choices
The choices was to leave the delivery pattern of potatoes unchanged or to
approach all the parties in the right manner to seek creative, collaborative solutions.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined )
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
222
7.2 Banana Supply: 1992
Banana centralisation.
An account of the event
Summary
Tesco made a decision to centralise the distribution of bananas through
composite rather than going direct to the retail stores.  Bananas are the biggest selling
line in retail and required a tightly controlled implementation programme.  Once
centralised there was a further supply channel development.
The background and context
Bananas are the most popular selling line.  They are the largest volume
quantities.  Prior to composite distribution, the banana suppliers made direct deliveries
to the retail stores, who would order product as they needed it over the telephone.  The
central buying policy for produce was gradually to change the supply channel from
direct delivery into the retail store and reorganise the suppliers to centralise and deliver
into composite distribution centres.  One of the motivations for this centralisation was
that Quality Assurance standards could be applied more consistently and so the
consumer would receive a better quality product.
However, bananas are a sensitive product.  They come over to the UK in
boats in a dormant state, during which their colour is green.  They need the exactly
correct temperature regime of 14.6 degrees Celsius for the ripening process.  The
ripening of bananas is triggered by the supplier using ethylene.  The timing of the
ripening process has to be calculated accurately so that the bananas are in the desired
state of ripeness by the time they arrive at the retail store for the consumer.  Consumers,
however, have their own views about the degree of ripeness they prefer.  Nonetheless
the agreed colour standard by the retailer was that the bananas should yellow all over
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with only a hint of green at the ends.  Equally they must not be over ripe with brown
patches. All these aspects of bananas were under the control of Technical Services and
Quality Assurance.  The planning detail was complex and difficult.  Composite
distribution had to create a special chamber for bananas so that they would continue the
ripening process and not be exposed to cold temperatures.  However despite these
difficulties the bananas were centralised successfully and the retail volumes soared.
The description of the event
The supplier would first trigger the ripening process and then select and
pack the bananas in boxes and deliver them into composite distribution.  Some stores
would take whole roll cages of bananas.  However, there were some difficulties with the
availability, the quality of the product and the delivery times from suppliers.  In a
similar process as described earlier with the potato suppliers, there were multi-
functional collaborative discussions between the various Tesco functions and the
suppliers.  One idea in particular was discussed at some length.  This was about the
allocation of volumes by suppliers to the different composite distribution centres
nationally.  The traditional commercial buying practice had been to spread commercial
risk by giving each supplier a portion of banana volume to deliver to each of composite
distribution centres nationally.  This involved each supplier arranging transport to each
composite.
During the course of the discussions a proposal was put forward which
would radically change existing practice.  It was a bold idea and it had its risks, but it
also had benefits.  The proposal was to re-align the volume proportions.  The suggestion
was that each supplier retain their portion of the volume but instead of delivering it to
all the composites up and down the country, they deliver it only to their nearest
224
composite distribution centre.  Despite it being a step change in shaping the supply
channel for bananas, the parties worked through the risks and benefits involved.  The
outcome was an agreement to the principle.  The contingency would be that each
supplier would act as a standby or back supplier to one other composite to help out
should the primary supplier for that composite be unable to fulfil the order quantity or
quality for whatever reason.
The result or outcome of the event
The outcome of this event was a rejuvenated banana supply channel,
delivering a high quality product with improved transport efficiency due to the shorter
distances that needed to be travelled.  The consequent growth in retail banana volumes
has been impressive.  There have since been dramatic developments in the retail
presentation of bananas that promote one-touch replenishment in store using a roll-in
display unit (Gustafsson et al 2006)
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author had direct experience of these developments although on this
occasion, not direct involvement in the reshaping of the supply channel.  The author
recalls clearly the excitement at the results of the step change to designating a main
supplier to each of the composite distribution centres.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is an example of the retailer acting as channel captain, firstly in
reshaping the supply channel from direct delivery to store into a centralised distribution
operation.  Secondly, the subsequent reorganisation of the supply channel resulted in
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improved quality and transport efficiencies.  Thirdly, the later development in the retail
roll in cage as part of the ‘flow’ and ‘one-touch’ replenishment supply chain strategy.
The style of conducting these developments is that of high quality collaboration and
strategic business partnerships.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The impact of this step change in thinking was significant.  There developed
a close identity between the primary supplier and their designated composite and more
importantly, the supplier’s work team took a great deal of pride in the quality of the
work they were doing and the product they were supplying.  Why was this?  The reason
was that there was now a strong bond of dependency between the two, which arose out
of the higher level of accountability that the retailer had bestowed on the supplier.  In
the past, quality did not really matter that much, because the suppliers volume
percentage was small and other suppliers were also delivering in.  Now the primary
supplier was the only supplier.  This result was totally unexpected and contrary to
expectations.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located in commercial buying, technical services, stock
management and distribution operations with the suppliers and their operations and
transport teams.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the accountability for quality supply from the
primary supplier to the designated distribution centre as well as the allocation of
volumes by commercial and the gains in transport efficiency.
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Identify the tensions
In the first strategic decision to switch away from direct delivery to the retail
store, there were tensions with the retail store management over their autonomy and
control.  The tensions were between the various internal departments and also with the
supplier about the variability in performance of quality, availability of supply and the
timing of the deliveries into the composite distribution operation.
Show the range of choices
Clearly the first decision to centralise was part of a much stronger policy
that the retailer had been implementing for several years.  The product could have been
left to continue direct delivery to store.  The other option in place of the choices on the
allocation of volumes and designating a primary supplier to a particular composite, was
to leave the structure and organisation alone.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.3 St Peter’s Fish: 1994
St Peter’s Fish product launch: 1994
An account of the event
Summary
A small niche product supplier and a giant supermarket work jointly to
provide the supplier with supply chain and logistics support.  St Peter’s Fish is a
speciality, which will extend the choice and variety on the Tesco Fresh Fish counter.
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The background and context
In the search for niche quality products, the buyer met a producer who could
supply St Peter’s Fish.  This would add quality and variety to the fresh fish counter
display in the retail store.  It was an opportunity for the buyer to help a small supplier
introduce St Peter’s Fish into Tesco stores.  There are the normal considerations on
quality, technical specification, price, promotion, product availability and choosing a
launch date.  The only issues left to resolve were the supply chain logistics
arrangements.
The description of the event
This niche supplier required considerable help to organise the supply chain
and logistics in time for the intended launch date.  The supplier was in an isolated
geographical location in the Midlands, with a small volume and was not in a position to
negotiate a good price or service from a transport company; his expertise is St Peter’s
Fish.  It would take all his time and energy to prepare the resources to ensure the
availability for the launch date and planned sales volumes.  The buyer took the
responsibility of helping this supplier to get his product to the marketplace.  He
contacted a member of the primary distribution team.  This team provided the expertise
to facilitate the supply chain and logistics arrangements at an economical price, based
on the Tesco scale of business.
The primary distribution team member visited the St Peter’s Fish supplier,
met with the Tesco designated temperature controlled logistics service provider for that
region and agreed the details of the collections and negotiated the price for the service.
It was a fast, efficient, collaborative service to help the supplier get started with Tesco.
The first stage was to sort out the order communication process, then agree the
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collection service times with the supplier and the logistics service provider.  Then St
Peter’s Fish would be integrated into the national zero degree temperature controlled
network service that delivered daily to each of the composite distribution centres.
These plans had to match the agreed launch date and roll out programme that was based
on the product availability programme.
The result or outcome of the event
St Peter’s Fish was successfully launched on schedule and achieved good
sales growth.  There were information leaflets on the fish counters.  The consumer had
something new to buy.  The buyer and the supplier were both satisfied with the cost of
the supply chain and logistics service.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
This event occurred in the early days of primary distribution in 1994.  The
team member was an experienced logistics operator from composite distribution.  He
knew the logistics service providers designated by Tesco to provide the primary
distribution service.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retail buyer provided this small specialist supplier with help and support
to get St Peter’s Fish into Tesco stores.  It was a collaborative partnership.  The buyer
did not take an opportunistic approach to the negotiations.  The buyer took
responsibility for the success of the supplier’s primary distribution service.  It is an
example of the role of a retailer acting as channel captain in retail supply chain change.
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Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The separate identification of the logistics cost provided a clearer base for
the commercial negotiation that would cover the small supplier’s cost of production.
Although the cost of the delivery was included in the product price, it was identified
separately in the calculation.  This permitted the buyer to focus on the cost of
production with the small niche supplier and make sure that he could remain in business
for the long term.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions about accepting the product, St Peter’s Fish, the price and
launch programme were located with the retail buyer in collaboration with the supplier
and the technical services department.  The supplier had to make the decisions about the
rate of availability of the fish to supply the launch programme.  The primary distribution
team member facilitated the decisions with the supplier and the logistics service
provider about the collection arrangements to get the fish into the composite distribution
network.  The consumer had to make the decision whether to try this new St Peter’s
Fish, with the support of the information leaflets and the advice from the fresh fish
counter assistant.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the risks involved in launching St Peter’s Fish into
the Tesco fresh fish counter product range.  Several factors were unknown; the choice
of the consumer relating to the price and volume; how to get the product physically to
market; selecting a realistic launch date.
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Identify the tensions
The tension arises in relation to the decision by the retailer about the manner
of conducting negotiations with small niche quality suppliers.
Show the range of choices
There is a choice about the style of negotiation.  Should the relationship be
nurtured for the long term or just exploited for the short term.  The choice to nurture the
relationship so that it was viable for the long term was an important signal and symbol
of the Tesco way of dealing with suppliers.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.4 Fresh Meat & Poultry: 1994
Implementing a centrally prepared fresh meat & poultry strategy: 1994
An account of the event
Summary
The retailer made a radical change to the retailing of fresh meat and poultry
by implementing a system of centralised production.  This involved a long term
partnership approach with supplies. It created a step change for retail, logistics and the
supply channel.
The background and context
Traditionally, retail stores had fresh meat counters staffed by in house
butchers. In the early 1980’s, the fresh meat industry moved away from delivering
whole or half carcasses of meat being to retail stores.  The industry had implemented a
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system of primal meat cuts, which were large segments of meat.  From these primal
meat segments the butchers in store would prepare fresh meat cuts for the consumers.
In the early 1990’s retail implemented another step change through a system of
centralised production for consumer prepared fresh meat. There would be no butchers in
the stores.  This centrally prepared meat was delivered through the composite
distribution network to the retail stores.  The consumers would purchase the products
from the fresh meat chill cabinets.  A similar system was implemented for poultry.
Fresh meat and fresh poultry are sensitive products with a high risk to food
safety. There are exacting standards for the maintenance of a continuous temperature
controlled supply chain from factory to store.  The temperature regime had to be zero
degrees Celsius, plus or minus one degree. Consumer prepared packs have thinner
portions of fresh meat than large primal cuts.  Any deviation from the strict temperature
parameters would have an instantly detrimental impact on the product. These stringent
conditions, required confidence in the disciplines at production, physical distribution,
transport and warehousing and retail.
The description of the event
The system was set up at several production units around the country.  This
case study is from the production unit in the South West of England. The impact was
felt along the full length of the supply channel: the producers, the suppliers’ transport,
the composite handling and assembly systems; the delivery to the retail store and the
store operation itself.  The company made this decision at Board level with the approval
of Retail and Commercial.  The supporting operations were distribution, stock
management, and technical quality services.  It was a major change, justified by an
approved cost – benefit business case.  This case study covers one aspect of the total
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change programme.  It describes the supply channel from despatch at the production
unit through to the delivery into composite distribution and the assembly of the store
order.  The implementation of the production facility processes and the retail
operational changes are not included in this description.
At the production facility the retail packs were prepared by product type,
placed in plastic trays on pallets that were then moved to the despatch area to be loaded
into temperature controlled vehicles for the different composite distribution centres.  On
arrival at the composite distribution centre, the trays were sorted by product type,
checked in and then assembled into retail store order quantities ready for despatch to the
store.  This was a big change from the previous system with large primal meat cuts.
These larger, heavier primal packs required fewer but larger plastic trays.  The number
of product lines was smaller.  The dramatic change was in the physical volume of trays
that now had to be transported from the production facility to the composite distribution
centres and onwards to the retail stores.  A greater physical volume resulted in more
work assembling the store order in the composite distribution centre.  The greater
physical volume also resulted in a greater number of vehicle trips from composite
distribution into retail and from the supplier into the composite distribution centre.  It is
to this latter issue that this case study now turns.
The supplier’s transport operation now had to complete a larger number of
journeys.  This was part of the cost of the production operation, all of which fell within
the commercial buyer’s budget.  Compared to the more compact and heavier unit sizes
used in the previous primal packs, there was an increase in the proportion of cost spent
on supplier transport.  As the production facility was totally dedicated to the Tesco retail
supply operation, the commercial buyer and the supplier had agreed to an ‘open – book’
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accounting arrangement. Here the buyer could examine all the costs, including transport
and if justified, would agree to pay the supplier.  Clearly both the supplier and the buyer
were interested in reducing the total cost of transport from the production unit to the
composite distribution centres.  The author was invited by them to find a way forward.
With their agreement, a selection process was implemented, inviting transport operators
from around the country to tender for the different routes to the individual composite
distribution centres.  Appointing different transport operators to different routes reduced
the total transport cost.  The commercial director approved this.
The result or outcome of the event
The result was the successful implementation of the new strategy for supply
fresh meat in centrally prepared consumer packs.  As an additional point, through the
collaboration with the supplier and the buyer, a lower total transport cost was achieved
from the production facility to the different composite distribution centres
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was directly involved with the supplier and the buyer in the
transport review for the inbound movement of the product from the production unit to
the composite distribution centres.  At the time moving to a centrally prepared meat
policy was an adventurous development for the company.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is another clear example of the retailer making a strategic policy
change by bringing together the skills of the supplier and harnessing the energies of the
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different functions within the company to implement the respective segments of the
change.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
From a logistics perspective this was the first time there had been such an
open and collaborative involvement in reviewing the supplier’s transport arrangements.
It was also an indication of the increased proportion that transport costs contributed to
the total costs of running the production facility.
Where were the decisions located?
The main decision was located at the retailer Main Board level.  There were
many other decisions that both lead up to the main decision and also the result of that
decision.  These other decisions were located in retail store operations, the suppliers
who were affected and involved, the commercial buying function together with
Technical Quality Assurance, stock management and composite distribution operations.
What were the decisions about?
In terms of the supply channel the decisions were about the location of the
production facility, the organisation of the suppliers’ transport; the goods in receipt and
store assembly process in the composite distribution centres; the order data collection
and lay off processes via head office, the temperature control and monitoring
procedures.
Identify the tensions
The tensions existed throughout the parts of the company affected by this
major change in strategy.  Retail store operations and their butchers, the suppliers
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affected the commercial function that needed the other functions to perform for the
planned change to be implemented smoothly.
Show the range of choices
One, the big decision. Two, leave things as they had been with the butcher.
On the supplementary decisions, especially about the supply channel, the supplier could
have been left to his own solutions to reduce the total cost of transport.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.5 Strawberry Supply: 1996
Strawberry supply and peak demand during Wimbledon tennis: 1996
An account of the event
Summary
It has not always been easy to supply British strawberries during the height
of demand during the season, which coincides with the Wimbledon Tennis
Championships. In the case study the retailer reshapes a successful solution by
collaborating with the other partners.
The background and context
British strawberries are in large demand during their short season, which
coincides with the Wimbledon Tennis Championships.  But strawberries are also fragile
and subject to many different problems that have caused severe shortages in the past.
There is competition among the retailers and wholesalers to obtain their full quantity of
British strawberries.  It appeared to be a difficult problem to resolve.
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The description of the event
The author was approached by the commercial buyer to provide some help
in resolving the supply problems anticipated for the coming season and Wimbledon
Tennis Championships.  A small team were called together from various functions in
head office, commercial, technical, stock management, along with the suppliers and
their transport operators and composite operations.  The commercial buyer and
technologist set the scene.  Everyone understood the problems only too well, but they
were willing and keen to find a successful solution.  Each representative provided
instances of failure of supply that affected their part of the supply channel operation.
Invariably, they were dependent on someone else, which limited their ability to perform
as they might wish.  Once all these issues were out on the table, a major transformation
took place.  Each representative began to think about how they could adapt or change
their part of the supply channel operation to assist the other links in the chain.
Here are some of the details from that list.  First, mould on strawberries; the
suppliers know several days in advance that mould is developing.  They agreed to
inform technical services immediately so that alternative sources of supply can be
notified in advance.  Second, Head Office order lay off amendments were made at
17:00.  This delayed the final preparation of the strawberry quantity, which in turn
delayed the departure of the suppliers’ transport.  The Head Office representative agreed
to set a much earlier deadline for order lay off amendments and to inform the retail
stores the reason for the change in deadline.  The suppliers’ transport operators said they
were willing to commit to the required collection times from the strawberry suppliers,
but the suppliers were quite often not ready with their full quantity, especially at the
peak of the season or the peak day of the week.  The suppliers agreed, that with the
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much earlier deadline for order amendments from Head Office that they would commit
to have the full quantity of product ready for the required collection time.  Composite
operations stated that the suppliers’ transport was arriving too late in the evening and
they did not have enough time to assembly the store orders, especially for those stores
receiving early deliveries.  However, once the suppliers’ transport operators agreed to
commit themselves to the required collection times, composite operations confirmed
that they could assemble the store orders in time.  All these action points were agreed
and implemented.  That season was a phenomenal success with higher volumes of retail
sales of strawberries than ever before.
The result or outcome of the event
The outcome of this short but effective meeting was a transformation in the
organisation, effectiveness and efficiency of the strawberry supply channel that
delivered resounding results for retail consumers.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
At the time, the author was Head of Primary Distribution at Tesco.  The
account of the event conveys the transformation in attitude that was taking place
between the different functions and their representatives.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer acted as channel captain in the best spirit of collaboration,
engagement and listening to issues and proposals from all the parties represented.
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Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
That event was an almost magical occasion for the author to be connected
with.  Tesco functions and the suppliers dealt with the detail of the operational and
order process links in an open and positive manner.  It was an example of anticipation
and proactive planning to overcome adversity and achieve great results.  To savour that
atmosphere and think back to earlier attitudes towards the supply channel operators was
a revelation.  That earlier attitude would have been a rather hands-off attitude from
retail, with a comment along the lines: “that is your problem to sort out”.  Now the
retailer acted as part of the solution.  That transformed the relationship between the
representatives.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located in that multi – functional group, who had been
given the autonomy to make effective decisions for the good of the business as a whole.
What were the decisions about?
The details of the decisions have been described.  Here the decision was
about being willing to collaborate, to listen, to be proactive, to commit and to be
accountable; above to work together to align the strawberry supply channel with the
needs of the consumer.
Identify the tensions
There were strong tensions between retail and head office function about the
previous season’s poor performance and non-availability of supply at times peak of
peak demand.
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Show the range of choices
The default choice was not to anticipate, not to be proactive, not to
collaborate, and not to listen to the other partners in the strawberry supply channel.  But
the choices made were do the right things in the right way with all the parties in the
channel.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.6 Spanish Iceberg Lettuce: 2002
Iceberg supply channel from Spain to UK retail: 2002
An account of the event
Summary
This is a temperature controlled supply channel case study of the Iceberg
lettuce journey from Spain to UK supermarkets.  The UK Retailer controls the supply
channel and requires the producers to provide high quality standards of iceberg lettuce,
in large volumes through an efficiently organised international delivery structure.
The background and context
Spain has become one of the major sources of produce for the rest of
Europe.  It could be called the garden of Europe.  In the mid 1990s’ the major UK
supermarkets started to purchase produce direct from Spanish supplier cooperatives
rather than purchasing produce through the UK wholesaler system.  In a short space of
time, the retailers increased their control along the produce supply channel so that by
2002 it was well established and in a mature state of operation.  Iceberg Lettuce is a
grown in large volumes in Murcia in south east Spain under direct contract between the
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retailer and the growing cooperatives.  The retailers’ Quality Assurance and Technical
departments provide the grower with the product specification and transport
temperature control requirements from Spain to UK.  The total flow of produce from
Spain to the UK alone is 1,000 vehicles per week.
The description of the event
There are two methods of direct delivery into the UK supermarket
distribution network.  The first is to fill the vehicle in Spain solely with Iceberg Lettuce
and split the delivery once it arrives in the UK by sending the vehicle to two different
distribution centres.  The second is to combine several produce products, e.g. Iceberg
lettuce and courgettes while the vehicle is still in its originating region in Spain, so that
the combined product volume fills the vehicle, which then delivers the whole load to a
single distribution centre in the UK.  The distance from Murcia to central England is
1,500 miles.  The deliveries flow through daily.  The total process time from harvesting
to customer is four days.  Day One: the Iceberg Lettuce is harvested, cooled, packaged
and loaded into temperature controlled vehicles set at plus three degrees and
despatched.  Day Two the vehicle travels up through Spain and France.  Day Three: the
Iceberg Lettuce arrives direct at the temperature controlled distribution centre of the UK
retailer, where it is checked in.  Within three hours it is allocated and picked for a retail
store ready to go out on the next delivery.  Day Four:  the Iceberg lettuce is on display
in the retail store ready for the consumer to purchase.
The efficiency of the delivery system is improved by allowing a residual
portion of the Iceberg lettuce delivery to be held in the distribution centre, should it be
in excess of the store demand for that day; this system is called ‘rolling stock’ over in
the depot.  The ability to roll stock means that full loads of Iceberg can be delivered
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direct to each distribution centre.  The benefit is that any stock that is not picked
immediately can be rolled over for the next day’s retail orders.  In order to permit ‘roll
over’ the code life on Iceberg lettuce direct from Spain is extended by one day above
UK deliveries; this extra day is used for rolling stock in depot.  This direct delivery
principle is applied to other products from Spain: in December & January; Soft citrus:
in January through to May; Tomatoes and Broccoli: in June through to August; Galia &
Honeydew Melons.
The result or outcome of the event
The UK retailer is in total control of the produce supply channel throughout
its phases; from product specification, growing conditions, production volume, quality
control, daily order quantities and the delivery and transport organisation into the UK
retailer’s distribution centres.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author’s knowledge of the direct delivery system from Spain is from
acquaintance of close associates in quality assurance, stock control and commercial
buying as well as the immediate knowledge from retail composite distribution
operations.  The author put forward the proposal, in 1994, that the retailer took control
over the logistics and transport operation for the produce from Spain.  This took several
years to evolve into the mature structure described in the case study.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is an excellent example of the retailer as the channel captain, taking
over from the role from the wholesaler / importer structure that had existed previously.
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The retailer acted in a multifunctional spirit through the produce commercial function,
who had both quality assurance and stock control staff integrated into their team.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The scale at which the large UK retailers operate is immense.  The annual
volumes required to supply the millions of customers weekly can no longer be left to the
vagaries of the commodity weekly or daily spot market.  The viability of the produce
business depends on closely controlled forward planning of crop production volumes,
which in turn requires a close and strategic business relationship with the supplier
cooperatives and organisations in Spain.  The Tesco style is close control with Tesco
sending their own technical staff out to Spain to ensure correct product production,
quality and volumes.
Where were the decisions located?
The decision to implement a direct delivery structure from Spain to the
retailer’s UK distribution centres was located in commercial buying, Quality Assurance
and head office stock control working jointly on the strategy.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about three aspects: the first was product quality and
supply; the second was the efficiency of full vehicle loads to each composite
distribution centre; the third was taking control over the transportation costs and
obtaining a rebate from the suppliers for the improved efficiency of the delivery system.
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Identify the tensions
If the operation described above is compared to what existed before, it will
help clarify where the tensions existed.  Previously the suppliers in Spain would
organise their transport to suit their objectives and best interests as they saw them.  For
example they would designate one vehicle to go to Kent and deliver to the different
retail distribution centres in that region; and another vehicle to go to Manchester to
deliver to the different retail distribution centres up there.  This was understandable
from their point of view, but quite inefficient from that of the receiving retailer.  The
tensions were in two arenas.  The first was the external arena of the Spanish supplier
and their transport operators who business was being changed as the UK retailer started
to implement the direct delivery system.  The second was the internal arena of the UK
retailer, between commercial, stock control, Quality Assurance, and distribution.  These
functions had to find ways of working together in a coherent strategy so all the different
business objectives were achieved.
Show the range of choices
The range of choices include leaving the delivery system as it had been in
the past; a hands–off approach to the matter of controlling the supplier cooperatives
tasks; or a close strategic collaboration with the supplier cooperatives and their transport
operators.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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Case Studies Category B: Broader Developments
This group of four case studies allow a higher level of analysis (Table 7.5).
The detail of the individual product case studies has taken the reader right inside some
of the specific dynamics that were taking place as a result of the leadership role taken
by the retailer.  But they were not events that took place in isolation.  They were part of
a broader development that was going on within the retail supply channel.
The author was directly involved in each of these case studies and that is the
reason they were chosen.  It is not the intention to convey an impression that the author
was acting alone.  Quite the opposite, there were many instances of leadership in the
retail supply channel where the person driving that change came from any and all of the
various functions and departments of the organisation.  But the author is not privy to
their experience even though he may have a general knowledge about their contribution.
Ref Category B: BROADER DEVELOPMENTS
7.7 L1 Chilled product supply ‘At the right freshness’: 1985 to 2005
Retail leadership in food safety, longer shelf life for consumer, dramatic growth in sales, still a
benchmark for others to follow
7.8 L1 Produce supplier logistics and primary distribution: 1990 – 2005
Shaping supply networks for service, efficiency and competitive advantage. Multifunctional
collaboration with suppliers and logistics service providers.
7.9 L1 Frozen from bulk storage to national network: 1986 – 2003
Transforming the structure and pace of the frozen supply channel from intervention to rapid retail
distribution
7.10 L1 Sustainable distribution: an integrated transport approach: 1997
The Tesco supplier collection and Department for Transport best practice programme, an example
of sustainable distribution.
Table 7.5  Case Studies Category B: Broader Developments
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7.7 Chilled Product Supply: 1985 –2005
Chilled product supply ‘at the right freshness’: 1985 to 2002
An account of the event
Summary
This case study describes the retail leadership in food safety, creating longer
shelf life for the consumer, with dramatic growth in sales, which is still a benchmark for
others to follow.
The background and context
This case study starts in 1985 because that is the year of the review about
the future supply channel and distribution strategy for the temperature controlled
products.  That debate resulted in the dramatic implementation of seven large scale
multi-temperature composite distribution centres in 1989.  But this case study examines
the underlying drivers of change that created a retail success.
The description of the event
The key driver was the retail leadership in response to and anticipation of
the food safety legislation that eventually came into force in 1991.  This leadership was
about implementing standards of temperature control throughout the retail supply
channel in order to protect product quality and hence consumer safety.  The author in
his MBA dissertation (1992) referred to this as ‘at the right freshness’, adding to the
marketing 4 P’s of right product, right place, right price and right promotion.  In an
earlier chapter reference was made to the work of quality assurance team and the
improvements in code dates for produce.  Table 4.2 demonstrated how the attention to
the integrity of the chill chain brought about benefits in the form of longer shelf life of
products, in particular produce, to which the table relates.  Consumers quickly noticed
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that the produce they purchased from their Tesco store remained fresher for longer in
their home, than produce they purchased from their local greengrocer.
There was a dramatic growth in sales of produce in those early years when
the chill chain disciplines were introduced by the Quality Control department along the
length of the retail supply channel.  For example, the sizes of the produce chambers in
the composite distribution centres were calculated to handle growth in demand at the
historical rate for at least five years.  In fact the growth in consumer demand was so
strong that within two years their capacity was insufficient.  Distribution operations had
to find other ways of handling the volume.  This was retail leadership which other
retailers then followed so that within a decade all retailers had implemented strict chill
chain controls along the retail supply chain and in their stores.  Tesco leadership had
raised the benchmark for others to follow.
The result or outcome of the event
This is a brief account of the driving forces during the major events over the
period 1986 to 2002, which were described more fully in the earlier chapters.  Freshness
and longer life in the consumer’s home are two critical success factors for retailing
produce and fresh products.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was closely involved in the implementation of the composite
distribution strategy in 1989 and fully aware of the activities that the company was
taking to implement strict temperature controls and better product freshness.
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Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is a good example of the retailer leading and reshaping the retail supply
channel for temperature controlled products and produce.  The disciplines were put in
place gradually until there had been a complete transformation of how the suppliers
were operating.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The hidden factor here is something that at once is obvious but at the same
time can be amazingly hidden from view.  The link between extended product code life,
freshness and the discipline over the chill chain from harvest to retail shelf is not
obvious to the consumer who purchases produce and fresh products from the retail
store.  It is the people who work in the industry who know about what has happened.  It
is like a ‘trade secret’. In the author’s fieldwork abroad, in South Africa, Mexico and
Jordan (see later case studies), it is clear that those involved in their fresh product and
fresh produce supply chains do not know yet about this ‘trade secret’.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located in retail, in quality control with the full
involvement of commercial, the suppliers, transport operators and retail
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about agreeing the standards of control and how to
implement the management disciplines effectively
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Identify the tensions
The tensions existed between the retailer and those suppliers who were
operating in the old way without strict temperature control.
Show the range of choices
The alternative choice was to do nothing, but the impending legislation
compelled the industry to act.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.8 Supplier Logistics: 1990 – 2005
Produce supplier logistics and primary distribution: 1990 to 2006
An account of the event
Summary
The first move into produce supplier logistics took place in 1990 but the
concept evolved and developed into a new function, Primary Distribution which is still
active today and effective in controlling and organising the inbound transportation of
the retail supply channel.  This development shaping the supply networks to provide a
better service, with greater efficiency, which gained competitive advantage for the
business.  It is founded on multi-functional collaboration by the retailer with the
suppliers and the logistics service providers
The background and context
In 1990 the author submitted a proposal to the Main Board Distribution and
Supply Chain Director, which was approved.  The proposal concerned the issues
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surrounding the logistics of supplying fresh produce in the retail supply channel.  “To
control the movement of Produce from the point of supply to Goods in at Composite to
ensure it arrives at the right time, in the right volume and at the right freshness” (Smith
1990).  The author took on the role of produce supplier logistics in addition to the duties
of controlling composite distribution centre operations run by logistics service
providers.  Later on, in 1994, the author was appointed Head of Primary Distribution
with a small team of managers.
The description of the event
In September 1990 the author held a preliminary meeting with a small group
of produce suppliers together with representatives of the main business functions of
Trading, Technical Services, Stock Management, Composite Distribution Operations
and Logistics.  A variety of issues were identified by the suppliers, examples of which
have been given in Case Study 7.1: Potatoes on the suppliers shift patterns and Case
Study 7.5: Strawberries on the timing of order lay off from Head Office and the
punctuality of the collection time by the hauliers.
The discussions with the main hauliers and suppliers revealed a picture of a
transport infrastructure for the Produce industry that was fragmented.  It was founded
on family businesses, with partnerships between certain suppliers and hauliers, which
went back over many years.  From a farming family, for example, one son might
become the mechanic and another son might become the grower.  Over the years, the
two brothers probably worked closely together helping each other out in times of
difficulty.  Such bonds are not easily broken apart; certainly not by some outsider
coming in and suggesting commercial competition among transport operators.  As a
consequence, although there was a surfeit of transport, this generated a protectionist
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attitude as a defence against competition.  The result was fragmentation rather than
coordination.  Success would depend on taking a different approach.  The author’s role
in supporting the supplier logistics development was to discuss with the suppliers, those
factors that impacted on the collection times.  The control of the departure times was in
the hands of the suppliers.  They controlled the interface with crop processing and the
production side of the business.  These discussions about production planning were
assisted by the presence of Technical Services who advised on production techniques
and the start times for lifting the crop.  The end result was the successful
implementation by the suppliers of firm operational control over their agreed despatch
times.  It was the key to effective logistics.  The principles were applied to other
temperature control product groups, such as Case Study 7.4: fresh meat and poultry.
In 1994, Primary Distribution was set up, headed up by the author, with a
good quality team of experienced logistics operators, each specialising in different
product groups.  Each member of the team was located within the relevant commercial
buying function.  The priorities for primary distribution action were agreed with
commercial.  There were many projects that were conducted successfully.  Another
major development taking place was the establishment of consolidation centres for
produce and other fresh product groups.  The operation and benefits of consolidation
centres were described earlier in chapter four.  They spread quickly throughout the
major fresh food retail sector.
At that time commercial were implementing a process of supplier
assessment and development through their buying teams.  Suppliers were judged
according to their abilities to contribute to the business.  The larger or more able
suppliers were then selected for development into a strategic partnership relationship
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with the company.  This attitude of growing collaboration progressed until in 1996, the
Main Board Director announced at a special national meeting with all the suppliers that
Tesco would be willing to share information.  There was something the he requested in
exchange: that the suppliers designate their best managers to think about the Tesco retail
business and come up with creative ideas to take the whole market forward.  Out of this
came the Tesco Information Exchange programme.  The other retailers each developed
their own version of information sharing with suppliers.  This raised the whole level of
collaborative thinking and partnership between retail and suppliers.
Later, Primary Distribution matured into a separate function in 2001 headed
by a Primary Distribution Director working with a Commercial Trading Director and a
joint team of commercial buyers and distribution logistics operations, some of whom
had been in the original primary distribution team.  By this time, Tesco had found a
financial method of implementing Factory Gate Pricing with their suppliers.  The
retailer now took direct control over the organisation and payment for the inbound
supply channel transport.
The result or outcome of the event
Within ten years, Tesco the retailer, evolved from a totally hands–off
relationship with the inbound logistics of the retail supply channel into a fully mature
primary distribution, fully engaged in the organisation and payment for that logistics.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
As already mentioned the author was closely involved in the early stages of
the evolution into primary distribution, which is now fully visible for everyone to see.
252
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer did become more involved and so evolved into a leader over the
logistics of the inbound retail supply channel.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The hidden evidence is that the costs of the inbound supplier transport were
included in the buyers’ gross margin.  It was only in 1994 that the true scale of those
costs were calculated and made known to the business.  It still took a further five years
to find the mechanisms and the will to separate out those costs as a directly manageable
expense.  More importantly, the mature primary distribution function, created
competitive advantage for the business by leveraging the benefits of scale of the
logistics operation and harnessing the skill and expertise of those within the
organisation.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located between commercial, distribution and the
suppliers.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about who should get involved with the inbound
logistics control and how to apportion the cost benefit of the savings.
Identify the tensions
The tensions were between the different functions within Tesco and also
with suppliers and their transport and logistics operators.  The tensions were about the
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control and choice issues as well as the impact on the suppliers of the removal of the
Tesco volume from their warehousing and transport scale.  Quite often it left a rump of
high cost distribution to the smaller operators.  The fact that the retailer is acting as
channel captain in this is received with mixed feelings by the suppliers and logistic
service providers, some of whom dislike it intensely.
Show the range of choices
The choice was to continue in a hands – off, no involvement, it is all down
to the suppliers to sort out attitude, behaviour and relationship.  The alternative was to
evolve into a fully engaged partner with the suppliers as happened with primary
distribution.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.9 Frozen Channel: 1986 – 2003
Frozen from bulk storage to national network: 1986 to 2003
An account of the event
Summary
This case study relates the story of the transformation in the structure and
pace of the frozen supply channel from ‘intervention’ storage to rapid retail distribution.
The background and context
‘Intervention’ is an expression that is not heard today.  It relates to an earlier
time in the 1970’s and 1980’s when across Europe, there were stockpiles of butter and
beef for example, called butter mountains and beef mountains.  These were the
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consequence of the agricultural and farming policies of the time.  There were even
unscrupulous people making money by moving these mountains from one country to
another and claiming subsidies.  Many of the frozen chambers and facilities of that era
made their profit from holding these butter mountains and beef mountains in storage for
months on end.  It can be imagined that there was a low level of associated logistics
activity.  A delivery once a day might be the norm and staff only needed to be on site
during an ordinary day shift, say from 8am to 4pm.  The chambers themselves were
crammed right up to the doors that were then firmly shut.
The description of the event
This was the normal operating environment of a frozen cold store in the
early 1980’s.  It is a big contrast with today’s modern fast moving stock and assembly
processing and deliveries to serve the retail supply chain.  How is it possible to make
the transformation, from that static operation into the dynamics of the latter?  In a
presentation in 1996, the author portrayed the former as an elephant, slow and
lumbering, with the latter as a cheetah, fast, agile and swift.  Such was the daunting
nature of the task.
Nonetheless, this was the task facing the author’s team in 1986.  The
business had made the decision to set up four dedicated frozen distribution centres,
using all the latest computer technology and stock control systems that the company had
already implemented in its ambient fast moving centralised distribution centres.
Making the modifications to the buildings, setting up the technology, store ordering
processes, and getting the delivery vehicles was readily achieved.  But finding the right
team of management and operators with necessary experience, was a totally different
matter altogether.  But, despite a few teething problems, it was achieved.  In addition to
255
this achievement, one of the team made it his personal objective to be able to assemble
store orders using the sticky assembly product labels that were well established in the
ambient grocery operations.  These four frozen distribution centres were all provided by
contract distribution operators and, as will be explained in Case Study 7.15, operated on
an open–book accounting system.
The strategy was to set up these four frozen distribution centres ahead of the
planned implementation of Composite Distribution in 1989.  The rationale being that
service to retail would be enhanced to daily deliveries immediately, using all the
modern ordering processes and systems.  An additional benefit would be that the
transition into the composite operation would be easier with both the systems and the
personnel transferring seamlessly over.  In fact that is exactly what happened.
The frozen food strategy evolved as demand exceeded capacity, especially
finding the space for the extensive number of product lines, some of which were very
slow moving.  A system of depot twinning was implemented in the mid 1990’s and
gradually the frozen chambers were removed from the Composite operations in order to
increase the capacity for the other pick-by-line product groups.  In 2001 an automated
national frozen distribution operation was set up by Junction 18 of the M1.  The stores
orders are now assembled there and the vehicles trunked to the composite distribution
centres who delivery them onward to the retail stores.  The weight limit on the vehicles
had increased to 44 tonnes.  This allowed the use of double decked trailers for trunking
the frozen goods into the national distribution centre from the supplier consolidation
operations around the country.
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The result or outcome of the event
There was a successful transition from ‘intervention’ to rapid retail
distribution operation for frozen food.  It then evolved into an automated national frozen
depot using double decked trailers for the trunk movements.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author had direct involvement in this frozen distribution development
from 1986 through to 1994.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This implementation process is yet another early example of the retailer
leading change in the supply channel, this time in retail distribution of frozen foods.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The hidden evidence is the state of the old ‘intervention’ frozen cold stores.
In a field trip to Greece in 2000, the author visited frozen cold stores from that tradition,
which were still in existence.  This highlighted the transformation needed by the
management to engage in modern retail store distribution.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located in retail distribution.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the way the design of a modern frozen distribution
centre and retail store delivery service was based on the fast moving grocery model.
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Identify the tensions
The tensions were with the management and operators as they went through
a steep learning curve, but once established they were good.  There were also tensions
with the suppliers who were not accustomed to the distribution way of doing things.
Show the range of choices
The alternative was to leave things as they were until Composite itself was
established.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.10 Sustainable Distribution: 1997
Sustainable distribution through integrated transport
An account of the event
Summary
The Department for Transport were promoting, through their Best Practice
Programme, examples of sustainable distributions and selected the Tesco supplier
collection system for inclusion.
The background and context
In 1998 the Department for Transport was due to develop a document on
Sustainable Distribution for Freight.  Their Best Practice Programme was based on that
of the series used for saving energy in large production and manufacturing operations.
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The description of the event
In 1997, the Department of Transport designated an engineer to validate the
sustainability benefits of the Tesco supplier collection programme that had been in
operation for several years.  This was a process, whereby Tesco vehicles, after they had
completed their retail store delivery, would go on to a supplier or manufacturer and
collect pallets of product for inbound movement to the retail distribution centres.  This
reduced the vehicle miles that would have been driven if the supplier had done the
inbound delivery and the retail vehicle return empty to the distribution centre.  Annually
it added up to three million miles, or 4,600 tons of CO2.
The result or outcome of the event
An important recognition by the Department for Transport of the value of a
Tesco distribution initiative, culminating in an award from the Minister of Transport.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was involved in working with the designated engineer in 1997.
Later in 1998, he worked with the Department for Transport, Freight division on the
Sustainable Distribution Policy Documenting, providing examples of Best Practice from
across the transport industry.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
Tesco was a leader in the scale of their supplier collection operation.  Other
retailers followed the example.
259
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The hidden evidence is the increasingly efficient use retailers make of their
vehicles.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions are located in retail distribution in collaboration with
suppliers, who agree a price with the retailer for the collection.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions are about the timings of the collections.
Identify the tensions
Tensions can arise with the pressures of other uses of the vehicles, such as
collecting empty cages, trays and recycling material from the retail stores.
Show the range of choices
The choices were not to do the collections, and also to negotiate with the
suppliers transport operation to take store orders and deliver them to stores on their way
back to their supplier base.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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Case Studies Category C: Capacity & Control
Table 7.6  Case Studies Category C: Capacity & Control
These four case studies (Table 7.6) go behind the scenes to explain some of
the hidden trends and developments that took place to anticipate and control the need
for capacity.  In any supply chain, capacity is a critical strategic and development issue.
Capacity can be altered by improving the methods of operating, that is, by working
smarter.  It can be altered by reconfiguring the shape of the supply channels or adding
or removing distribution facilities.
The scale of the retail operation is so large that they thrive on volume and as
the team becomes accustomed to operation at a certain volume, so they are able to
handle incremental volume year on year. The retailers can decide to involve external
companies in the work of managing part of the retail supply channel.  The fourth case
study explores the roles of the logistics service provider.  The retailer still remains as
the channel leader by determining the parameters or guidelines for the services that
these external companies provide.
Ref Category C: CAPACITY & CONTROL
7.11 L2 Warehouse Productivity, Just in Time capability:1980’s – 2000’s
The innovative techniques to increase productivity in distribution to service retail as they improved
their stock systems in store.
7.12 L1 Shaping supply networks pre-composite: 1980’s
Logical evolution, preparing way for composite
7.13 L1 Composite Capacity: 1989 – 2004
Ground breaking initiative, zero stock, pull demand and since then continuous growth that is hidden
from external view
7.14 L1 Role of Logistic Service Providers: 1980’s to 2005
The partnership with logistics service providers enabled retailers to, harness their logistics initiative
and achieve scale quickly. The retailer provided the thought leadership but with a style that was
transformational rather than transactional
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7.11 Warehouse Productivity: 1980s – 2000’s
Warehouse productivity: 1980’s to 2000’s
An account of the event
Summary
This case study describes the process of continuous improvement and the
innovation that took place to increase productivity in fast moving grocery distribution
centres so as to service retail better as they improved their stock systems in store.
The background and context
The twenty year period from 1980 to 2000 witnessed a major evolution in
retailing as described in the earlier chapters.  This case study examines some of the
warehouse productivity improvements that were implemented over the same timescale
by distribution operations in the retailer Tesco.  Whilst this is not a treatise on the detail
of productivity, it does provide an account of the major and significant developments.
Many of these are well known to professional logistics operators but are presented here
for the record.
The description of the event
In 1984, the author was appointed general manager to a Tesco fast moving
grocery distribution centre.  This was a time of great change in warehouse productivity.
Just prior to that time, warehouse store order assembly was organised in teams with a
productivity bonus based on the number of units assembled by the whole team and
shared out accordingly.  The store orders were assembled using printed lists, which the
assembler would tick as each item was selected.  During 1984 – 1985 a new warehouse
store order assembly productivity scheme was introduced based on an individual
assembler’s performance measured against work productivity standards, which were all
loaded into the computer.  The computer calculated the optimum order assembly route
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for each store order assignment in terms of distance travelled.   Once through the initial
difficulties of implementation, this new productivity scheme, which was titled:
‘computerised labour standards’ [CLS], proved effective.  It enhanced the store order
through put capacity of the distribution centre.  The mechanical assistance provided was
a battery powered low level order picker that had extended legs that would carry three
roll cages.  The store order assembly process was enhanced by using a set of sticky
labels that were printed out for the three-cage assignment.  The assembler took the
sticky label off the printout, placed it on the item to be selected and then put that item in
the roll cage.  This label contained important information, which both distribution and
retail could use, for example, to identify when the order was picked.  This system
continued in use for many years until the arrival, about 1998, of label-less picking using
mini scanners.
The other part of a fast moving grocery warehouse operation is the
organisation and control of the pallets of stock.  In the early 1980’s the warehouse
layout was computerised and set up so that the reserve stock locations were designated
to spaces close to the product assembly pallet, which was at floor level.  This system
replaced the earlier basic computer stock programme.  It had a range of benefits.  For
example, there used to be an annual stock take in which a team would come in and over
a couple of days, identify, count and reconcile, every pallet of stock with the database.
The new system paved the way for a rolling stock take of a portion of the pallets every
week and enhanced the control over the receipt of goods into the warehouse.  By the
late 1980’s the system was enhanced to assist with the organisation of the movement of
pallets of product in two areas, the first was the movement from goods in to the reserve
location, called ‘put-away’, the second was the movement from the reserve location to
the floor level selection location, called ‘let-down’.  In the past, the fork lift drivers had
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a list of pallet movements which they organised manually.  There was one team for
‘put-away’ and another team for ‘let-down’.  The upgraded system calculated a ‘least-
distance’ route plan and combined the two sets of activities, ‘put-away’ and ‘let-down’.
This was combined with scanning confirmation of the movements and on board radio
controlled information screens for the fork-truck drivers.  The warehouse productivity
and system developments described above were applied in all the distribution centres
where there were products held as stock on site.
The result or outcome of the event
These are brief accounts of a complex and technical topic.  The objective
was not to describe technical leadership, but convey the continuous improvement
progress, which increases the capability of the distribution operation to handle
increasing levels of throughput within the same physical space.  What are more visible
are the changes that have occurred in the retail stores themselves.  Stores have less back
up stock on site, are geared up for frequent deliveries of product that they can put
straight out onto the shelves, or just roll to the shop floor slot.  The computerised stock
and ordering systems in the retail store have evolved so that the order lead times have
become shorter and shorter.  The whole supply channel has speeded up its throughput
and at the same time reduced the levels of stock in the system.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was the general manager of a Tesco fast moving grocery
distribution centre from 1984 to 1986. For the next ten years through his involvement in
the different distribution operations, he kept in touch with warehouse productivity
developments.
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Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
As this topic is an inside view of one part of the supply channel, it is not
appropriate to critique the event on the scale of leader – follower.  From inside the
operation it felt like leadership.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
Retail store order assembly is a manually intense operation for fast moving
products.  Warehouse productivity drives the level of cost of the labour resource
required to handle the volume throughput.  This labour cost is a large percentage of the
annual operating budget for the warehouse.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions are located in distribution operations, productivity and
technical developments in computerisation.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions are about working smarter rather than simply working harder.
Identify the tensions
There are tensions between the labour force and management during
changes and implementation, but they are handled by involving the staff in the
developments.
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Show the range of choices
A big choice option is to automate warehouse operations.  This has been
applied in selected operations, such as slow moving product areas like Health & Beauty.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.12 Pre-Composite Supply Channels: 1980s
Shaping supply networks pre-composite distribution: 1980’s
An account of the event
Summary
This case study accounts for the logistics evolution that took place,
preparing the way for composite implementation.
The background and context
In 1986 the debate was: is it worth making any improvements in distribution
service to retail for those product groups that are destined to be placed in the Composite
Distribution network, which was scheduled for implementation in 1989.
The description of the event
Produce saw the commissioning of Aztec West Produce Depot, near Bristol,
in 1986, which represented the state of the art facilities and operation.  The decision was
made not to build any more produce depots but to manage the existing Produce network
until its absorption into Composite in 1989.  Long life provisions; butter fats and
cheese, had an effective two depot set up providing national coverage and continued to
provide an excellent service the until their transfer into composite.
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Frozen Food (Case Study 7.9) benefited from the decision to invest in four
distribution centres nationally by converting existing cold store locations with the
appointed logistics service providers.  These four facilities had the modern warehousing
systems.  The delivery service to retail was improved dramatically, better stock
availability, reliable service and, for most stores, daily delivery.  The old shared user,
cold store network this replaced could not have provided this type of service nor
handled the future growth in the business.  These four dedicated frozen distribution
centres performed excellently.  As a result of the forward thinking and investment in
systems, the transition into Composite when it came, was seamless, effortless and
occurred without the retail stores even noticing there had been a change.  It was an
excellent strategic decision, which paid dividends in the growth of frozen food in the
retail stores.
Short life provisions, both dairy based and meat based, were operated
nationally by two different logistics service providers, through two separate networks of
depots, each with their own way of operating.  The dairy based provisions were
assembled from stock at the depots and the meat based provisions were assembled on a
pick by line systems as the suppliers arrived. In those days, the orders were taken by
telesales and deliveries were made to the store two or three times a week.  The author’s
first task in 1986 was to undertake a review of the short life provisions distribution
structure.  The result was a decision to rationalise from eleven to six depots, with each
depot handling both dairy and meat based provisions.  This amalgamation had three
benefits.  The first was the synergy between the goods in delivery profiles from the
suppliers.  Dairy based provisions normally arrived during the morning and the meat
based provisions normally arrived in the late afternoon and early evening.  The second
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benefit is that stores could now receive a daily delivery service and for the larger stores
even a couple of deliveries in a day.  The third benefit was that the rationalised system
had the capability of handling the strong growth in retail demand through until
composite distribution was in place.  The result for retail was a resounding success,
which retail acknowledged, despite some early problems until the system settled down.
The transition into composite went smoothly.
The final product group is fresh meat and poultry, which at that time were
delivering primal packs (Case Study 7.4) on a variable-weight charging basis.  This
meant that each store was charged for the actual weight delivered, which would be
carefully scrutinised by the store butcher.  This system had been set a few years earlier.
This was at the time that Tesco was being to centralise its buying and had brought in
two trading managers to buy meat and poultry.  In this instance it was the logistics
service providers who lead the way in how the distribution should be organised,
particularly with the issue of variable weight.  There were six depots around the country
each delivering to a region.  The deliveries were two or three times a week and orders
were taken by telesales.  The system operated well and naturally the decision was made
to let it continue until composite was implemented.
The result or outcome of the event
The result of these decisions was that retail received a much improved
service for frozen food and provisions ahead of composite.  The other product groups,
produce, long life provisions, fresh meat and poultry, had distribution networks that
provided a good service that would meet the needs of the business until composite.
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Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author, as divisional director, distribution for Tesco from 1986 to 1990,
was in charge of the entire contract distribution operations nationally, most of which
were scheduled to be transferred into composite.  He was close to the implementation of
these changes and the continuity of service through to composite.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This period represents a cusp on the scale of leader –follower in terms of the
retail supply channel for these product groups.  There was leadership for produce and
frozen, short life provisions and long life provisions.  Fresh meat and poultry were
really shaped by the logistics service providers who had experience, particularly of
delivering variable weight products.  Clearly, as there was more and more product
groups being moved into centralised buying and centralised distribution, the retailer was
shaping the direction of the retail supply channel for these products, even though they
were dependent of the logistics service providers for the detail.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
What is hidden is the process of continuous improvement that has been
described in this case study.  This was not only for frozen and short life provisions, it
was also there for produce, fresh meat and poultry and long life provisions.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located with distribution operations accountable for the
various product groups together with those engaged in directing the strategy.
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What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the nature and timing of the enhancements to the
distribution service to retail.
Identify the tensions
Tensions were between retail, commercial and distribution about the detail
of the service to be provided during the interim.
Show the range of choices
Remaining with old network for frozen would have been a disaster.  The
short life provisions rationalisation did not need to happen.  Enhancing the other
product groups would have been an unnecessary cost.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.13 Composite Capacity: 1989 – 2004
Composite capacity: 1989 to 2004
An account of the event
Summary
This case study examines composite as a ground breaking initiative, with
zero stock holding, driven by pull demand and then continuing to grow fast, a fact that
is hidden from external view
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The background and context
A step change, a dramatic switch in strategy, building a new type of
distribution centre; all these are visible and were visible at the time to UK retail and
logistics professionals.  What goes on, year after year, inside these composite
distribution centres is not so visible.  The author returned to visit Composite fifteen
years after he was there at their start.
The description of the event
How does an operation continue to grow from strength to strength and
handle more and more volume in the same space?  This question does have some
answers, which will be documented here.  The first answer is in continuous
improvement in operational efficiency.  Composite distribution, as described in earlier
chapters, operates a ‘pick-by-line’ method, which was designed for temperature
controlled products that have a short code life, such as, produce, provisions, fresh meat
and poultry.  The suppliers received orders for the exact quantity required that delivery
day by the retail stores serviced from that composite.  As these deliveries arrived from
suppliers, they were checked in and immediately assembled into store orders.  The store
order assembly operation was quite different.  An assembler would take a pallet of
product, using a manual trolley, along a row of cages, each for a different store, and
then place the required number of cases of the product into the store cage, and then put
a label on the case.  In the pick by line set up, as there were not reserve pallets of stock,
there was no requirement of the ‘put-away’ or ‘let-down’ operation.
The other handling development that impacted on composite distribution
was the introduction of the plastic tray (Case Study 7.17.) for produce, fresh meat and
poultry and bakery products.  The use of trays improved the productivity of the store
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order because their design makes it easier to stack one on another.  They were placed on
dollies, while the roll cages were used for product that arrived in cardboard outers.  In
composite the manner in which the assembly teams are organised also promotes good
productivity and therefore increases the throughput capacity.  As the managers and
operators become accustomed to handling a new peak level of volume and learn how to
iron out the wrinkles and smooth the detail of the operation, so they can move forward
steadily to yet another new level.  The composite operation is so large, that
effectiveness is directly related to everyone knowing what is expected of them, knowing
exactly what to do, being experienced at pacing their effort to achieve the throughput
targets.  It is a compliment to the manner of the motivation of the teams.
Another answer to the question about achieving increasing volume
throughput in the same space is to use the space differently.  There were three groups of
stock products in composite at the beginning: some ambient lines, like pet food; frozen;
and long life chill products like butters, fats and cheeses.  In addition to that there was a
tray wash facility.  These four items have either gone or been modified.  The tray wash
facility became defunct with the opening of the recycling units (Case Study 7.17).  The
ambient stocked items were transferred out in the mid 1990’s when additional dry
grocery distribution centres were built.  The frozen food was transferred out by 2003
into the new national frozen centre (Case Study 7.9).  The long life product group of
butters, fats and cheeses, was converted from a stock held in depot system to the pick by
line system in 1997.  This conversion, although complex, was completed successfully.
Another way for creating extra space was to rationalise the temperature regimes in
composite, this allowed the unwanted partitions to be removed so that the floor space
could be used more effectively.
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The result or outcome of the event
In combination these two sets of improvements had the effect of more than
doubling the capability of the composite site over that fifteen-year period.  In 2004 a
composite assembled in one day as much as the same composite assembled at the
beginning in a week.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was directly involved in composite operations from 1989
through to 1994 at a senior level controlling up to five composites of the national total
of nine.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
Outstandingly, the implementation of Composite Distribution was Tesco as
a retailer acting as Channel Captain.  There was creativity in the strategy itself, it was
not borrowed from somewhere else.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
It is a temptation to assume that a specific distribution centre has a
capability that remains as its constant upper limit.  This case study demonstrates that,
intelligently planned changes can increase that capability over time.  The really hidden
factor, however, is the sheer ability of an excellent team to excel at achieving
performance to new levels of activity.  That fifteen-year revisit brought that home
strongly to the author.
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Where were the decisions located?
The decisions are located in retail distribution and supply chain, both at the
development planning level and at the site operations level.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions are about planning ahead for the growth and development of
the retail business and its demands on distribution operations capability.
Identify the tensions
If delivery performance fails, then the tensions are between retail and
distribution, usually escalated to Board level.  There is a tension in the strategic plan
about the location of various product groups around the complex national distribution
network.  There are tensions within the distribution operation as the business demands
higher throughput and the management and operators work together to achieve what is
required.
Show the range of choices
Failure to anticipate the future needs of the business on distribution can
harm a business severely.  Poorly implemented change will damage a business.
Investing in new logistics facilities is a long term commitment and is expensive
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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7.14 Logistics Service Providers: 1980s – 2005
Role of logistics service providers: 1980’s to 2005
An account of the event
Summary
The partnership with logistics service providers enabled retailers to harness
their logistics initiative and achieve results quickly.  The retailer provided the thought
leadership but with a style that was transformational rather than transactional.
The background and context
The role of the logistics service provider had changed and evolved.  There
was a time when large manufacturers, for example Unilever, would organise all the
transport themselves.  Then the manufacturers went through a long period of deciding
that they should concentrate on their core business of manufacturing and should not be
involved in tying up assets and management resources in logistics.  They disposed of
their transport operations, which in many instances became transport and warehouse
operators in their own right, some doing this through a management buyout.  This piece
of history is important in the examination of the role of channel captain organising the
supply channel to retail.  There was a time that the logistics service providers assumed
that the retailers too would not want to get involved in tying up their assets and
management resources in the intricacies of logistics.  That might apply to some of the
smaller retailers, but it did not apply to the large retailers.  What then did the large
retailer see as the role of the logistics service provider?
The description of the event
Several of the other case studies involve logistics service providers and their
role in the retail supply channel.  In the period of time before 1980 the transport and
warehouse companies provided shared user services to retail, without retail wishing to
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get close to the detail, provided the product was delivered as required.  The 1980’s saw
a shift in the relationship between the retailer and the logistics service providers, as
described in the other case studies, with the retail distribution departments employing
professional logistics specialists in order to direct and control the detail of the logistics
and supply operations of the logistics service providers.
This developed to a stage where the retailer distribution team were
providing the thought leadership and the logistics service providers were running the
daily operation, organising the resources and deliveries to the service specification
agreed with the retailers.  This is quite a surprising turn of events.  It marks a swing in
the debate about who is shaping the supply channel, the manufacturer or the retailer.
The logistics service providers of the pre-composite operation were mostly extensions
of suppliers and manufacturers that had by that time become independent or semi-
independent companies in their own right.  Their roots were with manufacturing.
Given that retailer had in house distribution operations, manned by their
own staff, what was the motivation to place such a critical part of the supply channel in
the hands of external logistics service providers?  In the case of Tesco pre-composite, it
was to provide flexibility in the logistics service during that interim phase before the
composite distribution network was commissioned.  As regards composite, the scale of
the implementation was so large, so dramatic, so daunting, that it was a strategy to
achieve scale rapidly.  Opening seven large operations in nine months in 1989 was
going to make a step change impact on the power of the retail business.  To have
opened two distribution centres a year over a four-year period, would not have had the
same impact and also stood the risk of failing to have the assets to supply the strong
growth in the retail business over that period of time.  The end result was that five
276
composites were contracted to logistics service providers.  They provided the
management, resources and energy alongside the Tesco run composites.  They did their
job well.
A special relationship developed between the retailer and these logistics
service providers.  The retailer wanted the local composite distribution management to
develop so that they learnt the full range of standards of operation that was required of
them.  They were encouraged to bring forward initiatives and ideas to develop
efficiency in its service and contact with the retail stores.  It was not simply a
transactional relationship: only do exactly what is instructed; it was also
transformational: develop, grow into the full role, and be creative and proactive.  This
was a successful and exciting way of working, from both sides.  Soon, logistics service
providers were sending the bright young managers to be initiated into the pace and style
of composite operations, which were being recognised as world class leaders.  These
young managers then went on to develop and head up similar distribution operations
that the logistic service providers were setting up for other retailers.  Composite became
the vehicle for the further evolution of the logistics service provider.
The result or outcome of the event
There has been a productive and strong partnership between retail and
logistics service providers.  The retail supply channel has gained.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was in charge of contract composite distribution centres
managed by logistics service providers at varying times between 1989 and 1994; and
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prior to that from 1986 he had accountability for national contract distribution
operations in Tesco prior to Composite.  He was in a good position to understand the
different roles of the logistics service providers.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer showed world class leadership with composite distribution.  The
logistics service providers benefited from their participation and now have feet firmly in
both camps, manufacturing and retail.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The hidden evidence is the proactive participation that went on with the
logistics service providers.  From the outside, either interpretation is possible: the
logistics service provider is leading it all; the retailer is dictating it all.  The truth is that
the sign of a good logistics operator is that they are always looking for better ways of
doing things.  That was true of these logistics service providers.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions were located in retail distribution operations management as
well as the logistics service provider’s management.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the strategy, the retail delivery service, the
operational systems and procedures; and the renewal or not of the contract.
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Identify the tensions
There were tensions between the retailer and the logistics service providers,
about the terms of the contract and its renewal.  These were handled properly.
Show the range of choices
The alternative of not using logistics service providers, was not practical
without delaying the implementation plan for composite.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
Case Studies Category D:  Technical & Design
Ref Category D TECHNICAL & DESIGN
7.15 L1 Open book accounting pre and post composite: 1986-90
Implementing visibility of costs for greater flexibility in service. This is a basic building block of
professional logistics, which is now the norm
7.16 L2 Composite three temperature compartment trailer: 1989
Industry innovation with external specialist Thermoking, led by retail.
7.17 L1 Second generation plastic tray: 1990s
Industry leadership from Tesco Board pushing design boundaries
7.18 L2 Bonded Distribution and Customs & Excise: 1988
Retail leadership in initiating assembly direct for Bond.
Table 7.7  Case Studies Category D: Technical & Design
This series of four case studies (Table 7.7) touches on some technical
leadership shown by retail through the specialist expertise of their team members. This
expertise is given the leadership space because of the brand leadership of the retailer.  If
these experts were working for another company not held in respect by the industry,
they would probably not be in a position to influence standards within the industry.
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7.15 Open Book Accounting: 1986 – 1990
Open book accounting, pre and post composite distribution: 1986 to 1990
An account of the event
Summary
Traditionally distribution had been contracted on a basis of agreeing a unit
cost per case.  As Tesco became more involved in retail distribution and centralisation
so there was a desire to implement the full visibility of logistics costs not only for
financial control but also to for a greater flexibility in providing the distribution service
to the retail stores.  This is a basic building block of professional logistics, which is now
considered normal but at the time was quite a dramatic change.
The background and context
During the 1980’s contract distribution was normally financed by an agreed
unit cost per case for a particular service for the whole year.  The customer considered
this as a sound stable way of budgeting for logistics services.  It was a guaranteed
method of planning revenue flow by the distribution operator.  At that time most
warehousing, transport and logistics contract operations were operating a shared user
policy.  There would be several customers using the same warehouse, storage, transport
and logistics facilities together.  The contract distribution operator knew the total costs
of the operation but kept that confidential.  It was not shown to the various customers.
It was up to the contract distribution operator to make his profit margin.
The description of the event
It was the context when Tesco implemented the policy of centralising the
distribution of product lines.  This decision was the result of the experience from
Operation Checkout in 1977. Tesco had used its in-house transport, storage and
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distribution facilities.  But there was a need to use contract distribution operators for
various products groups through several supply channels.  In 1986, the author took up
the responsibility for controlling the contract distribution operations nationally.  Some
of the contracts were left on a case rate basis but it was considered that others needed a
change to their terms.  This case study relates to one such contract, the frozen food
distribution contract operation, which serviced the retail stores in the South West and
Wales.  The whole site and operation were dedicated to this retail service.  It was logical
to consider the option of open–book accounting contract, rather than a case rate
contract.  After due negotiations this was agreed. The principle and process were
applied to other contract distribution operations.
There were several consequences to this transition to an open book
accounting contract.  The first was the provision of comprehensive information on all
the costs involved in providing the service.  The second was the need for a regular
management review of the expenditure before it was authorised for payment.  The third
was a requirement on the contract distribution operator to put forward ideas about
reducing the cost of providing the service.  Fourth, there was a lower incremental cost
of increasing the volume either annually or at peak times than would have occurred with
a case rate contract.  Fifth, there was a separate mechanism for paying the contractor a
management fee for providing the service.
The sixth consequence was an ability to enter a discussion with the retail
stores about additional costs for providing changes to the service that they requested.
This would lead onto a cost benefit business case; the result sometimes would be that
the retailer withdrew their request because it was not an overall gain to the company.
Many times however an improved service to retail was authorised and then the
281
appropriate costs were signed off and paid.  This method of open book accounting
became the standard for contract distribution agreements.
The result or outcome of the event
Some contract distribution companies willingly agreed to the transition to
open book accounting, others were reluctant because they felt they were losing control.
Nonetheless, even these reluctant contract distribution operators, started to apply the
open book accounting policy to their other contracts.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author, as the Divisional Distribution Director for Contract Distribution,
was closely involved in driving forward the change over to open book accounting
contracts.  It proved to be a benefit:  as the demands of retail changed and developed it
was easier to agree about the costs incurred.  It enabled distribution to provide retail
with a quality service at lowest cost.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer was emerging as a leader at this time.  Implementing the
transition to open book accounting was a sign of that leadership position.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
For the author, one sign of a good quality distribution operation is that the
team are always seeking ways to improve the operation either in providing a better
quality of service or inventing better ways of working smarter or more productively.
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Open book accounting provided the opportunity to collaborate with the contractor and
recognise good creative ideas.
Where were the decisions located?
The decision was located with the retailer through the senior distribution
operations manager.  The detailed operational decisions about the quality of service to
retail were located with retail and the local distribution operator.
What were the decisions about?
The big decision was the switch from case rate to open–book accounting.
Identify the tensions
There were significant tensions between the retailer and the contract
distribution company when the issue of switching to open book accounting was raised.
Once it was implemented, the contract operators liked it because it was transparent.
Show the range of choices
The alternative choice was to leave the case rate contracts in place and then
have a debate every time the service to retail needed to change.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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7.16 Composite Trailer: 1989
Composite three temperature compartment trailer: 1989
An account of the event
Summary
Transport industry innovation with external specialist Thermoking, led by
retail.
The background and context
Composite distribution enabled temperature controlled products, chilled,
fresh and frozen to be distributed through one system of multi-temperature warehouses
and vehicles.  In the preparation for the rollout of Composite distribution scheduled for
1989, there had to be planning and thought given to the specification of the delivery
vehicle used to take the different products to the retail stores.
The description of the event
The Tesco distribution development team with the responsibility for
transport joined with Thermoking to create a new type of trailer for the future use in
Composite distribution.  The objective was to design a special vehicle trailer with
temperature controlled compartments to deliver the combination of these products.  It
would provide daily deliveries of these products at the appropriate temperature so that
the products reached the customers at the stores in the peak of freshness.  The insulated
composite trailer can be sectioned into one, two or three chambers by means of movable
bulkheads.  There is independent control for up to three temperature regimes.  For
example, frozen products at -20 degrees Celsius can be carried with fresh meat at +1
degree and bread and bananas at +12 degrees without affecting product quality.  The
size of each chamber can be varied to match the volume to be transported at each
temperature.
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The result or outcome of the event
The three temperature compartment trailer was a resounding success.  It
improved transport utilisation by forty percent over the use of single temperature
trailers.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
In an interview with the European Head of Thermoking in 2002, the author
heard directly from the top engineering designer of Thermoking that the technical
development of the three temperature compartment trailer was a groundbreaking
innovation led by Tesco.  This is an amazing assessment.  As a senior manager involved
in Composite distribution implementation during 1989, the author knows first hand the
usefulness and continuing benefit of this trailer design
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is clearly an example of the retailer as a leader in the specialist
technical area of vehicle trailer design and thinking.  Normally a manufacturer, such as
Thermoking, would lead the way in technical innovation.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The scale of the Composite distribution operation is so large that there are
valuable transport efficiency gains from the flexibility of providing different
temperature regimes in the same trailer for a delivery to a specific store.
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Where were the decisions located?
The decision was located in Tesco retail distribution engineering
development team working in close collaboration with the manufacturer designer.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the technical way forward to achieve the desired
objective.
Identify the tensions
The tensions were about the development cost of creating a totally new type
of temperature controlled trailer.
Show the range of choices
One choice was to remain with the inefficiencies of single temperature
trailers.  These were the norm in the transport industry and so the cost was lower.  The
other choice was for the retailer to become the dominant designer in driving forward
quickly to a new level of solution.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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7.17 Plastic Tray: 1990
Second generation plastic tray: 1990 to 2005
An account of the event
Summary
Tesco initiated and implemented not only a national recycling structure but
also created a second generation plastic tray that was later adopted by the retail industry
in the UK and then in other European countries.  This was industry leadership from the
retailer that had a widespread impact on the supply channel.  It was achieved by pushing
the design boundaries beyond their previous limits.  The design and implementation
timescale was completed within two years, which is rapid
The background and context
In 1991 the Tesco Board made a strategic decision to implement a national
system of recycling centres that would provide a service to all the retail stores.  The
policy included reusable plastic trays and a facility for recovering all the waste
cardboard and plastic.  The company had identified the importance of the impending
EU waste packaging legislation and decided to create a business opportunity and act as
good citizens by protecting the environment.  An earlier version of the plastic tray had
already been introduced into the business about 1988, mainly for use with fresh fruit
and vegetables.  The plastic tray proved an effective solution for the store order
assembly process following the transition from the traditional stockholding depot
system to composite distribution, where no stock is held in the depot and consequently
there is a fast handling of product: what comes in goes out the same day.
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The description of the event
The management of Tesco decided to create a standard design for all the
recycling service units.  This standardisation applied both to the procedure of the
operations and also to the building size and design.  One of the considerations was to
minimise the cost of the land by building a unit on a minimum floor area.  One
influence on this was the floor space that would be needed for storing the empty trays.
Hence, the empty nesting ratio became a vital design issue. The first generation trays
had a reduction capacity ratio of 1:2, i.e. two empty trays take up the same loading
height as one full tray. In order to achieve an acceptable space economy for the
recycling building units, it was calculated that the empty nesting ratio needed to be 1:4,
i.e. four empty trays take up the same loading height as one full tray. When Tesco
addressed this empty nesting requirement to the supplier of trays, the first reaction was
that “this is impossible”. However Tesco representatives, supported by one of the board
directors, persistently argued the need to accomplish this task, pushing the tray
designers to go beyond the limits of the existing tray design features. Finally, a tray with
a nesting capacity of 1:4 was ready for delivery and was introduced into the business.
This second generation tray had other significant features other than an
empty nesting ration of 1:4.  It had fold-in / fold–out bale arms made as a result of new
technological developments in the strength of the plastic material.  The earlier versions
were weak and brittle and so broke easily.  The bale arms were folded inwards for
assembly and stacking when full so the product below was protected from the weight
above.  The bale arms were folded out for stacking when empty.  The bale arms had two
fold–in positions giving two different internal heights.  There was a family of trays of
differing heights on the same 400 by 600 mm base as well as half trays.  These
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variations in heights improved the space utilisation of the product in the trays according
to the actual height of the products.
Following the introduction of this second generation plastic tray there was
an expansion programme to increase rapidly the volume of product groups using the
plastic tray.  This expansion programme required the multi-party cooperation between
various Tesco functions and the suppliers of the products. The commercial buying
department selected the sequence of those product groups that should convert to using
the plastic tray in place of the corrugated packaging. The logistics department identified
solutions where handling and stacking operations would be improved by using the
plastic tray, and involved suppliers reduced their costs for packaging by using the
plastic tray.  The roll-out of the new plastic tray took place during 1992-1994.  The
commercial department had identified fresh fruit and vegetables as the first product
group to be introduced to the new plastic tray. The savings for the suppliers were easy
to calculate as they could shift from a high-cost good quality corrugated cardboard to
the plastic tray and benefit from its lower unit cost. The number of plastic tray
circulating per year formed the basis for the cost per tray, which the suppliers paid
instead of buying corrugated cardboard packaging. In the initial stage, that cost was
estimated at 27 pence per trip.
This cost was too high for many other product groups, so Tesco had to find
a way to reduce the unit cost of the tray. By introducing additional product groups, the
number of trays in circulation could be increased, and thus the cost per tray was
reduced. The next product group to be introduced was fresh meat and poultry. As the
production system for these products had been changed, it was now possible to pack the
finished products directly into plastic trays and then distribute to the retail stores via
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composite distribution.  Tesco’s management then set a further objective where the
growing number of products using plastic trays would reach an annual volume of 100
million tray trips by 1997. As the trip cost fell down to about 21 pence per trip, an even
greater number of products could be packed in the trays. The further product group to
be introduced was specialist bakery products, such as croissants and pastries.
The implementation was progressed through a multi-party approach
involving the suppliers and all separate functions within the retailer.  The company
decided that the best way to introduce the new strategy was to invite their suppliers to a
special demonstration day, held at one of their recycling service units. Small groups of
suppliers met Tesco representatives from the commercial, technical, supply chain, and
logistics departments as well as staff from the retail stores. At these meetings the
objective was to define and agree the optimum configuration of products in a tray and
also to discuss the implications of the packaging change. These meetings turned out to
be important events because it resulted in new ways of thinking about the use of plastic
trays, the implications for production and a greater awareness of the benefits both for
Tesco and the suppliers.  The suppliers gradually changed their perspective once they
saw the scale of the recycling operation and the new direction of the retail strategy.  The
suppliers elevated their decision making from the minutiae of production technicalities
to the level of choosing the Tesco supply channel.
The result or outcome of the event
The second generation plastic tray was a success.  Subsequently,
manufacturers concluded that they approved of the benefits of the plastic trays, but
pointed out that different retailers had their own different sizes and specifications. This
resulted in complexity in their production and distribution processes.  The
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manufacturers asked the retailers to act together and agree a common standard for the
plastic tray.  The result was that the industry adopted this second generation tray as the
standard.  At first sight, a technical design feature for a plastic tray seems far removed
from the issues of the supply channel.  However, the transition out of corrugated boxes
and into plastic trays had major repercussions on the production and packaging
organisation at the suppliers as well as a switch away from the original packaging
suppliers.  The whole product group had to switch to make the operation viable.  This
intensified the channel perspective
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author was directly involved in driving forward the roll-out of the
second generation tray during 1997 to achieve the target of 100 million trips per year.
This included the discussions with the commercial buyer directors and the multi-
functional supplier workshop days at the recycling units.  As a senior executive
responsible for composite distribution operation since 1989, the author was fully in
touch with the importance of the use of plastic trays in the supply channel.  The
information about the early development debate with the tray manufacturer was gained
through an interview with a colleague, who was responsible within Tesco for that
evolution in design features.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
In this instance, there was no doubt that the retailer acted as the channel
captain shaping the supply channel.  The new strategy was created, designed,
implemented and developed by the retailer.  The manner of the leadership was
291
collaborative and engaged the suppliers proactively to work through the implications for
their operations.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
The author witnessed, first hand, how the learning process that occurred at
the supplier meetings at the recycling units provided a good example of how
information, support and resources when properly controlled, can facilitate a change
process.  There came a point in time during the workshop, usually after a couple of
hours, that the suppliers elevated their decision making from the tactical, e.g. about the
production process, to the strategic level.  It had become clear to them that the retailer
was determined to embark on this new strategy.  Their choice was to join this new
direction willingly or get left behind.
Where were the decisions located?
The main decision was located at the level of the retail Board Director.  The
senior decision making was critical to the swift implementation of the project.  It
ensured all the functions in the company worked together to achieve the objective.  The
design function decision was made by the retailer, the design solution decisions were
made by the plastic tray manufacturer.  The rollout decisions were made at the
commercial buying department level in collaboration with retail, quality assurance,
stock control and logistics.
What were the decisions about?
The main decision was about the new strategy to implement a national
recycling structure.  Then there were the decisions about the design function and the
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design solutions.  Finally there was the series of decisions about which product groups
should be included in the roll-out programme.
Identify the tensions
There was a great deal of tension between the retail design function decision
makers and the plastic tray manufacturer who had to provide the design solution
decisions.  There was also considerable tension between the retailer and the product
suppliers who were asked to start using the plastic tray system.  There was also tension
between the product suppliers and the suppliers of corrugated packaging, who were
losing that part of the business.
Show the range of choices
As regards the main decision, clearly the retailer could have adopted the do
nothing approach, but instead chose the leadership route of being the market leader.
The design function and solution choices are dramatic.  Tesco took the opportunity of
being the “dominant designer” (Koehurst et al 1999), thus being able to be the driver of
both the outcome and the speed of implementation.  The retailer chose to make the
manufacturer discover new technological solutions.  There were choices about the level
of use of plastic trays, from minimal to maximum.  The retailer chose to maximize the
volume where it made commercial sense.  Finally, there was a choice to participate in
an industry standard or go on in isolation.  It is to the credit of both the retailers and
suppliers that one design was agreed.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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7.18 Bonded Supply: 1988
Bonded Distribution and Customs & Excise: 1988
An account of the event
Summary
The bonded warehouse operation successfully integrated with the Customs
documentation control systems to permit store order assembly direct from Bond.
The background and context
In 1985 – 86 Tesco set up two bonded distribution centre operations to
replace the previous bonded warehouse service.  They were both operated by bonded
qualified logistics service providers.  Prior to this development, stock had to be taken
out daily from the bonded reserve stocks and placed in a duty paid store assembly area
before sending to a distribution centre.
The description of the event
Tesco developed an integrated computerised link between the distribution
store order assembly systems and the duty control customs systems that were a
requirement for bonded warehousing.  After a considerable period of proving that the
system operated correctly, Customs and Excise authorised that store orders could be
assembled direct from bonded stock.  This was a first.
The result or outcome of the event
This was a revolution in procedures.  Duty would be paid in the normal
timescale, of six weeks, but it improved the distribution operation in terms of use of
space and reduced work because the reserved product did not have to be moved out of
Bond in order to allow store assembly.
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Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
The author took responsibility for the Bonded Wine & Spirits operations in
1986 until 1989. Although, he was directly involved in the Bonded distribution centre
operation, it was one of his team who was involved in the technical detail of the project.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer was clearly the leader and initiator in this project and had the
trust and confidence of the Customs and Excise.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
There was, naturally, a great deal of scepticism by Customs and Excise, who
were most uncomfortable that the reconciliation was going on inside the retailer’s
computer system.  However, trust was eventually established and the validity of the
detail of the duty charges was confirmed.
Where were the decisions located?
The development decision lay with the retailer.  The authorisation decision
lay with Customs and Excise.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about the detail validation of the duty charges.
Identify the tensions
There were tensions between the different parties involved but these were
resolved by sharing information in an open way.
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Show the range of choices
The alternative was to leave the Customs arrangements as they were.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
Case Studies Category E: International
This final category reflects the author’s international fieldwork and
experience (Table 7.8).
Ref Category E: INTERNATIONAL
7.19 L4 Thailand suppliers of fresh product: 2002
One example of the transfer of supply and logistics skills from UK retail to Eastern Europe and Asia,
shaping local temperature controlled supply chains to higher standards
7.20 L1 South Africa fresh product and air freight: 2003
An example of retails’ global reach and sourcing using air freight with good chill chain disciplines to
create value for the consumer
Table 7.8  Case Studies Category E: International
This section takes cases from two continents, Asia and Africa.  Tesco has
stores in Thailand.  The supply chain strategy is to transfer skills from the UK to local
management.  This case is an instance of a Thai quality assurance manager on a study
visit to Tesco UK.  The second case is a result of the author’s visit to South Africa in
2003.  It provides an opportunity to examine an example of global sourcing in the Tesco
retail supply chain.  It is fresh fruit salad, ready to eat, prepared in South Africa and
flown overnight for UK consumers
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7.19 Thailand:2002
Thailand suppliers of fresh product: 2002
An account of the event
Summary
An example from Thailand of the transfer of supply and logistics skills from
a UK retailer, transforming the local temperature controlled supply chains to achieving
higher standards.  This is a pattern that has been implemented across Eastern Europe
and Asia, when the retailer has taken over and expanded local retail chains.
The background and context
Tesco moved into Thailand in 1997 by buying 13 hypermarkets from Lotus.
There was then a period of rapid expansion so that, by 2002 there were 35
hypermarkets, consisting of 3.8 million square feet, with an additional 15 new stores
planned for 2005, which is an annual growth rate of 36%.  The country has an average
ambient temperature of 25 to 30 degrees.  This makes an interesting case study in
temperature controlled supply chain, contrasting with conditions in the UK.
The description of the event
A Quality Assurance Manager for Tesco Thailand Distribution visited Tesco
UK in July 2002 to study standards and techniques.  The result was two similarities and
three major differences.  The similarities arise because Tesco Thailand implemented
Best Practice from UK secondary distribution.  The first point of Best Practice was the
building of one composite distribution centre with multi-temperature regimes.  The
second point of Best Practice was the use of temperature controlled vehicles from this
retail distribution centre to make the delivery of products to the retail stores.
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There were several differences:  the first major difference is that Thailand
has a high ambient temperature of 25 to 30 degrees, compared with ambient
temperatures in the UK of 10 to 20 degrees.  The second major difference is in scale of
the supply channel operation.  There is only one composite distribution centre in
Thailand, whereas there are many in UK.  The other aspect of scale is that the average
size of suppliers in Thailand is small, whereas in the UK there are some large supplier
operations.  The third and most significant difference is the requirement to educate
suppliers in the disciplines of Quality Assurance Best Practice as developed in UK.
This Quality Assurance Manager had a special role.
The role was to put in place a development programme for the suppliers.
This programme covers HACCP analysis along the length of the temperature controlled
supply chain from producer to retail distribution centre, imposing the disciplines to
achieve temperature integrity in the primary transport.  The distances involved are much
shorter than those in the UK.  If these suppliers can achieve a fresh product supply
chain, which is fully temperature controlled, then the consumers will gain the benefits
that have been proven in the UK.
The result or outcome of the event
A successful transfer from the UK of fresh product supply channel skill sets
and management disciplines to Thailand for the benefit of consumers.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
With permission from Tesco, the author met the Thailand Tesco Quality
Assurance Manager, in 2002, at one of the fresh product consolidation centres in East
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Anglia.  It was a powerful experience conducting the interview with someone who fully
understood and knew the Thailand fresh product supplier way of doing things.  The
manager had a good grasp of the challenge that lay ahead; meeting with the suppliers,
explaining how things were done in UK.  This interview provided excellent supply
channel information about the local context, even though the author had not visited
Thailand.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
This is another excellent example of the retailer as channel captain,
transferring skills from the UK to a developing economy.  The approach taken was to
nurture local involvement and skills in the expectation that new management disciplines
would be successfully instilled in the local culture.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
It is one thing to make the statement: the UK retailer transfers skills to its
new operations in Thailand.  It is another experience to meet the person who has come
to the UK to visit and learn how these skills are practiced.  It shows excellent cultural
sensitivity to harness the enthusiasm of a local manager to convey to those local
suppliers how they need to change their management practices and change the
operational culture of their staff, every hour of every day, to implement an integrated
temperature controlled supply chain from the point of harvest to the retail distribution
centre.
Where were the decisions located?
The decision is firmly with the retailer in Thailand, building on the Tesco
track record of implementing Best Practice developed in the UK.  The critical question
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that faced the Manager on the return to Thailand is the decision making process of the
local suppliers.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions were about how best to bring about the change in strategy of
the fresh product supply channel from the producers to the retail composite distribution
centre from the local traditional attitudes to the new Best Practice methods transferred
from the UK.
Identify the tensions
The tensions would be about local culture and habits.  In a hot tropical
country, fresh fruit and vegetables are available ready to be eaten straight from the
ground or the tree.  It is not natural at all to think about a chill chain, let alone doing it
with such a degree of meticulous discipline.
Show the range of choices
The choice was whether to use a local person or a non-local person in
implementing this change in management culture and discipline.  The objective is to
engage the local suppliers to adopt a channel perspective on their decision making, so
they can benefit as suppliers from the anticipated growth in demand for fresh products.
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
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7.20 South Africa: 2003
South Africa, fresh products and air freight: 2003
An account of the event
Summary
The case describes the daily import of fresh fruit salad from South Africa.  It
is prepared today and is available, ready to eat for Tesco customers tomorrow.  The
transportation is by airfreight, with strict chill chain disciplines and effective thermal
insulation.  It is one example of the global reach and sourcing by modern retailers.
The background and context
A visit to the various types of fresh food departments in a modern
supermarket will quickly reveal, by examining the country of origin, the wide range of
products involved in daily overnight airfreight between continents. Daily global
sourcing has become routine: mange tout from Zimbabwe, sugar snap peas from Kenya,
blueberries from America, vegetables from Thailand etc.  What is not so visible to the
consumer is the intense activity that takes place in logistics, thermal insulation
packaging, maximizing space utilisation and the strict temperature control regimes
required for airfreight.
The production takes place at a location close to the airport of departure in
Johannesburg, South Africa. The journey continues to the airport of destination,
Heathrow and then onwards to the retail shelf for the consumer to purchase.  The
operators who use airfreight understand the demands of the fast pace of the fresh food
global supply channel.  They also know how to achieve best practice.  The first factor is
the maintenance of strict temperature control from producer to consumer.  The second
factor is the application of the correct packaging solutions for the airfreight of fresh
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products. The temperature extremes can range from +40 to –60 degrees.  These are the
two critical success factors to retain the freshness of the product during its
intercontinental airfreight journey. These logistics operations are located in the middle
of the supply channel. There is a wide variety of fresh products that pass through their
air cargo operations.  The range includes fresh fish from Namibia bound for Spain via
Heathrow; fresh impala meat steaks from Zimbabwe; fresh vegetables, cut flowers; all
from South Africa or neighbouring countries.  This is a good location to view the
contrasting results of good and bad practice; to see the consequences of low quality
packaging insulation and poor temperature control in the packaging of fresh product.
The description of the event
In the high care section of the fresh fruit production unit, the component
fruits, pineapple, mango, melon, guava, papaya, are prepared by removing the non
edible parts such as the outer skin. The fresh fruit is diced into small pieces so that it is
easy to serve and consume. The different varieties of prepared fruit are then mixed
together in punnet sized consumer packs, sealed and labelled. Throughout this process
there is strict quality control to ensure the flavour, sizing and trimming meets the
retailer’s standards.  Once outside the high care preparation area, the exact quantity pf
consumer packs are arranged in cardboard transport boxes, labelled and sealed. The
retail ordered quantities are arranged onto pallets and labelled for their different retail
depot destinations in UK, so that the correct quantity goes to each depot daily.  The
fresh fruit salad is sent that same evening from Johannesburg airport by air cargo to
Heathrow, London, where it arrives in at about 5am.  The retailers promptly collect the
delivery so that it can be on their shelves for consumers to purchase their fresh fruit
salad and eat it as a snack on the way home or with the evening meal.
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The result or outcome of the event
The consumer can choose fresh fruit salad ready to eat direct from Africa.
Without global sourcing these products would normally be absent from the UK
supermarket shelves for long periods during the year.  The work brings employment
opportunity to Africa.
Review of event from a channel perspective
Author experience of the event
During 2003, the author conducted several field visits in UK, South Africa
as well as Mexico and Jordan, on this topic of air cargo and the proper use of thermal
insulation and chill chain disciplines.  Through these encounters, the author gained the
benefit of the advice and wisdom of these operators located in the middle of the value
chain of the airfreight supply channel.
Critique of event on scale of leader – follower
The retailer controls the whole supply chain in collaboration with the
supplier: the specification of the product; the daily quantities to meet consumer demand;
efficient space utilisation and thermal insulation packaging.  This demonstrates the
global span of control exercised by such retailers in the quality of preparation,
presentation and air cargo delivery of fragile products.
Revealing hidden evidence more explicitly
Standing in the receipt and despatch area of an airfreight operator in the
cargo section of Johannesburg airport revealed some interesting information.  The effect
of inadequate and bad decisions about thermal insulation packaging was costing the
suppliers losses through deterioration of their product before it arrived at the retailer in
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UK.  For example, a £100 pack of impala steak would be ruined for the sake of 30
pence extra spent on proper standards of thermal insulation packaging.  The second
piece of hidden evidence is the rapid rate of growth in the volumes and value of
temperature controlled airfreight business, with growth rates of thirty percent per year.
The strong growth product groups are: fresh meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, and flowers.
Where were the decisions located?
The decisions at the production and departure segments are located with the
suppliers and producers.  It is the retailers who decide the pace of the airfreight fresh
product supply channel, in response to the demand from their consumers in Europe who
wish to buy ready to eat fresh products.
What were the decisions about?
The decisions are about the global sourcing of fresh produce, the quality
specification for the preparation of the product, the frequency of delivery, the cost of
thermal insulation materials and designing the cartons for improved space utilisation.
Identify the tensions
The tensions are a direct result of the high risk and degree of deterioration in
product quality on arrival at the UK retail distribution centres.  The cost is not only to
the supplier but also to the retailer in loss of product availability to their consumers,
which undermines the consumer confidence that the retailer is building in its Brand.
Show the range of choices
There are several choices.  The main choice is whether to use airfreight or
sea freight.  That decision is influenced by the life of the product and whether it is early
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or late in the season.  Fruit, for examples, will be flown in when it first becomes
available, in order to get to the market earlier, to bridge the gap while the sea freight
journey is being completed for the main season.  For airfreight both weight and cube
impact on the cost of transportation.  The quality, cost and use of thermal insulation
packaging are critical to prevent deterioration to the product from the extremes of
temperature, which can be +40 degrees on the tropical airport or –60 degrees during the
flight.  [Note: The author and colleagues provide a fuller account of the packaging
issues and solutions (Gustafsson et al 2006)].
Characteristic Keywords (Relevant keywords underlined)
Democracy; Associative; Collaboration; Interdependence; Non-Adversarial;
Goodwill Trust; Win-Win; Dominant Designer; Specification Buying; Integrative
7.21 Summary
The author has chosen this multiple case study approach in order to
illuminate parts of the retail supply channel that would not normally be visible to retail
commentators.  As mentioned earlier, some of these case studies are based on the
personal experience of the author in which the author felt directly the power of the
change management dynamics taking place.  For some of the other case studies the
author was in close contact with other persons in the organisation and supply channels
who had stories of their own that are worth recounting and so were included here.
This Table 7.9, identifies the relevance of characteristic keywords in each
case, where they were underlined.  The ten key words were: Democracy, Associative,
Collaboration, Interdependence, Non-Adversarial, Goodwill Trust, Win-Win, Dominant
Designer, Specification Buying, and Integrative.  Some of these keywords have a
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meaning in ordinary language.  However, the use of the selected keywords comes from
specific academic backgrounds, which defined their meaning here and will help the
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Table 7.9 Key Characteristics: Analysis of the Cases
This is intended to assist the process of extending academic knowledge by
building on the insights provided by this series of case studies.  They are documentary
accounts of real events that actually took place.  They are neither models nor
hypothetical scenarios.  They are insights into reactions from the middle of the value
chain and the dynamics involved.  They are presented here for others to build on.  One
academic link is through the selected characteristics represented in the keywords.
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It is intended that each case study is judged on its own merits.  They will be
subjected to whatever method of critique others choose to apply.  It is intended that the
contribution of these inside stories from the case studies add a depth and richness to
events that were visible to outside observers.  These insider experiences should show
that supply channel relationships can and do follow the norms of good business
relationships.  What conclusions, then, can be extracted from this series of case studies;
what might be the outcomes from this research?  It is this to which we now turn in






8 Analysis of Case Studies
8.1 Introduction
The thesis, so far, has considered aspects of leadership and change in
retailing, retail logistics, the supply channels, managing supply chain change, and
provided a series of small case studies based on real events.  This has created a basis to
assess those case studies against that range of theories on leadership and change.  In
order to do this the analysis and assessment can be presented at five levels.  First, is the
Literature Link between the earlier theories and the categories used in the analysis.
Second, a Generic Case Analysis, from theories that apply to all the cases are best
presented as a generic application.  Third, investigates Competing Explanations for
leadership.  Fourth, the Specific Case Analysis drawing out the learning from the real
event cases.  Fifth, the Channel Captain Ideal  role and style as a best practice or model.
The chapter concludes with a summary and link to the final chapter nine.
8.2 Literature Link
The cases were assessed alongside benchmark keywords, Table 7.9, from
the literature on managing supply chain change in chapter six.  The table shows a high
correlation between the academic literature concepts of ideal supply chain leadership
behaviour and the style of leadership demonstrated through the real event case studies.
This provides a sound base for constructing a scale of Leader – not a Leader Roles,
Table 8.1, linked to this academic literature.  Using that measure it is possible to
identify the profile of leadership demonstrated in these case studies.
In order to start the review it is good to ask the question: is there a leader?
Earlier, various options were discussed for the presence or absence of one or several
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supply channel organisers.  If there were several organisers, were they suppliers and
retailers and were they acting in harmony or as rivals?  That led to the classifications:
Joint Leader and Rival Leader.  For each case study presented in chapter seven, the
author has made an assessment on the scale of leader – not a leader and provided a
classification of the various roles along this scale, which come out of the thinking
developed in chapter six on managing change.  The language selected is chosen
deliberately to facilitate use in the practitioner business environment.
Code Title Description
BD Benevolent Dictator Dominant company dictates policy to channel partners,
but in a pleasant style. Stock (2003)
Autocracy (Mallen 1963) Acts without conferring
CL Collaborative Leader
(with channel partners)
Leader is collaborative with channel partners using joint
solutions to achieve joint business goals.
Democracy (Mallen 1963)
Associative (Dawson 1990)
Collaborative Partnerships (ECR 1996)
Collaboration (Spekeman 1998)
Interdependence (Porter 1980)
Non adversarial (Lonsdale 2002)
Win- win (Glaser and Glaser 1991)
Integrative (Kanter 1984)
Goodwill Trust (Hines 2004)
Strategic Alignment (Gattorna 1998)
Channels Compete (McCarthy 1981)
Situational Leadership (Hersey 1977)
Function to Process (Christopher 2003)
DD Dominant Designer Company dominates design strategy
Koehorst (1999)
Specification Buying Kelley (1953)
JL Joint Leader (with other channel
organiser)
Leader works collaboratively with other channel organiser
to achieve joint goals
Associative (Dawson 1990)
Collaborative Partnerships (ECR 1996)
Collaboration (Spekeman 1998)
Integrative (Kanter 1984)
RL Rival Leader (with other channel
organiser)
Leader acts as rival with competitive other organiser to
achieve channel goals
Anarchy (Mallen 1963)
CP Collaborative Partner Company willingly collaborately with leader or deliberately
using follower strategy
Associative (Dawson 1990)
Collaborative Partnerships (ECR 1996)
Spekeman (1998)
Integrative (Kanter 1984)
RP Reluctant Partner Company complying with leader policy reluctantly, against
their better judgement
Subdued conflict (Mallen 1963)
B Blocker Company not cooperating with channel partners or leader
Anarchy (Mallen 1963)
Table 8.1  Scale of ‘Leader – Not a Leader’ Roles
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In the summary, Table 8.1, each of the behaviour types is referenced to
academic related categories from earlier in the thesis and summarised in Table 7.9.
This supports the work with a continuity of thinking, some going back fifty years to the
roots of the concept of channel captain in American early marketing literature.  The
actual titles selected by the author are an extension of the earlier literature.  They strive
to bridge the language gap between academic terminology and practitioner business use.
The list begins with the Benevolent Dictator style of leadership in which the
dominant company dictates policy to channel partners, but in a pleasant style.  There
could be various forms of expressing this: “just do it, please”; “do not give us the
problems why you cannot do it, it is your job to find the solutions”; “that is what we
want done, take it or leave it”.  It can be, hands off, provocative, even brutal, but
effective.  The next category is Collaborative Leader; here collaborative is related to the
other channel partners.  There is a recognition of dependency on each other’s skill sets
and operational performance.  There is also an assumption that the partners are acting in
good faith and have encountered genuine obstacles if they have a performance problem.
A critical difference is that the leader company is open to their own role in unlocking
solutions, by changing their own policy or procedure.  The third category is the
Dominant Designer, which is the company that is driving the design strategy and has
achieved a solution that works well and can be applied more widely.  Next is the role of
Joint Leader with another channel organiser.  The two are acting in harmony, without
being competitive in an adverse manner.  The other channel parties see the channel
policy that is agreed as coherent.  The opposing role is that of the Rival Leader with
another channel organiser, where the two companies see themselves as having
conflicting objectives that are being opposed by the other leader in the same channel.
The policy and procedures are being pulled in different directions, usually to the
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disadvantage of the whole channel and its partners.  These first five categories are
variations on the predisposition of the channel leadership to behave in a certain manner.
The next group relates to those companies in a partnership role.  First is the
Collaborative Partner, a company, which has faith in the channel leader and is
compliant and positive about following instructions and policy.  The other way of being
a Collaborate Partner is that of a company, which deliberately applies a business
strategy of waiting to see what others are doing before deciding what to do.  One benefit
is that the company lets others spend the money and resources on development and then
copies solutions that are proven to be successful.  The next category is the Reluctant
Partner that is complying with the leader’s policy reluctantly, possibly against their
better judgement.  They may have put forward an alternative to the policy and failed to
persuade the others to see it their way.  Finally, at the end of the scale ‘leader – not a
leader’ is the Blocker, the company that does not want to cooperate with the channel
partners or leader on a policy.
Code Case study ref. 7.X Description
BD Benevolent Dictator
CL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 19 Collaborative Leader (with channel partners)
DD 16 17 18 Dominant Designer
JL 12 20 Joint Leader (with other channel organiser)




Table 8.2  Scale of ‘Leader – Not a Leader’ Roles: Case Studies
Those case studies relating to Tesco as the major UK retailer from chapter
seven have been evaluated along the scale ‘leader – not a leader’.  The results, Table
8.2, not surprisingly, reflect the author’s selection of cases. It is worth explaining why.
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There was a huge range of events from which to choose.  Colleagues in different
functions or different companies were involved in many excellent instances of supply
channel leadership.  But these events would be available to any researcher who was able
to gain access to these colleagues and conduct an appropriate interview.  However, the
author has adopted a policy to select those events, which were examples of retail
leadership in the supply channel that he himself experienced directly or knew about
closely.  With these events, the author can write about the events, and convey how it felt
to be involved at the time, in order to share the internal experience as well as the
external evidence.
The cases were selected to demonstrate retail leadership in the supply
channel.  Some cases are taken from the retail logistics segment of the supply channel,
which is from the distribution centres to the retail store delivery.  Other cases are taken
from the supplier segment of the supply channel, which is from the producer or supplier
into the retail distribution centres.  There is also a direct supplier to retail store supply
channel for specific products both ambient and temperature controlled.  As the author
was not directly involved in this direct supplier to retail store channel, none have been
included here.  The results as shown are: none appear as Benevolent Dictator.  There is
a cluster, fifteen, in Collaborative Leadership; the technical cases are three examples of
Dominant Designer; there are two for Joint Leadership; there are none for Rival Leader,
Collaborative Partner, Reluctant Partner or Blocker.  However, this classification on its
own does not explain the next obvious question that arises, which is: how might the
various leaders behave in different situations with the different types of partners in the
supply channel?  This is the subject of the next section 8.3.
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8.3 Generic Case Analysis
There are some theories described in chapter five on managing change that
will help with thinking about different relationship styles and how they impact on the
received experience of leadership behaviour.  These five theories are: strategic
alignment; whole channels compete; the situational leadership model; the negotiation
styles matrix; and the model of the integrative and the segmentalist companies and
supply chains.
How can these different theories help here?  The first theory of strategic
alignment, Figure 5.2, applies as a basic premise for all the cases.  The strategic benefit
of supply chain change is only realised when the business strategy and the supply chain
strategy are in alignment.  The second theory that whole channels compete, Figure 5.3,
has a long marketing history.  It demonstrates the value of a cohesive channel linked to
the consumer.  The third theory, Situational Leadership, Figure 5.19, provides a way of
thinking about interrelationships between managers and staff, which can be applied
more broadly to the relationships between companies in supply channels; the fourth
theory, the negotiation matrix, Figure 5.20, explores the different positions and attitudes
that can occur between parties during negotiations; and finally, the theory of integrative
and segmentalist models, Figure 5.24, touches on culture and style within companies as
well as supply chains.  Each of these in isolation can help us to understand different
approaches to the variations that can occur in relationships. When these theories are
used together, they can complement each other and provide a richer set of tools to
analyse the different relationships.
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8.3.1 Situational Leadership
The situational leadership model, Figure 5.19, is normally used to help
management develop a range of styles in order to deal with different staff in an manner
that is appropriate for the staff’s attitude and skill level.  These can vary according to
the particular task that the member of staff is being required to do.  However, rather
than thinking only about individual people, this model can be extended to the
companies that are working together in a supply channel.
There can be a variety of styles in the relationship. The style chosen could
depend on the task that needs to be done as well as the attitude of the company and the
skills the company possesses.  This is taking the variants of the model, which was used
for individuals, and applying them to companies.  The question that arises concerns the
suitability or appropriateness of the choice of style expressed in the business
relationship.  Sometimes the choice is good and effective, sometimes the choice is not
suitable and the result is unsatisfactory.  How then, would it feel to the company on the
receiving end?  That would depend on matching the right style to the situation.  If the
appropriate style is chosen, then it should be expected that the company on the receiving
end would experience this in a positive manner.  If an unsuitable style is selected, it is
probable that the company on the receiving end will have a negative experience and
react accordingly.  The situational leadership model implies that one style alone does
not suit all parties or circumstances.  This is one factor to examine in the relationships
between companies in the supply channel.
It is worth re-examining some of the case studies with this perspective in
mind, using the guidance from Table 5.1 on situational leadership styles.  At the risk of
repeating some of the detail, a good case to revisit is the frozen food channel, case 7.9.
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It began in more of a Benevolent Dictator style.  In the situational leadership model, that
would be described as a Structuring Style, (Style S1); in which one party is telling the
other party exactly what to do and how to do it.  Given, further, that the previous
companies were not performing adequately, they were moving backwards on the
movement curve on the model; disaster was about to happen unless drastic action was
taken quickly. That style of approach was a result of the dire situation of the earlier
frozen food distribution network.  So, in this instance, it is not unreasonable for a
Collaborative Leader to act in a Structuring Style with a non-performing partner.  That
partner might experience that relationship as a Benevolent Dictator style; and may be
not so benevolent if the company was about to lose the business.  The case study
described an earlier way of working, which was in the business of ‘intervention’ with its
mountains of butter and beef, in frozen storage business.  Those earlier operators were
definitely in the Reluctant Partner or even Blocker mould.  There was little choice but to
isolate them and move on with a new set of management and staff or new set of
companies.  Once that difficult process was completed the style was decidedly
Collaborative Leadership.  In what way was it different?  What was different was the
style of relationship that was chosen.
The management of the logistics service providers, case 7.14, who had been
successful in obtaining the new business, had to go through a steep learning curve.
Even though they were Collaborative Partners, they could not just be left to their own
devices to find their way forward and achieve what was expected of them.  A Delegated
Style, (Style S 4) was not appropriate.  Interestingly enough, there were people on both
sides who thought it should be.  But those with accountability within the retailer were
not so willing to let go so easily.  That situation itself is worth a reflection because it
shows how companies self perception of their skills and expertise conditions how they
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expect to be treated.  Where the management of a company holds the view that the
company has all the skills, in both management and staff, to perform the task, they
expect to be in a Delegated Style relationship between the two companies.  This is fine
if both sides know that to be the case.  However, the other company, already
experienced in this type of operation, may make the judgement that the newly appointed
company needs a period of time to learn the skills and develop an efficient
implementation of the process and during that time a variety of support and a closer
level of monitoring performance.  This might be an Encouraging Style (Style S3) or
even a Coaching Style (Style S2).  The gap between how one company wants to be
treated and how the other company views it needs to be treated will lead to a
Collaborative Leader being experienced as a Benevolent Dictator, probably expressed
as over interfering and over controlling.
The point has probably been made and so there is no need to elaborate
further.  In fact it could make an excellent workshop to set up groups, some of whom
choose appropriate styles and others who are misled through their instructions and adopt
totally unsuitable styles.  The verdicts of those receiving the different styles would be
very different.  The classification of the role in the supply channel and the respective
style can therefore be expressed in very different ways, depending on the received
experience as much on the intentions of the party driving the business relationship.
8.3.2 Negotiating Style
The next model, Figure 5.20, concerns the selection of the appropriate
Negotiating Style for the relationship between the two companies.  The first influence is
the type of negotiation relationship from open market through to collaboration, Figure
5.13. It could be assumed that a Collaborative Leader would have a company culture
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and a negotiating team, which would choose, as it preferred style, the Collaborate Style
(Style N2) in its dealing with the other partners in the supply channel.  The same types
of mismatches could occur with negotiating as with the choice of style in the Situational
Leadership Model.  A company or its representative may choose a Defeat the
Opposition style (Style N1) Figure 5.20, in which the lead company takes everything
they can get without any concession to the impact on the other company; in others
words an exploitation of their scale and power position, without considering the
continued viability of the other company.
The choice of an inappropriate negotiating style could be the preferred style
of the lead company in which case, that would then define its classification; for
example, whether it is in the style of a Benevolent Dictator or Collaborative Leader.  To
take another example from the case study on the potato supply channel, case 7.1, where
the buyer was an experienced mature manager with a long relationship with the six
major suppliers, mentioned in the case study.  These suppliers agreed to make changes
in staffing shifts in order to continue assembling the product after the confirmed order
had been received and so deliver the product into composite distribution in the agreed
earlier time window of 08:00 to 17:00.  There was a negotiation aspect to this
agreement.  The buyer had a choice of negotiating styles to pursue; collaborative, also
known as win – win; or defeat the opposition at all costs; for example: we do what we
want and they absorb the extra cost.  The buyer chose a collaborative negotiating style,
Figure 5.20 with the skill sets of Figure 5.21.  It was clear that the six potato suppliers
felt that the end result was collaborative.  The point about choice of negotiating style
probably does not require any further elaboration here.
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8.3.3 Integrative and Segmentalist
The third model is about integrative and segmentalist companies and supply
channels, Figure 5.24.  From this framework the case studies can be examined in terms
of the classification of the companies and supply channels involved.  The strawberry
supply channel, case 7.5, preparing for the Wimbledon tennis championship is an
illuminating case to examine in this context.  Clearly the conditions that gave rise to the
concern in the first place suggest that the supply channel was segmentalist, with each
company doing its own part to the limit of its circumstances.  As was illustrated in the
sharing of the issues by the different parties at the start of the meeting, each company
was experiencing a barrier or obstacle not of their own making.  But no company in
isolation was able to resolve the difficulty or remove the barrier or obstacle; that had to
be done by another party in the supply channel.  Some of the individual companies were
in a segmentalist or silo management culture; others were in an integrative or multi
team sharing culture.  Whatever their own culture, there was a great deal of frustration
being experienced in each and every company.  It was self evident to each of the parties
that disaster as normal was the likely forecast for the impending peak season during
Wimbledon tennis championships.  A state of anticipated depression hung gloomily
over each department in each company: there will be the usual catalogue of difficulties;
late collections, product shortages, last minute order adjustments:  “no surprise it will
not go well”.
In this type of contrary situation, it requires a good quality Collaborative
Leadership style to approach this impending crisis in the open and trusting style that
was exhibited in the case study.  All the parties were Collaborative Partners.  The
successful resolution of so many issues, difficulties, obstacles and barriers, transformed
the supply channel from segmentalist to integrative.  There was a huge shift in
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effectiveness that was demonstrated by the resounding success of continuous supply of
Strawberries and new levels of sales not seen before.  The perceptions and experiences
of the teams involved, and the nature of the feedback that was shared, also influence
this.  The talk would have been about the great sales figures, or that “at last they got
their act together”; rather than commenting on the achievement of creating an
integrative supply channel in place of the earlier segmentalist supply channel.
In this section, three different models have been applied to ways of
assessing the nature of the supply channel relationships.  Some of the case studies have
been used to illustrate the various points.  The overall direction of the debate is that
classification is a function of the person or company making that judgement.  Their
judgement being strongly influenced by their experience at their end of the relationship
rather than what might have been intended by the other party, who may or may not have
chosen the right or the wrong approach for the relationship and business goals at the
time.  This leads onto a further question, which is about the competing explanations for
supply channel organisation and dynamics.
8.4 Competing Explanations
There are competing theories for explaining or advocating different models
of behaviour in supply channels.  They can be polarised into Always Adversarial
(Mallen, Anarchy) and the opposite view of Collaborative Colleagues (Spekeman,
Collaboration).  Both relate to the use of power in business relationships but neither
deals with those relationships from the particular perspective of the presence of a
channel captain.  The presence of a channel captain requires that the role takes on
leadership of the team.  Although the members of the team have various skills they are
not all equal when it comes to leadership.  Both the Always Adversarial wing and the
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Collaborative Colleagues wing of the debate would probably challenge the
classification Channel Captain, but for different reasons.  An Always Adversarial view
would be that Benevolent Dictator is about as good as it gets between a large powerful
company and any of its suppliers, large or small and that the term Collaborative
Leadership is a euphemism for manipulation.
Equally the term Channel Captain or Collaborative Leader would generally
be considered an inappropriate term to use in the Supply Chain Management or Supplier
Collaboration context, where the emphasis is on collaboration between partners, each of
whom has a valuable contribution to make.  The differences in scale and power between
the partners in a supply channel is so obvious that using terms such as channel captain is
not conducive to creating an atmosphere of respect and collaboration in a relationship.
Probably, both views would find difficulty in accepting the term Channel Captain as a
classification that should be included in their model or theoretical structure, because it is
naïve, simplistic or outdated thinking.  The view could also be that it does not add
anything to today’s academic thinking to pick out a turn of phrase, channel captain, that
was in use for only a short period in American marketing channel literature and applied
primarily to national manufacturers dealing with regional wholesalers and retailers.
They might ask the question: why apply it to the large modern retailer in a very
different business and economic setting?  That is a question to which we will return.
The adversarial – non-adversarial polarity is projected in the model on
supply channel relationship in Figure 5.17 (Lonsdale et al, 2002).  Here the four
quadrants identify the different types of relationship between companies based on two
dimensions: the share of the value created on the Y axis and the nature of the interaction
on the X axis.  If the share of the value created is unequal the relationship is adversarial;
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but if the share of the value created is equal then the relationship is non-adversarial.  If
the nature of the interaction is limited then the relationship is arms-length, but if the
nature of the interaction is extensive then the relationship is collaborative
The next question that arises is how to move from one quadrant to another,
to move from being in an arms-length relationship to a relationship based on more
lasting qualities such as good will trust in Supply Chain Management in Figure 5.18
(Hines, 2004) an explanatory model of integrated supply chain management.  As
described earlier this model seeks to plot a route through from the frequent start point to
the reach the desired relationship by moving from contractual trust through competence
trust to the goal, which is goodwill trust.  One of the key behaviours that is required of
the dominant player is to show some self discipline, to exercise restraint, or withhold
power, by not taking unscrupulous or opportunistic advantage of the weakness, smaller
scale, or powerlessness, of the other party, case 7.3: St Peter’s Fish.  This expresses well
one of the qualities required in any dominant party in a negotiation or relationship.  It
could be applied to the role of Channel Captain.
This brings the debate to a different level, which is set out in the power and
competition analysis model, Figure 5.16, (Porter 1980).  It is about the broader
influences on whether it is the buyer or supplier that has dominance rather than a
relationship of independence.  The conclusion of the model is that it is only when the
buyer and supplier are equal that there is inter-dependence.  That may not move the
debate forward directly in terms of explaining the role of the channel captain but it
provides some criteria that drives the level and ownership of dominance in the buyer –
supplier relationship.  In the factors influencing supplier power resources there is a
section on ‘competition in existing supply market’.  It asks these two questions: is there
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a clear market leader and if so, how long is their lead likely to last? And if there is no
clear market leader, does the supply market collude or compete?  Although the model is
about single companies competing it is easy to apply it to supply channels competing.
So the term market leader is not far removed from using the term channel captain.  The
power of the channel has an impact on the strength of the market leader: the stronger the
channel, the greater the strength of the market leader.  As the market leader grows their
business so the other members in the channel benefit.
8.5 Specific Case Analysis
The behaviour of different companies in their relationships with each other
in the supply channel is a complex topic.  This is summarised in Tables 8.1 and 8.2,
which classify the different styles of leadership behaviour. The main group of fifteen
cases is in the category of Collaborative Leader.  This is the dominant style of the Tesco
retail team in achieving the various supply channel goals.  The cases in this category are
further grouped into three subsets, which examine the strategic, tactical and operational
levels of supply chain change.  These subsets are titled: channel restructure (8.5.3),
channel capability (8.5.4) and channel enhancement (8.5.5).
There are two smaller groups in the categories of Joint Leader and
Dominant Designer.  The analysis begins with these two categories. They are close in
terms of style of behaviour because they represent circumstances when the retailer is
dependent on another party for development ideas and implementation to drive the
business forward.  In order to reflect this closeness in behaviour style, these have been
entitled in their sections here: Joint Leader: Channel Development (8.5.1) and Dominant
Designer: Technical Development (8.5.2).
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8.5.1 Joint Leader: Channel Development
The first group consists of two cases studies demonstrating Joint Leadership
in channel development. These two cases investigate supply channels in the process of
development and in which the retailer, suppliers and logistics service providers, are
acting as Joint Leaders.  Each party is bringing some unique expertise to the design or
implementation of the channel that the retailer does not possess.  The two case studies
examine real scenarios and events in two very different circumstances.  The first is
taken from a very early phase in the Tesco supply chain change in the 1980’s.  It is the
relationship between Tesco and the logistics service providers in shaping the supply
networks in the decade before composite was implemented, case 7.12. The logistics
service providers, who were involved in the retail distribution supply network pre-
composite distribution had knowledge, capability and skill-sets that the retailer did not
possess at the time.  They acted as Joint Leaders during that early pre-composite period
and so achieved three benefits.  First, they enabled Tesco to restructure its logistics
network from the earlier setup organised by the suppliers.  Second, this provided an
enhanced service to retail, which was growing strongly at that time with the
implementation of the superstore format.  Third, it reduced the risk of a collapse in the
service to retail during the transition into composite itself.
The second case is an example of the implementation of global sourcing and
is taken from a field study conducted by the author in 2003.  It is the supply from South
Africa of fully prepared, ready to eat, fresh fruit salad that is flown into the UK
overnight by air-freight, case 7.20.  The Joint Leadership is between Tesco and the
supplier, who implemented a new method of maintaining the integrity of the chill chain
from the factory in Johannesburg to Heathrow.  What was radical was the use of
dedicated small mobile refrigeration units to hold the pallets while waiting, often in
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intense heat, to be loaded on to the aircraft.  The second initiative shown by the supplier
was the redesign of the transport packaging to reduce the amount of air cargo space
required. This South African fresh product supply chain involving air freight was a Joint
Leadership between Tesco, who wished to source globally and the local supplier, who
knew how to make the temperature controlled air freight portion of the supply channel
work effectively.
In summary, the retailer may direct the strategy for sourcing and the supply
chain but the suppliers and logistics service providers are acting in harmony with the
retail strategy as Joint Leaders.  They are more than Collaborative Partners.  Their
leadership and unique skill sets are essential to the design and practicality of the
retailer’s sourcing and supply chain strategy.
8.5.2 Dominant Designer: Technical Development
The Dominant Designer style of leadership is demonstrated through case
studies of technical development. They demonstrate leadership in areas of expertise that
might not be associated with a retailer. Each of these topics; Trailers 7.16, Plastic Trays
7.17 and Bond 7.18, helped to shape the Tesco retail supply channel in a unique way.
These technical successes were the result of different creative genius within the retailer,
who had a clear vision about the specification required in their design and functionality.
Normally, the supplier’s technical design team provide the core ideas.  In each of these
examples, it was the Tesco expert, who was demanding a solution to a specific design
requirement that the suppliers initially judged to be unattainable. However the
Dominant Designer style of leadership has aspects that are close to Benevolent
Dictatorship and the authority of the Main Board was applied to gain the full response
from the suppliers.  Nonetheless, all three case studies had a prevailing style of
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Collaborative Leadership between the retailer and product suppliers. It was up to the
supplier to find the technical solution for the product that match the design demands of
the retailer.  The solutions were ground breaking within their respective industries and
later gained widespread application in different companies.  This role reversal is
unusual and it included in the set of case studies because of its importance in
demonstrating the leadership role of Tesco in supply chain change.
The main grouping of fifteen cases, Table 8.2, was in the category
Collaborative Leader.  These are analysed in three subsets relating to the strategic,
tactical and operational levels of retail supply chain change.  The first is channel
restructure, 8.5.3; the second is channel capability, 8.5.4 and the third is channel
enhancement 8.5.5.
8.5.3 Collaborative Leader: Channel Restructure
This section, Collaborative Leader: Channel Restructure, examines four
cases at the level of strategic change within the retail supply chain.  These four cases
were conducted in a Collaborative Leadership style by the retailer team.  An
examination of these strategic developments demonstrates the large scale and wide
scope of the retail strategy in shaping the retail supply channel
The chilled product supply ‘at the right freshness’, case 7.7, demonstrates
the dramatic effect of the retail supply strategy of centralising chilled product. It
implemented a new level of discipline in temperature control along the full length of the
supply channel, from the producer or supplier through to the retail store.  As the case
study reports, the growth in chilled product was faster and greater than expected or
anticipated.  It was an outstanding success.  This was at a time when the consumer was
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very conscious about healthy eating and wanting to buy fresh fruit and vegetables.  It
was also a time of increasing travel by consumers so they wished to buy product they
had purchased when on holiday abroad.  The timing of the composite strategy
implementation, in 1989, combined with the whole supply channel temperature control
disciplines to accelerate the consumer switch, for example, away from the local
greengrocer.  The superstore retailer produce department was located right at the front
of the store entrance to attract consumers with the fresh produce and enable them to get
quickly involved in the shopping task.  The model became a benchmark for other
retailers to follow over the next decade.  This trend illustrates that the strategy was
successful in growing the business not only for the retailer but also for the producers
and suppliers.  It was a successful channel to get involved with, which helped to
promote the collaborative style of channel leadership. It was easier for the suppliers to
make a channel decision and work with the retailer in implementing the new disciplines
of the the temperature controlled supply chain.  This case contains many collaborative
characteristics that are shared with the next case on supplier logistics.
Supplier logistics, case 7.8, which started in 1990 with fresh produce, is a
strategic restructure of the relationships within the supply chain.  The Tesco team
dedicated to the inbound supplier logistics got involved with the detail of individual
suppliers, their products, and their arrival times at composite distribution.  The team set
out to learn about the particular circumstances facing the suppliers. They examined the
issues that needed to be unlocked in order to smooth the flow of chilled product along
the supply channel from producers to composite distribution and so onto the retail
stores.  It was a collaborative leadership style.  Eventually, the practices became
embedded in the supplier operation and the role became part of the commercial buying
function.  The first phase was focused on fresh fruit and vegetables.  There was a
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second phase of this programme, which was the rollout to other product groups, such as,
fresh meat and poultry, and chilled provisions.  This was conducted with the same
collaborative leadership involvement by the supplier logistics team.
In 1994, the policy evolved into primary distribution and by 2000 into
‘factory gate pricing’.  Primary distribution was structured to include experienced staff
from commercial buying, supply chain and distribution operations.  Their joint
contribution was effective in reshaping the supply channel from the supplier to the
distribution centres.  The scale of the operation was large.  In response to this
reorganisation, parts of the industry objected to the retailer taking control over the
inbound transport.  This reaction raises a question about the effect on the other parties
of being led in this way.  A question that will be referred to later under topics for further
research.
The next case study examines the strategic restructuring of the frozen food
channel, case 7.9 in the mid 1980s.  As noted in section 8.3.1 this case had an early
phase, which was negative. Once that difficult phase was completed, the style switched
to that of Collaborative Leader working with Collaborative Partners.  It was out of that
collaborative leadership style that the new frozen distribution centre operations, even
though they were working in old converted buildings, were soon developing through
their steep learning curve and operating well.  It was an evolutionary process.  Quickly,
the skills became embedded in the operation and the service to retail had taken a step
change improvement.  One final benefit of this collaboration was that transfer into
Composite was a seamless transition in service to retail.
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This section concludes with an International case study demonstrating the
supply chain change strategy of Tesco as it transfers Best Practice between the UK and
its operation in Thailand, case 7.19.  The Thailand fresh produce supplier development
is a good example of the internationalisation of the ways of working of the retail supply
channel. Tesco had chosen a local Thai national, who was a Quality Assurance
Technical Manager to visit the UK fresh produce operation in 2002.  The objective was
to transfer those skills back to the suppliers in Thailand.  The attitude of the manager
was in tune with a collaborative leadership approach to the suppliers.  Those suppliers
were about to experience a step change not only in their standards but also in the culture
of their workforce.  It is not easy to transpose operating disciplines from one culture to
another.  But the manager informed me that the suppliers were Collaborative Partners,
motivated to comply and learn a different way of conducting their operations.  It was
important to the retailer that the supply channel was improved and enhanced to high
standards.  It is a policy that Tesco has continued to implement as it establishes the
infrastructure for its international operations in countries outside the UK.
8.5.4 Collaborative Leader: Channel Capability
There are five case studies in the Collaborative Leader: Channel Capability
category.  These cases examine the tactical level in supply chain change.  They each
have similar processes and outcomes although they are set in very different operating
environments.
The open book accounting case study, 7.15 introduced a step change in the
contractual arrangements in distribution with the various logistics service providers.
Reaction was mixed.  to the Tesco contract distribution team began with the
Collaborative Partners and then persisted determinedly with the Reluctant Partners
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without crossing over the line to Benevolent Dictator.  All were performing well as
distribution operators, so it was appropriate not to be create animosity over a change in
accounting policy.  Once the logistics service providers had made the transition and
experienced for themselves the reduced financial risk and flexibility of open book
accounting, the relationship settled down.  The practice became embedded and later on
the policy was used by the logistics service providers for their other contracts.
Logistics service providers, case study 7.14 experienced a changing role
with Tesco during the period before and after the implementation of composite
distribution.  Prior to Composite the logistics service provider, e.g. for fresh meat and
poultry, was a Joint Leader of the supply channel.  They had expert knowledge about
the distribution of fresh meat and poultry and in particular the control of the variable
weight invoicing.  This was at a time when centralised buying of fresh meat and poultry
was just being implemented in the retailer.  After Composite, the logistics service
providers were Collaborative Partners rather than Joint Leaders (8.5.1).  The retailer
provided the thought leadership on the composite strategy and operations.  The logistic
service provider managed the operation itself.  They did a good job.  The relationship
was transformational not just transactional, they gained and evolved and developed their
expertise. Then, having learnt the skills and sent their best young managers into
composite, they were able to export those skills to their other contracts and so become
Collaborative Leaders with those other retailers in similar operations.
The next pair of cases in Collaborative Leader: Channel Capability are in
retail logistics. The first is in the ambient sector, case study 7.11, investigating the
improvements in warehouse productivity in fast moving grocery distribution operations.
The second is in composite, case 7.13.  It examines the action taken to increase the
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throughput capacity without adding additional distribution centres.  Both of these cases
are internal in content.  They are not that visible to the external observer but they are
very much part of the shaping of the retail supply channel at the level of tactical change.
They each increased the capability of their category of the retail distribution network.
They were conducted in Collaborative Leadership style.  Some of the change was
internal with the operational management and staff.  Other aspects were external, such
the inbound transport from suppliers and the outbound transport the retail stores.  The
external partners experienced changes in their operation, procedures and an increased
tempo in the supply chain.  It was all implemented in a collaborative style.
The final case, 7.10, of tactical change in channel capability was also
conducted in a Collaborative Leadership style. It investigated the process of
implementing a policy of the integrated supplier collections by the retailer.  This saved
money for the supplier, it gained revenue for the retailer distribution operations and
most importantly it helped the environment.  It was held up by the Department for
Transport, in 1997, as a Best Practice example for others to follow.  It is a model that is
now applied by other retailers.
These five cases complete the set of examples of tactical supply chain
change.  They build on the examples of strategic change, 8.5.3, and demonstrate that
Collaborative Leadership style can operate at all levels of change.  The final level is the
operational change and the next section 8.5.5 investigates and analyses six cases.
8.5.5 Collaborative Leader: Channel Enhancement
This section on Collaborative Leader: Channel Enhancement, examines
cases at the operational level of retail supply chain change.  These six cases, 7.1-7.6,
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study the detailed operational interaction between the different parties in the supply
chain.  Each case investigates a supply chain change for a specific product group:
potatoes 7.1, bananas 7.2, St Peter’s Fish 7.3, fresh meat & poultry 7.4, strawberries 7.5,
and iceberg lettuce 7.6.  The significant facilitating role in each of these cases is taken
by the commercial buyer, who is regarded by the company as owning the relationship
with the suppliers.  However, the manner of conducting this role had changed.
Traditionally, the buyer would meet up with the supplier’s representative
face to face, on their own.  There would be no representatives from other functions.  If
distribution operations had an issue with a supplier’s delivery performance, they would
pass it to depot stock control, who would pass it to commercial if it needed escalating to
a higher level.  The buyers did not see their role as needing to get involved in
distribution issues.  They could take an attitude that it was “down to the suppliers to sort
themselves out”.  This left the local distribution centre operations feeling isolated,
which is typical of a silo management culture.  However, by the date of these case study
events, the policy of the commercial division was changing to a more internally
collaborative approach (Grant Interview 1995).  It was becoming more inclusive and
buyers would invite representatives from other functions to participate in the supplier
contact.  In each of these six product case studies, colleagues from other functions
accompany the buyer: quality technical assurance, stock management, distribution
operations, and logistics.
There were sizeable changes required in these case studies: for the potato
suppliers, changing their shift patterns; for the banana supplier, changing their transport
schedules; for the St Peter’s Fish supplier, fitting in with the retailer’s collection
arrangements; for the fresh meat and poultry suppliers, changing their transport
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operators; for the strawberry suppliers, changing the operation to achieve regular
punctuality for collections at a time of peak volumes and pressure; for the iceberg
lettuce suppliers, changing their loading and delivery patterns to dedicate the vehicles to
specific retailer distribution centres.  All of these events were conducted in a style of
collaborative leadership by retail with the collaborative partners in the supply channel.
This comes across clearly in the detail of case studies.  The retailer was driving the
strategy, achieving increasing control along the length of the supply channel, getting
involved in the detail of the operation by employing staff in their teams, with the right
expertise and experience.  The benefit of this collaborative style was that operational
practices and skills were developed and embedded in the daily task.  It transformed the
supply channel to a level of competence so that larger and larger volumes of product
could be moved quickly and effectively.  It created efficiencies of scale.  And it is this
scale that benefits the consumer as well as the producer and the retailer.
This section concludes the analysis of the specific cases documented in
chapter seven.  In turn it has examined the minor groupings of Joint Leader and
Dominant Designer and then the three subsets of Collaborative Leader.  These are at the
different levels of supply chain change: strategic, - channel restructure; tactical -
channel capability; and operational - channel enhancement.  This provides a full range
of analysis with specific information based on real events.  It creates a foundation from
which to examine the ideal behaviour profile of a retailer acting as channel captain in
retail supply chain change.
8.6 Channel Captain Ideal Behaviour.
The question that arises: is there an ideal profile of the style of behaviour of
a channel captain?  There is probably sufficient material to provide an ideal profile of
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behaviour using the theories and models supplied earlier.  The most influential of those
models is that concerning Situational Leadership.  The core belief underpinning that
analysis is that a leader is best served when a range of behavioural styles are available,
from which to select that which suits the task, ability and attitude of the other party.
This in itself is a valuable conclusion.  An idealised profile of the style of behaviour of a
channel captain is precisely the possession of that range of relationship styles.
The second major area of contact between channel members is that of
negotiation.  The preferred negotiating style that has the highest rate of achieving good
quality agreements is the collaborative, win – win style.  The model includes other
styles, which may from time to time be suitable in specific circumstances, but to be used
with caution.  There is strong preference for the values of collaborative style
relationships with other parties in the supply channel, in which the leading company is
willing to adapt its procedures to gain advantage for the achievement of the overall
business goals and the coordination of the whole supply channel, transforming it into an
integrative supply channel.
The reverse side of this idealised profile of behaviour styles of the channel
leader and captain is the experience of the other partners in the channel.  If that is a
good experience of being in a business relationship with a collaborative leader then the
collaborative partner becomes more effective, coordinated and productive.  In fact the
decision making level is elevated to that of a channel decision.  It is the broader vision
of being part of a successful supply channel.
The conclusion of this case research is that Tesco as an International UK
Retailer has conducted its supply chain change at two critical levels.  The first and
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earlier level was as a sound logistics strategy.  The second and more recent level
particularly in its International expansion is as strategic logistics.  This concept is taken
from Fabbe-Costes and Colin (1999) cited in Bourlakis and Bourlakis (2001).
8.7 Summary
Chapter eight is a further exploration of the role of channel captain as
depicted in the twenty- case studies in chapter seven.  The theories and models from the
earlier chapters have been reapplied to create various perspectives on the interplay in
relationships between the different partners in a supply channel.  There are three
outcomes from this reflection.
The first is a classification of the roles and levels of organisation in supply
channels.  The second is an idealised behaviour profile of the role of a channel captain.
The third is the confirmation that Tesco, both in its National and International supply
chain strategy, is a excellent example of the role of retailer as channel captain in retail







9 Conclusions & Recommendations
9.1 Introduction
This PhD is the author’s contribution to academic reflection.  It is based on
his logistics practitioners experience with the leading UK grocery retailer, Tesco.  That
live experience was during a time of great change in the supply chain structure.  Those
changes were not merely reiterations of past practice and past relationships.  They were
major transformations in the supply chain strategy.  They demonstrated that the retailer
possessed the ability to implement structural change in its relationship with the
suppliers.  This thesis studies the nature of that change.  It is a change in the ownership
and control over the retail supply chain.  The author’s working experience was closely
involved in the retail logistics implications of that shift in power balance from supplier
to retailer.
The link between the author’s practitioner experience and the world of
academia is the Institute for Retail Studies at the University of Stirling. It provided the
opportunity to collaborate with academics, who were knowledgeable about retailing and
marketing.  The first collaboration was an MBA.  That was followed by a series of joint
articles, chapters in books and finally co-authoring a book, published in 2006. Another
part of the collaboration was participation in various executive programmes run by the
Institute, presenting on a range of retail logistics topics.  One of the strengths of
embarking on a PhD is the contact with professional academics.  This contact was
facilitated through the annual Logistics Research Network Conference.  That contact
provided the author with the opportunity for direct conversations about his research
topic with knowledgeable academics.
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The thoughts on the research topic began to settle on the supply chain
change in Tesco.  Gradually the attention focused on the change in relationship between
suppliers and retailers.  There was much general academic discussion about these
relationships and the use of power and control in the supply chain.  Gradually the theme
that emerged was ‘the role of the retailer in retail supply chain change’.  However, that
on its own lacked impact.  If Tesco, as a retailer, had initiated these strategic changes; it
raised questions about channel leadership, it added a twist to the topic.  Then, buried
deep in American manufacturing marketing literature, was the expression, ‘channel
captain’.  That presented a good challenge for a piece of research.  That was worth
examining.
The decision was made: the thesis Aim was: to examine ‘the role of
Retailers as Channel Captains in retail supply chain change: the example of Tesco’.  It
would be a broader, deeper and more demanding research task.  It would be set firmly
within the contemporary debate about the nature of supply chain relationships and
practitioner initiatives, such as Efficient Consumer Response.  It required the author to
re-examine his practitioner experience from a new perspective.  It was much wider than
the operational detail of retail logistics.  It was broader because it required a higher level
of reflection.  That level would be the interplay between retailer and supplier about the
control over the strategy of the supply chain structure.  That strategy had wider aims
than simply moving products from supplier to store.  There was competitive advantage
and the capability to support strong retail expansion at stake.  It would even go further
and underpin the growing strength of the Tesco brand.  It would be deeper because the
author was in a position to re-visit his practitioner operational experience.  That
experience was in both retail logistics and the supply channel.  It was in the mature
ambient centralised distribution operation.  It was also in the emerging structures of
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temperature controlled logistics.  In this latter sector, it spanned the transition from
supplier organised logistics to retailer organised logistics.
A practitioner can bring practical experience to the academic debate.  It was
not theoretical models or hypothetical cases that were needed in this research.  What
was needed was insight into real events.  The external observer does not often get the
opportunity to go behind the scenes and find out the nuances of what is happening.  This
thesis, then, draws together two strands.  The first is the public academic reflections and
analysis of retailing, retail logistics and supply chain management.  Through his
extended collaboration with the Institute for Retail Studies at the University of Stirling,
the author gained access to the depth and breadth of their retail research.  What he could
also do is revisit those American origins of the concept of the channel captain.  The
second strand is the practitioner reflection on real events.  The author would be in a
position to reveal directly their detail and subtlety.  The thesis aim would be to elicit
reflections on the nature of the relationship behaviour that really took place.  The
purpose would be to examine the extent to which those participating showed and
understanding that these events were part of a larger transformation; namely, that of
retail supply chain change.  The anticipation is that the two strands together will
produce more insight than examining each in isolation.  This is a PhD with a
practitioner dimension.  The contribution it aspires to make is to place the concept of
the retailer acting as channel captain in a real setting.  Then it is there for future
researchers to see, as part of the evidence of the processes of retail supply chain change
in a major UK retailer.
The process of conducting this research is founded on the three objectives
that supported the building blocks of the thesis topic.  The first was the investigation
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into the historical origins of the concept of the ‘channel captain’ in American
manufacturing marketing in 1960’s.  This necessitated a visit to America to meet the
authors, James Stock and Stanley C Hollander.  The second objective is the
consideration of the general nature of modern European retailers and their varying
stages of involvement in retail supply chain change.  In this the author was dependent
on the work of his colleagues at the Institute for Retail Studies. The conclusion of this
examination is that an in depth study of Tesco would provide the most benefit to
academic and practitioner knowledge.  The third objective is an examination of the role
and behaviour of Tesco as a Retailer in retail supply chain change.  This would cover
some more general description and analysis of elements of the supply chain: retail
logistics, the supply channel and managing change.  It would then provide a series of
cases from real events.  They would be the material for the more detailed and nuanced
reflections and analysis in terms of retail supply chain change.  The whole thesis would
then be a culmination of the process of intertwining the academic and the practitioner
elements into a high quality contribution.
After the Introduction in Chapter One, the thesis starts with the historical
investigation into the American origins of the concept of channel captain in Chapter
Two.  Then it moves immediately onto a general consideration of the modern European
retailing scene.  This reveals that most of the major grocery retailers control their retail
supply chains.  It reveals change in the balance of power between suppliers and
retailers. Given the author’s operational experience, it is logical to conduct an in-depth
examination of the retailer Tesco. The next chapters consider the role of the channel
captain in retail supply chain change.  The sequence chosen reflects the order that
retailers get involved.  The first, Chapter Three, is retail logistics, which is the
movement of goods from centralised distribution centres to retail store.  The second,
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Chapter Four, is the supply channel, which is the movement of goods from the supplier
to distribution centre. Chapter Five, Managing Change, examines different approaches
to supply chain change and relationship.  This investigates another aspect of the Aim,
namely, the examination of the behaviour of the Retailer as Channel Captain in retail
supply chain change. Chapter Six, Methodology, explains the reasons for choosing
participant action research combined with case study approach.
Thus far the thesis structure has been examining the broader dimension of
the role of the Retailer as channel captain in retail supply chain change.  This breadth is
complemented with more depth in Chapter Seven, which is a series of twenty cases, all
real events, all known to the author.  It provides a variety of angles, nuances and detail
about retail supply chain change, beginning at the operational level and then exploring
different examples at the tactical and strategic levels.  These are analysed in Chapter
Eight to elicit the results of the intertwining of the academic and practitioner strands.
Finally, this Chapter Nine provides an overall judgement on the thesis, its process and
its contribution to academic and business knowledge.
This chapter will now proceed with sections on: Meeting the Objectives;
Conclusions and Contribution; and finally, Limitations and Future Work.  Meeting the
Objectives provides an account and summary of the results for each objective in turn.
Conclusion and Contribution, discusses the broader issues that arise from the
examination of the thesis topic and the contribution that the thesis makes to academic
and business knowledge.  Limitations and Future Work, is in two sections.  The first
section, describes aspects of the research process that were constrained either by the
author’s circumstances or the nature of the methodology selected.  The second section
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explores some opportunities for further work under the headings: depth, breadth and
global, which concludes the whole document.
9.2 Meeting the Objectives
There are three objectives for the thesis.  The first objective is to investigate
the origins of the concept of Channel Captain.  The second objective is to consider if
there are one or more modern European retailers who act as channel captains and to
select the retailer Tesco as an example for further study.  The third objective is to
examine the role and behaviour of a retailer acting as a channel captain.  These three
objectives have been achieved by bringing together academic analysis and practitioner
operational experience.  The process of working through each objective in sequence has
attained the goal of fulfilling the thesis Aim. Here is a summary of the results for each
objective.
9.2.1 Origins
The first objective is to investigate the origins of the concept of Channel
Captain.  At first, the author had some difficulty in uncovering these origins until, in
2003; he met and interviewed two American authors, James Stock and Stanley C
Hollander on the topic.  Their advice and guidance was helpful in putting these origins,
particularly the work of E.J. McCarthy, into the context of the academic thinking and
business practice during that period of 1970’s America.  At that time, marketing
thinking was evolving from a functional framework into a managerial perspective.  This
was part of an emerging view that it was the marketing channels themselves that
compete with each other.  It was about channel competition and not just product
competition.  This led logically to proposing that the channel needed an organiser, a
leader, a Captain.  Those origins primarily depicted that channel captain as the
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manufacturer.  That manufacturer, with a strong national or international Brand,
organised the marketing channel through wholesalers to promote, distribute and develop
sales of product in the different destination markets.  The channel captain model had
expectations about desirable behaviour; for example, how best to deal with the task of
handling conflict.  That conflict might be with wholesalers or between wholesalers
working in the same region.  Although the model was predominately about
manufacturers, it was seen as having the potential to be applied to other parties in the
marketing channel.
There was awareness that entities other than the manufacturer might be the
channel captain.  More specifically, that the wholesalers in a region might themselves
organise their regional market, especially if that was remote from the manufacturer’s
sphere of influence.  Despite much debate between academic commentators; retailers
were not normally identified as channel captains, which might reflect their limited
sphere of influence, since they were more local or regional rather than national.  Stanley
C Hollander, however, was clear that the large department stores, such as Mace’s or
Sears & Roebuck, were the channel organisers, even in the 1930’s.  Although the term
channel captain was not used back then, Stan Hollander affirmed that these retailers
acted as the companies that led the supply channel and made the decisions on supply,
implementing a policy that was termed: specification buying for some products.  The
retailer collaborated with chosen suppliers in order that they produced products for
which the retailer controlled the detail of quality and design to a set price.  This built on
their strengths of international purchasing strategy, bringing products from a variety of
sources, national and international, into the department stores for consumers to buy.
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The term channel captain was in use in the academic and professional
literature till the end of 1980’s.  Towards the end of this period the retailers, because of
their closeness to the consumers and the greater availability of product choice, were
gaining in power and position at the head of the vertical marketing channels.  But the
description of their role as channel captains was not as prominent as that of the
manufacturers. However, the term channel captain gradually fell out of use.  The reason
seems to be that this managerial perspective on marketing had become established and
embedded in the business culture and the need to be so explicit about the role receded
naturally. These origins provided some guidance about the attributes of a channel
captain and the business conditions in which the role could emerge.  This guidance can
help with the process of considering the existence of modern European retailers acting
as channel captains.  In this way the completion of the first objective provides tools to
consider the second objective.
9.2.2 Retailers
The second objective is to consider whether there exist one or more modern
European retailers who are acting as channel captains and to justify the selection of
Tesco as an example.  This is a wide-ranging topic; it began with a broad consideration
of retailing in general and grocery retailing in particular.  One variant of modern
retailing is the large national multiple retailer with an international presence and a
global reach for sourcing products.  Such a retailer has a strong brand, large scale and a
powerful position in the marketplace.  Their power has grown because of the market
concentration that has taken place, their centralised organisation and their closeness to
the consumer.  One of the enablers of their success has been their control over the
supply channel.  They have organised the suppliers and the flow of products to achieve
their retailing business objectives of sales growth and improved their market position.
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There are countries where the major grocery retailers together command a high
percentage of the market share.  A number of these grocery retailers also implement
direct control over their supply chains as part of their business strategy.  In these
circumstances retailer control over the supply chain is becoming commonplace.  Some
of the major European grocery retailers are acting as channel captains in retail supply
chain change; even though that title is not ascribed to such companies.  The first result
of the second objective is that it has identified some of those retailers, who could be
suitable companies for further study.
The second result is to select a retailer, Tesco, as an example for further
study.  This is a critical decision point in the thesis process.  The choice produces its
own type of contribution to the academic literature. The benefit of selecting this
particular retailer is that it provides an opportunity to focus in some depth on its role
and behaviour. The limitation of selecting Tesco as an example is that it is a view from
a single company, which may or may not be typical of the retailers as a group.
However, other retailers may not allow the author openness in terms of accessibility to
events.  That would influence the ability to reveal some of the depth of insight into the
channel captain role and behaviour in retail supply chain change in those retailers.  The
opportunity to enhance the depth of the investigation through great insights from
particular real events requires open access being granted to the author.  Hence, the
selection of Tesco as the retail company for examination in this thesis was strongly
influenced by the author’s operational experiences in this major UK multiple food
retailer.  The Institute for Retail Studies at University of Stirling has had a long
relationship with Tesco over a period of more than twenty years.  It reaches back to a
period close to its major decision to get involved in centralised distribution for its own
survival.  The reflections of Tesco Main Board Director, Donald Harris, from the
345
1970’s, particularly during Operation Checkout in 1977, emphasise the trauma and
shock of those supply delivery problems that were triggered by the outstanding retail
success of Operation Checkout.  It is such a dramatic story that it brings home very
clearly why the retailer then wanted to be in control of their own destiny and find a
better way of organising the supply channel. The author had direct experience of the
continuing developments from 1984 to 1998.  The selection of Tesco made it easier to
conduct the further study required to progress the third objective of the thesis.
9.2.3 Role & Behaviour
The third objective of the thesis is to examine the role and behaviour of a
retailer acting as a Channel Captain.  The author had operational experience in both the
retail logistics and the supplier logistics segments of the total supply channel from
producer to consumer for a major UK multiple food retailer.  These are the two
components of the physical logistics in the supply channel.  The movement of goods
outbound from distribution centres to the retail stores and the inbound movement of
goods from the suppliers into the distribution centres.  They are presented in this
sequence because it is the order in which the retailers took over control in the supply
chain.  In the initial stages of the evolution of the channel control process, the retailer
began by setting up its own centralised buying functions across each of the product
groups. At the same time there was a policy of increasing the centralisation of the
warehousing, distribution and transport functions, which enhanced the leverage of the
buyer’s bargaining power.  As a result, the retailer gained improved product availability
and also enhanced product margins.  These were the benefits of implementing a strategy
of centralised distribution under its own control.  It was a major improvement over the
direct delivery service from the supplier to the retail stores, organised by the
manufacturers and their transport and logistics companies.  It was retail logistics, then,
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that was the first phase of channel control by the retailer as channel captain.  This
strategy rapidly spread right across the full product range found in the retail store.
The second phase of channel control by the retailer as channel captain was
supplier logistics, which is the organisation of the logistics of the inbound movement of
goods from supplier to centralised distribution.  This time the retailers gained by
improving the coordination of the timing of product flow through the logistics system,
which provided fresher products for the consumer and provided a further benefit of
enhanced product margins.  These benefits were achieved by the retailer’s ability to
coordinate the various components of the supply chain.  They are also the benefits from
the large scale of the multiple retail operation.  This strategy was seen as a process of
aligning the whole supply chain; from the producer through to the retail store, in order
to better meet the needs of the consumer.  It was also an exercise in improved logistics
efficiency.  In the early stages this was about shared user distribution alongside
dedicated logistics and transport.  This involvement in supplier logistics gradually
developed into Primary Distribution.  By the millennium, the commercial and
distribution divisions agreed to a joint team that implemented a policy of Factory Gate
Pricing, as part of its Step Change programme.  This is a strategy of full retail control,
including the direct payment, of the inbound movement of goods from supplier to the
distribution centres.  Primary Distribution had a separate budget and the cost of the
delivery was taken out of the buyer’s gross margin.  The commercial members of the
team conducted the negotiation with the suppliers.  The distribution members of the
team conducted the logistics reorganisation and negotiation with the logistics service
providers.  This has brought about a full reversal of the logistics set up that prevailed in
the 1960’s, when it was the manufacturers who owned and controlled the warehousing
and transport operations.
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There is the other dimension of channel control that is usually referred to as
Supply Chain Management.  This organises the information and data flow from retail to
the suppliers, which in turn enables the physical product to be organised and delivered.
There were two benefits from this information control.  One was the reduction in order
lead times, together with increased delivery frequency.  The second was the
improvement in stock turn in the distribution pipeline, and at the retail store.  The
disciplines and procedures were closely linked to the developments that took place
within the retail store itself.  The whole system was treated as an integrated process.  All
these aspects are included in the role of the channel captain.
However, having summarised the tasks for the role, there is, in addition, the
debate about the manner in which the retailer conducts the role with the suppliers and
logistics service providers.  Here, the Efficient Consumer Response movement has
striven to promote a collaborative, also called associative, partnership between retailer
and manufacturer, between buyer and seller.  That is the predominant style in which the
role of the channel organiser, leader, and captain is expected to be conducted.  The case
studies provide a selection of real practical examples of collaborative, leadership, also
called democracy.  They provide the inside story for a set of events; selected to illustrate
change management actions to eliminate instances of dysfunction in the supply chain
and create more integrated solutions.  The selection is based on events personally
known to the author.  It is recognised, however, that other colleagues and operators have
similar stories based on their experience in their parts of the supply channel.  This third
objective completes the process of exploration of the topic of ‘the role of Retailers as
channel captains in retail supply chain change: the example of Tesco’.
348
9.3 Conclusions
This section on conclusions is an opportunity to reflect on the issues that
arise from the thesis topic.  These are grouped under the subheadings: the Concept, the
Role, the Behaviour, followed by Author Learning.  The final and the most important
section is the Contribution to academic and business learning.
9.3.1 The Concept
The concept of the channel captain had been useful in America during
1960s to early 1980s.  It was introduced during a transition phase in management
thinking about manufacturing led marketing channels.  Its use symbolised the need for
someone to take responsibility for making the channel happen in an integrated and
effective manner.  Its period of usefulness coincided with the growing awareness of the
ability of marketing channels to compete with each other as channels.  It was a concept
of its time, with the American spirit of team sports and leadership.  It marked a change
in the evolution of marketing channel thinking, which then broadened out to include
other parties in the channel.  Wholesalers could be channel captains.  Some types of
retailers, such as the large department stores, acted as channel captains, but were not
referred to as such in the literature.  This development in the concept of managing the
marketing channel made it easier for manufacturers to accept the benefits of setting up
long term alliances with transport and distribution companies.  This model of
manufacturing controlled distribution was also the dominant practice in the UK during
1960’s and 1970’s.
The concept is useful when there is absolute clarity about the identity of the
dominant company in the marketing channel.  In those earlier days, it was the American
manufacturer with a national or international Brand.  Its application was in the context
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of the debate about the use of power and control in the buyer–seller relationships; their
confrontation; their collaboration.  This encompassed further exploration of the theories
about the nature and dynamics of the power relationship.  Its application to
manufacturers was gradually being overtaken by events.  There was an increasing focus
on customer choice.  There was also a strengthening of the retailers’ ability to exercise
control and choice over the use of their shelf space.  By then the marketing power
balance was beginning to change its focus onto consumer choice rather than volume
product sales.  Mass retailers were beginning to decide which product ranges and brands
they needed to stock in order to meet the needs of their customers and give them great
choice.  This type of retailer was becoming the head of the vertical marketing channel;
in effect, taking on the channel captain role.  The clarity about the identity of the
channel captain, that had existed when the concept of channel captain was first
introduced, was beginning to get lost as the retailer gradually increased in strength and
power.  At the same time, the concept of channel captain became embedded in
management thinking; and as James Stock explained, there was no longer a need to
keep talking about it.  The thinking had moved on to other aspects of channel
relationships.
The concept is useful in European retailing today.  The point has now come
when there is clarity, once again, about the identity of the channel captain. This time,
though, it is clearly the retailers who are the channel captains.  Market concentration has
strengthened the retailers’ position relative to suppliers.  But, the use of the concept is
rare.  It has not become established or widespread.  The retailers, even though they may
not explicitly be called the ‘channel captains’, are expected to behave in a certain style
of leadership.  This links up with discussion about the retailers’ use of power and the
need for collaboration with suppliers.  In the UK, this is exemplified in the Efficient
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Consumer Response movement.  The ECR concept has proven to be useful in both
America and Europe.
What is against the idea of a channel captain and the activities and ideas it
represents?  For some supply chains it is not applicable; it may be considered too
simplistic or out of date.  If there is no clarity or agreement about the identity of the
channel leader, then there probably will not be the recognition and trust from the other
channel members.  If several members of the supply chain each regard themselves as
the channel leader they need to agree whether they are collaborating or becoming rivals
for the leadership.  Conflicts of interest between the companies could then create greater
dysfunction of the supply chain. The members may demand a more egalitarian, more
collaborative or associative relationship between the companies, with much greater
independence for each member.  This is the type of position or assumption seems to be
taken by the Efficient Consumer Response movement.  Although a channel member
might be larger or stronger there is explicit pressure to engage in the industry goals on a
basis of greater equality.  This leaves the movement open to a lack of leadership if the
companies are not willing to take part.
9.3.2 The Role
Leadership is the hallmark of the role of a channel captain in retail supply
chain change.  But, differing supply chains permit varying opportunities to exercise that
leadership.  This can be linked to the retailer’s position in the life cycle of channel
leadership for that particular supply chain.  One way to assess the role is to measure the
extent to which it is possible to demonstrate that leadership.  This could be expressed as
steps towards leadership, starting with follower, and then progressing through emerging,
early adopter, creative, and mature.  The body of the thesis provided information about
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the sequence in which retailers generally get involved with the supply chain.  The first
segment is retail logistics, which is the delivery from centralised distribution centre to
retail store.  The second segment is the supply channel; the delivery from the producer
inbound to the retail distribution centre.
The degree of leadership, even in the first segment of retail logistics, can
vary by the type of supply chain.  For example, the ambient grocery products were often
centralised first into the retail distribution centres.  The UK multiple retailers tackled
this sector at an early stage, so by the 1990s, this sector was in a mature state of
development.  The distribution centres and vehicles are visible for everyone to see.  The
warehouse technology though, which was already well established, is still evolving and
developing.  As a group, the retailers are the channel captains for the ambient grocery
channel.  But an individual retailer within that set might be a follower, an early adopter
or even a leader, pushing forward processes and practices.
Using these steps or categories is a way to express an assessment of the role
of individual retailers as channel leaders.  For instance, was Tesco a leader in retail
supply chain change? Yes, undoubtedly, but not always.  In the past, when Tesco had
centralised only a small percentage of the ambient grocery, they were more like early
adopters.  Other retailers had already pursued the centralisation strategy for ambient
products.  But that was before the effect of Operation Checkout in 1977.  After the
success of Operation Checkout, with its the delivery problems, Tesco in effect became
the channel captain.  They made a firm and all embracing strategic decision to get fully
involved in centralisation across their product channels.  In reality, it was a series of
decisions, looking at the different product channels according to their capability to
sustain the growth in the business.  It was from that Board decision that Tesco took the
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initiative away from the suppliers.  Tesco wanted to control its retail supply chain.  It
had the strong desire and the will power to make it happen; to implement retail supply
chain change.
The same issue can be considered for the temperature controlled supply
chain.  A few retailers, for example, Marks & Spencer, were well established and in
control over their retail supply chain.  They already had an excellent single temperature
contract logistics service in place.  In the case of Tesco, the assessment is quite
different.  Tesco had a series of single temperature supply channels each dedicated to a
distinct product sector.  But, each channel had a restricted capability to expand and
grow.  The supply chain capability assessment made by Tesco in the mid 1980s,
concluded that the single channel supply chain strategy of ‘more of the same’ was
inadequate.  It would require too much investment and be too complex and inefficient to
sustain the company’s growth into the future.  A new model of supply chain structure
was required to provide the logistics capability for the future growth intended for the
business.  That was precisely the conclusion that drove Tesco, as a retailer, to take the
initiative with composite distribution.  That is why the decision was bold.  It really
made Tesco stand out as the leader, as the Channel Captain.  It was a step change of
enormous proportions. It had vast scale, huge volumes, and multiple temperatures that
consolidated a variety of product groups.  It was precisely not: ‘more of the same’
supplier logistics formula.
No supplier could have ventured into composite.  Only a retailer with the
courage and the conviction based on previous experience of the failure of supplier
organised logistics could do this.  The spectre of Operation Checkout and its supplier
problems still haunted the Boardroom.  It was after all only ten years on.  Michael
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Darnell was the Distribution Director at the time of Composite, he was a calm hand on
the tiller; guiding the strategy through it initial difficulties. One logistics contractor’s
lack of performance at one of the sites resulted in Tesco taking that composite in-house.
That logistics service provider had not worked with Tesco in retail logistics before; they
were not accustomed to the Tesco culture and practices.  All the other logistics service
providers who were appointed were companies with existing Tesco contracts and had
experience of its culture and way of working.
Was Tesco special?  Yes, in many ways.  Following Operation Checkout in
1977, Tesco was determined to be the supply chain channel organiser and made the
distribution and logistics decisions to meet the needs of the retail business.  It acted as a
strong and competent supply chain leader.  The author was fortunate to be there as a
practitioner, during the transition phase between the first phase and the second phase of
retailer control over the supply chain: the point where the interplay between supplier led
logistics and retailer led logistics was becoming visible through the logistics changes
that were being implemented.  Many of those changes, transitions, shifts in power, were
not visible externally at the time; the public gaze was diverted onto the implementation
of composite distribution on its grand scale.  The actions taken with the temperature
controlled supply channels ahead of the composite implementation were part of a
transition process.  That was not just about logistics but also about implementation with
conviction and drive.  The rate of change was fast.  There was the vision and goal of
composite on the business horizon.  Without that goal, the pre-composite finessing
would have been merely a tweaking of the process, a repetition of a strategy that had
already been judged to be inadequate and unable to provide the capability to handle the
company’s intended future growth.  With composite as the goal, those same actions
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acted as stepping-stones of improvement, paving the way for a smooth transition from
the old system into the new.
The role of channel captain is powerful for the author as a practitioner;
reflecting on the logistics changes and a real life involvement in the mid to late 1980s
with the leading UK grocery retailer. The operational task with the contract distribution
network prior to Composite was tough.  It was creating an improved service and a
higher standard of performance. It involved extensive work with temperature controlled
supply channels that were closely associated with the suppliers’ logistics structure.  In
these product supply channels, the retailer was in the process of emerging as the channel
captain, which was a different position from that held in the ambient grocery supply
chain.  The long term effect was channel leadership, to the benefit of the supply chain.
Supply chains compete.  Tesco temperature controlled retail supply chain
changes created barriers to market entry in chilled product groups for competitor
retailers, brand manufacturers, and for smaller retail companies that could only justify a
simpler temperature controlled supply channel structure.  It also opened up avenues to
market for specialist niche suppliers, like case 7.3 St Peter’s Fish.  This increased the
value of the category management for the product by partnering small suppliers with
national retailers.  It enhanced the retailer brand for quality products.  This was a shift in
retailer supplier relations that side stepped the head to head encounters of the branded
ambient manufacturers.  Without realising it at the time, it embodied a great deal of the
best practice desired by Efficient Consumer Response.
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9.3.2.1 Tesco Brand
The development of the retailer brand in the UK has been strong in the fresh
chilled product sector.  For example, Marks & Spencer fresh chilled quality products
were the market leader and the benchmark at that time, for others to aspire towards.
Marks & Spencer had conditioned the behaviour of their customer not only to perceive
the product offering as excellent quality (high price), but also to come in early,
especially on Saturdays, to buy from limited stock availability (scarce supply).  The
business target for Tesco was to bring that high quality and variety to all consumers, at a
less expensive price and with full on-shelf availability all of the time.  The
transformation of the chilled distribution supply chain structure, through composite,
enabled that goal to be attained.  For the traditional chilled food branded manufacturers,
the supply chain through composite was simply a substitute for their own very effective
single temperature logistics channel.
The process of implementing composite distribution helped Tesco become a
Brand leader in the chilled sector.  The company had developed with the mainstream
manufacturers a range of the retailer’s own label fresh chilled products, following the
model from ambient grocery.  But, there was a more dramatic change going on at the
same time.  The national multiple retailer was taking over from the local butcher, the
local greengrocer, and the local baker.  This process was much lamented by some
consumers; they saw their small local shops closing down.  But, judging by the growth
in sales for those products, the switch in consumer behaviour was real and dramatic.
For fruit and vegetables, fresh meat and poultry, morning goods and cakes,
the transition to composite was more like a transformation, a repositioning of their
image with the consumer.  These products are considered strong destination shopping
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drivers.  The consequence of the strict temperature control was fresher, long lasting fruit
and vegetables.  The fresh meat and poultry suppliers prepared luxury meals and the
retailer gave national coverage to specialist bakery products.  This transformation
created a positive response from the consumer to these products, compared to the
quality they had been accustomed to buying locally.  The transition to the composite
supply chain strategy created a surge in the value of the retail brand.  In those early days
of composite, before all the other retailers caught up, the contrast was tangible; the
consumers noticed; sales surged, volumes burgeoned.  Today, much of that is forgotten,
as those standards, which at the time were the new benchmark, have now become the
norm.  The role of Tesco, the retailer as channel captain in retail supply chain change
was to achieve the stature of emerging as the brand leader.  No manufacturer on their
own could compete with that.  The retail supply chain change strategy created not only
competitive advantage; it enhanced the retail Brand.
9.3.3 The Behaviour
There is a major theme that runs through the channel captain concept.  It is
involvement.  The message to the 1960’s American manufacturers can be summed up
as: ‘get involved in making the marketing channel work properly’.  Another way of
expressing this is that the manufacturer should not just presume the marketing channel
will automatically operate effectively by its own.  Nor should the manufacturer take a
view that the channel problems are all external to the manufacturer; for example: a view
that ‘it is all their fault’ or ‘they should sort it out’.  The involvement of the leading
company makes a difference.  They can help put solutions in place.  The same message
applies to modern European retailers.  It is worthwhile their getting involved with
managing the supply chain.  The case of the strawberries, 7.5, was selected to show how
that can work.  Retailers need to be part of the solution.  The role of being a channel
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captain is one of involvement and participation.  It is best done collaboratively.  The
cases in chapter seven highlight supply chain change behaviour.  Each is selected to
embody a different aspect or nuance of the relationship and interaction between the
retailer, the supplier and the logistics service provider, as analysed in chapter eight.  The
detail in these cases is not visible to the outside observer; that is why they have been
documented in this thesis. Then others later will be able to view them in the light of the
behaviour of the retailer as channel captain in retail supply chain change.
The culture of a company and the behaviour of its representatives might be
so strongly aligned and firmly embedded that the channel captain style of behaviour
continues even when an individual moves on from that role.  However, if the alignment
is fragile or weakly embedded, then the standing of the channel captain is more
vulnerable.  The two are inter-related and can influence the effectiveness of the supply
chain.  The track record over a period of time can be a strong influence over the
reactions to individual incidents.  This brings the discussion back to the earlier point.
The appropriate channel leader, in helping the channel perform well, re-enforces the
channel captain concept so as to encourage involvement.  The dominant vision is that
channels compete rather than individual companies on their own.
9.3.4 Author Learning
What has been the new knowledge that the author has learnt as a result of
this PhD?  A major item of new knowledge the author acquired is the interesting
literature search about American manufacturing and marketing origins of the concept of
channel captain.  The topic is closely linked to developments in marketing thinking.
The experience was linked with making the acquaintance of American authors who
were knowledgeable about American retailing.  In particular, it was a special privilege
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to meet Stanley C Hollander and receive his advice.  The subsequent time spent in the
Michigan State University library was valuable.  It provided an opportunity to follow up
the leads Stan Hollander had suggested.  The author was able to access their library
resource and find additional material about the concept of the channel captain, which he
brought back to the UK for further reading and reflection.
The second item of new knowledge for the author is the exposure to the
academic literature on a wider basis relating to the thesis topic.  The facilities of online
searching facilities were very good during the latter stages of the PhD.  It transformed
and improved the distance learning part of the research.  The benefit of academic
journals is their discipline about references, which make interesting reading in
themselves.  The other aspect of this academic exposure was the pleasure of meeting so
many academic professionals, especially through the Logistics Research Network
Conferences.  It broadened the author’s awareness of the wide range of debate and
research that is taking place in the UK and Europe.  A further aspect of this academic
exposure is the benefit of collaborative writing, which enabled the author to make the
transition from business report to academic paper.  It was a special pleasure to be part of
a team, writing a book.
A third item of new knowledge has been gained through the extended
cooperation with the academic colleagues at the Institute for Retail Studies at Stirling
University.  It improved the author’s understanding of the drivers of retail development
and the interaction between retail and its logistics and supply chain.  One example
would be the link between retailer brand and the composite supply chain for chilled
products.  It broadened his knowledge of the wider European retailing scene.  As
portrayed through the thesis, the process of reviewing and revisiting real events has
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revealed new insights for the author about the change management process in channel
behaviour.  Finally it allowed the author to experience the benefits of revisiting his
practitioner experience through the channel captain perspective. It also makes him
appreciate that his operational experience took place during an important enhancement
phase of the UK’s leading grocery retailer that is now an international retailer.
9.3.5 Contribution
There are several contributions for both academia and business.  The first
contribution is the rediscovery of the concept of channel captain and its application to
contemporary debate.  The second contribution is revisiting the historical origins of the
concept of channel captain in the light of contemporary retail and supply chain
developments.  The third contribution is the construction of a Channel Captain Ideal
profile of behaviour from the literature and operational experience in Tesco.  The fourth
contribution is the examination of the transition phase as a retailer moves from logistics
strategy to strategic logistics in which logistics is a means of gaining competitive
advantage.  The fifth contribution is exposition of the development of primary
distribution in the agribusiness sector, which is a dimension of the retailer – supplier
relationship that is not usually included in the academic literature.  The sixth
contribution is placing the practitioners experience into the academic arena.
The first contribution is the rediscovery of the original use of the concept of
channel captain.  This is a contribution in the context of the application of the channel
captain concept to European supply chains.  Clearly marketing academics, especially in
America, are acquainted with the application of the concept in both manufacturing and
retailing.  The term channel captain is not in use in current academic papers, for
example, at the Logistics Research Network Conferences.  When the author discussed
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the thesis topic with academic colleagues in Europe, there was interest in what might be
the results of the research.
The contribution adds historical depth to contemporary debate. This
contribution comes from the original insights and analysis of the authors cited in this
thesis: Kelley 1953, McCarthy 1960, Mallen 1963, Moyer 1975, and Hollander 2003.
The concept of channel captain was an important component in the evolution of the
marketing thinking during the 1960’s.  The concept drew attention to the importance of
the role of leading the marketing channel in an effective and collaborative manner.  In
the 1960s, it was a message to the big American manufacturers not to neglect the
importance of planning the allocation of their distribution channels in their policies on
Place.
That was one phase in a much longer time horizon that started in 1890s.
Then it was the manufacturers who were small, while the wholesalers were the
middlemen, controlling access to the marketplace.  Subsequently, the manufacturers
dramatically increased their scale and size until they squeezed the wholesalers out of
their dominant role. Then, after the 1960s, the balance of power changed yet again. In
the consumer market, the mass retailers grew in scale and power until they were in
position at the head of the marketing channel. The retailers had become the channel
captains.  One example of their channel leadership was their use of specification buying.
The literature from that period in America reflects different camps.  Some were totally
on the side of the manufacturer as channel captain, others on the side of the retailer.
These historical events and analysis provide historical depth to the contemporary debate
about the use of power by the retailers in 2000s Europe.
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The second contribution is providing contemporary breadth to those
historical origins; Dawson 1990, Hines 2004, Gattorna 1998, Spekeman 2002,
Christopher 2003, Lonsdale 2002. Koehurst 1999, Fernie 1992 & 2004.  It is the re-
application of the channel captain concept to the modern European retailer.  It is a huge
shift in time, culture, consumer habits, marketing, technology, supply chain, logistics
practice, global sourcing and retailer environment.  One aspect of the channel is quite
distinctive compared to the historical American setting.  It is not the manufacturers who
are the channel leaders in the supply chain, but the retailers.  On first examination there
is more to contrast than compare.  But the core idea of a team captain is readily
understood in everyday language.  The message from the past is: manage the marketing
channel properly with the channel members.  The message for the present is: lead the
strategy and get involved with the supply chain partners productively.  Both focus on
the vision that it is channels that compete with channels.  Both encourage companies
within the same channel to avoid self-interested conflict as it impacts on channel
efficiency.  There is external evidence of a number of large European retailers
controlling their physical distribution and supply chain management.  Each is a channel
captain.  There are some retailers who are leading the industry in supply chain practice
and other retailers who are followers, implementing proven practices, sometimes using
competent logistics service providers.  In Europe there is Efficient Consumer Response,
which embodies some of the spirit of the channel captain concept; but clearly does not
wish to use that phraseology.
The third contribution is the profile of a Channel Captain Ideal through the
in-depth examination of the role and behaviour through the selected cases.  These
covered the transition period from the supplier led logistics to the retailer led logistics in
Tesco.  This relates to Tesco as a channel leader at two levels.  The first level is as the
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channel captain for the Tesco supply chain itself.  The second level is more broadly, that
Tesco is the leading grocery retailer in the UK and from that position makes a
leadership contribution to the industry as a whole in supply chain management
practices.  It is a leader and other smaller retailers, and retailers from other countries
around the world, follow the same policy by adopting similar practices in their own
supply chains.  The selected cases are presented to illustrate a variety of supply chain
circumstances.  Each event is real and takes a supply chain situation that needs some
improvement and enhancement.  It presents the real life interaction that took place to
implement retail supply chain change.  They reflect some of the better practices about
the behaviour and style in which such change can be conducted.
The author’s experience in presenting to business colleagues is that there is
an interest in real events.  In that way they can understand the context, think how it
might apply in their own business context.  They like to hear both what was done and
how it was done.  These cases re-enforce the benefits of being a company that is
integrated internally and part of an effective and coordinated supply chain.  They
demonstrate the importance of being involved in supply chain change by taking
ownership of the issues it raises.  The retailer benefits from this collaborative
involvement because the retailer can implement changes within their own organisation
that enhance the effectiveness of the supply chain as a whole.  This is a contribution to
the practitioner community.  It is a contribution to the academic community, who will
approach the cases from their own theoretical or specialist background.
The fourth contribution is an illustration of the transition phase between
logistics strategy and strategic logistics (Bourlakis & Bourlakis 2001).  One example
was the exploration of the link between the implementation of the composite
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distribution strategy and the growth of the retailer brand across the fresh, chilled
product groups.  This demonstrates that the retail supply chain change has benefits
additional to efficiency and cost elimination.  As explained, the temperature controlled
supply channel was in a different phase from the ambient centralisation process.  The
latter was well established and Tesco acted more as an early adopter rather than an
industry leader, when it changed the pace at which it increased its ambient centralisation
percentage.  The chilled and frozen supply channels were more supplier-driven prior to
the composite strategy implementation.  The author was in charge of the pre-composite
contract distribution networks for chilled and frozen foods.  Produce distribution
remained in house.  He knows from direct experience their strengths and limitations.
The step change impact of composite distribution was industry leadership by Tesco.  It
was a very decisive move away from the supplier logistics networks.  The quality of
logistics service, daily deliveries, sales based ordering systems, with strict temperature
control from produce to retail customer, all provided the retail brand offer with strong
support.  The freshness of the chill product, especially produce was enhanced as a result
of these strict disciplines.  The rate of growth of the produce and chill sector was strong
and enabled the large retailer to enhance the retail brand.
A fifth contribution is the supply chain analysis of the role of primary
distribution and the agribusiness sector.  The major grocery UK retailers have
implemented category management as part of Efficient Consumer Response.  The
consequent product and supplier rationalisation was widespread, especially in those
categories dominated by private label, namely fresh produce, meat and diary products.
The benefits are lower transaction costs and a reduction in the risks associated with
quality and food safety by dealing with fewer, larger and more sophisticated suppliers.
However, the market concentration acquired by these retailers increases because they
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control access to consumers, which strengthens their buyer power.  The Office of Fair
Trading (OFT 2004) reviewed the implementation of the legally binding Code of
Practice, introduced in 2002, by the top four retailers.  This Code of Practice was
intended to exemplify best practice in commercial relationship, underpinned by three
key principles for all parties involved.  First, the need to response quickly to customers
and deliver value.  Second, the supply chain participants benefit by working together to
expand the market for their products and develop of profitable and sustainable business.
Third, all trading partners should be treated fairly and reasonably.
This review was conducted through a survey, which produced empirical
evidence from suppliers on the nature of their relationships with supermarkets (Fearne
et al 2005).  This investigation is limited to the buyer –seller relationship.  The same
limitation applies to other research.  An example is the work investigating the nature
and management of power in a vertical supply chain context, which selected the UK
fresh food channels because the business relationships are imbalanced (Hingley 2005).
The retailers are powerful buyers and suppliers are largely dependent.  Fresh foods are
typically unbranded in the UK and sector origin and growth has been reliant on the
growth and channel dominance of supermarket chains.  These concerns of the
agribusiness sector and the related research do not include investigation into the
structure and evolution of primary distribution between suppliers and retailer regional
distribution centres.  There is a gap in the agribusiness research literature.  This thesis
makes a contribution to this debate.  It analyses the evolution of retail control of
primary distribution particularly in the fresh food sectors, which was an area of the
author’s direct operational experience.
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The sixth contribution is the placing of one practitioner’s experience into the
academic arena.  The case studies in Chapter Seven constitute an extended review or
longitudinal study of Tesco and the internal dynamics of its evolution towards its role as
channel captain in the supply chain at the operational, tactical and strategic levels.  This
thesis is intended to provide value to future researchers as evidence of real events that
illustrate the role and behaviour of the UK’s leading grocery retailer as channel captain
in retail supply chain change. The contribution is made with the recognition that many
colleagues in the retail and logistics industry have valuable contributions from their own
events to share on this theme of retail supply chain change.
9.4 Limitations and Future Research
This section covers the limitations on the research and ideas for future work
that could be worthwhile investigating.  There were several types of limitations around
this PhD thesis.  They can be covered by the topics: methodology, practitioner, and PhD
circumstances.  There are various areas for further work and research.  These are
grouped under the headings of Depth, Breadth, and Global.  Depth relates to retailer
specific topics.  Breadth examines opportunities for learning across the broader retail
industry.  Global considers the value for retailers who are expanding internationally; for
retailers who are still developing in their own countries, and for suppliers who are
seeking to supply the major retailers in Europe.
9.4.1 Limitations
The first item of limitations is methodology.  The main consideration for the
methodology is its practicality.  The methodology options, described in chapter three,
were limited by some considerations.  The first was the degree of access that retailers
and suppliers would allow the author.  It was anticipated that his Tesco retail
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background would limit the independence and detachment that could be attained.  While
this might have been less of an issue for a more generalised research approach, it would
have been a significant factor for any in-depth investigation.  The second factor is a
consequence of this restriction on access to retailers and suppliers.  It could have
introduced a strong bias in the responses to any questionnaire or semi-structured
interviews.  Different interviewees might respond with contrasting value judgements,
influenced more by the Tesco retail background of the author than by the nature of the
topic under investigation.  The decision was made to avoid these risks, as it was
anticipated that they could outweigh any apparent benefit from the result.  Involvement
at that time might also place a constraint on future research that the author might be
required to conduct.  This decision ruled out some very interesting research
opportunities.  High on the list would have been an investigation into the Factory Gate
Pricing policy that both Tesco and Sainsbury’s were implementing just after 2000 and
its impact on relationships between the retailers, their suppliers and the logistics service
providers.  This is a topic that is listed below for Future Work.
The consequence of this decision was the option to reflect more deeply
about real events from the author’s operational retail logistics experience that would be
pertinent to achieving the aim of the thesis.  Part of the aim is to examine the behaviour
of the retailer as channel captain in retail supply chain change.  The intention would be
to identify a sample of instances that exemplified a good style of channel captain
behaviour across a range of different supply chain circumstances.  The events are real
and were selected by the author from his direct knowledge or experience.  They are not
the type of events it would be easy to validate independently after the length of time that
has elapsed since they occurred.  This is a limitation on their future application.
Equally, the author could have chosen to include in the selection a range of real events
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that showed negative types of interaction.  These would then be examples of a channel
captain behaving ineptly in order to demonstrate the consequent disruption to channel
effectiveness.  The decision not to include some negative events might be considered a
limitation on the methodology choice made for this research.  But, the events selected
mostly begin from a channel situation that is disrupted in some way. The cases then
move through the detail of the action taken, which was effective in achieving a more
integrated supply chain.  They demonstrate the process of making that change.  The
research does provide real life cases, which are then available for future researchers to
review. They are intended to be a valuable contribution to the knowledge base for
academics and practitioners.  In the author’s experience, operators are interested in
hearing the inside story of real events because they are easier to understand and apply to
similar situations they might encounter in their own business environment.  They like to
know how things are done as well as what is done.
The second limitation is related to being a practitioner.  The author’s
practitioner background required some hard work to get him accustomed to write in the
academic style.  The solution was to partake in collaborative writing with colleagues at
the Institute for Retail Studies at Stirling University and the Packaging Logistics
Department at Lund University, Sweden.  This resulted in the publication of articles for
journals, conferences, chapters in books and even a co-authored book.  This process of
joint authorship helped the author evolve from the writing style of a business report to
that of academic research.  There is another limitation from the author’s practitioner’s
background in logistics operations.  This relates to the topic chosen for the thesis.  It
requires a more reflective appraisal of that operational experience.  This is not a
technical document, either from a logistics operations point of view or from a
theoretical framework, such as behavioural psychology.  It has a limited focus
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conveying an internal portrayal of the events in the cases.  It does however place those
internal observations into a more public domain, for others to assess.
The third category of limitation relates to the circumstances around this
PhD.  This doctorate is being done on a part time distance-learning basis.  It started in
1997 and is being submitted in 2006, which is nine years.  There are repercussions from
these circumstances.  The author runs a private business as a management consultant in
retail logistics. As might be expected, there are obligations in running a private business
that can disrupt a plan for academic research.  Sometimes, the author would make a
commitment and allocate time to conduct aspects of the PhD.  But, from time to time,
these good intentions would be swept aside by the pressures and demands of business
from clients to meet their deadlines.  This reflects the feast and famine fluctuations that
can occur in a private management consultancy.  The consequence has been this
prolonged length of elapsed time between starting and completing this part time PhD.
That has given rise to issues about the coverage for the literature search and also the
timeframe for the Tesco retail logistics review.  A decision had to be made about the
cut-off time for these activities.  For the literature review the focus is on the period 1997
to 2004.  For the Tesco operational review the time span is from 1984 to 1998, which is
the period of the direct experience by the author; supplemented by further investigations
up to 2004.  One limitation is that it reduces the immediacy of the research.
However, the author takes the view that his direct involvement with Tesco
between 1984 and 1998 covered a period of evolution in the supply chain that is
particularly pertinent to the aim of this thesis.  He experienced for himself the transition
from a supplier driven supply chain to a retailer led supply chain.  His experience was at
a senior level within the company, implementing supply chain logistics change.  He was
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closely associated, during that time, with colleagues who were planning the detail of the
supply chain and logistics policy, in particular composite distribution.  His reflection on
that experience is from a practical involvement of the situation before as well as after
the step-change of composite.  He also knew personally the senior directors, who had
been at the top level of Tesco during the 1977 Operation Checkout success, with its
supplier delivery issues.  That experience retains its interest for both the academic and
the practitioner.  In some ways, allowing additional time to elapse permits a more
mature reflection.  The passing of time can reveal aspects that have a lasting benefit,
and make it easier to identify effects that are transient.  The timescale for the transition
from supplier domination to retailer domination over the supply channel has been long
and gradual.  It has accelerated in recent times in Europe, where there is now greater
clarity that it is the retailer who is now the channel captain.
9.4.2 Future Research
The areas for further research are grouped under the headings of Greater
Depth, Regional Breadth, and Global, International and Emergent Retailers.  Greater
Depth relates to the retailer Tesco on specific topics.  Regional Breadth examines
opportunities for learning across the broader retail industry by region, eg UK and EU.
Global, International and Emergent Retailers considers the value for retailers who are
expanding internationally; for retailers who are still developing in their own countries,
and for suppliers who are seeking to supply the major retailers in Europe.
9.4.2.1 Greater Depth: Tesco
There are aspects of Tesco the retailer acting as channel captain that could
be researched to a greater depth.  The topics would be a) primary distribution and
transport; b) the viewpoint of suppliers; c) the perspective of contract distribution or
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logistics service providers, and d) the role of Tesco within the industry influencing
associations such as the Institute of Grocery Distribution with its program of Efficient
Consumer Response and supply chain research.
Primary Distribution, as it evolves into its mature stage, is an excellent topic
for further research with Tesco.  At the time of researching for this thesis, the author
had information about primary distribution but made a judgement that it was too soon in
the process to conduct an academic assessment.  Now might be a suitable time to
conduct further academic investigation.  The recent implementation of primary
distribution has created a condition in the industry that is a full reversal of the status of
the supply channel as it had been in the 1960’s. Back then it was the manufacturers who
owned the warehousing and transport operations, which were subsequently separated
out as independent transport and warehousing services on behalf of the manufacturers.
It is that strategic decision by the manufacturers to focus on what they considered their
core business and contract out the warehousing and transport which makes an
interesting start part to this further research.  Yet now, some fifty years later, it is those
manufacturers and suppliers, who are reacting in a negative way to the retailers because
the retailers have extended their control further up the supply channel through the
Factory Gate Pricing strategy in primary distribution.
This topic was not one restricted to Tesco alone.  There were several UK
retailers progressing the same strategy with their suppliers and inbound transport.  It
quickly became an industry wide change and the IGD (2003) collated information from
retailers and suppliers.  This is an excellent account of the events and the reactions to
this change.  Hence as well as being a topic suitable for Greater Depth with Tesco, it is
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also an industry research topic for the next section, Regional Breadth, especially for the
UK.  However, the topic will be discussed solely in this section to avoid duplication.
Tesco Primary Distribution has implemented a Factory Gate Pricing policy
beginning with its frozen suppliers between 2001 and 2003.  Tesco Primary Distribution
now organise and pay directly for the physical flow of goods from the supplier to the
retailer distribution centre, through retailer appointed transport and warehouse logistics
service providers.  Further research could investigate three topics; the first could
examine the internal changes in Tesco; the second could elicit and consider the views of
the unsuccessful transport and logistics service providers and the suppliers they had
been serving, and the third could study the views of those transport and logistics service
providers, who were successful in gaining the primary distribution contracts from
Tesco.
The first topic of the further research would be to examine the internal
organisational changes that Tesco as a company had to make to create the primary
distribution function by aligning the retailer’s centralised buying with its distribution
and supply chain functions. This part of the research relates to the internal dynamics of
the evolution of primary distribution and the conditions that are required to be
successful in implementing this change in the supply chain.  The second topic of the
further research would be a more detailed understanding of the views of the
manufacturers and the logistics service providers about the Factory Gate Pricing policy.
For those who were not successful, it has removed from their operations, the large-scale
volumes that had been going to the multiple retailers’ distribution centres.  Their claim
is that the result has been a loss of critical mass from their business, which has created
inefficiency in the rump of remaining work to the smaller retail and other operations.
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Their experience is that the retailer exercised its power in a dictatorial manner.  The
Tesco position is that this is not the case as the principle of the primary distribution
rationalisation is to identify those operators with a structural synergy, which would
produce transport efficiency improvement for the volume taken as a whole.  This aspect
of greater efficiency could be more clearly investigated with those operators who were
successful in winning these transport contracts from Tesco.
As an overarching research topic, these tensions raise wider issues about the
relationships between the three parties, retailers, suppliers, and logistics service
providers and how they are conducted.  To reinforce the need for this further research, a
gap in the literature has been identified, as demonstrated in the agribusiness (see 9.3.5)
where the research questions are about the exercise of power between retailers and
suppliers in their activity of buying as a dyadic relationship.  It does not investigate their
activity in the supply chain, transport or logistics, a subject where further research into
the changes brought about by the presence of retail primary distribution would provide
new insight into the debate about retailer – supplier relationships. Primary Distribution
includes the transport operator or logistics service provider as an important participant
in the relationship.  The activity is not solely a dyadic relationship because it involves
three parties. Further research could examine the implications of the shift in power
balance in the supply chain for each of three participants, who are critical to its success,
retailer, supplier and logistics service provider.
The final research topic on this list for Greater Depth is the examination of
the role of Tesco as a leading retailer in the work of the Institute of Grocery Distribution
(IGD) through its programme of Efficient Consumer Response and its annual supply
chain research programme.  The IGD brings together the main parties in the Grocery
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Industry, the retailers and the suppliers, although it does not directly involve transport
operators or logistic service providers.  In this context Tesco is called upon to champion
various projects and industry initiatives in a collaborative style with suppliers and other
retailers.  The term Channel Captain is not one that is used in these projects, but the
desired attributes of the retailer’s conduct are a close match to those identified in this
thesis.  The research question would be to examine these desired attributes in this
industry setting and so bring them into the academic literature and extend learning from
this tradition.  The IGD has an established reputation for bringing all parties in the
grocery supply chain together in an environment, which is conducive to positive and
open exchange of ideas and issues with the overriding objective of better serving the
consumer and growing the grocery retail business in the country
9.4.2.2 Regional Breadth: Other Retailers
A broader view is the issue of transferring to other retailers the lessons from
the Tesco story.  The broader area of further research would investigate the changing
awareness in other retailers about the possibility of their role as channel captain.  In the
UK and other countries in Europe, there are retailers who are thinking about the benefits
of taking control over their supply channel on either an “emergent” or “deliberate”
logistics strategy (Bourlakis & Bourlakis 2001).  There now exists an example from
Tesco that they can evaluate and make their own business decisions to progress to a
position of channel leadership in the supply chain.  There is also the availability of
logistics service providers, who have had good quality experience gained from their
involvement with the retail leaders and early adopters of centralised retail distribution.
These other retailers may be motivated by the need to organise and control their own
destiny or by their assessment that the supply chain is part of gaining competitive
advantage.  In the modern retailing environment do these retailers now regard retail
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controlled supply chain strategy as an essential part of being a retailer?  How can the
learning from Tesco be extended to the range of other retailers in the regions of Europe?
The different regions of Europe can be defined specifically for the purposes
of this future research into seven areas.  The first region is the United Kingdom, with its
four leading grocery retailers, Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury, Morrison, and the other smaller
retailers.  The second region is the core of mainland Europe, where multiple retailing
has been well established, France, Germany Holland, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland.
The third region covers the Nordic countries, including Denmark.  These countries have
strong cooperative retailers, who have high market share as well as private retailers.
There has been some recent restructuring of the grocery retail market. Most of these
retailers have adopted centralised distribution in more recent times applying the model
from the UK and the core mainland European countries. The fourth region is the area
that can loosely be designated as Southern European, where multiple retailing is not as
strongly established as in the previous regions.  The countries in this fourth region are
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece.  All of these countries now have multiple grocery
retailers, who are either national or extensions of retailers from other countries.  In this
southern region, the development of centralised distribution is more recent. The changes
in the retail and distribution structure have been compressed in time and the small
retailer methods are still present or within recent experience.  The fifth region contains
those countries in Eastern Europe, which have recently joined the European Union.
This region includes, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia.  These countries
have seen a dramatic change in retailing over the past ten to fifteen years.  They have
been the markets that the established European retailers have targeted for expansion,
bringing with them their own ways of organising the supply chain, distribution and
logistics.  These countries have experienced a sea change in retailing and its supporting
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infrastructure.  The sixth region contains those countries in North East Europe, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia.  These countries are in more recent transition into the European
Union, and together with Russia, are about to experience changes in the retail market
structure and supporting functions.  The seventh region consists of those countries in
South Eastern Europe or the Balkans, which are in the process of joining the European
Union.  These countries are Slovenia, Serbia, Herzegovina, Macedonia, Turkey, and
Cyprus.  Each of these seven regions can be studied in isolation or in comparison to
each other.
There are three possible approaches to this regional retail supply chain
research.  One method of conducting this further research is a benchmark evaluation to
identify the different retailers and map their position towards establishing their role as
channel captain in supply chain change.  This would produce a benchmark map
classifying retailers and countries according to their retail supply chain status.  This
benchmark map could be reset for different periods of time, e.g.; the present, ten years
ago, five years in the future.  A second method of conducting this further research is to
study the expansion methods of the large grocery retailers into countries outside their
home market.  There are several research questions that could be asked.  How do these
retailers apply their supply chain strategy to support their retail expansion into other
countries?  Does their supply chain strategy differ from that applied in their home
market?  How does the power relationship between retailer and manufacturer or
supplier change outside the home market?  Do such retailers show greater supply chain
leadership outside their home market than they do within their home market?  A third
method of conducting this further research is to examine the role of the logistics service
provider or contract distribution operator in supporting retailers to gain supply chain
leadership in the different regions.  There are a variety of research questions that could
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be pursued.  How have those logistic service providers applied the earlier experience
they have gained from working for the leading retailers in the mature multiple retail
markets?  Do retailers bring their established logistics service providers with them into
new markets?  Do retailers contract out or conduct their supply chain, distribution and
logistics in house when expanding into new regions?
This broader research into the retail supply chains in the different regions of
Europe would fill a gap in the academic and business literature.  The Institute of
Grocery Distribution has recently expanded the scope of its research on retailers outside
the UK.  This may develop into a fuller exploration of the supply chain development
and the role of the retailer in leading supply chain change.  The IGD would be a suitable
institute to link up with in conducting this type of broader research into retailers by
region.
9.4.2.3 Global, International and Emergent Retailers
Further research into Global, International and Emergent Retailers has four
components.  The first component consists of those retailers who are judged to be
Global Retailers.  The second component is composed of those retailers who are judged
to be International Retailers but not yet sufficiently established as global retailers.  The
third component is that group of Emergent Retailers, who are regional or national
retailers in countries outside the European Union or North America.  The use of the
term emergent is to classify the development status of those multiple retailers and is not
used to imply that the countries in which they are operating are necessarily emergent as
economies.  The fourth component is the category of suppliers in various countries that
struggle to gain access to the European major retailers for their products. The
experience gained with those retailers who are now in a mature phase of supply channel
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control could provide other retailers with benchmarks and milestones on the route to
establishing a centralised distribution strategy.
The first group are those retailers that are judged to be Global Retailers.
These are Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Tesco (IGD 2006b) (Table 9.1).  These global
retailers are identified and assessed using a number of measures, which are more than
just size alone.  It is about international presence, retailing vision and global strategy
and culture.  The IGD has constructed a Global Retail Index (GRI), which uses a range
of hard and soft factors to assess the extent to which retailers have become ‘globalised’,
providing a benchmark for retailers and suppliers worldwide.  By net turnover Wal-
Mart is by far the largest global retailer, with world with sales of $285,222 million in
their fiscal year 2005.  However Carrefour holds the number one position as a global
retailer on the IGD Global Retail Index ahead of Wal-Mart, with Tesco third.  These
three retailers are in a category of their own as leading global retailers.  Further research
into these retailers would reveal more information about their supply chain leadership
and how they have been successful globally.  That would form a base from which
concepts and constructs could be defined and used to analyse other retailers as they each
have a strategy, which they apply to their supply chain to support their global
expansion.
The second group are those retailers that are judged to be International
Retailers (IGD 2006b) (Table 9.1).  These are in two categories; those who are almost
global and those with the potential to be global.  Their retail strategies are analysed by
commentators, such as IGD.  However, further research into the changes they are
making to their supply chain strategies would highlight their analysis of the successful
strategies being applied by the three global retailers.  This research would apply the
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concepts and constructs from the three global grocery retailers as a benchmark to both
categories of international retailers and examine the degree of leadership skills that they
demonstrate.  The last ten retailers in the top thirty retailers are leading domestic and
emerging international retailers who still have a significant gap to fill to become global.
‘Grocery Retailers’ are defined by IGD as those retailers where ‘food and drink’
accounts for a significant proportion of sales (over 25%) and where grocery is key to the
business strategy.  These leading thirty international grocery retailers generated $1,403
billion in 2004/2005, of which Wal-Mart contributed some 20%; the next nine
contributed 38% and the next twenty 42%.  This set of thirty retailers is therefore a
suitable group for further research.
The third group are the Emergent Retailers, who are regional or national
retailers, outside the European Union or North America, that are still in a development
process towards mature status as a retailer leading their supply chain.  This
classification is stimulated by the author’s study visits between 2000 and 2004 to
Greece, Mexico, South Africa and Jordan, which revealed the different stages of some
of the retailers and suppliers operating in such countries.  One conclusion from these
visits is that retailers vary in their awareness of the role of the supply chain in their retail
strategy.  A second conclusion is that evaluating these retailers from a mature
benchmark can indicate their probable development, even though they themselves may
not be aware of that potential.  This research would need to part of some broader retail
analysis for one of the international regions, such as the work of the IGD, who currently
monitor over a hundred retailers in forty five countries, a research programme that they
are expanding and deepening to include the supply chain.
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1 2 Carrefour France 87
2 1 Wal-Mart Stores US 85




4 3 Metro Group Germany 71
5 4 Ahold Netherlands 67
6 14 Auchan France 56
7 19 Seven & I Japan 54
8 9 Aldi Germany 53
9 20 Groupe Casino France 53
10 7 Costco US 52





12 8 Rewe Group Germany 49
13 10 Lidl & Schwarz Germany 45
14 22 Tenglemann (inc A&P) Germany 44
15 17 Spar International Netherlands 43
16 16 Aeon Japan 42
17 12 ITM Entreprises Intermarche Spar France 34
18 18 Leclerc France 30
19 13 Edeka Gruppe (inc AVA) Germany 27







21 6 Kroger US 23
22 39 Coop Norden Scandanavia 23
23 34 Marks & Spencer UK 22
24 36 Cora Louis Delhaize France 21
25 31 Migros Switzerland 19
26 35 Coop Italia Italy 19
27 27 Loblaw Companies Canada 17
28 24 Woolworths Australia 17
29 37 Lawson Japan 16








Source: IGD Global Grocery Retailers 2006
Table 9.1  Global and International Grocery Retailers
The fourth group are those emergent suppliers, who do not know how to
gain access to the markets of the major European retailers. The author’s study visits in
2003 and 2004 to Mexico, South Africa and Jordan revealed some of the difficulties
facing producers, for example, of fresh fruit and vegetables.  The smaller suppliers in
particular face hurdles in their aspiration to supply the multiple retailer chains.  At
present, their options may be so limited that it is difficult for them to reach markets
beyond their home economy.  The changing organisation within retail supply channels
requires a different approach from suppliers.  They have to change their understanding
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and approach from product production to retail niche marketing if they are to find a
space on the supermarket shelves for their products.  This is a difficult area.  But the
attraction of gaining entry to the European supermarkets is very strong.  A better
knowledge of these supply chain processes would benefit those suppliers, who currently
struggle to access the major retailers.  Further research, even with a view to applying the
models of the mature retail supply chains, would best be part of a programme conducted
by a recognised Food Channel Institute, as the marketing strategy is critical to the
success of such suppliers.
This section on Further Research has identified a series of options for
Greater Depth, Regional Breadth and Global or International spheres of investigation.
Such research, if it were done in conjunction with broader retailing analysis, would
make a valued contribution to an understanding and an application of good retail supply
chain change and leadership.
9.5 Summary
This draws this thesis to a close.  The final chapter has summarised the aim
and results of the thesis.  It has demonstrated that there is both academic and
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